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Abstract 
 
This study aims to investigate the determinants of efficiency, profitability 
and stability in the banking sector across the world over the period 2005-2012. In 
this study, efficiency is measured using data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is 
divided into technical efficiency (TE), pure technical efficiency (PTE), and scale 
efficiency (SE). The profitability is represented by return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), and net interest margin (NIM). Furthermore, the z-score and 
capital ratios are the main indicators for stability. The data includes 323 banks (43 
Islamic, 242 conventional, and 38 socially responsible banks [SRBs]) from around 
the world, covering 37 countries. The statistical methods to find the determinants 
are ordinary least square (OLS) and fixed effects model (FEM). The data for this 
study was extracted from the Bankscope and World Bank databases.  
According to efficiency, the DEA measures demonstrate that socially 
responsible banks (SRBs) are the most efficient banks. This is due to the fact that 
SRBs management employ minimum inputs; one of the main characteristics of 
SRBs is the saving of resources (inputs). In contrast, the least efficient scores are 
achieved by conventional banks. As conventional banks have higher interest 
expenses to pay. In terms of Islamic banks, the larger banks were found to be 
more efficient. Furthermore, lending services are important to maximise outputs 
effectively. Additionally, efficiency in Islamic banks is influenced significantly by 
earnings. Islamic banks with higher capitalisation were found to be more efficient, 
and new Islamic banks operate better than older banks. Regarding the 
macroeconomic factors, countries with better market capitalisations include more 
efficient Islamic banks. Based on the conventional banks‟ findings, banks with a 
higher size performed better than the smaller sized banks. The loans profits 
increased the efficiency significantly. Focusing on age, the more recent banks 
achieve better efficiency scores. The three types of ownership (foreign, domestic, 
and public) reflect inverse correlations with DEA. With regards to the external 
variables, the wealth of the country is highly important in terms of efficiency. In 
addition, stock market growth supports the efficiency positively and significantly, 
while inflation and the global financial crisis (GFC) influenced the efficiency 
negatively and significantly. Concentrating on SRBs, banks with more capitals 
operated more efficiently than lower capitalised banks. Additionally, GDP, inflation 
and market capitalisation enhanced efficiency significantly. Overall, the 
relationship between the control of corruption and efficiency is positive and 
significant in Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks. Tighter controls 
on corruption have led to better efficiency. 
Regarding the profitability, the highest ROA and ROE were attained by 
conventional banks. This is because the main aim for conventional banks is to 
achieve returns, and charging interest maximises their earnings. On the other 
hand, SRBs scored the lowest ROA and ROE as those banks are primarily 
concerned with providing social and environmental services over profits. According 
to NIM, Islamic banks do not have interest expenses, which can allow them to 
score the highest NIM measures in this study; while conventional banks have the 
minimum NIM ratios due to higher interest expenses. Based on the Islamic banks‟ 
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results, Islamic banking was affected positively by total assets of banks. In 
addition, the stable Islamic banks achieved greater profits based on the strong 
associations between z-score and earnings. This contradicts the relationship 
between profitability ratios and capital ratios, which indicate negative and 
significant correlations. Depending on country-specific factor, Islamic banks in 
higher productivity countries could not exploit the growth to gain higher profits. 
This results in a weakness for Islamic banks in terms of being resistant to higher 
inflation rates. For the conventional banks, size of bank and capital are highly 
important for profits. The conventional banks can concentrate on providing more 
loans to maximise their returns. The stability of conventional banks also has 
positive and significant associations with profitability ratios. Concerning the SRBs, 
profitability ratios are affected significantly and positively by stability (z-score) and 
market capitalisation growth. On the other hand, foreign, domestic and public 
ownerships negatively impacted the profits. According to industry-specific 
variables, GDP growth reduces profits significantly.   
For the stability, SRBs are demonstrably the most stable and resilient 
system against financial crisis. Accepting more deposits and attaining greater 
profits significantly increase the stability of all banks and lower the risk of 
insolvency. Overall, listed banks were found to be more efficient, profitable, and 
stable than unlisted banks. 
This study helps managers and policy makers within the banking sector to 
reduce costs and increase profits with lower risks. In addition, finding the positive 
determinants allows managers to make more decisions based on positive factors. 
On the contrary, through raising efficiency, profitability and stability in banking, 
managers can aim to avoid negative variables altogether. 
Finally, this study contributes to the literature in terms of adding socially 
responsible banks into the equation. In addition, comparing efficiency, profitability 
and stability simultaneously is a new method that can allow bankers to build 
effective strategic decisions based on the determinants.  
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction and Structure 
1.1 Introduction     
This study investigates three major topics within the banking system: efficiency in 
banking, profitability in banking, and stability in banking.  
1.1.1 Efficiency in banking 
The importance of research into efficiency within the banking sector has increased in 
recent years, as all banks strive for efficiency by minimising inputs, such as expenses, 
and maximising their output, i.e. profits. The importance has also risen since there has 
been a considerable increase in bank mergers. Some studies suggest that mergers and 
deregulation lead to raised efficiency in the banking sector (Avkiran, 1999). Large banks 
take over smaller banks for a number of reasons, such as to reduce competition and 
risk, and to raise capital (Fixler & Zieschang, 1993). However, studying efficiency in 
banking can be helpful for shareholders, policy makers, managers, market analysts, 
investors, clients and government regulators (Andries & Căpraru, 2014). According to 
Aikaeli (2006), when monetary policies are effective, then banks are more likely to be 
efficient. Efficient banks can use minimum inputs to generate maximum outputs, which 
could increase the sustainability of banks; Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that the 
success or failure of all firms relates to transforming their inputs into outputs. The main 
aim of banks is to achieve economies of scope and scale through deposits, loans and 
banking services. 
In terms of a banking definition, the bank has been defined as an intermediation 
organisation that accepts money from depositors and provides it to borrowers. Another 
concept is that banks act as a production organisation, generating both deposits and 
loans by using labour and capital (Abdul-Majid et al., 2011). Recently, banking services 
have expanded, and a larger number of operations represent competitive advantage for 
banks such as providing insurance options and financial consultations (HSBC UK, 
2015). In this study, deposits are used as inputs and loans as outputs to calculate 
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efficiency measures (the intermediation approach). As a result, banks are applying 
system theory as a way to employ the available resources for the provision of services.  
The importance of this research is represented as two sides. The first side represents 
the clients of banks, and the second side represents the bank itself. In terms of clients, 
customers prefer dealing with efficient banks as they provide better quality services. To 
this end, the banks have to declare their efficiency measures to make the customers 
aware of quality levels, and to make the banks more competitive. The banks can thus 
improve their performance by declaring their balance sheets, income statements, and 
cash flow statements, which can be found on their websites or via the Bankscope 
database when the banks announce their efficiency results. Research into banks is 
important to increase banking performance, and thus attract more clients; additionally, 
efficiency measures lead to knowledge about any disadvantages of the operation within 
the bank. Furthermore, increased knowledge of the efficiency measures helps bank 
managers and policy makers to reduce costs and increase profits. As a result of finding 
points of weakness that can lead to inefficiency, banks can build strategies to enhance 
efficiency. Banks have recently faced many challenges affecting their efficiency, such as 
the global financial crisis of 2007, which had a significant impact on most financial 
institutions. Only the most highly efficient firms were able to resist the challenges due to 
strong backup (World Bank, 2014). This thesis covers banks from 37 countries around 
the world divided into three types: Islamic, conventional, and socially responsible banks 
(SRBs). This study applies data envelopment analysis (DEA) for measuring efficiency 
which consists of research by Feng and Serletis (2010) and Gardener et al. (2012). 
Indeed, a large number of studies focus on efficiency, especially in conventional 
banking, due to the availability of large amounts of data (Garza-García, 2012; Han et al., 
2012). In contrast, studies of efficiency in Islamic banking are much fewer due to lack of 
information (Rosman et al., 2014). However, recent studies have concentrated on a 
comparison between Islamic and conventional banks (Olson & Zoubi, 2011; Hadad, et 
al., 2012). Regarding SRBs, as yet there has been no study analysing their efficiency, 
which encourages this researcher to focus more on this type of bank. Subsequently, 
efficiency scores will be compared between Islamic, conventional, and SRBs. As a 
second stage of the research, the determinants of bank efficiency will be specified 
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utilising two models: ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects regressions. These 
models will be used to provide robust evidence of the impact between efficiency 
measures (treated as the dependent variables) and their determinants (independent 
variables).  
1.1.2 Profitability in banking  
Studying profitability allows policymakers to determine financial performance. According 
to a recent literature review, most researchers calculate profitability through return on 
assets (ROA) or return on equities (ROE) or both, such as Beck et al. (2013a). Some 
studies include net interest margin (NIM) such as Ghosh (2015) and Houston et al. 
(2010). However, banks‟ profits are attained through charging fees on their services and 
through interest. As a result, the most profitable banks are more efficient, competitive 
and stable (Apergis, 2014). Determinants of profitability can be internal (bank-specific 
variables) and external (macroeconomic variables). However, focusing on determinants 
of profitability simplifies understanding of the reasons behind any loss or profits which 
lets senior banking management look for alternative plans if there is any drop in returns. 
In case of a rise in profits, banks are able to create higher earnings by focusing on 
variables that increase profits. According to the literature review, there is no study which 
concentrates on profitability‟s determinants, and specifically comparing Islamic, 
conventional, and socially responsible banks. This study finds the relationship between 
the profitability indictors (ROA, ROE, and NIM, which can be dependent variables) and 
the internal and external variables (determinants of profitability which can be 
independent variables) in the banking sector.  
1.1.3 Stability in banking 
After the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007, focusing on insolvency risk analysis 
became more important as the majority of banks achieved a huge amount of loss or 
bankruptcy. The stability indicators can be z-score, as employed by Ghosh (2014), and 
capital (equity to total assets) ratio (Horvàth et al., 2014). In this study, both measures 
are used: z-score and capital ratio during the period 2005-2012. The z-score was 
developed by Boyd et al. (1993) and statistically concerns the probability of bankruptcy. 
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A higher z-score means the bank is more stable, and less likely to go bankrupt. 
Regarding the capitalisation ratio, better values indicate that the firm is well capitalised 
and stable. After measuring the stability and comparing values between Islamic, 
commercial, and socially responsible banks, finding the determinants of stability is the 
main topic. As the determinants of efficiency and profitability, stability variables can be 
internal, such as the size of the bank (log of total assets), and external, e.g. inflation. 
However, these variables can affect the stability positively or negatively. In fact, the 
relationship between stability and its determinants clarifies the future view towards 
which variable can be used more, less, or even neglected altogether in order to avoid 
insolvency risks and to raise financial stability within the banking sector. In accordance 
with macroeconomics, identifying the factors that affect banks leads to the allocation of 
better recovery plans by banking policymakers. This study identifies the stability (z-
score and capitalisation) as an explainable variable and its determinants (explanatory 
variables).  
1.2 Objectives and research questions of the study 
The main aim of this study is to measure the determinants of efficiency, profitability, and 
stability within the banking sector. Statistical models for Islamic, conventional, and 
socially responsible banks will be employed, which helps regulators, investors, bankers 
and clients. This study is divided into three main sections. 
 
First section: The first step is to measure efficiency through DEA techniques. This can 
maximise the banks‟ benefits through knowledge of the factors that reduce bank 
efficiency. In addition, calculating efficiency leads to minimising inputs and maximising 
outputs through awareness of the right amount of inputs and outputs. After estimating 
efficiency measures, a comparison of efficiency will be conducted to find the differences 
in efficiency scores between Islamic, conventional, and socially responsible banks. This 
raises the competition between banks, which in turn provides improved service quality 
and aims to maximise profits. The second step towards finding the determinants of 
efficiency is explained in Chapter Five. These measures would allow banks to recognise 
the main reasons for their negative or positive efficiency. This can help the bank to 
5 
 
apply strategies against the factors that impact efficiency in a negative way. However, 
there are extensive studies on efficiency in the literature, particularly studies on 
conventional banks. Conversely, there are very few studies on Islamic banks, mainly 
due to lack of data. Nevertheless, some researchers have tried to compare efficiency 
between Islamic and conventional banks. Although there is a comprehensive number of 
studies on efficiency in the banking sector, there is no such study including socially 
responsible banks, which led the researcher to add this type of bank to the field.  
 
Second section: Calculating profitability ratios for all banks makes it easier to identify 
which type of bank needs to improve their financial performance. After calculating the 
profitability ratios, this study empirically analyses the determinants of profitability, 
whether bank-specific (internal) variables or macroeconomic (external) variables.  
 
Third section: this part estimates the z-score and capital ratios of all banks to find the 
stability levels (higher z-score and capitalisation means more stability was achieved). 
The second step is finding the variables that increase or decrease the stability through 
statistical models.  
 
Overall, the effect of internal variables (positive or negative) allows banking regulators 
to apply strategies to raise efficiency, profitability, and stability. Further, the impact of 
macroeconomic variables allows banks to invest more by establishing more or fewer 
branches in any country. The calculation of efficiency, profitability, and stability supports 
finding the differences between Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banking 
sectors. However, this study aims to answer the three following questions: 
 
Q1: Are Islamic, conventional, and socially responsible banks efficient, profitable, and 
stable over the period? Which type of bank is the most efficient, profitable, and stable? 
Q2: What are the determinants of efficiency, profitability, and stability in Islamic, 
conventional, and socially responsible banks? Are the determinants different for these 
bank types?  
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Q3: How do internal and external factors affect efficiency, profitability, and stability? Are 
the influences positive or negative? 
1.3 The main contributions of the study 
The inclusion of socially responsible banks contributes to the existing literature, as it 
adds a new type of bank into the literature around efficiency, profitability, and stability 
within the banking sector. In addition, this study shows the importance of society‟s 
activities rather than simply profits achieved. Furthermore, the inclusion of the 
corruption control variable is severely limited in the existing literature. However, 
comparing the efficiency, profitability, and stability and their determinants for Islamic, 
conventional, and socially responsible banks can contribute highly to the field of banking. 
In terms of researcher knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of the 
global financial crisis on socially responsible banks. Consequently, the gaps identified 
are covered in this thesis. Finally, combining MENA and UK banks as one group and 
comparing it with socially responsible banks across the world is a useful contribution 
towards researcher knowledge. 
1.4 Structure plan  
This paper is organised in the following way: Chapter One is an introduction, including 
the difference between Islamic and conventional banks; objectives of the study; data of 
the study; brief of efficiency, profitability, and stability measures; profile of the countries 
under the study; central banks roles; SRBs responsibilities; SRBs characteristics; and 
the main contribution of the study. Chapter Two discusses the literature review of 
efficiency in Islamic banks, efficiency in conventional banks, and a comparison between 
Islamic and conventional banks. Chapter Three evaluates the recent studies on 
determinants of profitability, before explaining the findings in the existing literature on 
stability within the banking sector. Chapter Four reveals the methodology, which 
includes research questions, research philosophy, research method, measures of the 
study, and the data description. Chapter Five focuses on the empirical results of the 
DEA estimator and the models of efficiency‟s determinants. Chapter Six then presents 
the determinants of profitability. Chapter Seven investigates the determinants of stability. 
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Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the thesis, and suggests recommendations for future 
research. Figure 1.1 below summarises the structure plan of this thesis. 
1.5 Summary 
Chapter One has given the background of the banking sector. In addition, a brief 
explanation of efficiency, profitability, and stability within the banking sector has been 
presented. This chapter has also highlighted the difference between Islamic, 
conventional, and socially responsible banks. The objectives and research questions for 
the study have been presented. Furthermore, the main contribution of the study and 
structure plan has been provided in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Structure plan of the thesis 
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Chapter Two: Theories of Banking and Literature Review on 
Efficiency in Banking 
 
2.1 Theories of banking and hypotheses of efficiency, profitability and stability   
According to Islamic banking, there are two resources of Sharia law (Islamic 
Development Bank, 2015) which are: 
1. Primary sources: these sources are taken directly from the holy Quran and 
Sunnah.  
2. Secondary sources: these are the interpretations (Ijtihad). Islamic banks have to 
follow the rules according to the above sources.  
The operations of the Islamic banks are based on Islamic law (Sharia). Chong and Liu 
(2009) conclude that Islamic banks can be defined as being similar to conventional 
banks, but there are four principles that Islamic banks follow:  
 The prohibition of uncertainty (Gharar). 
 The prohibition of interest (Riba). 
 Money is not a commodity. 
 The prevalence of justice. 
 
In fact, conventional banks do not follow all of the above principles. In addition, the main 
purpose of conventional banking is to maximise profits.  
According to New Horizon Magazine (2014), published by the Institute of Islamic 
Banking and Insurance, Islamic banking services are divided into ten forms, as follows: 
1. Mudharabah (profit sharing): This operation happens when a bank gives whole funds 
to the investors and shares the resulting profit, and one partner (bank or customer) is 
responsible for any potential losses. There is a fixed percentage to the bank, which is 
written into the contract between the investor and the bank.  
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2. Mousharaka (joint venture): This operation happens when a bank represents a 
shareholder, and the losses and profits can be shared between the borrower and the 
bank. This depends on the amount of equity of the company‟s assets. 
3. Mourabaha (commercial funding with profit margin): This operation happens when a 
bank buys certain merchandise for a customer, then the bank achieves a fixed-margin 
profit determined within the contract, or the bank can share the losses and profits with 
the client based on the investment. The payment can be made in the future, whether 
paid in instalments or as the whole amount at once. The timing of payment and goods 
received must be predetermined.  
4. Ijar (leasing): This is a lease contract that allows banking customers to use a bank‟s 
fixed assets or services for an agreed specific price and period under Sharia law 
conditions. 
5. Wadeea‟a (safekeeping): This occurs when a customer deposits an amount of money 
in an Islamic bank for safekeeping. There is no interest on this deposit.  
6. Gardh Hassan (interest-free loans): This is a completely interest-free loan. In this 
case, Islamic banks charge a certain amount of money called a loan processing fee. 
7. Bai muajjal (credit sale): This is a contract between a bank and a customer that 
requires goods or services to be specified following Sharia law. The payment is in 
advance and the goods or services can be obtained in the future.  
8- Ijar (leasing) that ends with ownership: An example of this case would be when a 
bank and a customer both share in buying a house, but the bank pays the majority of 
the money. The customer then pays rent to the bank for using the house. In this 
situation, the customer‟s share (equity) increases and the bank‟s share decreases. This 
process happens until the customer owns the property. 
9. General loans: Islamic law prohibits that money can be borrowed and returned with 
interest. So in this case, a bank will buy house or car for a customer under the bank‟s 
ownership. The customer then pays the bank instalments until the full amount of the 
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item is repaid, and the customer then owns the property outright. In the event that the 
customer is unable to pay, the bank can invest or sell the item.  
10. Sukuk (Islamic bonds): These are financial certificates that prove that the customer 
is involved in Islamic banking operations (1-9 mentioned above) in order to save 
customers‟ rights and equity. 
In conclusion, Islamic banks operate with interest-free rates compared to other types of 
banks. However, the majority of recent studies on efficiency measurements have been 
based on conventional banks due to the wider availability of information on them 
compared to Islamic banks, which are a fairly new concept with little data available. It is 
observable that there is a higher number of commercial banks in this study‟s sample 
than Islamic banks. In fact, in any country containing both types of bank, there is always 
a higher proportion of commercial banks (Bankscope, 2012). 
With regards to SRBs, there are many different names for this type of bank: alternative, 
civic, sustainable, and socially responsible banks. The main concerns regarding socially 
responsible banks are related to social or environmental (green) issues. Kansal et al. 
(2014) specify corporate social responsibilities (CSR) as follows: 
 Sponsoring community events 
 Providing local scholarships 
 Encouraging literacy 
 Providing affordable prices for houses 
 Looking into energy saving 
 Applying a green building strategy 
 Reducing pollution  
 Supporting recycling  
 Defending human rights and dignity 
 Launching green funds. 
 
The organisation responsible for controlling banks is the central bank of any country. 
We can conclude some main tasks of central banks, which are outlined below.  
 Measuring banks‟ efficiency, through using the parametric and nonparametric 
approaches to encourage inefficient banks to be more efficient. This approach 
depends on comparing inputs of banks with outputs to see the performance of 
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firms (Mester, 2003). Mester (2003) argues that the standard techniques of efficiency 
measurements can be used on the central banks as they have inputs and outputs. In 
addition, these measurements can improve the performance of central banks; however, 
it is hard to apply efficiency techniques on certain central bank policies, such as 
monetary policy. 
 Monitoring the stability of the banking sector 
 Issuing currency 
 Strengthening the local currency 
 Appraising banks 
 Giving loans to banks 
 Determining the interest rates 
 Intermediating between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the country 
 Providing prices for foreign currencies 
 Imposing penalties and sanctions against the contravention banks   
 Implementing monetary policies 
 Managing foreign currency reserves 
 Regulating the banking systems.  
Source: Several Central Banks (e.g. Bank of England, 2015; Central Bank of Egypt, 
2015). 
 
To sum up, Table 2.1 compares between Islamic, conventional and socially responsible 
banks. 
Table 2.1: Comparison between Islamic, conventional and SRBs  
Criteria Islamic Banks Conventional Banks SRBs 
Other names 
Interest-free banks 
Sharia compliant banks 
Traditional banks 
Commercial banks 
Ethical banks 
Green banks 
The main aim Applying Islamic rules Maximising profits Social and ecology issues 
Supervisory 
Committee 
Sharia Supervisory Board  
Board of Directors 
Board of Directors Ethical Committee 
Constraints 
Trading in something 
against Sharia law such as 
gambling 
Services are illegal by 
government such as 
weapons trade 
Dealing with unethical 
services such as alcoholic 
business 
Source of guidance Quran and Sunnah  Central banks 
Religious groups who 
avoiding investing in Sin 
stocks 
Services 
Mudharabah 
Mousharaka 
Mourabaha 
Ijar 
Wadeea 
Gardh Hassan 
Sukuk 
Takaful 
Profit sharing 
Joint venture 
Commercial funding 
Leasing 
Deposit 
Loan 
Bonds 
Insurance 
Profit sharing 
Joint venture 
Green fund 
Leasing 
Deposit 
Loan 
Bonds 
Insurance 
Sources: Adopted from Johnes (2014), Kansal (2014), Abdelsalam et al. (2013) and Forte and Miglietta 
(2007). 
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There are many differences with regards to concepts between Islamic, conventional, 
and socially responsible banks. The Islamic banking system‟s prohibition of interest 
(Riba) and constraints in dealing with non-ethical activities (for instance, gambling), 
means these factors are expected to reduce profitability compared to conventional 
banking. On the other hand, Islamic banks prefer to use their equity finance rather than 
debt finance (borrowings). This allows Islamic banks to be well capitalised (Usmani, 
2002). With regards to conventional banks, the main aim of the conventional banking 
system is to maximise earnings compared to Islamic banks (providing ethical services 
based on Sharia Law, according to Iqbal [1997]) and socially responsible banks (social 
and environmental issues). As a result, conventional banks are likely to be the most 
profitable banks. Focusing on SRBs, one of the main goals for SRBs is to save 
resources (Kansal et al., 2014). Based on this concept, SRBs are able to be the most 
efficient banks through using minimum inputs (resources). Therefore, effective 
employment of inputs results in maximised outputs, which allows for more financial 
stability. Figure 2.1 shows the framework of how Islamic, conventional, and socially 
responsible banks operate. 
 
In conclusion, we can conduct hypotheses of efficiency, profitability and stability as 
follows: 
H1: Socially responsible banks are more efficient than Islamic and conventional banks. 
H2: Conventional banks are more profitable than Islamic and socially responsible banks. 
H3: Socially responsible banks are more stable than Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
2.2 Efficiency in banking 
This section is divided into two parts: a literature review on efficiency, and the 
determinants of efficiency in the banking sector. 
2.2.1 Literature review on efficiency in banking 
One of the most important studies on efficiency was conducted by Farrell (1957) on the 
American agricultural sector. The data from this study was classified over 48 states 
using variables as land, labour, materials and capital. These variables were compared 
with each other for each state to generate the efficiency measures, which varied  
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between 33 (minimum) to 100 (maximum). The study concludes that there are two types 
of efficiency: technical efficiency and price efficiency. Technical efficiency concentrates 
on production amount only (excluding costs of inputs and outputs). In this case, firms 
can be efficient by minimising inputs to maximise outputs. However, price efficiency 
focuses on optimal inputs and outputs to achieve better returns (considering costs of 
inputs and outputs). Farrell (1957) assumes that when an organisation produces more 
than average, then it is efficient; otherwise it is inefficient. Further to this, Charnes et al. 
(1978) adopted the DEA approach by comparing more than multiple inputs with multiple 
outputs which could not be used by Farrell (1957). The study aimed to estimate the 
technical efficiency of American schools using inputs and outputs without knowing their 
costs. Charnes et al. (1978) established an approach called CCR (standing for Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes) to avoid the non-availability of the input and output costs problem, 
but this approach assumed constancy in earnings. In 1984, Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper were able to develop the CCR concept by considering the variety of returns and 
the costs of inputs and outputs. Banker et al. (1984) called the new approach „BCC 
(pure technical efficiency)‟. They then discovered scale efficiency, which compares the 
CCR and BCC ratios (any difference between CCR and BCC leads to scale inefficiency). 
There are extensive previous studies focusing on efficiency in conventional banks. In 
comparison, fewer studies concentrate on efficiency in Islamic banks due to the limited 
availability of data for them. Recently, several studies compared the efficiency of 
conventional and Islamic banks. However, in the literature, no study has considered 
socially responsible banks (SRBs). Therefore, this study can fill the gap by including 
SRBs in the comparisons.  
This chapter is divided into three sections: first, efficiency in Islamic banks; second, 
efficiency in conventional banks; and third, efficiency in Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
2.2.1.1 Efficiency in Islamic banks 
There is a study by Hassan (2006) of the Islamic banking industry and it included 21 
Muslim countries around the world including 43 Islamic banks over the period 1995-
2001. Hassan (2006) examined two methods to investigate their efficiency, the 
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parametric (cost and profit efficiency) and the nonparametric approaches (data 
envelopment analysis and malmquist productivity index). The minimum efficiencies 
were cost efficiency (73.5%) and allocative efficiency (73.3%) and the maximum 
efficiency was pure technical efficiency (95%). The results concluded that the Islamic 
banks were relatively inefficient in containing costs but they were efficient in generating 
profits (84.4%). According to determinants, sizes of banks, profits and loans supported 
efficiencies positively. This study did not include ownership impact on efficiency. Hence, 
this thesis finds the ownership influence on efficiency. In addition, this study examined 
the ROA and ROE as independent variables. Consequently, this can provide a high 
Multicolenarity, which led the researcher to avoid containing more than one profitability 
ratio as explanatory factors. 
Hassan and Hussein (2003) used a non-parametric approach (DEA) and a parametric 
approach (SFA) to examine 17 Sudanese Islamic banks during the period 1992-2000. 
Their findings showed that the average DEA was 23%, while the average cost and profit 
efficiencies were 55% and 50%, respectively. The allocative and technical efficiencies 
scored 37% and 60%, respectively, which indicated that average cost inefficiency in the 
Islamic banks happened due to technical errors such as manager control. As a result, 
the banks could improve the X-efficiency by allocating their inputs, second, the labour 
force could be trained better, and third, the banks can increase the branches and ATMs 
to reduce the potential costs. 
Focusing on the Malaysian Islamic banking sector, Sufian (2007) investigated 17 
Islamic banks in Malaysia using DEA over the period 2001-2005. The findings 
concluded that the foreign banks exhibited more technical efficiency than the domestic 
banks. The efficiency scores varied from 0.597 to 0.975. The inefficiency occurred due 
to scale efficiency rather than pure technical efficiency. However, the banks could 
increase their efficiency by increasing their size in Malaysia. The disadvantage of this 
study is that no evidence of macroeconomic impact on efficiency, which can be covered 
by this thesis. 
Rosman et al. (2014) measured the efficiency of 79 Islamic banks in the Middle East 
and Asia employing DEA through the period 2007-2010. The DEA measures illustrate 
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that Asian Islamic banks have higher efficiency measures than Middle Eastern Islamic 
banks. The results of DEA explain that the Islamic banks were able to sustain their 
operations throughout the financial crisis period as there is a slight drop in TE, PTE and 
SE after 2009 in Asian banks and after 2008 in the Middle East. The profits and 
capitalisation enhanced efficiency in Middle East but total assets led to poorer efficiency. 
According to Asian banks, profits, size of bank, capital ratio and loan loss provisions 
supported efficiency positively. The gap of this study is that there is no analysis of effect 
of loans (one of main banking operations) on efficiency.  
Belanes‟s et al. (2015) study focused on 30 Islamic banks in GCC using DEA over the 
period 2005-2011. Most banks remained efficient but some banks witnessed a slight 
decline in technical, pure technical and scale efficiency measures. However, the most 
inefficient year was 2009 for TE, PTE and SE. The most efficient Islamic banks were in 
UAE due to the booming financial sector, while Bahraini Islamic banks attained the 
minimum efficiency indicators. No determinants of efficiency were estimated in this 
study, only efficiency measuring was included.  
Mokhtar et al. (2007) measured the technical and cost efficiencies using DEA in 
Malaysian fully-fledged Islamic banks and Islamic windows as conventional banks, 
finance companies and merchant banks for the period 1997-2003. The inputs were: 
total deposits, personal expenses and other overhead expenses, and the outputs were 
total earning assets for 288 financial statements. The findings suggested the average 
efficiencies of Islamic banks increased during the period; also the fully-fledged banks 
achieved higher efficiency scores than Islamic windows but lower efficiency than the 
conventional banks. The main determinants of efficiency according to their regression 
were the size of the bank, adequacy of capital, bank expenses, quality of loan and age 
of the bank. Overall, the efficiency of the banking sector in Malaysia needed to be 
improved as the efficiency scores were very low. This study neglected the effects of 
Asian financial crisis (AFC) upon efficiency that started in 1997, particularly in Thailand 
(IMF, 2014).  
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To sum up, efficiency in the Islamic banking system is always low due to restrictions in 
their operations (applying Sharia law). As a result, a reduction in the outputs (such as 
profits) can occur in Islamic banking systems. 
2.2.1.2 Efficiency in conventional banks  
Assaf et al. (2011) used the DEA to analyse the technical efficiency of 9 Saudi 
commercial banks during the period 1999-2007. The study suggested that the efficiency 
had started to rise from 2004 and the Saudi banks with foreign capital were inefficient. 
The highest average efficiency score was 0.918 in 2006. On the other hand, the lowest 
average efficiency was 0.784 in 2002. This study did not show the impact of external 
variables.  
Garza-García (2012) used the DEA efficiency for Mexican banks during the period 
2001-2009. The data used in this study included 18 of the largest banks in Mexico. 
From the DEA, the average inefficiencies were 15%, 29% and 14% for technical 
efficiency (TE), pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE) respectively, so 
the inefficiency occurred due to pure technical efficiency. The results of Tobit model 
indicate that higher profits (ROA), loans and foreign ownership attained better 
efficiencies. On the other side, non-performing loans and inflation affected efficiencies 
badly. The disadvantage in this study that is including three profitability (independent) 
indicators (net interest margin, return on assets and net interest income) which can 
have a high Multicollinearity hence, using one profitability ratio is enough. 
Sufian (2007) examined the long-term trend in efficiency in six conventional 
Singaporean banks during the period 1993-2003. His results suggested that the 
technical efficiency scored 88.4%. In other words, the examined banks had a high 
efficiency, but they still had a waste of input inefficiency (11.6%). The overall efficiency 
was declining during the earlier period, but it started to grow later. All determinants of 
efficiency found to be negative and significant (total assets, loans and deposits). This 
study could contain more explanatory variables rather than three variables only. 
Concentrating on the Korean banking sector, Sufian (2011) examined the technical 
efficiency of 29 banks during the period 1992-2003. The results suggested that the 
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technical efficiency was high under the operating approach, but it was slightly lower 
under the intermediation and value-added approaches. In addition, as a whole the most 
efficient year was 1992. No statistical analysis in this study conducted to show the 
factors that specifies efficiency in Korea. 
Yeh (2011) used SFA to find the cost efficiency of 44 conventional Taiwanese banks 
over the period 1999-2004. The average cost efficiency of the examined banks was 
72.69%, which is inefficient. The researcher suggested increasing the performance of 
Taiwanese banks by reducing the managerial share of ownership to reduce costs and 
increase the performance and efficiency of the banks. In addition, banks in Taiwan had 
to engage in mergers to raise their efficiency. The main positive determinants were total 
assets and borrowing (debt ratio). The limitation of this study can be observed that profit 
efficiency was not measured.  
Shamsuddin and Xiang (2012) investigated the efficiency of 10 Australian banks 
utilising SFA during the period 1995-2008. The results noted that the efficiency had 
improved in large and small Australian banks in the technical, cost and profit efficiencies. 
In particular, large banks achieved more average cost efficiency than small banks. 
Small banks attained a higher level of average technical and profit efficiency. 
Additionally, bank stock returns impacted the efficiency positively and significantly. The 
study did not indicate the influence of global financial crisis on efficiency. 
Another study investigated cost and profit efficiency in the banking sectors across 
Central and Eastern Europe between 1993 and 2000 (Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007). The 
sample panel consisted of 325 banks. The SFA methodology concluded that average 
profit and cost efficiencies in CEE banks were 72% and 77%, respectively. According to 
cost efficiency‟s determinants, size, capitalisation, loans, foreign ownership and GDP 
supported efficiency positively and significantly whereas, loan loss reserves decreased 
efficiency. However, profit efficiency was affected negatively and significantly by loan 
loss reserves, GDP and foreign ownership. The results could be more important by 
comprising domestic and public ownerships dummies.    
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Focusing on Eastern European countries, Fries and Taci (2005) used SFA to measure 
the cost efficiency taking a sample of 15 Eastern European countries and using 289 
conventional banks during the period 1994-2001. The results showed that the overall 
cost efficiency measures of Eastern European banks were low. The highest average 
cost efficiency was achieved by Estonian banks scoring 0.85 and the lowest mean cost 
efficiency was achieved by Romanian banks at 0.55. The results showed as well that 
the private banks were more efficient than the state-owned banks due to deregulating. 
The researchers suggested that for improving the Eastern European efficiency, the 
banks had to take a position of competition against the European Union countries and 
the banks had to reduce their costs and raise their profits through planned strategies 
and policies. Overall, estimating profit efficiency could improve the study through 
comparing with cost efficiency.    
Al-Sharkas et al. (2008) studied mergers in the United States banking industry using 
DEA and SFA during the period 1987-1999. The sample panel included 440 
conventional banks. This study compared merged and non-merged banks in the US 
banking industry. Their findings suggested that the mergers enhanced the profit and 
cost efficiencies of banks. Moreover, by using efficient technology, the merged banks 
had lower costs than non-merged banks. Furthermore, the efficiency measures 
increased gradually over the period. All efficiency measures concluded that the merged 
banks were more efficient than the non-merged banks. Finding the determination of 
efficiency could enhance this study. 
In a recent study on the US, Feng and Serletis (2010) employed DEA to find the 
technical efficiency of 292 conventional banks over the period 2000-2005. The results of 
DEA indicated that the US banks were relatively efficient during the period but the 
technical efficiency reduced from 2000 (0.934) to 2005 (0.926). The short period of this 
study considered to be ineffective. In addition, no factors impacted efficiency were 
analysed in this research. These two disadvantages can be included in this thesis.   
Al Shamsi et al. (2009) measured the economic efficiency of 21 Emirati commercial 
banks during the period 2002-2004 using SFA and DEA. The banks studied were 
inefficient relatively due to cost, allocative, technical and pure technical reasons. The 
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banks in United Arab Emirates (UAE) did not take advantage of the development that 
has happened in Emirates recently in terms of size, technology and the integration with 
the world‟s economy. The researchers found that the banks could improve their 
efficiency by establishing more branches, enhancing the skills of the employees and 
reducing the ownership of the banks from the government. The weakness points in this 
study are estimating the efficiency of one country only (there is no comparison between 
any countries) and banks‟ names are not clear.  
Using one output only, Erdem and Erdem (2008) used profit before tax generated from 
the inputs of employees, physical capital and interest bearing liabilities. They utilised 
DEA to measure the efficiency of 10 listed Turkish commercial banks during the period 
1998-2004. Six banks were technically efficient during the period 1998-2004. The 
lowest efficiency for all the banks was in 2003 as a consequence of the economic crisis 
in Turkey, scoring 0.594, 0.794 and 0.325 for technical, allocative and economic 
efficiency, respectively. On the other hand, the highest efficiency was in 1999 scoring 
0.781, 0.847 and 0.653 for technical efficiency, allocative and economic efficiency, 
respectively.  The economic crisis in Turkey in 2000 and 2001 affected the efficiency in 
banks. Erdem and Erdem (2008) did not estimate PTE and SE which considered to be 
the main indicators of DEA. Furthermore, there are no explanatory variables in this 
study. 
Focusing on Indian commercial banks, Sathye (2003) measured the productive 
efficiency of public, private and foreign banks in India from 1997 to 1998 utilising DEA 
on 94 conventional banks. Sathye (2003) argued that to improve efficiency, the banks 
should have enhanced the staff performance and considered the rationalisation of using 
inputs. In another study of Indian conventional banks using the SFA and DEA approach 
on the Indian banking sector, Das et al. (2004) examined the efficiency of Indian 
commercial banks during the period 1997-2003. The technical efficiency included two 
approaches, input-oriented technical efficiency and output-oriented technical efficiency, 
and both of them illustrated high levels of efficiency during the period. The cost and 
revenue efficiencies were high, compared to the profit efficiency. Overall, the 
efficiencies during the period increased slightly due to the financial liberalisation that 
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happened in India in the 1990s. Both above studies did not examined the factors that 
affected efficiencies in India On the other side, Das and Ghosh (2009) estimated the 
determinants of efficiency in Indian banking sector. They examined the profit and cost 
efficiencies during the period 1992-2004 using the DEA. Their findings showed that the 
cost efficiency levels were high, especially in 1998 scoring 0.880, whereas the profit 
efficiency levels were low, especially in 1992 scoring 0.4277. In other words, the 
commercial banks in India during that period focused on reducing the costs and did not 
achieve profit maximising. The banks‟ sizes, liquidity, deposits and public ownership 
found to be increasing efficiency significantly over the period of the study. This result is 
contradicted with loans, which negatively and significantly affected the efficiency in India. 
This study found the determinants of efficiency in banking sector using Tobit model only. 
In order to improve the results, another statistical model could be run due to providing a 
robust evidence of the impact. Moreover, considering foreign ownership as an 
explanatory variable would support the comparison between the efficiency of private 
and public ownerships. 
Comparing the efficiency of Indian and Pakistani conventional banking sectors during 
the financial liberalisation, Ataullah et al. (2004) employed DEA over the period 1988-
1998. The study compared the public sector banks, domestic private banks and foreign 
banks in India and Pakistan. Overall, the technical efficiency measures concluded that 
the efficiency improved over the period for both countries especially after 1995 due to 
the financial liberalisation. In the case of India, the technical efficiency rose as a result 
of improvement of the scale and pure technical efficiencies. In the case of Pakistan, the 
technical efficiency rose due to the improvement of the scale efficiency. The results 
showed that in both countries the banks were more efficient in terms of generating 
earning assets rather than generating income. They found that the financial 
liberalisation closed the gap in efficiency between small and large banks. Higher profits 
in India and Pakistan (ROA) led to attain better efficiency indicators whereas, costs 
(costs to assets and costs to revenues ratios) directed to poorer efficiencies. In general, 
this study could be more effective by examining more factors of efficiency rather than 
three variables only. Additionally, there are no external variables in the model (such as 
inflation). 
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Zhang et al. (2012) investigated the technical efficiency of a panel sample of 133 city 
commercial banks in China (31 regions) during the period 1999-2008. Their results 
indicated that the banks‟ efficiency could be heavily affected by the law enforcement 
effectiveness of the 31 regions used. In conclusion, the average technical efficiency 
based on the income model (score 0.816) was slightly higher than the average technical 
efficiency based on the earning assets model (score 0.799). The positive determinants 
of technical efficiency found to be loans, capitalisation and securities while, GDP and 
non-performing loans increase inefficiency. This study could be developed by using 
more efficiency indicators such as pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency.  
Staub et al. (2010) compared state-owned, private, foreign, private (domestic) and 
foreign participation banks in Brazil using from 184 banks. The method was DEA to 
investigate cost, technical and allocative efficiencies over the period 2002-2007. Their 
figures indicated that the cost efficiency was the lowest. In other words, the costs as 
inputs were high in Brazilian banks. The highest efficiency score was the allocative 
efficiency. The results showed that the large banks and foreign banks were the most 
efficient. The market shares and age of banks led to higher efficiencies. The gap in this 
study is lack of external factors have been used, which are highly anticipated influencing 
efficiency in Brazilian banking sector.  
However, Casu and Molyneux (2003) employed DEA on 750 commercial banks from 
the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany and France over the period 1993-1997. They compared 
the constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS). Overall, the 
results illustrated relatively low average efficiency levels, and in the CRS stage, the 
average efficiency was higher than the VRS stage. The highest level of average 
efficiency was in 1997 in the CRS and VRS stages, whereas the lowest average of 
efficiency was in 1995. The limitation of this study can be concluded that Casu and 
Molyneux (2003) could not examine the internal and external factors that can impact the 
efficiency. 
Sufian (2010) compared the efficiency of the Malaysian and Thai banking industries 
using a sample of 15 conventional banks before and after the financial crisis that 
happened in Asia in 1997 employing DEA for the period 1992-2003. The results 
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indicated that Thai banks were more efficient than Malaysian banks achieving higher 
means technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies equal to 0.880, 0.943 and 0.934, 
respectively. Malaysian banks scored average technical, pure technical and scale 
efficiencies equal to 0.663, 0.837 and 0.806, respectively. The inefficiency in both 
countries was due to technical analysis rather than pure technical and scale efficiencies. 
The results of DEA showed that before 1997 the efficiency indicators were high, then 
declined after 1997 until 2000 and then increased. The drop happened due to the 
financial crisis in 1997 and the banks suffered for some time; after that they tried to find 
new strategies to raise the efficiency again after 2000. According to Malaysian 
banking‟s efficiency, there are positive and significant correlations between efficiency 
and loans, ROA and deposits whereas, negative and significant relationships attained 
by loan loss provisions, size of banks and non-interest income. Thai banks affected 
positively by size, loan loss provisions and capital ratio. The Asian financial crisis (AFC) 
affected Malaysian and Thai banks badly.  
Another study on a European country has been conducted Hasan and Marton (2003) 
who analysed all the Hungarian commercial banks that operated in the Hungarian 
Financial and Stock Exchange Almanac (HFSEA) during the period 1993-1998 utilising 
SFA to measure the inefficiency. The results suggested that the average profit 
inefficiency was higher than the average cost inefficiency at 34.50% and 28.76%, 
respectively. In other words, the Hungarian banks were more efficient during the period 
in reducing costs than generating profits. The empirical results suggest that profit 
efficiency could be improved by focusing on financial investment, bank size, foreign 
shares and acquisition but reducing liquidity and capitalisation increased efficiency. 
According to cost efficiency, liquidity, size and foreign shares supported efficiency 
positively whereas, financial investment and capitalisation led to inefficiency. This study 
could compare Hungary with another European country to provide clearer point of view. 
Additionally, macroeconomic variables were not available in this study. 
Another study measured the productive efficiency of Lebanese commercial banks after 
the war in Lebanon. Ariss (2008) used SFA during the period 1990-2001 for 60 banks. 
The results suggested that the period of 1996-2001 was much more efficient due to 
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more liberalisation in the economy such as deregulation than the period of 1990-1995. 
The average cost efficiency for the period of 1996-2001 was 97.06%, whereas for 1990-
1995 the mean cost efficiency was 85.33% which shows that the banks in Lebanon 
enhanced their cost efficiency during the period of the study. Overall, the average cost 
efficiency was relatively low due to the war in the country (Ariss, 2008). In this study, 
profit efficiency was not measured, which can be one of the main disadvantages of the 
study. Moreover, determinants of efficiency were not investigated in this study. 
Another study concerning the Australian banking industry was conducted by Vu and 
Turnell (2004). This study analysed cost and profit efficiencies of nine Australian 
conventional banks during the period 1997-2009, employing the SFA approach. They 
divided their study into two periods, pre-global financial crisis (GFC) from 1997-2006 
and during GFC from 2007-2009. The findings showed that the overall profit efficiency 
of Australian banks during the period was higher than the overall cost efficiency. The 
major banks were found to be more efficient in cost and profit than the regional banks. 
Before the GFC, the major banks scored 0.865 and 0.691 for average profit and cost 
efficiencies, respectively, whereas the regional banks scored 0.811 and 0.723 for 
average profit and cost efficiencies, respectively. During the GFC, the major banks 
scored 0.758 and 0.701 for average profit and cost efficiencies, respectively; whereas, 
the regional banks scored 0.653 and 0.686 for average profit and cost efficiencies. The 
statistical results reported that banks with lower size and capital were more efficient. 
Additionally, profitability ratios (ROE and NIM) had a negative signs with efficiency. 
Finally, non-interest expenses (NIE) impacted the profit and cost efficiencies negatively 
and significantly but the GFC decreased profit efficiency significantly only. The limitation 
of this study is that the external factors‟ impact was not available in this study. 
A study of the New Zealand banking sector by Tripe (2003) estimated the scale 
efficiency of eight conventional banks using the DEA approach for the period 1996-2002. 
The highest average scale efficiency was attained by the Bank of New Zealand scoring 
96.29% and the lowest average scale efficiency was attained by the National Bank of 
New Zealand scoring 87.59%. This showed that the banks could improve the scale 
efficiency by expanding their size and enhancing the managerial practices in terms of 
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technical efficiency. Statistically, time trend increased efficiency while, interest rates 
reduced efficiency. This study could be improved by including more variables in the 
regression rather than two explanatory factors (interest rate and time trend).  
Drake et al. (2009) examined the efficiency of the Japanese banking sector using DEA 
during the period 1995-2002 employing intermediation, production and profit/revenue 
approaches. The findings showed that the majority of Japanese banks were relatively 
efficient. The intermediation approach produced the highest relative efficiency measures 
due to employing a clear policy agenda from the decision makers in the range of 
67.46%-77.60% of average efficiency; whereas, the least relative efficiency scores 
obtained through the production approach were in the range of 24.47%-33.40% for 
average efficiency. There is no statistical approach conducted in this article to show the 
internal and external factors that affect efficiency.  
Canhoto and Dermine (2003) compared the efficiency of 20 new and old banks in 
Portugal over the period 1990-1995 utilising DEA. In 1986, Portugal entered the 
European community and then the government changed the whole banking system 
using the deregulation system as privatisation, granting new banking licences and an 
opening borders policy. Due to deregulation, the efficiency of Portuguese banks 
improved. The banks increased their efficiencies during the period of the study. New 
banks were more efficient than old ones scoring 0.77, 0.86 and 0.89 for mean CRS, 
VRS and scale efficiencies respectively. Old banks attained 0.62, 0.73 and 0.85 for 
average CRS, VRS and scale efficiencies, respectively.  
Percin and Ayan (2006) measured the efficiency of 31 Turkish conventional banks 
utilising DEA for 2003 and 2004. The efficiency levels of CRS, VRS and scale 
efficiencies were reduced from 2003 to 2004. In 2003, the Turkish banks scored 
averages of 0.868, 0.955 and 0.911 for CRS, VRS and scale efficiencies respectively, 
whereas in 2004 the banks achieved averages of 0.772, 0.848 and 0.900. In 2004, they 
calculated that 11 banks out of 31 were found to be efficient, whereas 16 banks were 
efficient under the VRS approach. In 2003, the results indicated that 16 banks were 
efficient under the CRS approach, while 23 were efficient under VRS assumption.  
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Assaf et al. (2012) used the cost efficiency of 25 Nigerian banks during the period 2002-
2007, dividing this period into two parts, first, pre-consolidation and second, post-
consolidation using the intermediation approach. The consolidation started in Nigeria in 
2004 when the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) declared new policies for Nigerian banks. 
These policies were to encourage the banks to raise their average size by acquisition 
and mergers, but some banks could not handle the CBN policies, which pushed them 
into liquidation. The findings showed that the cost efficiency had significantly increased 
after the consolidation level in 2004; the average efficiency started from 0.782 in 2002 
and grew to 0.912 in 2007. The period of this paper could be extended to find the global 
financial crisis effects. 
Concentrating on the Chinese commercial banking system, Wang et al. (2014) analysed 
the efficiency of 16 major commercial banks during the period 2003-2011 using DEA 
measures. They used two stages to find DEA measures; deposit production and profit-
earning stages. The findings suggest that the overall efficiency improved during the 
period. Even the efficiency in the first stage (deposits production) was found to have 
risen in DEA measures over the period. According to DEA estimators in the second 
stage (profit-earning), the graph of DEA fluctuated and dropped sharply in 2006 and 
2009; in contrast, the graph slightly increased in the rest of the years. In general, they 
found that state-owned banks are more efficient than joint-stock banks during the period. 
The gap of this study is that there is no consideration for determinants of efficiency.  
Svitalkova (2014) compared the efficiency of six European countries namely, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia during the period 2004-2011 
using the DEA approach. He used inputs as personnel costs, fixed assets, deposits 
while the outputs are loans, net interest revenue and loan loss provisions. According to 
CRS and VRS values, the efficiency of Hungary, Austria and Czech Republic are 
relatively high compared with Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland. This study shows the 
effect of the financial crisis in these countries as in 2009 the CRS and VRS had a sharp 
decline and kept reducing until 2011 apart from Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland for the 
CRS and VRS estimators. In other words, the only three countries that could improve 
their efficiencies after 2009 are those countries. Focusing on the Czech Republic 
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banking sector only, Řepková (2014) analysed the efficiency of 11 commercial banks. 
The data was extracted from Bankscope for the period 2003-2012. The DEA indicators 
were adopted through the input-oriented (intermediation) method which transfers 
deposits to loans. However, Řepková (2014) employed labour and deposits as inputs, 
and loans and net interest income as outputs. In conclusion, the mean CRS reached 
84%-89% and the VRS scored 70-78%. In addition, larger banks were found to be less 
efficient than the smaller banks due to the excess of deposits in the balance sheet and 
inappropriate size of operation. 
Ohsato and Takahashi (2015) is a very recent study that focused on management 
efficiency in the Japanese banking sector for the years 2012 and 2013. All regional 
banks had inefficient scoring DEA with 0.352 and 0.266 in 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
This study suggests that Japanese banks need to minimise the inputs and maximise the 
outputs through policy makers‟ strategies, otherwise the efficiency will keep decreasing 
over time.  
In conclusion, according to the literature on efficiency in Islamic banks, conventional 
banks were found to be relatively more efficient than Islamic banks, because 
conventional banks aim to maximise their profits (outputs). In addition, the efficiency 
scores in developed countries are significantly higher than efficiencies in emerging 
countries.  
 
2.2.1.3 Efficiency in Islamic and conventional banks  
Johnes et al. (2009) examined the efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks in the 
GCC countries over the period 2004-2007 using data envelopment analysis. The 
findings suggested that the average efficiency was significantly lower in Islamic banks 
than conventional banks. In contrast, Abdul-Majid et al. (2010) found that the efficiency 
of the Islamic banks was more than the efficiency of the conventional banks over the 
period 1996-2002 using data from 10 countries (111 banks).  
Mostafa (2007a) examined the efficiency of the top 100 Arab conventional and Islamic 
banks from 14 countries in 2005 using DEA. The researcher employed two methods of 
DEA using CCR and BCC. However, the inputs of Mostafa‟s (2007a) study were: the 
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capital and assets of the banks, whereas the outputs were: the profits, the return on 
equity (ROE) and the return on assets (ROA) of the banks used. The results showed 
that the Arabian banks of the study were inefficient, as only 4 banks scored 100% 
efficiency in both BCC and CCR scores. In other words, 96 banks were inefficient as 
they needed to reduce their inputs and increase their outputs to raise efficiency. The 
four efficient banks were from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates namely, the Banque 
de Caire and Egyptian American Bank from Egypt, and the National Bank of UAE and 
United Arab Bank from the United Arab Emirate. In another study, Mostafa (2007b) 
examined 50 GCC Islamic and conventional banks using DEA of BCC and CCR in 2005, 
and he found that 5 banks achieved 100% efficiency of BCC and CCR. 
Hadad et al. (2012) utilised a couple of models: „semi-oriented radial measure‟ „slacks-
based model‟ or „SORM SBM‟ DEA which was created by Tone (2001), and the range-
directional (RD) model suggested by Silva Portela et al. (2004) to analyse the efficiency 
of 130 Indonesian conventional and Islamic banks over the period 2003-2007. The 
results suggested that the most efficient bank type was the state-owned and the least 
efficient bank type was the regional government-owned. Furthermore, the average 
efficiency in banks varied between 58%-63% for the SORM SBM model, and between 
72%-79% for the RD model, which indicated in general, inefficiency in Indonesian banks. 
Comparing the cost and profit efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks, Olson and 
Zoubi (2011) studied the efficiency of 10 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) 
countries. There was a large difference between the average cost and profit efficiency, 
scoring 70.3% and 59.4%, respectively. The conventional banks had higher cost and 
profit efficiency than Islamic banks with the conventional banks scoring cost and profit 
efficiency of 71.2% and 74.4%, respectively, whereas Islamic banks scored 66.4% and 
59%, respectively. The disadvantage of this study can be observed that the model 
included many faded coefficients. In addition, macroeconomic variables have not been 
investigated to find the effect on efficiency. 
Bader et al. (2008) examined and compared the cost, revenue and profit efficiencies of 
37 conventional banks and 43 Islamic banks around 21 different countries for the period 
1990-2005. All banks examined attained high average cost efficiency, scoring 0.918, but 
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lower average revenue and profit efficiency, scoring 0.811 and 0.872, respectively. On 
the other hand, all banks examined were better in using their inputs (resources) than 
generating outputs (profits and revenues). In particular, conventional banks were found 
to be more cost efficient, achieving average cost efficiency of 0.935, than the Islamic 
banks who achieved 0.903; the Islamic banks were found to be high in revenue and 
profit efficiencies achieving average revenue and profit efficiencies of 0.817 and 0.879, 
respectively, whereas conventional banks achieved 0.806 and 0.863, respectively. 
To conclude, based on the literature of efficiency in conventional and Islamic banks, 
some studies approved that Islamic banks operated more efficiently than conventional 
banks and some studies confirmed the vice versa. Most studies focused on the Middle 
Eastern region due to a high availability of Islamic banks in this area.  
 
2.3 Determinants of efficiency in banking 
This study empirically examines the effect of internal and external factors on efficiency 
in Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks. Depending on the literature 
review, the most effective and available internal variables can be bank size, capital ratio, 
loan intensity, credit risk, financial leverage, return on assets (ROA), bank age, 
ownerships (foreign, domestic and public) and listing. The external variables can be 
gross domestic production (GDP), inflation, market capitalisation, global financial crisis 
and control of corruption. The following section explains the recent studies of each 
variable. 
2.3.1 Internal variables 
1. Bank size 
Most studies use bank size as an indicator of efficiency and many found a significant 
and positive effect on efficiency, which means that larger sized banks are more efficient 
than smaller sized banks. In other words, more assets owned by banks led to improved 
efficiency; Sufian‟s (2009) study employed DEA to investigate the efficiency of 36 
Malaysian commercial banks in 1990-1999. In the second-stage regression, the findings 
imply that larger sized banks are more efficient than smaller sized banks. Many studies 
are in line with Sufian (2009) (e.g., Wanke & Barros, 2014; Tan & Floros, 2013; Vu & 
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Nahm, 2013; Abul Alkheil et al., 2012; Noor & Ahmed, 2012; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009; 
Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007; Yudistira, 2004). In contrast, a number of studies proved 
that smaller banks attained better efficiency measures (Hou et al., 2014; Chortareas, et 
al., 2012; Han et al., 2012; El-Moussawi & Obeid, 2010; Satub, et al., 2010; Ariff & Can, 
2008; Girardone et al., 2004; Hasan & Marton, 2003). However, Rosman‟s et al. (2014), 
Zhang and Matthews‟s (2012) and Chiou‟s (2009) results suggested that size of banks 
influenced the efficiency positively and negatively in their studies. In general, few 
studies found that the relationship between size and efficiency is insignificant (Wanke & 
Barros, 2014; Garza García, 2012; Assaf et al., 2011). 
 
2. Capital ratio 
Another internal factor is capital ratio that indicates the importance of shareholders 
equity of firms. Higher capitalisation can increase efficiency in the banking sector 
(Mamatzakis et al., 2015; Rosman et al., 2014; Taba et al., 2013; Noor & Ahmed, 2012; 
Chiou, 2009; Pasiouras, 2008; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007; Grigorian & Manole, 2006; 
Hasan & Marton, 2003). In some cases, lower capitalised banks are more efficient (Vu 
& Nahm, 2013; Zhang et al., 2012; Fang et al., 2011; El-Moussawi & Obeid, 2010; Hermes 
& Nhung, 2010; Ariff & Can, 2008; Girardone et al., 2004; Casu & Molyneux, 2003). 
Banks could enhance their efficiency based on the relationship between capital ratio 
and efficiency measures whether increasing or decreasing the capital of the bank. 
However, Hou et al., (2014), Chortareas et al. (2012) and Sufian and Habibullah, (2009) 
could not justify any effect on efficiency by capitalisation.  
 
3. Loan intensity 
One of the main roles of the banking system is to provide loans. Most studies in the 
literature examined loans to assets ratio as a main determination of efficiency. As a 
result, many studies point out that providing more loans could raise efficiency in the 
banking sector such as Johnes et al. (2014), Garza García‟s (2012), Sufian and 
Habibullah‟s (2009), Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) and Pasiouras (2008). On the other 
side, Noor and Ahmed (2012) and Sufian (2009) underline that loans raise the risk of 
inefficiency in the banking sector. Havrylchyk‟s (2006) findings suggest that loans could 
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improve the technical and cost efficiencies, while loans decrease the allocative 
efficiency in the Polish banking sector. However, Vu and Nahm (2013) and Hasan and 
Marton (2003) could not find any correlation between loan intensity and efficiency. In 
general, accepting more deposits from clients allows banks to supply more loans which 
could maximise the profits. Hence, banks need to offer more services to attract more 
clients to deal with banks.  
 
4. Credit (liquidity) risk  
Lee and Chih (2013) examined the efficiency of large and small banks in China during 
the period 2004-2011. This study claimed that credit risk (loan to deposits ratio) 
empirically determined the profit efficiency significantly and negatively in smaller banks. 
This means that banks needed to focus on increasing loans to raise efficiency. Hou et al. 
(2014) found the same relationship between credit risk and efficiency. Ariff and Can 
(2008) conclude the opposite results which confirm that engaging in more lending 
activities led to worse efficiency over the period 1995-2004 in China. This is in line with 
Zhang et al. (2012) also in the Chinese banking sector over the period 1999-2008.  
 
5. Financial leverage 
Few studies concern financial leverage as a determinant of efficiency such as Abul 
Alkheil‟s et al. (2012) study. This examined the efficiency as a first stage in Malaysia, 
the UK, Turkey and GCC over the period 2005-2008. The second stage examined the 
variables that influence efficiency.  Abul Alkheil et al. (2012) pointed out that there was a 
negative and significant association between the DEA scores and financial leverage. 
 
6. Return on assets (ROA) 
An extensive number of studies have concentrated on ROA as an explanatory variable 
of efficiency. Most studies have proven that the profitability ratios increase efficiency 
(Rosman et al., 2014; Tabak et al., 2013; Fukuyama & Matousek, 2011; Sufian, 2009; 
Hassan, 2006). This result is expected and realistic as banks achieving more returns 
are able to provide better services which raise efficiency. However, a few studies found 
that there was a negative and significant relationship between efficiency and profitability 
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ratios (Hou et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2011). In addition, El-Moussawi and Obeid‟s (2010) 
findings proposed that ROA affected efficiency positively and negatively in the GCC 
banking sector through the period 2005-2008. Sufian and Habibullah noted that ROA 
had no impact on efficiency in Korean commercial banks over the period 1992-2003. 
 
7. Age 
Abul Alkheil et al. (2012) revealed that older banks were more efficient than new banks 
in Islamic and conventional banks. This result is realistic due to older banks having 
more experience in banking operations and could provide better quality of service. 
Satub et al. (2010) and Chiou (2009) also state that older banks are more efficient. In 
contrast, Lee and Chih (2013) confirmed that new commercial Chinese banks attained 
better profit efficiency measures than older banks as the relationship between PE and 
age was negative. However, Hasan and Marton (2003) suggested that age is not 
important to efficiency in Hungarian conventional banks through the period 1993-1998. 
 
8. Ownership 
Mostly ownership has been examined as a dummy variable like Gardener et al. (2012) 
who classified the ownership to country-level of state banks, foreign banks and private 
banks. This study demonstrated that foreign banks concentration increased efficiency 
significantly, whereas an increment in state and private bank levels affected efficiency 
significantly and negatively in the South East Asian banking sector during the period 
1998-2004.  
 
Wanke and Barros (2014) found that an increase in the role of public banks led to better 
productive efficiency in Brazilian commercial banks in 2012. This result is in line with 
Chortareas‟s et al. (2012) and Ariff and Can‟s (2008) studies. 
 
Girardone et al. (2004) found that public banks were more efficient than private banks in 
Italy over the period 1993-1996. Additionally, they pointed out that raising the private 
banks‟ level decreases efficiency.  
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Garza García (2012) investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and 
efficiency using DEA measures (TE, PTE and SE) in Mexico over the period 2001-2009. 
The results suggest that the relationship between efficiency and foreign ownership is 
positive and significant. Some studies have the same conclusion such as Tabak‟s et al. 
(2013), Chortareas‟s et al. (2012), Grigorian and Manole‟s (2006) studies. In contrast, 
Zhang and Matthews (2012) confirm that foreign banks‟ level decreased the cost 
efficiency in Indonesian commercial banks through the period 1992-2007. 
 
Fang et al. (2011) conclude that foreign banks concentration affects the cost efficiency 
negatively and significantly. Moreover, government banks were found to be more 
efficient than foreign banks but government banks did not impact the cost efficiency in 
South-Eastern Europe during the period 1998-2008. Regarding the profit efficiency, 
foreign banks increase the profit efficiency, while government banks decrease the profit 
efficiency.  
 
Satub et al. (2010) divided ownership into foreign, domestic private and state-owned 
banks. The empirical results show that state-owned banks scored the highest efficiency 
measures. Furthermore, more domestic private and state-owned banks lead to better 
allocative efficiency through the period 2000-2007 in Brazil.  
 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) examined the SFA of 12 European countries with 
transition economies over the period 1993-2000. The results of the fixed-effects model 
propose that foreign ownership increases the cost efficiency but decreases the profit 
efficiency in European countries under study.  
 
Finally, Assaf et al. (2011) examined the correlation between the pure technical 
efficiency and domestic ownership in Saudi Arabian Islamic and commercial banks over 
the period 1999-2006. Their findings indicate that domestic banks significantly increase 
the pure technical efficiency. Tabak et al. (2013) also underlined that domestic banks 
improve the profit and cost efficiency in the 17 Latin American countries between 2001 
and 2008. Additionally, they conclude that domestic banks could impact the profit 
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efficiency negatively and significantly over the period. However, Hou‟s et al. (2014), Vu 
and Nahm‟s (2013) and Fukuyama and Matousek‟s (2011) results found no relationship 
between efficiency and ownership. 
 
9. Listing 
This variable can be examined as an additional test to find which banks are performing 
more efficiently - the (stock market) listed or unlisted banks. Few studies analyse the 
effect of listing on efficiency in the banking sector. As an example, Yudistira (2004) 
found that unlisted Islamic banks achieved better DEA measures than listed banks. 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) and Havrylchyk (2006) found insignificant associations 
between listing and efficiencies in their studies.   
 
2.3.2 External variables 
1.  Gross domestic production (GDP) 
Comprehensive studies consider GDP as a determinant of efficiency. Hermes and 
Nhung (2010) examined the determinants of DEA in Latin America and Asia for the 
period 1991-2000. The findings revealed that banks located in countries with 
development in GDP operated efficiently. This finding is consistent with the studies of 
Hou et al. (2014), Johnes et al. (2014), Tan and Floros (2013), Vu and Nahm (2013), 
Chortareas et al. (2012), Garza García (2012), Zhang et al. (2012) and Hermes and 
Nhung (2010). The growth of GDP is the main indicator of the economic situation; the 
more GDP generated the better the economy. Thus, banks concentrate on countries 
with greater GDP to invest. The investment can be through operating more branches, 
increasing capitalisation or mergers and acquisition. In contrast, Sufian and Habibullah 
(2009) claimed that GDP influenced efficiency negatively and significantly in the Korean 
banking sector. A few studies reached the same conclusion such as Zhang et al. (2012), 
El-Moussawi and Obeid (2010), Satub et al. (2010), Yildirim and Philippatos (2007). 
However, Abul Alkheil et al. (2012) stated that GDP was not significant to efficiency in 
their study. 
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2. Inflation 
El-Moussawi and Obeid (2010) examined inflation as an independent variable. The 
relationship between the inflation and efficiency was significant and positive in Islamic 
banks. On the other side, most studies confirmed that inflation affects efficiency 
significantly and negatively which is closer to the realistic economic condition of Vu and 
Nahm (2013) Garza García (2012) and Sufian and Habibullah (2009). However, a few 
studies found that inflation has not impacted efficiency (Gardener et al., 2012; Grigorian 
& Manole, 2006). In general, higher inflation restricted banks from achieving profits due 
to lack of purchasing power of individuals which reduced the deposits of banks. As a 
result of lowering deposits, banks decrease loans that reflect banking operations 
negatively. Generally, banks need to find ideal strategies such as operating in countries 
with lower inflation rates. 
 
3. Market capitalisation 
Johnes et al. (2014) and Vu and Nahm (2013) consider market capitalisation as a 
positive determinant that increases efficiency. In contrast, Grigorian and Manole‟s (2006) 
findings proved that stock market growth led to reduced efficiency over the period 1995-
1998. Some studies confirmed that the stock market had a positive and negative 
correlation with efficiency (Garza García, 2012; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009). However, 
Noor and Ahmed (2012) illustrated that the stock market was not important to efficiency 
in the Islamic banking system. 
 
4. Global financial crisis (GFC)  
Noor and Ahmed (2012) empirically found that the global financial crisis influenced the 
efficiency significantly and negatively in the Islamic banking system (similar to Moradi-
Motlagh & Babacan, 2015). The economy was affected negatively around the world 
over the period of the GFC (2007-2009). However, this study examines the effect of 
GFC on efficiency measures using OLS and fixed effects models. Many studies have 
examined the effect of the Asian financial crisis (AFC) on efficiency such as Sufian and 
Habibullah (2009) who claimed that AFC influenced efficiency significantly and 
negatively in commercial Korean banks. 
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5. Control of corruption 
There is a lack of research analysing the correlation between controlling corruption and 
efficiency in banking. To our knowledge, only one study is available which concentrates 
on the control of corruption, which is Chortareas‟s et al. (2012) study. This study claims 
that stronger supervision on corruption increased efficiency significantly in European 
banks between 2000-2008. 
 
A summary of more detailed recent studies on the determinants of efficiency is shown in 
Appendix 1. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter introduced the recent studies on efficiency and its determinants, explaining 
efficiency and comparing Islamic and conventional banking sectors as a first stage. The 
second stage explains the factors of efficiency; thus the literature review on 
determinants of efficiency was discussed in this chapter. After reviewing the recent 
studies of efficiency, the researcher decided to use DEA measures (TE, PTE, and SE) 
for calculating the efficiency. The reason behind choosing DEA is because of its more 
accurate and reliable measurements compared to other efficiency indicators. However, 
the relationship between DEA measures and explanatory variables can be found 
through the OLS and fixed effects models. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review on Profitability and Stability 
3. Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first section presents a literature review on 
profitability in banking. The second section offers a literature review on stability in 
banking. 
3.1 Literature review on profitability in banking 
Historically, Short (1979) is the pioneer of examining the performance determinants 
within the banking sector. Short (1979) analysed the association between banking 
profitability and banking concentration using a dataset of 12 countries through the 
period 1972-1974. The results suggest that greater concentration leads to higher profit 
rates. Afterwards, Bourke (1989) conducted a study to find the internal and external 
determination of profitability in Europe, North America, and Australia over the period 
1972-1981. Bourke (1989) concludes that a higher degree of market power increases 
profits. 
There are comprehensive studies on financial performance in commercial banks, but 
few comparing Islamic and commercial banks, and no study comparing Islamic, 
conventional, and socially responsible banks. There are three main performance 
indicators used by researchers: return of assets (ROA), used by Apergis (2014) on the 
US banking sector; return on equities, which is utilised by Lee and Kim (2013) on 
commercial banks in Korea; and net interest margin (NIM), employed by Tan and Floros 
(2012), that focuses on the commercial banking sector in China. Some studies use ROA, 
ROE, and NIM, such as Liang et al. (2013), on the European banking sector. Most 
studies found the determinants of profitability using statistical models such as OLS 
(Olson & Zoubi, 2011) or the fixed effect model (Sufian & Habibullah, 2010). This 
division is arranged as a literature review on profitability in Islamic banks, profitability in 
conventional banks, and profitability in Islamic and conventional banks, and then 
determinants of profitability (ratios) are explained.  
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3.1.1 Profitability in Islamic banks 
Smaoui and Salah (2012) examined the profitability‟s determinants in GCC region 
including 44 Islamic banks over the period 1995-2009. The ROA, ROE and NIM were 
utilised as profitability indicators in this study. The main findings conclude that greater 
asset quality, capital and size lead to better profits. The macroeconomic variables in this 
study (GDP and inflation) have a positive and significant correlation with profitability. 
This study could be improved by analysing the impact of the global financial crisis on 
the Islamic banking system. Additionally, the researchers could compare Islamic 
financial performance with conventional banks to see the difference. 
Wasiuzzaman and Tarmizi (2010) focused on financial performance of 16 Islamic 
Malaysian banks over the period 2005-2008. The profitability ratio is represented by the 
return on average assets (ROAA), and OLS was used to find the determinants of ROAA. 
The empirical results in this study show that the positive determinants were found to be 
liquidity, operational efficiency, GDP and inflation, while asset quality and capitalisation 
affected the banking earnings inversely. The use of only one profitability indicator 
represents a weakness point in this study is neglecting the comparison between 
performance ratios. 
Bashir (2003) considers ROA and ROE as dependent variables for Islamic banks to find 
the factors of profits in the Middle East during the period 1993-1998. Large capitalised 
banks attained better ROE but fewer ROA. In addition, foreign banks were likely to 
achieve better profits. The results also show that financial market structure is very 
important for profitability. Moreover, the taxation reduced the ROA and ROE 
significantly and badly. Finally, the inflation in the Middle East influenced the banking 
profits positively and significantly over the period 1993-1998. 
To summarise, in Islamic banks, return on assets and return on equity found to be 
highly employed to evaluate the financial performance but few studies concentrate on 
NIM.  
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3.1.2 Profitability in conventional banks 
Sufian and Habibullah (2010) examine the characteristics that affect bank performance 
in Malaysia over the period 1999-2007. The dependent variables are ROA and ROE 
while the independent variables are bank characteristics, economic conditions and 
freedom standards. The fixed effects and generalized method of moments (GMM) 
regressions have been employed to find the determinants of performance. The 
outcomes of the regressions indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship 
between ROA and loan intensity, diversification, cost ratio, capital ratio, inflation, 
economic freedom, business freedom and corruption freedom. In contrast, the variables 
found to be dropping the ROA are credit risk, GDP and monetary freedom. According to 
ROE, Sufian and Habibullah (2010) reveal that loan intensity, diversification, cost ratio, 
inflation, economic freedom, business freedom and corruption freedom increase the 
ROE, whereas credit risk, GDP and monetary freedom reduce the ROE throughout the 
period in Malaysia. The limitation of this study can be excluding net interest margin as 
an explained variable. Moreover, this study could be expanded in time period to 
investigate the global financial crisis influences.  
Westman (2011) focused on the European banking sector by estimating the 
performance determinants of investment and commercial banks of 37 European 
countries from the years 2003 to 2006. The baseline model specification has been run 
to find the relationship between the profitability (ROA and ROE) and its determinants. 
Overall, non-traditional banks are more profitable than traditional and diversified banks. 
Moreover, larger banks have more profitability than smaller banks. Finally, banks with 
higher capital achieve more ROA, whereas banks with lower capital scored more ROE 
during the period in the examined banks. 
In the Macedonian banking system, Ćurak et al. (2012) analysed bank-specific, 
industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability (ROA) over the 
period 2005-2010 adopting the GMM method (statistical approach). According to the 
results, ROA is influenced significantly and negatively by solvency risk (capital ratio), 
credit risk (loans to total assets) and operating expenses of management (costs to 
assets). In contrast, liquidity (loans to deposits), concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
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Index) and GDP growth were found to be correlated with ROA significantly and 
positively (the higher the determinants the more profits) in selected Macedonian banks.   
Tan and Floros (2012) focused on the Chinese banking industry by examining the 
factors of profitability (ROA and net interest margin (NIM)). The sample includes 101 
banks (5 state-owned banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks and 84 city commercial 
banks) for the period 2003-2009. The statistical approach to find the determinants of 
profitability is the GMM method. Regarding the findings of GMM, this study illustrates 
that ROA has been affected positively by labour productivity (gross revenue/number of 
employees), banking sector development in China (bank assets to GDP), stock market 
development (market capitalisation of listed companies/GDP) and annual inflation rates. 
In contrast, credit risk (LLP/loans), taxation (tax/operating profit before tax), 
capitalisation ratio and concentration (total assets of the largest five banks/total assets 
of the whole banking industry) were found to be reducing the ROA through the 
examined period in China. Overall, the banks under the study scored very low average 
ROA (0.007) which needs to be improved through maximising the profits by reducing 
the capital of banks and increasing the labour productivity. The ownerships‟ effects were 
not considered in this study, which can be included in this thesis.  
Lee and Kim (2013) investigated the bank performance and its determinants examining 
17 Korean commercial banks for the period 2003-2010. This study used ROA and ROE 
ratios as dependent variables and the independent variables of size, risk ratio (loans to 
deposits), ownership, GDP growth, and mergers and acquisitions transactions. The 
relationship between profitability ratios and its determinants was evaluated by fixed 
effects regression. As a result, larger banks were found to be more profitable, GDP 
growth improves the profits, and merger and acquisitions transactions reduce the 
profitability in terms of the ROA measures. According to the ROE determinants, the 
GDP growth enhances the ROE over the period in Korea. Overall, foreign international 
banks were found to be more profitable than government banks in Korea. In order to 
improve this research, another statistical regression could be used (e.g., OLS model) 
besides fixed effects model. Evermore, public ownership could be added to compare 
foreign and public possession.   
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Focusing on the US banking sector, Apergis (2014) evaluated the factors that impact 
the profitability of 1725 non-traditional banks spanning the period 2000-2013. The 
explained variable in this study is the ROA with the explanatory variables of insolvency 
risk index, total non-traditional activities, ratio of loans to assets, capital ratio, ratio of 
non-performing loans, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, consumer prices, real per capita 
income and financial crisis. The findings explain that all the above factors affect the 
profitability in US non-traditional banks as ROA influenced positively the total non-
traditional activities, ratio of loans to assets, capital ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
consumer prices, and real per capita income. In contrast, a negative and significant 
relationship was found between ROA and insolvency risk, ratio of non-performing loans 
and financial crisis. In particular, ROA has been affected the most by the financial crisis 
as the coefficient was the highest compared to other factors. Overall, considering ROA 
only as a dependent variable is a disadvantage point as including more profitability 
ratios (such as ROE and NIM) provide a stronger argument of earnings‟ factors. 
Concentrating on NIM only, Hussain (2014) applied a linear estimation to find the NIM 
determination for 26 commercial Pakistani banks from 2001-2010. The main findings of 
the study suggest that smaller banks invested their interest revenues more effectively 
than larger banks. The negative determinants of Pakistani banks found to be liquidity, 
diversification and stock market. On the other side, in order to achieve better NIM 
Pakistani banks could consider operating costs and market share in terms of bank-
specific indicators. According to industry-specific variables, industrial growth and 
inflation increased the NIM significantly. However, ignoring the impact of the global 
financial crisis reflects a weakness point in this study.  
Overall, by comparing the profitability of conventional banks with Islamic banks, we find 
that conventional banks are more profitable because they charge interest for some 
services, and Islamic banks have specific constraints (e.g. alcoholic trade) that affect 
their earnings.  
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3.1.3 Profitability in Islamic and conventional banks  
Olson and Zoubi (2011) analysed the performance of 83 Islamic and conventional 
banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region covering 10 countries. The 
period is from 2000 to 2008 using ROA and ROE as dependent variables. The statistical 
relationship between the profitability and its determinants has been found after running 
random effect regression. The results of the study show that loan intensity, capital ratio, 
credit risk and inflation impact the ROA positively and significantly. On the other side, 
the inefficiency ratio calculated as operating expenses to gross income was found to be 
affecting the ROA negatively. This study contributed that loan intensity and inflation 
raise the ROE, whereas inefficiency ratio, capital ratio and credit risk are reducing the 
ROE during the period in the examined MENA banks. Furthermore, foreign banks were 
found to be achieving more profits than government banks. 
Beck et al. (2013a) identify that size decrease of ROA and ROE in 510 Islamic and 
conventional banks across 22 countries for the period 1995-2009. In other words, small 
banks achieve more profits referring to the significant and negative relationship between 
the size and ROA/ROE over the period of the study. In contrast, the results suggest that 
an increase in fixed assets leads to a decline in ROE only. In general, the researchers 
proved that Islamic banks are affected less by financial crisis than conventional banks; 
also, Islamic banks financially performed and capitalised better than conventional banks 
during the period of the study. In order to make this study more effective, more 
determinants could be included.  
Ghosh (2015) examined the determinants of profitability using ROA and NIM as 
explained variables in 12 MENA countries through the period 2000-2012. The 
advantage of this study is that the researcher included the Arab Spring (revolutions 
period). The results confirmed that Arab Spring affected ROA and NIM negatively. 
Regarding to ROA‟s results, capital ratio impacted ROA positively and significantly while, 
liquidity had a negative relationship with ROA. The other independent variables (size, 
capital ratio, ratio of liquid asset to total asset and diversification) were not important to 
the NIM in MENA countries. In conclusion, the competitive advantage in this study is 
including the Arab Spring, which contributes to the literature strongly. But, neglecting 
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ROE (as a profitability indicator) and industry-specific factors can be disadvantages of 
this study. 
As a summary of the literature review of profitability in Islamic and conventional banks, 
the main region of the literature review is the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) 
area. 
3.2 Determinants of profitability in banking 
Based on the literature review on profitability, this study examines the determinants of 
profitability using the highest beneficial internal variables as bank size, capital ratio, loan 
intensity, credit risk, deposit ratio, age, z-score, ownership (foreign, domestic and 
public) and listing. On the other side, GDP, inflation, market capitalisation, global 
financial crisis and control of corruption can be examined as external variables.  
3.2.1Internal variables 
1. Bank size 
Most studies examined size of bank (total assets) as an indicator of profitability such as 
Petria et al. (2015) who examined the effect of size on performance in 27 European 
countries over the period 2004-2011. The results suggest that size impacts the ROA 
positively and significantly. This concludes that banks with higher total assets achieved 
better profits. The reason for this result could be due to larger banks being more likely to 
gain profits from economies of scale than smaller banks, with a higher degree of 
production differentiation and loan diversification. Many studies proposed that size of 
the bank influences the ROA positively (e.g., Chronopoulos et al., 2015; Guillén et al., 
2014; Bertay et al., 2013; Lee & Kim, 2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013; Shehzad et al., 2013; 
Haan & Poghosyan, 2012; Houston et al., 2010; Flamini et al., 2009), also based on 
NIM, Liang et al. (2013) and Sufian and Habibullah (2009) found that more assets 
supported the interest revenues. On the other side, some studies suggested the 
opposite finding which is smaller sized banks were more profitable (see Căpraru & 
Ihnatov, 2014; Haan & Poghosyan, 2012; Barry et al., 2011; Lin & Zhang, 2009; 
Altunbas & Marques, 2008). However, the size of the bank could be unimportant to the 
financial performance (Ghosh, 2015; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Al-Musali & Ismail, 2014; 
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Shah & Jan, 2014; Ćurak et al., 2012; Delis et al., 2012; Tan & Floros, 2012; Olson & 
Zoubi, 2011; Athanasoglou et al. 2008). 
2. Capital ratio 
A comprehensive number of studies have focused on the relationship between 
profitability in banking and capitalisation. As an example, Căpraru and Iulian Ihnatov 
(2014) examined the impact of capitalisation in 143 commercial banks for the period 
2004-2011 in Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. The results 
show that the correlation between profitability ratios (ROA and ROE) and capitalisation 
is positive and significant. Banks with greater capital can invest effectively more than 
lower capital banks which leads to achieving better profits. This finding is supported by 
a large number of studies in the banking area (e.g. Ghosh, 2015; Mamatzakis et al., 
2015; Apergis, 2014; Mirzaei et al.  2013; Chitan, 2012;  Kutan et al., 2012; Manlagnit  
2011; Sufian & Habibullah, 2010; Flamini et al., 2009; García-Herrero et al., 2009  
Altunbas & Marques, 2008; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 
1999). In contrast, Chronopoulos, et al. (2015) pointed out that capitalisation influences 
the profitability negatively and significantly in the US banking sector for more than 
17,500 commercial banks over the period 1984-2010. In fact, a few articles found that 
lower capitalised banks are more profitable than higher capitalised banks (Mollah & 
Zaman, 2015; Shehzad, et al., 2013; Ćurak et al. (2012) Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; 
Altunbas & Marques, 2008). In some cases, capitilisation could increase and decrease 
profitability ratios such as Olson and Zoubi (2011) and Westman (2011) who conclude 
that capital enhances ROA but reduces ROE. Delis et al. (2012), Tan and Floros (2012) 
and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) pointed out that capital ratio has no effect on 
profitability (ROA/ROE) in their studies. According to NIM, most studies went with the 
idea of higher capitalised banks were able to invest in interests (see, Căpraru & Ihnatov, 
2014; Heffernan & Fu, 2010; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009; Claeys & Vennet, 2008; Lanine 
& Vennet, 2007) while, few studies disagreed with this concept and underlined that 
increasing capital forced banks to pay more interest expenses (Zhou & Wong, 2008). 
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3. Loan intensity 
Lin and Zhang (2009) investigated the loans impact on financial performance examining 
322 Chinese banks through the period 1997-2004. The statistical results indicate that 
providing more loans leads to higher profits. On the other side, Manlagnit (2011) 
recommended banks to reduce loans due to increasing profits in Philippines for the 
period 1990 to 2006. Chronopoulos et al. (2015) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999) agreed with this point of view. However, Altunbas and Marques (2008) classified 
their data into two types: domestic (207 banks) and cross-border mergers (55 banks) in 
Europe over the period 1992-2001. The finding of hierarchical regression suggests that 
domestic mergers banking could find strategies of making a cut in their loans due to 
raising the earnings; whereas, cross-border mergers banking includes a positive 
relationship between loans and profits. Referring to the NIM determinants, not many 
studies considered loan intensity as a determinant, Sufian and Habibullah (2009), 
Claeys and Vennet (2008) and Lanine and Vennet (2007) mentioned that involving in 
lending activities supported the net interest margin positively and significantly. This 
result occurred due to providing more loans can raise the lending interests (earnings) 
from clients.  
 
4. Credit (liquidity) risk 
Chitan (2012) considered loans to deposits ratio as a negative sign to the ROE ratio for 
Romanian commercial banks during the period 2004-2011. This means that the growth 
in lending leads to better ROE ratios (similar to Altunbas & Marques, 2008). In this case 
banks could find strategies that can link between deposits and loans such as providing 
more loans with higher interest rates due to intensifying the earnings. Liang et al. (2013) 
concluded the opposite relationship between NIM and credit risk after examining 194 
European commercial banks for the period 2000-2007. In this case, banks had to 
reduce loans due to achieving better NIM. 
 
5. Deposit ratio 
This variable allows policy makers in the banking sector to accept more or fewer 
deposits. A few studies examined deposit ratio as an independent variable to the 
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profitability such as García-Herrero et al. (2009) who investigated the impact of deposits 
in China. This study examined 87 commercial banks for the period 1997-2004. The 
statistical empirical results proposed that deposit intensity could increase the profitability 
significantly. This result is in line with Claeys and Vennet (2008) who encouraged 
accepting more deposits due to strengthen the NIM. The banks can provide more 
deposit interests to attract clients in this case. By contrast, Barry et al. (2011) confirmed 
that deposits affected the earnings negatively and significantly in the 16 West European 
countries in the period 1999-2005 for the commercial banking sector.  
 
6. Age 
Mirzaei et al. (2013) examined the correlation between age profits for 1929 banks over 
1999-2008. They divided their sample into emerging and advanced economies including 
40 countries. The fixed effects model underlines that old banks attained more returns in 
countries with emerging economies. This could be due to older banks having more 
experience in banking operations than new banks; also, time could allow banks to 
generate more capitalisation which leads to profits. In comparison, new banks had 
better profitability in advanced economies countries (negative relationship between 
profitability ratios and age which is consistent with Beck et al., 2005 study).  
 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) focused on the Swiss banking sector using data of 372 
commercial banks. This study used age as a dummy variable and found that older 
banks were more profitable (ROA and NIM) than new banks. According to new banks, 
they increased the return on assets significantly. According to return on equity ratio, 
older banks (insignificant with ROE) were also found to be more profitable than new 
banks (significantly increase the ROE). 
However, Dedu and Chitan (2013) found no impact of age on profitability in Romania for 
the period 2004-2011. 
 
7. Z-score 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) consider the Islamic and commercial banking sector in their 
study examining the determinants of profitability including z-score in 25 countries 
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including 172 banks (86 Islamic and 86 commercial banks) for the period 2005-2011. 
The association between profitability and z-score was positive and significant in Islamic 
and commercial banks (similar to Mamatzakis et al., 2015 outcome). This demonstrates 
that more stability and less default risk encourage banks to achieve more returns. Thus, 
banks seek to increase capitalisation and profits simultaneously.   
 
8. Ownership 
According to ownership, most studies classify ownership into three types: domestic 
(private), foreign, and government (state-owned or public) ownership. Regarding 
domestic ownership, some studies conclude that domestic banks increase the 
profitability such as Athanasoglou et al. (2008). This contradicts with Flamini et al. 
(2009) who estimated that domestic ownership decreases the earnings. Focusing on 
foreign ownership, Lin and Zhang (2009), Micco et al. (2007) and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) confirmed that foreign banking concentration improves profits in their 
studies. On the other side, Dedu and Chitan (2013), Lee and Kim (2013), Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2011) and Manlagnit (2011) pointed out that the relationship between 
profitability ratios and foreign ownership was negative and significant. However, Mirzaei 
et al. (2013) had a mixed point of view which confirms that foreign ownership could 
increase (in emerging economies) and decrease (in advanced economies) profits. 
Concerning public ownership, Rumler and Waschiczek (2014) proved that public 
ownership increases the profitability of Austrian commercial banks for the period 1995-
2010. Lee and Kim (2013) and Olson and Zoubi (2011) disagree with this point of view 
(negative relationship between profitability and public ownership).  
 
In general, the relationship between ownership and profitability can encourage or 
discourage banks‟ shareholders to invest more or less in banking such as buying or 
selling shares. In addition, shareholders can operate more branches locally or abroad 
based on the relationship between ownership and profitability. 
 
 
 
48 
 
9. Listing  
Many studies propose that banks listed on the stock market are more profitable that 
those which are unlisted. The reason behind this is because listed banks have more 
control from central banks, which lead them to be more organised than unlisted banks. 
Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015) and Lin and Zhang (2009) approved this point of view. 
On the contrary, Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) found the opposite correlation 
between listing and ROA for Switzerland. However, Barry et al. (2011), Heffernan and 
Fu (2010), Olson and Zoubi (2011) and García-Herrero et al. (2009) found insignificant 
associations between stock market listing and profitability ratios. 
 
3.2.2 External variables 
1. Gross Domestic Production (GDP) 
Mostly all banks focus on countries with developed economies to achieve economies of 
scale and scope. Recent studies have underlined that GDP growth enhances ROA/ROE 
(e.g., Chronopoulos et al., 2015; Guillén et al., 2014; Rumler & Waschiczek, 2014; 
Bertay et al., 2013; Dedu & Chitan, 2013;  Lee & Kim, 2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013; Chitan, 
2012; Kutan et al., 2012; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; Houston et al., 2010; Flamini et 
al. 2009; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; Boubakri et al., 2005). A few studies have the 
opposite point of view that GDP development reduces ROA/ROE (see Bertay et al., 
2013; Shehzad et al., 2013; Delis et al., 2012; Sufian & Habibullah, 2010; Boubakri et 
al., 2005). However, Ewijk and Arnold (2014), Houston et al. (2010) and Claeys and 
Vennet (2008) supported that investing in interests is better in countries with higher 
GDP growth as the relationship between NIM and GDP were significant and positive. 
 
2. Inflation 
In the literature, many studies indicate that banks in countries with higher inflation rates 
financially perform better than banks in countries with lower inflation rates as the 
relationship between inflation and profitability ratios were positive and significant. 
Examples that support this point of view include the studies of Căpraru and Ihnatov 
(2014), Rumler and Waschiczek (2014), Bertay et al. (2013), Delis et al. (2012), Kutan 
et al. (2012), Tan and Floros (2012), Olson and Zoubi (2011), Sufian and Habibullah 
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(2010), Flamini et al. (2009), García-Herrero et al. (2009) and Pasiouras and Kosmidou 
(2007) who considered ROA and ROE. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), Hussain 
(2014), Tan and Floros (2012) and Houston et al. (2010) found also that countries with 
higher inflation rates have better environment for interests investment (positive 
relationship with NIM). However, a few studies went against this result in terms of ROA 
and ROE such as Lee and Kim (2013), Mirzaei et al. (2013), Shehzad et al. (2013), 
Kanas et al. (2012) and Houston et al. (2010) who found that higher inflation rates led to 
lower earnings. Considering NIM, Liang et al. (2013) and Sufian and Habibullah (2009) 
found a negative and significant correlation between NIM and inflation. This point of 
view is more logical due to inflation causing decrement in an individual‟s wealth 
(purchasing power or cash flow) which negatively affects the deposits of banks. As a 
result of reduction in deposits, loans reduce which leads to less profit. Although inflation 
is a very important variable to the economy, Petria et al. (2015), Mirzaei et al. (2013), 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) could not find any 
evidence of inflation impact on profitability in their studies. 
 
3. Market capitalisation 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) investigated the determinants of profitability in 15 
European countries using data of 584 banks over the period 1995-2001. The stock 
market expansion was found to be very important for banks to maximise their profits as 
the relationship between market capitalisation and profitability was highly correlated at 
the 1% level. However, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) found that stock market 
index was insignificant in their study over the period 1988-1995. Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2014) found that stock market growth did not affect NIM in their study. 
 
4. Global financial crisis (GFC) 
Al-Musali and Ismail (2014) proved that the profits of Saudi commercial banks were 
increased in the period of the global financial crisis. Apergis (2014) found the same 
result on American commercial and investment banks. By contrast, Haan and 
Poghosyan (2012) confirmed that the global financial crisis affected the financial 
performance of the American commercial negatively, savings and cooperative banks. 
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Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) underlined that the global financial crisis badly 
decreased the net interest margins and banks at that time suffered from high costs 
(expenses).  
 
5. Control of corruption 
Sufian and Habibullah (2010) found that the relationship between corruption freedoms is 
strongly significant and positive in terms of profitability ratios (ROA and ROE). In 
addition, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) confirmed that corruption affects the 
profits of banks significantly and negatively. This result encourages the government to 
impose more control on corruption to enhance financial performance in the banking 
sector. 
 
Appendix 2 explains, in detail, the recent studies which examine the determinants of 
profitability in the banking sector. The relationship between the profitability ratios and 
the independent variables are shown as well. 
 
3.3 Stability in banking 
As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, studies on stability have increased 
considerably in importance since the global financial crisis of 2007. Many studies 
concentrate on conventional banks (Cubillas & González, 2014; Fu et al., 2014; William, 
2014), but there are limited studies analysing Islamic banks or comparing Islamic and 
conventional banking stability (Ghosh, 2014; Beck et al. 2013a). Most studies focus on 
z-scores which indicate the percentage of bankruptcy. Many studies also consider 
capital ratio as a stability indicator (dependent variable), such as Horvàth et al. (2014), 
Schaeck and Cihàk (2014) and DeYound and Torna (2013). There are comprehensive 
studies which found the determinants of stability through statistical regressions such as 
OLS, which is the most common model (Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014; Jeon & Lim, 
2013; Lee & Chih, 2013; Srairi, 2013), fixed effect regression (Fu et al., 2014) and 
random effects (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Cubillas & González, 2014). This next part is 
divided into two topics: a literature review on stability in Islamic banks and stability in 
conventional banks, and then stability in Islamic and conventional banks.  
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3.3.1 Stability in Islamic banks 
Ĉihák and Hesse (2010) used only z-score as a stability indicator for 77 Islamic banks 
across the world, over the period 1993-2004. The main determinants in this study are 
efficiency ratio, loan intensity and size. In particular, efficiency ratio has a negative and 
significant correlation with stability. This means that expenses of banks were 
remarkably more than income, which raises the probability of bankruptcies. The lending 
activities also impacted the stability inversely and significantly. Finally, larger-sized 
banks were found to be more stable and less risky. This study could be improved by 
including more stability indicators such as capital ratio. 
Rajhi and Hassairi (2013) discuss the Islamic banking stability for MENA and Southeast 
Asian regions for the period 2000-2008. This study explains the causes of stability as 
size of banks, loans services, liquidity and GDP. In contrast, efficiency ratio and inflation 
led to instability. These results allow managers to attract more clients to borrow; one 
way could be by minimising the lending interest. Additionally, bankers could consider 
reducing their costs, as efficiency ratio has a negative and significant sign.  
Concentrating on 15 African countries, Faye et al. (2013) investigate the Islamic 
financial resistibility using z-score and equity to assets ratio as dependent factors over 
the period 2005-2012. The main empirical results conclude that stability and 
capitalisation were significantly and conversely affected by the size of banks. The GDP 
per capita and supervision quality were very beneficial in supporting capitals. Moreover, 
more restrictions in banking activities imposed from government resulted in better 
financial stability and fewer insolvency risks.  
 
The literature review of the stability in Islamic banks is limited. Therefore, further 
research can be conducted and more stability indicators can be examined.   
 
3.3.2 Stability in conventional banks 
Concentrating on the stability factors of four South Asian banks (Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka), Nguyen et al. (2012) evaluated the causes of stabilities 
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through using z-score as a dependent variable for the period 1998-2008 using 
generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimator as a statistical method. The findings 
show that banks with greater market power are more stable when they diversify into 
non-traditional activities. Moreover, size, total non-interest income, capital ratio, financial 
development (market capitalisation to GDP) and business cycle (GDP growth rate) raise 
the z-score (decrease insolvency risk); whereas, ex-post credit losses and 
concentration reduce the z-score (increase insolvency risk). Overall, state-owned banks 
were found to be less risky than foreign banks. In conclusion, the most stable country 
was found to be Sri Lanka (average z-score = 8.93) followed by India (8.33) then 
Pakistan (7.54) and Bangladesh (7.41). However, the results indicate that the selected 
banks have not been influenced by the Asian financial crisis (AFC) or global financial 
crisis (GFC). 
Concentrating on the Chinese banking sector, Lee and Chih (2013) examined the 
impact of financial regulation upon risk of commercial banks in China using z-score for 
the risk during the period 2004-2011. Statistically, the OLS model was employed to find 
the determinants of risk. The results of the OLS model reveal that small banks were 
exposed to more risk of bankruptcy than large banks scoring Ln (z-score) of 3.744 and 
3.850 for small and large banks, respectively; a higher z-score means that the bank has 
less risk and more stability (Fu et al., 2014). However, large banks show a negative 
relationship between the risk and operating cost to operating income ratio. Moreover, 
the capital (adequacy) ratio and leverage impact the risk positively in small banks. 
Finally, loan to deposits seems to be relevant for small banks (negative relationship with 
risk) also, new large banks face more risk of bankruptcy than older large banks. In this 
study, it is observable that there is no presence for macroeconomic variables that could 
have significance relationship with financial stability. 
An international study by Cubillas and González (2014) examined the financial stability 
of 4333 banks in 83 (developed and developing) countries from 1991 to 2007. Their 
methodology depends on the random effects model having z-score and bank market 
power as dependent variables. The results obtained by Cubillas and González (2014) 
explain that the financial liberalisation increases the risk-taking which also raises the 
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competition in the banking sectors. Moreover, capital requirements help decrease the 
negative impact of financial liberalisation on financial stability. Additionally, official 
supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries. 
However, the main determinants of z-score according to this study are bank market 
power which have a positive effect on z-score, while, deposit insurance coverage to 
deposits per capita, GDP growth, GDP and inflation affect z-score negatively. In 
comparison, banks in developed countries are more stable and have less risk than 
developing countries referring to the findings. Furthermore, small banks were found to 
be having more risk-taking (lower z-score) over the period of the study in the 83 
countries. This study failed to compare stability between the used countries. 
Jeon and Lim (2013) discuss the impact of competition, bank-specific and economic 
variables on financial stability by comparing commercial banks and saving banks in 
Korea through the period 1999-2011. The statistical methods of analysing the results 
are OLS and fixed effects regressions. Three main issues were discussed; (i) 
Competition in the Korean banking market significantly increases the financial stability 
of commercial and savings banks in Korea (positive relationship between competition 
and z-score) but specifically, savings banks are more stable (have more z-score 
measures) over the period than commercial banks. (ii) Referring to bank characteristics, 
this study points out that profit ratio (net income over revenues) and loan to deposits 
ratio (credit risk) allowed banks to be less insolvency risky. (iii) According to economic 
variables, the findings indicate that the market volatility and interception affected the z-
score significantly and negatively which means these variables are decreasing the z-
score and raising the insolvency for commercial and saving banks in Korea during the 
period. In order to develop this research, the analysis could count effects of Asian 
financial crisis and global financial crisis.  
Concentrating on the Asian Pacific region, Fu et al. (2014) analysed the financial 
stability and its determinants in 14 countries during the period 2003-2010 including 1500 
observations. The z-score is the dependent variable and the independent variables are 
efficiency of bank competition (calculated as the difference between price and marginal 
cost), concentration, size, loan loss provision to total assets, net interest margin, GDP 
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growth, financial crisis, entry restrictions, capital requirements and deposit insurance. 
After using fixed effects regression to identify the stability‟s determinants, the results 
suggest that the competition and net interest margin (profitability ratio; more profits 
makes banks more stable) are the only variables that increase the stability and reduce 
the risk. On the other hand, the higher concentration of the three largest banks in each 
country leads to decline in the stability; also, the findings show that smaller banks were 
found to be less risky and more stable over the period in the Asian Pacific region. 
However, there is no significant effect from the financial crisis on the stability referring to 
the empirical results of that study. However, there is no consideration in this study for 
ownerships‟ impacts on stability. 
Williams (2014) made a study on 1091 Asian banks over the period 1998-2012. This 
study summarises that increasing capital (equity), fixed assets, GDP, deposit rate led to 
raising the z-score over the period. Thus, these independent variables made the 
stability higher and reduced the risk, so banks could consider them due to achieving 
more stability in the future. Overall, both AFC and GFC affected the banks‟ stability 
negatively as the z-score reduced during the crisis periods and they faced a high 
probability of failure (insolvency risk). 
Another study on 68 Asian banks has been conducted by Chalermchatvichien et al. 
(2014) focusing on bank stability in the Asian region using z-score as a dependent 
variable through the period 2005-2010. The results of OLS examination reveal that net 
stable funding ratio (available amount of stable funding to required amount of stable 
funding) influences the z-score significantly and positively over the period which made 
the banks more stable. In contrast, a significant and negative relationship was found 
between z-score and the following variables: ownership concentration, loan loss and 
revenue growth. In other words, these variables led to making the banks weaker and 
unstable (with high risk-taking). The OLS only was used in this study, which reduce the 
effectiveness of results. Thus, using another statistical model (for example, fixed or 
random effects models) provides more robustness. 
Focusing on capital ratio as an indicator of stability, Schaeck and Cihàk (2014) analysed 
banking sector in 10 European countries for the period 1995-2005. The main findings 
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estimated that banks with fewer assets (small) could maximise their capital more than 
large banks. Additionally, older banks were well capitalised compared to the new banks. 
Finally, banks in countries with higher individual wealth (GDP per capita growth) could 
raise their capitalisation. The logic reason behind this result can be due to higher GDP 
per capita provide an advantage to banks to take more deposits and then invest them 
by exposing lending interests.   
Horvàth et al. (2014) studied the stability of Czech Republic commercial banking sector 
by taking 31 commercial banks through the period 2000-2010. Horvàth et al. (2014) 
employed GMM model to find the capital ratio determinants. The findings proposed that 
z-score had a significant and positive relationship with the capital which means that the 
Czech banks were stable and not risky when they involved more in operations. In 
addition, higher inflation rates increased the capital which is unexpected. On the other 
side, negative determinants of capitalisation found in the study as non-performing loans, 
credit risk, earnings volatility, size and unemployment. This study neglected employing 
loans and deposits as explanatory factors. This gap can be examined in this thesis to 
find whether loans and deposits affect stability or not. 
Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) compared the stability of public and private banks in Indian 
employing capital ratio as a stability measure for the period 1990-2011. The empirical 
results confirmed that credit risk (loans to deposits ratio) badly rose in both sectors 
(public and private), which means that banks were finding a trouble in terms of covering 
the clients‟ deposits. In this case, banks could reduce the amount of loans and accept 
more deposits. Focusing on Indian industry-specific factors, the GDP and inflation 
decreased the shareholders‟ equity in terms of public banking sector significantly. On 
the other side, the inflation rates found to be increasing the capital ratio positively and 
significantly in private sector.  
According to US banking sector, DeYound and Torna (2013) analysed American 
banks‟s stability using capital ratio from 2007-2010. The statistical results showed that 
over the period, the American banks‟ capitalisation were affected significantly and 
positively by stakeholder, liquidity, non-performing loans, equity, brokered deposits, 
goodwill. The contribution of this study is using the goodwill which has not been 
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considered in the recent studies. However, there is no negative determination in this 
study. 
Based on the literature review of stability in conventional banks, financial stability is high 
due to the generation of outstanding profits by conventional banks. As a result, this 
moves the banks further away from the risk of insolvency.  
3.3.3 Stability in Islamic and conventional banks 
Beck et al. (2013a) argue that non-loan earnings assets increase the z-score in 510 
Islamic and conventional banks across 22 countries for the period 1995-2009. The 
results suggest that Islamic banks are less likely to dis-intermediate during crises due to 
higher z-score. Overall, small banks were found to be scoring the highest z-score and 
increasing in fixed assets leading to raising the z-score, which makes banks in the 
sample more stabilised. In conclusion, the selected banks can reduce the probability of 
bankruptcy by focusing on non-loan earnings assets and fixed assets. According to 
capital ratio, smaller banks found to be more capitalised than larger banks. In contrast, 
banks with greater amount of fixed assets had less capital.    
According to the MENA region, Srairi (2013) compared the determinants of risk using 10 
countries over the period 2005-2009. This study evaluated 175 Islamic and conventional 
banks in MENA. There are three types of explanatory variables as ownership, bank-
specific variables and financial indicators. Srairi (2013) adopted OLS regression as a 
statistical approach to examine the determinants of z-score. This study yielded three 
main results: (i) Family banks tend to be more stable than company and state-owned 
banks. (ii) Concentration (equity % participation by the largest shareholder of the bank), 
size, loan growth, operating leverage, diversification, banking sector development, 
shareholders rights and bank concentration (assets of 3 largest banks to total assets of 
all banks in the country) were found to have a significant and positive z-score which 
leads to making the banks less risky. (iii) Efficiency ratio (cost to income) was found to 
be decreasing the z-score which raises the insolvency risk. Overall, during the period, 
conventional banks have more mean z-score (21.7) than Islamic banks (20.8) which 
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makes the conventional banks more stable and resistant against crises in MENA 
countries. 
An international study by Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) focused on Islamic and conventional 
banks covering 16 countries using z-score as a bank stability indicator. This study used 
68 (34 Islamic and 34 Conventional) banks for the period 1998-2009 using random 
effects to find the factors that affect the stability. The results obtained by Bourkhis and 
Nabi (2013) argue that the global financial crisis (GFC) does not impact the banks‟ 
stability. Overall, stability was affected significantly and negatively by loan intensity 
(more loans lead to lower z-score). However, a significant and positive relationship was 
found between z-score and inflation rates which made the banks more stable with low 
amount of failure risk. In particular, the findings suggest that efficiency ratio (cost to 
income) influenced the z-score in large banks only inversely. Larger banks were found 
to be unstable compared to small banks. In conclusion, Islamic banks could reduce the 
risk of bankruptcy more than conventional banks over the period. This study could be 
improved by using more stability indicators (e.g., capital ratios) to allow comparison 
between banks. 
A significant comparison has been conducted between Middle Eastern banks and 
Eastern Europe banks over the period 1999-2008 examining 1929 banks by Mirzaei et 
al. (2013). The empirical results explain that for banks in the Middle East, market share, 
interest rate, capital ratio and overheads to total assets ratio have a significant and 
negative relationship with z-score, while inflation and bank size were found to be 
decreasing the z-score (increasing the risk). Regarding the Eastern Europe banks, the 
findings indicate that z-score (stability) was influenced significantly and positively by 
market share, interest rate spread, capital ratio, off-balance sheet to total assets, bank 
age, inflation and GDP. In contrast, overheads to total assets ratio is negative and 
significant with z-score at the 5% level. Overall, the most stable banks were found to be 
the foreign banks (Middle Eastern and Eastern Europe) through the period. 
According to the GCC banking market, Ghosh (2014) tested the relation between risk 
and capital for 57 conventional banks and 46 Islamic banks in the GCC region for the 
period 1996-2011. The main finding (after employing the 2SLS model) shows that banks 
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generally increase capital in response to an increase in risk. However, the determinants 
of risk identified by Ghosh (2014) such as funding (short-term funding over total assets) 
and listed banks explain the z-score significantly and positively. In contrast, income 
diversification was found to have a significant and negative relationship with z-score 
(the risk indicator) which made banks more risky through the period. Regarding the 
capitlaisation, the relationship between the capital ratio and size found to be significant 
and negative while, ROA were improving the capital significantly over the period. In 
general, Ghosh (2014) proposed that the GFC does not impact the stability of banks in 
GCC.  
Köhler (2015) examined the factors of stability on 15 EU countries investigating 3362 
banks through the period 2002-2011. The factors that strengthen the stability were 
found to be non-interest income share, capital ratio, loan intensity, net interest margin, 
GDP growth and GDP per capita. On the other side, size, inflation, deposit money bank 
assets to GDP and real long-term interest rate reduce the stability. Overall, the most 
stable type of bank was the cooperative banking system, while investment banks were 
exposed to the highest insolvency risk. However, comparing stability of commercial, 
investment, cooperative and savings banks could add a contribution to the literature.   
The literature review on stability allows the researcher to empirically analyse the 
relationship between the stability and the independent variables. The bank-specific 
variables can be bank size, capital ratio, loan intensity, credit risk, ROA, operating 
leverage age, ownerships (foreign, domestic and public) and listing. On the other side, 
GDP, inflation, market capitalization, global financial crisis and control of corruption can 
be examined as macroeconomic variables. All recent variables were available through 
Bankscope and World Banks databases. 
In comparison, Islamic banks were found to be well capitalised compared to 
conventional banks, as Islamic banks prefer to get their finance through equities rather 
than debts (Usmani, 2002). However, conventional banks are more stable and less risky 
than Islamic banks. This is because conventional banks are more profitable than Islamic 
banks.  
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3.4 Determinants of stability in banking 
The recent studies examined the factors of stability through internal and external 
variables. The following section introduces the literature review of stability in the 
banking sector which can be used efficiently in this thesis.  
 
3.4.1Internal variables 
1. Z-score 
Horvàth et al. (2014) examined the stability of commercial banks in Czech Republic 
over the period 2000-2010 using capital ratio as an indicator of stability. The results 
suggest that banks with higher capitals found to be resistible against any fail. In 
addition, well capitalised banks are financially performing better and strongly stable over 
the period of the study. 
 
2. Capital ratio 
Capitalisation is one of the most important bank-specific variables to describe stability in 
the banking sector. There are many examples showing the importance of capitalisation 
such as the studies of Ghosh (2015), Kohler (2015), Tabak et al. (2015), Williams 
(2014), Mirzaei et al. (2013), Nguyen et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2012) who claimed 
that higher equity led to raising constancy in the banking industry. Consequently, more 
capitalisation lets banks face any threat of failure. On the contrary Tabak et al. (2013) 
argued that capitalisation decreased the stability in the Latin American banking sector 
for the period 2001-2008. In order to avoid any bankruptcy risks, banks need to reduce 
their capitalisation (which enhances the stability). However, Srairi (2013), Delis et al. 
(2012) and Barry et al. (2011) found no relationship between capital ratio and z-score in 
their studies. 
 
3. Bank size 
The size of banks (total assets) played a very important role on stability in the recent 
studies. There are various points of view considered regarding banking size. Some 
studies confirmed that size keeps banks stable with less default risk and others go 
against this orientation. An example of a study that considered a positive relationship 
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between stability and bank size could be the most recent study of Tabak et al. (2015), 
who examined the stability (z-score) determinants of 76 Brazilian commercial banks for 
the period 2001-2011. The result of this study supports having more total assets in the 
Brazilian banking industry. The same result was found by Cubillas and González 
(2014), Beck et al. (2013a), Srairi (2013), Nguyen et al. (2012), Soedarmono et al. 
(2011), Houston et al. (2010), Berger et al. (2009) and Berger et al. (2009). Conversely, 
Kohler (2015), Zhang et al. (2015), Dong et al. (2014), Fu et al. (2014), Beck et al. 
(2013b), Mirzaei et al. (2013), Tan and Floros (2013), Agoraki et al. (2011) and Barry et 
al. (2011) proved a negative and significant correlation between size and stability (z-
score). This result is in line with Ghosh (2014), Horvàth et al. (2014), Schaeck and 
Cihàk (2014), Beck et al. (2013a), Bertay et al. (2013) and Berger et al. (2009) who 
confirmed also a negative relationship between capital ratio and total assets. However, 
some studies found an insignificant association between bank size and stability (e.g., 
Anginer et al., 2014; Ghosh, 2014; Gulamhussen et al., 2014; Williams, 2014; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Bertay et al., 2013; Jeon & Lim, 2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013). 
 
4. Loan intensity 
Kohler (2015) found that banks with a larger loan portfolio have significantly higher z-
scores. This encourages banks to raise their lending activities due to being further from 
insolvency risk, as noted for European commercial banks in the period 2002-2011. This 
contradicts the results of Rumler and Waschiczek (2014), Beck et al. (2013), Bourkhis 
and Nabi (2013) and Berger et al. (2009) who claimed that loans decrease the financial 
stability (z-score) and increase the risk-taking in their studies. Ghosh (2014) found that 
lending operations did not make any difference to stability and risk default in the GCC 
Islamic and commercial banking industry through the period 1996-2011. Berger et al. 
(2009) analysed both stability indicators (z-score and capital ratio) for 23 countries for 
the period 1999-2005. This study discouraged banks from giving more loans as lending 
reduced the capital and increased the default (bankruptcy) risk which logically made 
banks instable. 
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5. Credit (liquidity) risk 
Soedarmono et al. (2011) conducted a study which concentrated on examining the 
financial stability using a sample of commercial banks from 12 Asian countries over 
2001-2007. They documented that the relationship between liquidity and stability ratios 
(z-score and capitalisation) are positive and significant (the same conclusion as Nguyen 
& Nghiem, 2015; Dima et al., 2014; Jeon & Lim, 2013). This means that banks could 
enhance their stability through providing fewer loans to cover the withdrawals of clients. 
On the other side, Lee and Chih (2013) found a negative and significant correlation 
between z-score and loans to deposits ratio. As a result, increasing the loans to 
deposits ratio let banks take less risk over the period 2004-2011. Dong‟s et al. (2014) 
results revealed that loans to deposits ratio was irrelevant to stability in the Chinese 
commercial banking sector through the period 2003-2011. 
 
6. Return on assets (ROA) 
The statistical results of Anginer et al. (2014) claimed that the profitability ratio (ROA) 
improved the steadiness of banks over the period 2004-2009. This result also concludes 
that earnings of banks are very important in terms of profits and can save banks from 
default risk. This is consistent with Ghosh (2014) in terms of capital ratio. The rest of the 
studies in the literature could not provide any further evidence that profits influence 
stability and risk in banking systems (Tabak et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015; Ghosh, 
2014; Srairi, 2013; Tan & Floros, 2013).  
 
7. Operating leverage 
A few studies have examined the determination of fixed assets intensity on stability. 
Srairi (2013) concentrated on the stability indicators of 10 MENA countries including 175 
(Islamic and conventional) banks for the period 2005-2009. Based on the results, the 
Islamic and conventional banks in MENA countries were recommended to purchase 
(invest) more fixed assets as the z-score and operating leverage were found to be 
significant and positive which is consistent with Williams‟s (2014) finding. Berger et al. 
(2009) had an opposite result which suggested that fixed assets (negative correlation 
with z-score) made the financial stability worse (raised the risk of failure) over the period 
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1999-2005 in their sample of 23 countries (1091 Asian commercial banks). This result 
allows policy makers to sell more fixed assets; depreciation could be due to the high 
cost of the fixed assets. In contrast, this study approved that fixed assets intensity 
increased the capitalisation significantly over the period. 
 
8. Age 
Lee and Chih (2013) compared the stability (z-score) of small (185 banks) and large 
(57) banks in China for the period 2004-2011. Lee and Chih (2013) argued that the 
experience in the Chinese banking sector affected the stability of large banks. Higher 
experience time leads to steadier banks with less insolvency risks. In this study, age is 
unimportant for small banks (similar to Dedu & Chitan, 2013). Schaeck and Cihàk 
(2014) included z-score and capital ratio as dependent variables to find if the age 
impact the stability or not examining 10 European Countries for the period 1995-2005. 
As a result of this study, time trend found to be highly important to both z-score and 
capitlisation. Another study also focused on age, Mirzaei et al. (2013) compared the 
stability (z-score) between emerging economies and advanced economies in the Middle 
East and Eastern Europe through the period 1999-2008. This study concludes that older 
banks in advanced economies were financially more settled and less risky. On the other 
side, age was found to be an insignificant variable to stability (z-score). 
 
9. Ownership 
Agoraki et al. (2011) examined the effect of the ownership on the stability of banking 
system examining 13 European transition countries for the period 1998-2005. The 
results suggest that public ownership increase the stability and reduce the risk of 
insolvency while, foreign ownership tended to affect the stability significantly and 
negatively (same conclusion of Berger et al., 2009). Barakat and Hussainey (2013) 
concentrated on government roles of banking for 20 Eurpean Countries through the 
period 2008-2010. As a result, government involvement impacted the stability of banks 
badly. Regarding to capital ratio, Berger et al. (2009) underlined that foreign ownership 
maximised the banks‟ capital significantly over the period 1999-2005. 
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10. Listing 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) claim that banks that are included in the stock market are 
well capitalised. This contradicts with Ghosh (2014) who proposes that unlisted banks 
are better capitalised than listed banks. According to the z-scores, many studies show 
that listed banks are more stable than unlisted banks (such as Wang et al., 2015; Dong 
et al., 2014; and Ghosh, 2014). In contrast, Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi‟s (2015) outcome 
goes against this (i.e. unlisted banks have better financial stability than listed banks). 
However, Nguyen et al. (2012) and Barry et al. (2011) could not find a significant 
association between listing and stability. 
 
3.4.2 External variables 
1. Gross Domestic Production (GDP) 
The GDP growth is a macroeconomic indicator that has been examined by most studies 
in stability of the banking industry. The majority of studies prove that there is a positive 
relationship between GDP development and stability (z-score) in the banking industry 
e.g. Kohler (2015), Anginer et al. (2014), Diaconu and Oanea (2014), Dima et al. 
(2014), Lee and Hsieh (2014), Williams (2014), Bertay et al. (2013), Dedu and Chitan, 
(2013), Mirzaei et al. (2013), Srairi (2013), Tan and Floros (2013), Delis et al. (2012), 
Zhang et al. (2012) and Houston et al. (2010). In contrast, a minority of studies 
proposed that GDP decreases the stability and increases the probability of bankruptcy. 
Examples for this case can be the studies of Cubillas and González (2014), Dong et al. 
(2014), Agoraki et al. (2011) and Soedarmono et al. (2011). Bertay et al. (2013) 
confirmed that banks in better GDP growth found hurdles in growing (investing) their 
capital (negative association between capital ratio and GDP growth). According to 
capitalisation, Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) confirmed also that GDP affected the stability 
negatively. However, Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) could not estimate any 
correlation between GDP and z-score (stability). 
   
2. Inflation 
Rumler and Waschiczek (2014) investigated the factors that determined the bank-taking 
risk, focusing on the Austrian banking industry for the period 1995-2010. In fact, they 
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found that inflation reduced the bank risk-taking. As a result, the constancy of Austrian 
commercial banks enhanced. Many studies support Rumler and Waschiczek‟s (2014) 
result (for example, Barakat & Hussainey; 2013; Bertay et al., 2013; Bourkhis & Nabi, 
2013; Tan & Floros, 2013). Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) in private banking sector and 
Horvàth et al. (2014) found the same result in terms of capitalisation. This result 
encourages banks to expand their activities in countries with higher inflation rates but 
some studies discourage banks from operating more due to a negative and significant 
relationship between z-score and inflation rates (see Kohler, 2015; Cubillas & González, 
2014; Mirzaei et al., 2013; Delis et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2010). Nguyen and Nghiem 
(2015) approved the same conclusion in accordance to public banking sector. In fact, 
the inflation rates are not always an influential variable to stability (Srairi, 2013; Delis et 
al., 2012). 
 
3. Market capitalisation 
Nguyen et al. (2012) indicate that financial development in the Asian economies such 
as in the stock market is very important to the banking industry as they investigated the 
financial stability (z-score) determinants of 151 Asian commercial banks including 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka over the period 1998-2008. Dima‟s et al. 
(2014) results show the same association between stock market growth and stability (z-
score) using a sample of commercial banks in 63 developed and developing countries 
through the period 1997-2010. In addition, Lee and Hsieh (2014) found also a positive 
and significant relationship between capital ratio and stock market earnings. Anginer et 
al. (2014) and Tan and Floros (2013) argued that stock market development did not 
influence stability in the banking industry.   
 
4. Global financial crisis (GFC) 
For GFC, there is no study finding a positive relationship with stability. Williams‟s (2014) 
findings suggest that Asian commercial banks faced a risk of bankruptcy over the GFC 
period. In addition, Anginer et al. (2014) conclude that bank stability was affected by 
GFC. Some studies found no influence of GFC in banks such as Ghosh (2014), 
Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) and Nguyen et al. (2012). 
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5. Control of corruption 
There is a lack of research which considers the impact of corruption. Depending on the 
literature review of stability in banking, the researcher found only one study which 
included corruption as an independent variable; this study was conducted by Hoque et 
al. (2015) of 12 EU countries over the period 2000-2012. The results demonstrated an 
insignificant correlation between stability and corruption. Based on this, the present 
thesis will consider the influence of controlling corruption on financial stability.  
 
Based on the literature review around efficiency, profitability, and stability, no study 
covers the socially responsible banking sector; therefore, this study can fill the gap. In 
addition, comparing efficiency, profitability, and stability simultaneously has not been 
covered in recent studies, especially comparing Islamic, commercial, and socially 
responsible banks. This allows banks to become aware of strengths and weaknesses, 
as well as being able to identify threats and challenges. In terms of profitability, based 
on the researcher‟s knowledge, no study addresses the relationship between net 
interest margin and z-score. However, including the three types of ownership (foreign, 
domestic, and government) could be a useful contribution and could also help banks to 
make decisions about whether to invest or not, based on the results. Finally, no study 
examines the impact of the global financial crisis on capitalisation within the banking 
sector. 
 
Appendix 3 illustrates the literature review on stability (as a dependent variable) and its 
independent variables, and the relationship between them. 
3.5 Conceptual framework  
With regards to determinants, based on the literature on efficiency, many bank-specific 
variables were found to be influential to efficiency. Therefore, this study examines the 
most important bank-specific factors such as bank size, capital ratio, loan intensity, 
credit risk, financial leverage, returns on assets (ROA), bank age, ownerships (foreign, 
domestic and public), and listing. In the literature, macroeconomic factors were strongly 
associated with efficiency. Hence, the most significant variables examined in this thesis 
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are gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, market capitalisation, the global financial 
crisis, and corruption control. For profitability, the highest beneficial internal variables 
are bank size, capital ratio, loan intensity, credit risk, deposit ratio, age, z-score, 
ownerships (foreign, domestic, and public), and listing. On the other side, GDP, inflation, 
market capitalisation, the global financial crisis, and control of corruption can be 
examined as external variables. Finally, the financial stability of banks can be 
determined by internal factors, such as z-score, capitalisation, bank size, loan intensity, 
credit risk, ROA, operating leverage, bank age, ownerships (foreign, domestic, and 
public), and listing. GDP, inflation, market capitalisation, and GFC can represent 
stability effectively. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between efficiency, profitability, 
and stability and their determinants. 
 
3.6 Summary  
The ROA, ROE, and NIM are the most common indicators identified in the literature 
review, and reflect the relationship between banks‟ performance and its determinants 
through the statistical regressions such as OLS and fixed effects models. Regarding the 
stability, z-score and capital ratio are measured for all banks, then the correlation 
between stability and the independent variables can be identified. The period for this 
study includes 2007, which was the year of the global financial crisis, and is the reason 
behind choosing z-score as a main indicator for banks‟ stability; z-score is realistic in 
terms of finding the insolvency risk. Additionally, the values required for calculating the 
z-score were available from the Bankscope database (ROA and capital ratio).   
 
Statistically, the relationships between efficiency, profitability, and stability indicators 
(dependent variables) and their determinants (independent variables) will be analysed 
through two main regressions: OLS and fixed effects models. The OLS is the most 
common model utilised by researchers, as the results of OLS are outstanding. 
Regarding fixed effects, this model is the second most common model used in recent 
studies.   
OLS and fixed effects regressions are the most accurate models compared to Tobit and 
random effects regressions. Moreover, the researcher has chosen these two models to  
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ensure that the results are correct by giving robust evidence through OLS and 
fixed effects. Furthermore, the shared models in the literature review of efficiency, 
profitability, and stability were OLS and fixed effects models. In general, this study 
analyses the banking sector across the world (Islamic, conventional, and socially 
responsible banks) over the period 2005-2012.   
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The data in this research is analysed through three main methods: efficiency, 
profitability and stability methodologies. This chapter explains in detail each 
method including the indicators of efficiency, profitability and stability. In addition, 
the data collection method and data description are shown in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the explanation of bank-specific and macroeconomic variables 
(determinants) is indicated in this part of the thesis. Finally, the used models to 
analyse the data are shown in this section. 
4.1.1 Data collection method  
The data in this study was extracted from two main sources: Bankscope and 
World Bank databases as follows: 
4.1.1.1 Bankscope database 
This research uses the database of Bankscope providing information about banks 
around the world. Bankscope provides updated balance sheets, income 
statements, retained earnings statement, profitability ratios and rating of banks. 
The data is updated more than 20 times a year and declared on the main 
Bankscope database through the internet which supports the transparency 
principal for the clients of banks. In other words, the client can check the financial 
statements before opening accounts in any bank. The data of the study will be 
gathered for Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks from 2005-2012 
(Bankscope, 2015). This research uses two statements of balance sheet and 
income statement for the banks‟ data and World Bank database in terms of 
macroeconomic variables. All data was organised as a panel data set. 
1. Balance sheet: is a financial statement that includes two parts: credit and debit. 
The debit part contains assets owned by the company as current assets, fixed 
assets and intangible assets. On the other side, the credit part contains all claims 
against assets as current liabilities and equity. According to accounting methods: 
assets = liabilities + owner‟s equity. Assets can be defined as economic values of 
70 
 
what the company owns, and has three types: physical (fixed) assets such as 
buildings, cars, machines and equipment, financial (current) assets e.g. cash, 
account receivables, short-term investment and inventories, and intellectual 
(intangible) assets such as trademarks, patent, goodwill. On the other side, 
liabilities can be defined as the amount of money that the company owes to others 
and have two types: current liabilities e.g. payable and short-term debt, and long-
term liabilities such as long-term debt. The last section of the credit part is equity 
defined as the amount of money which constructs the capital of a company; it is 
represented as percentages of ownership that allow owners to earn profits as 
percentages of sharing (Brooks, 2010). Capital contains equity plus debt in the 
following equation: 
Capital = total equity + total debt 
 
2. Income statement: is a measure of the performance of a company during a 
period of time through comparing revenues and costs by the following equation: 
Net (profit or loss) = total revenues - total expenses 
If the result is positive then a company achieves a profit, whereas if the result is 
negative then it means that a company achieves a loss. The income statement 
starts with revenue and ends up with net income; companies get net income after 
reducing all costs, expenses, depreciation and tax from revenue (Brooks, 2010). 
4.1.1.2 World Bank database 
The World Development Indicators (WDI) database is the main source of the 
World Bank database. World Bank collects the data from the official sources such 
as database of ministries of countries. The data available is national, regional and 
global. This database is updated three times a year and the formal publication is 
released in April each year. World Bank database covers most countries‟ 
economies. However, most Macroeconomic data gathered from the World Bank 
database is free to access on the internet (World Bank, 2015).    
4.2 Type of data gathering  
The way of gathering the data in this study is secondary data which is concerned 
with gathering the information through Bankscope and World Banks databases. 
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According to Bryman and Bell's (2007) observations about the recent research 
methods of students, they found some advantages of secondary data collecting: 
1. It gives high standards of quality as data is checked and updated continuously. 
2. Gathering data through a secondary approach saves cost and time, as data can 
be accessed through university or internet accounts.  
3. It reduces the effort of travelling to collect the data. 
4. It gives the chance of cross cultural analysis by knowing balance sheets and 
income statements for different countries without travelling and meetings. 
4.3 Research sample  
The data in this study was extracted from two main sources: Bankscope and 
World Bank databases. For Bankscope, the data was extracted from balance 
sheets and income statements of 323 banks being 43 Islamic banks (13.31% of 
used banks), 242 conventional banks (74.92%), and 38 socially responsible banks 
(11.76%) across the world covering 37 countries available in the Bankscope and 
World Bank databases from 2005 -2012. The data has been gathered from Middle 
Eastern and North African (MENA) regions including Islamic, conventional and 
socially responsible banks. Regarding the banks, data has been collected from 20 
countries namely, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, 
Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, as well as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which are considered to be oil exporter 
countries in the Middle Eastern region namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates which include Islamic and 
conventional banks in this study (Bankscope, 2014). Furthermore, we have banks 
from the United Kingdom (the UK can be used as a benchmark), which is one of 
the strongest industrial countries in the world. In addition, the UK has several 
Islamic banks such as the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), which was the first Islamic 
bank in the UK (it was established in 2004) (Islamic Bank of Britain, 2014). 
Currently, the name of IBB is Al Rayan Bank which formally changed its name in 
December 2014. Actually, Al Rayan Bank in the UK is owned by Qatari Maraf Al 
Rayan Bank. According to Al Rayan Bank, the bank is following a socially 
responsible banking scheme under an Islamic, socially responsible finance 
programme (Al Rayan Bank, 2015). Therefore, the researcher has chosen to 
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compare banks in the MENA region and the UK, as they both have Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks and due to availability of data in 
Bankscope. In addition, there are some socially responsible banks in the UK that 
can link to this study, which can lead to the comparison of Islamic, conventional, 
and socially responsible banks from completely different regions. However, 
socially responsible banks spread globally, so we gathered them from some 
MENA countries and 17 different countries around the world ordered alphabetically: 
Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. According to data gathered 
from World Bank database, macroeconomic variables e.g. inflation rates have 
been collected for the 37 countries. In general, 5 conventional banks in this 
sample are adopting Equator Principles (EPs) namely Bank of Muscat in Oman, 
Barclays Bank, HSBC Bank, Lloyds Bank and Standard Charted Bank in the 
United Kingdom. All these banks are following the environmental and social risk 
management in their projects (Equator Principles, 2016). Regarding the listing, 21 
listed Islamic banks and 22 unlisted Islamic banks are included in the sample. 
According to conventional banks, there are 98 listed conventional banks and 144 
unlisted banks. For the socially responsible banks, 7 listed banks and 31 unlisted 
banks will be estimated in this study (Bankscope, 2016). 
In fact, all data has a unified currency of US Dollars in millions. The names of 
banks are shown in appendices 5-7. So, this study examines eight different groups 
as: 
1. Islamic banks including UK and MENA. 
2. Conventional banks including UK and MENA. 
3. Socially responsible banks across the world. 
4. Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks in MENA (including GCC). 
5. Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks in MENA (excluding GCC). 
6. Islamic and conventional banks in GCC countries. 
7. Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks in UK (the UK can be used 
as a benchmark). 
8. Islamic (UK and MENA), conventional (UK and MENA) and SRBs (across the 
world). 
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4.3.1 Profile of the countries under study 
4.3.1.1 MENA Countries 
This section explains the economic background of MENA countries, the United 
Kingdom, and countries which use socially responsible banks in the sample. The 
main purposes of choosing MENA countries are set out below. 
1. Most MENA countries have the same culture and language (Arabic). 
2. They contain Islamic, conventional, and socially responsible banks. 
3. There is an appropriate level of availability of data for the MENA region. 
4. The first international Islamic bank, the Islamic Development Bank, was located 
in the Middle East in 1975 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (Islamic Development Bank, 
2014); whereas the first domestic Islamic bank, namely Dubai Islamic Bank, was 
established in Dubai, UAE, in 1975 (Dubai Islamic Bank, 2014). 
5. Some MENA countries are leading global oil exporters, especially GCC 
countries whose GDP is based on the oil sector. Eight MENA countries (Algeria, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) out of 12 members are in 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (OPEC Organisation, 
2014).  
 
Overall, MENA includes 20 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Libya, Malta, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen. 
4.3.1.2 The United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom (which is used as a benchmark in this study) is one of the 
strongest industrial countries in the world. In addition, the UK has several Islamic 
banks such as the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), which was the first Islamic bank in 
the UK (established in 2004) (Islamic Bank of Britain, 2014). Currently, the name 
of IBB is Al Rayan Bank, which formally changed its name in December 2014. In 
fact, Al Rayan Bank in the UK is owned by the Qatari Maraf Al Rayan Bank. 
According to Al Rayan Bank, the bank follows a socially responsible banking 
scheme under an Islamic, socially responsible finance programme (Al Rayan Bank, 
2015). Therefore, this researcher has chosen to compare banks in the MENA 
region and the UK, as they both have Islamic, conventional, and socially 
responsible banks, as well as the availability of data in Bankscope. In addition, 
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there are some socially responsible banks in the UK that can be linked to this 
study, and can be compared with Islamic, conventional, and socially responsible 
banks from completely different regions.  
4.3.1.3 Countries including socially responsible banks 
Socially responsible banks are found all over the world, so we gathered them from 
MENA countries and from 17 other countries (Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America).  
4.3.2 Economic situations 
It can be seen in Table 4.1 that the wealthiest country is the USA, achieving GDP 
equalling USD 17,416,235 million. The weakest economy is Palestine, with GDP 
equal to USD 6,641. According to GDP per capita, Qatar was found to be the 
highest in terms of individual wealth (USD 146,178), with the GDP per capita at 
USD 53,143 in 2014. In contrast, the minimum GDP per capita in 2014 was found 
to be in Bangladesh (USD 2,948). The remaining countries used in this study are 
shown in Table 4.1, which shows their GDP and GDP (PPP) in 2014. 
 
4.4 Methodology of efficiency  
4.4.1 Introduction 
This study compares the efficiency of Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks to see any differences between efficiency scores utilising a non-
parametric approach as DEA including technical and scale efficiencies. The 
technical efficiency is divided into two approaches: technical efficiency (TE) 
constant-returns-on-scale (CRS) and TE variable-returns-on-scale (VRS); the 
selection of technical efficiency is the ability of the bank to use its available 
technology (or equipment) compared with scale efficiency which shows the 
efficiency of output amount (size of production) compared to inputs. After that, this 
study investigates the determinants of efficiency as a second stage through using 
two main models; the ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects regression. 
Both models have been used to provide robust evidence of the impact between 
efficiency and its determinants with varied regressions over the period 2005-2012. 
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Table 4.1: GDP and GDP per capita of countries under the study 
N Countries GDP (million US$) in 2014  GDP per capita (US$) in 2014  
1 USA 17,416,253 53,143 
2 Germany 3,820,464 40,007 
3 UK 3,002.947 39,762 
4 France 2,935.356 36,907 
5 Canada 1,793,797 43,472 
6 Australia 1,482,539 46,550 
7 Spain 1,400,483 32,103 
8 Netherlands 880,394 43,404 
9 Saudi Arabia 777,870 24,500 
10 Switzerland 679,028 53,705 
11 Norway 511,602 65,461 
12 Austria 436,069 46,223 
13 UAE 402,340 63,497 
14 Iran 367,098 15,590 
15 Denmark 330,614 42,790 
16 Israel 290,643 32,491 
17 Egypt 271,427 11,089 
18 Iraq 229,327 14,951 
19 Algeria 212.453 13,320 
20 Qatar 202,450 146,178 
21 New Zealand 181,574 34,826 
22 Kuwait 175,787 70,686 
23 Bangladesh 161,763 2,948 
24 Morocco  103,824 7,198 
25 Oman 77,116 26,900 
26 Syria 71,998 5,100 
27 Libya 65,516 21,046 
28 Tunisia 46,995 11,125 
29 Lebanon 45,019 17,174 
30 Yemen 40,415 3,959 
31 Jordan 33,858 33,858 
32 Bahrain 32,791 27,900 
33 Bolivia 30,824 6,130 
34 Nepal 19,341 2,244 
35 Mongolia 11,516 9,433 
36 Malta 9,545 29,133 
37 Palestine (Gaza) 6,641 4,921 
Source: World Bank (2015) 
4.4.2 Measures of data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
There are many approaches for measuring the efficiency in the banking industry 
but the most common are nonparametric approach such as DEA including 
technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies. In the literature many studies have 
used DEA such as Rosman et al. 2014 and Wanke and Barros (2014). On the 
other side, some articles focused on employing the parametric approach such as 
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SFA including cost, profit and revenue efficiencies (Fang et al., 2011; Hasan & 
Marton, 2003). Some researchers used both DEA and SFA in their study (for 
instance, Gardener et al., 2012; Fukuyama & Matousek, 2011; Hassan & Hussein, 
2003). According to Sturm and Williams (2004), the DEA is defined as an indicator 
that represents a non-parametric linear programming approach which excludes 
input and output prices. In addition, DEA can measure the same type of examined 
organisations which are banks in this study; in other words, decision making units 
(DMU‟s). The DEA does not consider the error, which is a disadvantage of this 
indicator. The measures of efficiency varied from 0 which means there is null 
efficiency to 1 which indicates the maximum level of efficiency. This study uses 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) for the period 2005-2012. The DEA is a linear 
programming technique and non-parametric or mathematical programming 
method to estimate production frontiers by comparing inputs with outputs (Banker, 
1993). Simply DEA represents a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs, the 
more outputs generated the more efficient banks can be attained (Sufian, 2006). 
In Figure 4.1 below (proposed by Cooper et al., 2006), the efficient points can be E, 
F, G and B points due to a high number of outputs (higher than A, C and D dots). 
In contrast, the inefficient areas are A, C and D points. In this case, Cooper et al. 
(2006) explained that a firm can generate two outputs from using one input. The 
efficiency of point A can be calculated by dividing the distance between 0-A by 0-B 
(0-A / 0-B).  
Figure 4.1: Efficient frontier of efficiency measures 
 
*Source: Cooper et al. (2006) 
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Comparing DEA and SFA, the DEA always focuses on individual DMU‟s and the 
SFA focuses on estimating frontier. In this study DEA measures are used as 
dependent variables due to investigating the determinants of efficiency.  
Estimating DEA indicators based on Charnes et al. (1978) approach who provided 
a mathematical model for DEA as: 
                          Max h0 = 
∑           
∑         
  
subject to          
∑          
∑        
  ≤ 1, j =  1,ʌ,n (for all j)       
Where: yr: represents output data for decision making unit (DMU)        
            xi: represents input data for decision making unit (DMU)                                        
Based on the formula above we can conclude the technical efficiency as follows: 
TE  
                      
                      
……………………………………………………………...(1) 
The following study on efficiency which conducted by Banker et al. (1984) 
approved the following equation for pure technical and scale efficiencies: 
PTE = Technical Efficiency / Scale efficiency………………………………………..(2)  
Subject to SE = Technical Efficiency / Pure Technical Efficiency…………………(3) 
Where: PTE: pure technical efficiency 
            SE: scale efficiency 
 
This means that any difference between technical and pure technical efficiencies 
leads to scale inefficiency. In fact, technical efficiency can be used as a formula of 
pure technical efficiency multiplied by scale efficiency. 
However, DEA can be divided into two approaches; intermediation and production 
techniques (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). The intermediation method can be defined 
as a firm being a producer of services using deposits as inputs to generate outputs 
such as loans; the production method can be defined as a firm that produces 
deposits as outputs (Sufian, 2007). This research applies the intermediation 
approach that deals with deposits as inputs. In addition, DEA can be classified by; 
first: the CCR score which is related to Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (Charnes et 
al., 1978) which can indicate the first DEA usage in the efficiency field and it 
assumes that there is no relationship between the scale of operations and 
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efficiency under the (CRS) approach. Second: the BCC score which is related to 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (Banker et al., 1984) which improves the CCR 
approach by assuming the model under (VRS) function gives the pure technical 
efficiency. To simplify more, TE (CRS) and CCR approaches are the same and 
PTE, TE (VRS) and BCC methods are the same as well. However, Sufian, (2007) 
proposed that if there is a difference between the technical efficiency and pure 
technical efficiency it leads to the scale inefficiency. Finally, DEA can be examined 
by the following measures:  
1. The Technical Efficiency (TE). 
2. The Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE). 
3. The Scale Efficiency (SE). 
4.4.2.1 Technical Efficiency  
The objective of technical efficiency is to obtain the efficiency through comparing 
the current production and the potential production. The TE scores show how well 
management of banks‟ strategies (decisions) can use inputs to achieve outputs 
(size of operations). So, the technical efficiency considers practical (operational) 
work. The efficiency situation can be maximum when the production index hits the 
frontier, and it gives the proportional reduction in input usage (Green, 1993). The 
technical efficiency can be determined as how to use inputs efficiently. Farrell 
(1957) defined technical efficiency as comparing the performance of a bank with 
its counterparts facing the same regulations, environment and technology based 
on production function. 
Another formula is TE = PTE x SE (Banker et al., 1984) 
This is the simple equation of the technical efficiency but the programmes of 
measuring efficiencies using complicated formulas are the main reason for using 
software to measure efficiencies from the researchers (e.g. Frontier Analyst, 
DEAP and DEA Solver programmes). Technical efficiency measures the quality of 
using the technology through time periods based on inputs and outputs. Sufian 
(2007) defined technical efficiency as the ability of firms to generate maximum 
outputs from a set of inputs and he adopted a technical efficiency approach on 
Singaporean commercial banks and found that the mean technical efficiency was 
88.7%.  
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4.4.2.2 Pure Technical Efficiency  
Pure technical efficiency is representing the efficiency measure of management 
practice (performance) of transforming inputs to outputs. Greater PTE indicates 
that bank practically operates more efficiently. All banks strive to score the highest 
efficiency measure (1). The PTE has been calculated as technical efficiency 
divided by scale efficiency as extracted from the equation above. In fact, PTE was 
defined by Rosman et al. (2014) as a measurement of technical efficiency devoid 
of the scale efficiency effects. Additionally, PTE includes the costs of inputs and 
outputs compared to TE (does not consider costs of inputs and outputs) If there is 
any difference between TE and PTE measures of a particular bank at any year, it 
means that there is scale inefficiency in the same year. Gaganis and Pasiouras 
(2009) applied the PTE method to the Greek banking industry. In particular, they 
conduct a comparison between the efficiency of foreign and domestic banks. 
Domestic banks achieved higher PTE scores than foreign banks in Greece. 
However, the equation to calculate pure technical efficiency is PTE= TE / SE 
(Banker et al., 1984). In fact, pure technical efficiency (PTE) is technical efficiency 
under a variable-to-scale method (VRS). Another name for PTE is the BCC model 
from Banker, et al. (1984).  
4.4.2.3 Scale Efficiency   
The main determinant of scale efficiency is the ability to generate large size of 
outputs using fewer amounts of inputs. In other words higher size of banking 
operations (by comparing TE with PTE) means better scale efficiency which allows 
banks from achieving economies of scale. This study utilises scale efficiency 
following Garza-García (2012) studying the Mexican banking industry. Garza-
García (2012) uses calculated SE= CRS / VRS. In the other words, SE= TE / PTE 
(Banker et al., 1984). In conclusion, any difference between technical efficiency 
and pure technical efficiency forces banks to have scale inefficiency. 
4.4.3 The theoretical difference between DEA Input and output orientations 
The input oriented approach uses fixed variables of production and assumes that 
DMUs are efficient in achieving the same amount of outputs whereas, the output 
oriented approach gives the efficiency as the quality of outputs; which is more 
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realistic (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations - Corporate 
Document Repository, 2012). In general, the input-oriented method attempts to 
minimise the inputs with the given outputs‟ level. In contrast, the output-oriented 
method aims to maximise the outputs with the existing inputs (Cooper et al., 2007). 
Based on the definitions above, we can conclude the cases of efficiency. 
 
1. Reduce inputs and generate fixed amount of (or given) outputs (input-
orientation). 
2. Fixed amount of inputs leads to maximise outputs (output-orientation). 
3. Minimise inputs and maximise outputs (optimal case). 
4. Raise inputs and outputs simultaneously, but in this case inputs need to be less 
than outputs. 
5. Reduce inputs and outputs together (inputs have to be less than outputs). 
In this study, input-orientation is used as the results encourage banks to reduce 
the waste of resources (inputs). 
4.4.4 The difference between DEA, CRS and VRS frontiers 
The constant return to scale (CRS) assumes that all banks (DMU‟s) operate on an 
optimal scale as a linear frontier, whereas variable return to scale (VRS) considers 
that the outputs are placed on a changeable frontier as in Figure 4.2 below.  
Figure 4.2 assumes in the CRS case that using any amount of inputs can be 
generate the same amount of outputs (any point on CRS is efficient). On the other 
side, the VRS frontier assumes that point A is fully efficient due to employing a low 
amount of inputs and producing high outputs. In comparison, point B denotes 
inefficiency (inputs more than outputs). However, in case of points A, C and D 
(efficient), the amount of inputs is less than the production.  
 
More details explained by Gaganis and Pasiouras (2009) who assumed K inputs, 
M outputs for each N bank. In addition, KxN is X matrix and MxN is Y matrix so, 
the input-oriented measure for one DMU under CRS method is calculated as: 
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Figure 4.2: The difference between CRS and VRS 
*Source: Banker et al. (1984) 
 
Minθ,λ θ 
       - yi + Y    ≥ 0 
        θxi - X    ≥ 0      
          ≥0      
Where:   is a vector of N x 1 constant  
y: output 
x: inputs 
                                                                                                      
θ is efficiency score which varies from 0-1, 1 represents an efficient bank and it is 
placed on the efficiency frontier; whereas, θ ˂ 1 means that the bank is inefficient 
and needs to reach the frontier through the reduction of inputs by the result of 1 - θ. 
Banker et al. (1984) divided VRS into two types: TE under VRS or pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency. TE (VRS) or PTE refers to the ability of using 
the available resources through firms‟ managers. On the other hand, SE refers to 
the ability of firms to exploit economies of scale and produce optimal outputs 
under CRS. Banker et al. (1984) defined CRS as a linear programme considering 
VRS by adding the convexity N1′  =1, where N1 is a N×1 vector of ones.  Even 
more, Banker et al. (1984) applied VRS as: 
Minθ,λ θ 
       - yi + Y    ≥ 0 
        θxi - X    ≥ 0    
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        N1′  =1 
           ≥0                            
                                                                                      
4.4.5 Advantages and limitations of DEA 
By comparing DEA with SFA (the most common indicators), we can conclude the 
following advantages of DEA: 
 
1. DEA can calculate the efficiency using multiple inputs and outputs. 
2. There is no restriction in choosing the type of inputs and outputs compared to 
SFA which only deals with cost and profit functions. 
3. DEA identifies the DMU‟s which are inefficient. 
4. It can give accurate results of efficiency if the peers are unified such as banks. 
 
Whereas, the limitations are as follows: 
1. DEA is a deterministic technique rather than statistical. 
2. It could not compare the scores of two different studies. 
3. It neglects the error and there is sensitivity against the error. 
4. DEA is sensitive to the size of the sample, inputs and inputs‟ specification. 
However, other efficiency indicators can be seen in Appendix 4. 
 
4.5 Inputs to calculate the efficiency indicator 
From recent studies, we can extract some useful inputs that can be used in the 
study. In the literature, many inputs have been used e.g., employees, deposits, 
terminals, number of accounts, suppliers, computers, location, acquired equipment, 
funds from customer, loanable funds, space, rent, automated teller machines 
(ATMs), counter transactions, interest costs, non-interest costs, expenses, assets, 
operating costs, capital stock, marketing, capital, number of loan accounts, 
number of mortgage accounts, number of cheque accounts, credit applications, 
number of branches, current accounts, saving accounts, net worth, borrowings, 
capital stocks and size. However, the highest valuable inputs which can be used in 
this study are (Brooks, 2010): 
1. Fixed assets: is a tangible (physical) asset that the company owns such as 
property, automobiles, plants and equipment. According to the literature review 
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above in chapter three, fixed assets have been used as inputs (Rosman et al., 
2014; Zhang & Matthews, 2012; Assaf et al., 2011; Hassan, 2006). 
2. Deposits short term funding: is the amount of money that banks take from 
clients, deposits can be through cash or cheque. Some researchers used the 
deposits as inputs such as Das and Ghosh (2009) on Indian conventional banks 
(also, Rosman et al., 2014 used deposits short term funding as inputs).  
3. Equity: is the amount of money which constructs the capital of a company; it is 
represented as percentages of ownership that allow owners to earn profits as 
percentages of sharing. Equity has been used as an input in many studies (Hadad 
et al., 2012; Olson & Zoubi 2011; Satub et al., 2010).  
4.6 Outputs to calculate the efficiency indicator 
The outputs of the previous studies are: profits, revenues, return on assets (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE), deposits, number of products, number of customers, loans, 
dividends, number of transactions, advances, insurance commission, net profit, 
customer loyalty, mortgage loans, customer response, balance of current account, 
number of accounts, investments, investment on securities, sales and customer 
satisfaction. 
 
The chosen data for this study are fixed assets, (deposits and short term funding) 
and equity as inputs, whereas the outputs are net income, total securities and 
loans (Brooks, 2010): 
1. Net income: is the result of revenue minus expenses, costs, depreciation and 
tax. Hadad et al. (2012) Ho and Zhu (2004) used net income as an output to find 
DEA.  
2. Total securities: are financial instruments supported by physical assets; it has 
three types: equity securities (shares), debt securities (bonds) and derivatives 
contracts (options) which can be traded in second markets. Total securities have 
been used as outputs in many studies (see Assaf et al., 2011; Feng & Serletis, 
2010). 
3. Loans: are the amount of money that banks give to customers to be repayable 
on an agreed date between the bank and client including the interest rate that can 
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be raised in case of not paying on the due date. The most used output was loans 
such as Rosman et al. (2014), Abdul-majid et al. (2011) and Al Shamsi et al. 
(2009). 
 
In this study, we use three inputs and outputs as three was the average number of 
inputs and outputs used by recent researchers according to the literature review in 
chapter three. In terms of inputs, the minimum number of inputs was one input (Al-
Sharkas et al., 2008). The maximum number of inputs was six inputs (Drake and 
Howcroft, 2002). On the other hand, the minimum number of outputs was one 
output (Baten and Kamil, 2010), whereas the maximum number of outputs was 
five (Drake et al., 2009). The researcher of this study is trying to find the most 
relevant mixture of inputs and outputs through Bankscope. In addition, three inputs 
and three outputs give accurate results and make the balance between the inputs 
and outputs. Additionally, the most available inputs and outputs were the selected 
data above in the Bankscope database. One of the main advantages of DEA is 
choosing any type of inputs (current or fixed assets) and outputs as mentioned 
before. Hence, this study tries to estimate efficiency measures through the main 
banking activities such as using deposits to generate loans. In addition, equity and 
fixed assets are compulsory to operate banks. Evermore, securities and net 
income are highly important to banks. 
4.7 Data description of inputs and outputs used in DEA estimations 
DEA was employed using an intermediation (input-oriented) approach after using 
three inputs; fixed assets, deposits and short term funding and equity. On the 
other hand, there are three outputs selected net income, securities and loans 
which were extracted from Bankscope database. Table 4.2 below illustrates the 
data description of inputs and outputs used to obtain DEA estimations for Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks during the period 2005-2012. 
From Table 4.2 below, we can observe that the total observation is 2423 
observations divided into 1827, 284 and 312 observations for conventional, 
socially responsible and Islamic banks, respectively. The socially responsible 
banks have the highest means of fixed assets (508.30 million USD), equity 
(3330.74 million USD), net income (442.74 million USD) and loans (23444.43 
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million USD). While, the conventional banks are leading in averages of deposits 
and short term funding (29392.34 million USD) and securities (22418.61 million 
USD) In contrast, the lowest means of inputs and outputs were attained by Islamic 
banks. 
Table 4.2: Inputs and outputs data used in DEA estimations 
Type 
Data Description 
Inputs 
Variables (Million US$) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Islamic 
Banks 
Fixed assets 312 205.4659 438.8246 0.1 3084.4 
Deposits & Short term funding 312 6413.603 11623.06 0.04 87855.43 
Equity 312 1015.166 1419.184 8.61 9725 
Outputs 
Net income 312 122.0563 316.6348 -559.4 2102.6 
Securities 312 741.0557 1373.682 1.03 10901.4 
Loans 312 4967.355 8991.731 0.5 58681.78 
Conventional 
Banks 
Inputs 
Fixed assets 1827 313.1431 1605.954 0 28031.7 
Deposits & Short term funding 1827 29392.34 122116.9 0.06 1369820 
Equity 1827 2578.103 9623.323 0.02 100757.6 
Outputs 
Net income 1827 167.0845 1332.514 -19801.5 16662.9 
Securities 1827 22418.61 129049.9 0 1881055 
Loans 1827 22696.33 99842.09 0.01 1104887 
Socially 
Responsible 
Banks 
Inputs 
Fixed assets 284 508.3079 2075.199 0.1 16888.57 
Deposits & Short term funding 284 26134.31 96256.97 31.2 729536.9 
Equity 284 3330.748 11666.04 3.2 75455.86 
Outputs 
Net income 284 442.7419 2220.969 -9026.8 17351.66 
Securities 284 4372.075 12204.02 0 77597.68 
Loans 284 23444.43 91484.12 6.8 743053.5 
All 
Banks 
Inputs 
Fixed assets 2423 322.1532 1574.239 0 28031.7 
Deposits & Short term funding 2423 26051.59 111359.6 0.04 1369820 
Equity 2423 2465.067 9292.401 0.02 100757.6 
Outputs 
Net income 2423 193.5962 1391.534 -19801.5 17351.66 
Securities 2423 17512.04 112463.4 0 1881055 
Loans 2423 20501.12 92409.25 0.01 110488 
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4.8 Methodology of profitability 
4.8.1 Introduction 
One of the main aims of banks is maximising profits and minimising costs. With 
regard to profitability ratios, the values of ratios reflect how well the financial 
performance is; higher values mean the performance is better. In this study, the 
determinants of profitability will be identified through using the profitability ratios as 
dependent variables and treating bank-specific and macroeconomic variables as 
independent variables for all Islamic, conventional and socially responsible 
banksfor the period 2005-2012. However, more profits lead to more experienced 
employees and better quality assets; for example, high security software and 
modern computers raise the efficiency of work and save time, both of them are 
costly, which needs high profits to cover their expenses. 
 
4.8.2 Profitability measures 
The major and most common used ratios in the recent studies are return on assets 
(ROA), return on equities (ROE) and net interest margin (NIM): 
4.8.2.1 Return on assets (ROA) 
ROA is an indicator that shows how efficiently the resources (total assets) of firms 
are used by the management to generate profits (Short, 1979). The ROA is 
defined as net income divided by total assets of the firm (Mamatzakis et al., 2015). 
Guillén et al. (2014) argue that higher ROA indicates that the firm is more efficient 
in using its resources. However, the ROA indicator is used as a dependent in 
many studies (Apergis, 2014; Ćurak et al. 2012; Tan & Floros, 2012). 
4.8.2.2 Return on equities (ROE) 
According to Guillén et al. (2014), ROE is a ratio defined as net income over total 
shareholders‟ equities. The ROE reflects the abilities of management to use the 
shareholders‟ funds effectively (more ROE means that the management in utilising 
the shareholders capital is more efficient). Many studies examined ROE as an 
explained variable (Beck et al., 2013; Lee & Kim, 2013; Olson & Zoubi, 2011). 
In conclusion, this study employs ROA and ROE as explained variables using the 
following formulas: 
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ROA = Net Income / Total Assets…………………………………………………….(4) 
ROE = Net Income/ Total Equity……………………………………………………..(5) 
 
Where: ROA: return on assets 
             ROE: return on equity 
4.8.2.3 Net interest margin (NIM) 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) state that NIM is defined as the value of net 
interest margin to total earning assets. NIM calculates the profits generated from 
lending investment. This ratio represents the effectiveness of interests‟ investment. 
Higher NIM ratio means that the interest revenue is better and the investment is 
valuable. In case NIM is negative, then the interest expense is higher than interest 
revenues which raise the risk of loss. The income interest can occur through 
lending interests and bonds‟ revenues. On the other side, interest expenses are 
achieved from paying interests such as paying deposit interests to clients and 
borrowing interests. According to total earning assets, it includes any assets can 
produce income, for example,  the investment in stocks, bonds, income from rental 
property, certificates of deposits can be earning assets. Regarding Islamic banks 
interest-free investment is representing the net interest margin ratio. The NIM can 
be used in this study as an explained variable using the following ratio (Bankscope, 
2015): 
NIM = Net Interest Income / Total Earning Assets…………………………………(6) 
4.9 Methodology of stability and measures 
The stability of banks is determined by the amount of risk that the bank can be 
exposed to. This risk can lead to achieving more loss and ending up bankrupt. The 
main indicators to measure the stability are z-score and capital ratio. Williams 
(2014) defined z-score as the sum of average ROA and average capital divided by 
the range volatility of ROA. Williams (2014) mentioned that the larger value of z-
score means that the firm is further from bankruptcy and more stabilised. However, 
after the global financial crisis (GFC) that occurred in 2007, measuring stability has 
become an important issue. According to capital ratio, this calculated as equity to 
total assets that measures the proportion of the total assets that are financed by 
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stockholders. Higher capital raises the stability due to the readiness of financial 
support in case of any unexpected loss or financial crisis occurred (Horváth et al., 
2014). Some other stability indicators have been used in the literature such as 
non-performing loans or NPL (credit risk) and non-interest income (NII). The NPL 
has been defined by Srairi (2013) as the ratio of non-performing loans over total 
loans. Regarding the NII, Nguyen et al. (2012) used NII as total non-interest 
income to total assets.  
This study employs z-score as an explained variable to describe stability. Boyd et 
al. (1993) proposed the z-score formula: 
        
        
     
 …………………………………………………...…...…….(7) 
 
Where: ROA: return on assets 
             E/TA: equity to total assets (or capital) ratio  
             S.D. ROA: standard deviation of return on assets 
 
Higher z-score indicates more financial stability and less bankruptcy (default) risks. 
 
According to capitalisation ratio, Horváth et al. (2014) employed the capital ratio as 
follows: 
 
Capital ratio = Equity / Total Assets………………………………………………….(8) 
4.10 Research questions 
After choosing the right methods to analyse the data, this study is able to answer 
the research questions which are: 
Q1: Are Islamic, conventional, and socially responsible banks efficient, profitable 
and stabilised over the period? Which type of bank is the most efficient, profitable 
and stable? 
Q2: What are the determinants of efficiency, profitability and stability in Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks? Are the determinants different for 
these bank types?  
Q3: How do the internal and external factors affect the efficiency, profitability and 
stability? Is the influence positive or negative? 
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The research method is a tool that helps to find the answers to the questions of 
research to reach the research objectives. The importance of this study is in 
studying the banking industry of countries that provide oil and natural gas which is 
considered to be nowadays the best income maximiser of GCC countries (which is 
part of the Middle Eastern region) and the rest of the MENA countries which have 
a large number of Islamic banks. Islamic, conventional and socially responsible 
banks in MENA and countries with socially responsible banks across the world 
and the UK (which has Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks) are 
compared in terms of efficiency, profitability and stability over the period 2005-
2012. Regarding the UK banking sector, it is considered to be one of the best 
countries in the world for manufacturing industry such as the automotive 
manufacturing sector and aerospace industry. In addition, London was classified 
as the world‟s largest financial centre in the world in 2008 according to MasterCard 
research (Worldwide Centres of Commerce Index, 2008) which made the 
researcher choose the UK with the Al Rayan Bank (formerly: Islamic Bank of 
Britain) in their banking system; so, this study is based on the largest financial hub 
of the world.  
4.11 Determinants of efficiency, profitability and stability 
There are two different types of independent variables; industry-specific (bank-
specific) variables and country-specific (macroeconomic) variables. This study 
identifies the determinants of efficiency, profitability and stability of Islamic and 
conventional banks, whether industry-specific variables or country-specific 
variables.   
4.12 The independent variables definitions 
4.12.1 Bank-specific (internal) variables 
These types of variables are related to bank factors. In this study, there are six 
industry-specific variables; size, capital ratio, loans intensity, credit risk, ROA, 
financial leverage, deposit ratio, operating leverage, age, z-score, ownerships 
(foreign, domestic, government) and listing (Bankscope, 2013). Another name for 
industry-specific variables is bank characteristics (Demirgiic-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999). 
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1. Bank size 
This factor represents the bank‟s total assets. To ease the data, natural logarithm 
of bank‟s total assets will be used. Tan and Floros (2013) investigated size as a 
determinant of efficiency in China and they used the logarithm of total assets. For 
profitability, Lee and Kim (2013) examined the effect of bank size on profitability in 
Japan. Focusing on stability, Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) analysed the stability of 
Islamic and commercial banks. The results suggest that smaller banks are less 
risky and more stabilised. 
2. Capital (adequacy) ratio (or leverage intensity) 
It indicates the ratio of equity divided by total assets. This ratio shows the size of 
capital compared with total assets. Bank regulators strive to score more than a 
minimum adequate level to reduce the probability of bankruptcy (Apergis, 2014). 
Gardener (2012) examined the capital ratio (also, known as capital risk) and his 
results show that banks with higher capital were more efficient than banks with 
lower capital in terms of technical and cost efficiencies. In contrast, there was a 
significant and negative relationship between the capital ratio and the allocative 
efficiency in South East Asian banking over the period 1998-2004. For profitability, 
Ćurak et al. (2012) argued that capital ratio reduces the ROA. Regarding stability, 
Williams (2014) suggests that banks attaining higher capital ratios are far away 
from bankruptcy. 
 
3. Loan intensity  
This ratio is calculated as loans over total assets. This shows the liquidity of loans 
provided by banks using the available assets over a specific period. Many studies 
have concentrated on loan intensity as an explanatory variable for efficiency 
(Garza-Gracia, 2012; Sufian, 2009; Psiouras, 2006). These studies concluded that 
there was a positive relationship between loan intensity and efficiency, thus an 
increase in loans raises efficiency through lower costs and leads to better quality 
loans (Isik & Hassan, 2003). Referring to profitability, most studies found that there 
is a positive relationship between profitability ratios and loan intensity (Olson & 
Zoubi, 2011; Sufian & Habibullah, 2010). Regarding stability, some studies 
suggested that more loan intensity leads to lower z-score which increases the 
likelihood of bankruptcy such as Kohler (2015).  
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4. Credit (liquidity) risk 
It is a ratio calculated as loans divided by deposits. This ratio indicates the extent 
of risk of lending (using the deposits), whether high or low risk depends on the 
ratio. Hou et al. (2014) argued that reducing the credit risk in banks is maximising 
the efficiency and allows banks to be able to cover the withdrawals of clients. 
Higher credit risk means that banks rely on borrowed funds rather than deposits 
for lending. However, this variable has been used by Chitan (2012) in terms of 
profitability. They found that credit risk had a significant negative impact on 
profitability which means that shareholders are exposed to less risk from lending 
more. Referring to stability, Jeon and Lim (2013) indicate that Korean savings 
banks which provide more loans achieve less stability (z-score). Nguyen and 
Nghiem (2015) confirmed that capital ratio was affected significantly and 
negatively in Indian banking sector through the period 1990-2011. 
 
5. Return on assets (ROA) 
The ROA is a profitability ratio concerned with earnings which comes from using 
the total assets of the firm. However, the equation of ROA can be calculated as 
net profit divided by total assets (Garza-Gracia, 2012). Additionally, many studies 
have examined the impact of ROA on efficiency in the banking sector (Garza-
Gracia, 2012; Sufian, 2009). As a result, the relationship between ROA and 
efficiency was significantly positive, the more ROA (profitability) achieved the more 
efficient banks can be. However, ROA has been used in the literature as an 
explanatory variable for z-score (explained) such as Ghosh (2014) and Srairi 
(2013). As a result, ROA has not had any effect on z-score in these studies. 
 
6. Financial leverage 
Abu-Alkheil et al. (2012) defined financial leverage as total assets over total equity. 
This ratio finds the amount of financed assets by shareholders‟ equity. They found 
that the financial leverage ratio decreases the efficiency (negative correlation).  
 
7. Deposit ratio 
García-Herrero et al. (2009) defined the deposit ratio as deposits over total assets. 
This ratio can determine the risk of accepting deposits from clients and how to 
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invest the deposits compared to total assets. However, deposit ratio has been 
used in this study as an explanatory variable to explain profitability ratios.  
 
8. Operating leverage 
Operating is a ratio calculated as fixed assets to total assets (Srairi, 2013). This 
shows the financed fixed assets using total assets of the firm. However, Srairi‟s 
(2013) findings suggest that operating leverage ratio raises the stability over the 
period 2005-2009 in Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA region. 
 
9. Age  
Age of banks is counted as years of banks‟ operation. Akhigbe and McNulty (2005) 
examined the age of banks, and they found that older banks are more efficient 
than new banks in USA for the period 1995 to 2001. However, in this study we 
examined age as a log of years since establishment. Regarding Beck et al. (2005), 
new banks in Nigeria were able to achieve more profits than older banks during 
the period 1990-2001. Moreover, older banks are more stabilised than new banks 
according to Lee and Chih‟s (2013) research. 
 
10. Z-score 
Z-score has been used as an independent variable following Apergis‟ (2014) 
approach. Apergis (2014) found a negative correlation between z-score and ROA, 
with more profits leading to less stability in the US during the period 2000-2013. 
Sufian and Habibullah (2009) argue that risk reduces the efficiency in their study.  
 
11. Ownership 
Many studies used ownership as an independent variable in terms of efficiency 
literature. For example, Gardener et al. (2012) divided banks into three parts; 
foreign, private and state banks. They found that foreign banks are the most 
efficient banks in the South East Asian region over the period 1998-2004. 
Referring to profitability literature, Lee and Kim (2013) investigated that foreign 
international banks have more ability to improve the performance than the 
domestic banks in Korea. Regarding stability, Mirzaei‟s, et al. (2013) empirical 
results reveal that foreign banks are assume to have lower risk of failing. This 
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study represents ownership as the main dummy for foreign, domestic and 
government banks. 
 
12. Listing 
This variable can be examined as dummy as 1 for the listed banks and 0 for the 
unlisted banks. The listing dummy compares between the listed and unlisted 
banks and shows which banks are more efficient, profitable and stable. Yudistira 
(2004) argued that listed Islamic banks are more efficient than unlisted banks. 
Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015) proved that listed banks are more profitable than 
unlisted. Finally, Wang et al. (2015) confirmed that listed banks are more stable 
and less risky than unlisted banks. 
4.12.2 Macroeconomic (external) variables 
The macroeconomic variables are the external factors of the economy as a whole. 
There are four macroeconomic variables used in this study including GDP, 
inflation, market capitalisation, global financial crisis (GFC) and control of 
corruption (World Bank, 2013).  
1. GDP 
The gross domestic product is the sum of local market values of services and 
goods under political rules. The GDP is the main indicator of the amount of output 
(production) for governments (World Data Atlas, 2012). Hermes and Nhung (2010) 
found a positive relationship between efficiency and the GDP in the sample of 
banks used. In most studies, GDP increases the profitability such as Dedu and 
Chitan‟s (2013) study. Regarding stability, Tan and Floros (2013) illustrate that 
higher GDP in China leads to a higher z-score (more stability). 
 
2. Inflation 
Is an economic situation that indicates the rise in prices of services and goods 
over a determined period in countries; it represents in percentages the indicators 
of inflation shown annually. However, according to Economics Help Organisation 
(2013), inflation can happen in any country due to: 
a. Rise in oil prices 
b. Rise in shipment prices 
c. Increase of labour costs 
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d. Increase in demand 
e. Rise in population 
f. Scarcity in resources 
g. Increase of cost of raw material 
h. Printing more money 
i. Higher taxes 
j. Decline in productivity 
k. Rise in house prices  
 
Hermes and Nhung (2010) found that the inflation had not significantly influenced 
the efficiency. Therefore, this study examines the impact of the inflation on banks‟ 
efficiency. On the other side, Garza-Gracia (2012) showed that an increase in 
inflation reduced the banks‟ efficiency in Mexico during the period 2001-2009. As 
expected, inflation reduces the profitability in most studies due to decline in 
liquidity power of the population. Inflation was also used in the literature of 
profitability in banking such as Căpraru and Ihnatov‟s (2014) study. In terms of 
stability, Cubillas and González (2014) suggest that inflation decreases the 
stability and raises the insolvency risk. 
3. Market capitalisation 
Market capitalisation (MC) is an annual rate that indicates the growth of a stock 
market considering GDP. Vu and Nahm (2013) found that there was a positive 
relationship between MC and efficiency. Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) 
examined the stock market influence on the profitability and they found a positive 
relationship. Regarding stability, Nguyen et al. (2012) show that the market 
capitalisation increases the stability of banks. 
 
4. Global financial crisis  
Most banks have been affected by the global financial crisis that occurred in 
August 2007. This crisis was the result of many direct and indirect factors, but it 
started when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds. 
Bankruptcy also happened after the huge loss in the American mortgages. It was 
considered the worst regression since the financial crisis of the 1930s. However, 
this crisis has negatively affected the entire world; as the GDP reduced 
internationally following the crisis, the world stock markets fell across the world, 
the large financial institutions collapsed or were bought out, and governments in 
even the wealthiest nations had to come up with rescue packages to bail out their 
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financial systems (World Bank, 2014). In this study, we include the financial crisis 
to estimate its impact upon the efficiency, profitability and stability in Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks. In fact, Noor and Ahmed (2011) 
found that there was no impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) and Asian 
financial crisis (AFC) that happened in 1997 upon the ROE but Noor and Ahmed 
(2012) conducted a study proving that AFC influenced the efficiency positively and 
GFC affected the efficiency negatively in Islamic banks over the period 1992-2009. 
William‟s (2014) findings could not show evidence of a correlation between GFC 
and z-score. In this study, financial crisis is a dummy for three periods: pre-crisis, 
during crisis and post crisis.  
 
5. Control of corruption 
This variable is showing the percentage of corruption control, higher rate indicates 
better control. Chortareas et al. (2012) found that increasing in controlling of 
corruption led to higher efficiencies in European banks. According to profitability, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) approved that corruption influencing the 
profits of banks badly. Regarding the stability, Hoque et al. (2015) found 
insignificant relationship between stability in European banking sector and 
corruption.  
 
The main source of the independent variables above is World Bank (2013). 
However, this thesis is answering the research questions in the empirical results 
chapter. 
 
This study reveals if the efficiency, profitability and stability of Islamic, conventional 
and socially responsible banks are influenced by these variables over the period 
2005-2012. Table 4.3 summarises the method of use in the model of each 
explanatory variable. 
In terms of bank-specific variables, it is observable that the conventional banks 
have the highest total assets (size) scoring mean equalling 8.16 million USD; also, 
conventional banks achieved the largest mean ROA (10%) in the group as in 
Table 4.4 below. While, the largest average capital ratios were obtained by the 
Islamic banks (30.5%). However, according to the loan intensity ratio, socially  
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Table 4.3: Definitions and descriptions for the explanatory variables 
Variable Name Notation Description 
Bank size LTA The natural logarithm of total assets 
Capital ratio EQTA The ratio of equity to total assets 
Loan intensity LOANSTA Loans over total assets ratio 
Credit risk LOANSDEPO Loans to deposits ratio 
Financial leverage TAEQ The ratio of total assets to equity 
Deposit ratio DEPOSITSTA Deposits to total assets ratio 
Return on assets ROA Net income over total assets ratio 
Operating ratio FATA The ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
Bank age LAGE The natural logarithm of time since establishment 
Z-score LOGZ Logarithm of z-score 
Foreign banks FORE Dummy variable: 1 for foreign ownership, 0 otherwise 
Domestic banks DOM Dummy variable: 1 for domestic ownership, 0 otherwise 
Government banks GOV Dummy variable: 1 for government ownership, 0 otherwise 
Listing* LISTED Dummy variable: 1 for listed banks, 0 unlisted banks 
GDP LGDP Logarithm of gross domestic production 
Inflation INFLATION Inflation rates 
Market capitalisation MCAP Market capitalisation to GDP ratio 
Global financial crisis GFC Dummy variable: 1 for the period 2007-2009, 0 otherwise 
Corruption control* CCONTROL Percentage of controlling corruption by government 
* Additional variable 
 
responsible banks are leading in terms of providing loans (42.2%). According to 
macroeconomic variables, the greatest GDP was found to be in the countries of 
the socially responsible banks scoring averages of 26.58. Focusing on inflation 
rates, the lowest mean inflation was attained by conventional banks‟ countries 
(5.70%) then Islamic banks‟ countries (9.90%) and socially responsible banks‟ 
countries (12.66%). 
 
4.13 Efficiency models and hypotheses 
OLS and fixed effects models are run in this study due to finding the determinants 
of banks‟ efficiency and the regression can be as follows: 
- Main test: 
Effit = α + β1 LTAit + β2 EQTAit + β3 LOANSTAit + β4 LOANSDEPOit + β5 TAEQit + β6 ROAit + β7 
LAGEt + β8 FOREi + β9 DOMi + β10 GOVi + β11 LGDPt + β12 INFLATIONt + β13 MCAPt + 
β14 GFCt + ɛit……………………………………………………………………….(9) 
      i = 1….n; t = 1….n  
 
 
The dependent variables are the efficiency scores, as derived from DEA which is 
Effit as TE (or CRS), PTE (or VRS) and SE, i is the observations, t is time, α is the 
constant, β denotes the coefficient of variables and ɛit is the error term. Whereas  
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Table 4.4: Independent variables to specify determinants of efficiency, profitability 
and stability 
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Bank-specific Variables 
Variables Obs Avr. S.D. Min Max Obs Avr. S.D. Min Max 
Log (total assets) 312 7.732 1.843 0.73 11.48 284 7.858 2.251 3.54 13.77 
Capital ratio 312 0.249 0.309 0.02 4.01 284 0.305 0.326 0.01 0.96 
Loan intensity 312 0.469 0.270 0 2.78 284 0.424 0.286 0 1.83 
Credit risk 312 2.559 23.805 0 417.5 284 0.748 0.264 0.02 2.09 
Deposit ratio 312 0.667 0.327 0 4.16 284 0.823 0.191 0.25 3.19 
ROA 312 0.009 0.150 -0.87 2.2 284 0.005 0.011 -0.08 0.039 
Log (Z-score) 312 2.622 1.002 -1.72 5.51 284 3.898 1.165 0.92 6.26 
Financial leverage 312 8.044 6.676 0.25 58.27 284 16.793 17.360 1.83 198.38 
Operating leverage 312 0.022 0.028 0 0.37 284 0.013 0.014 0 0.1 
Age 312 3.053 0.628 1.95 4.5 284 3.613 0.808 2.08 5.16 
Foreign (Ownership) 312 0.321 0.467 0 1 284 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Domestic (Ownership) 312 0.426 0.495 0 1 284 0.588 0.493 0 1 
Government (Ownership) 312 0.253 0.436 0 1 284 0.225 0.419 0 1 
Listing* 312 0.474 0.500 0 1 284 0.190 0.393 0 1 
Macroeconomic Variables Macroeconomic Variables 
Log (GDP) 312 25.426 1.442 22.25 28.67 284 26.589 1.879 21.65 30.38 
Inflation 312 0.099 0.099 -0.05 0.53 284 1.266 3.449 -0.01 11.04 
Market capitalisation 312 0.613 0.515 0 2.99 284 0.554 0.565 0 2.99 
Global financial crisis 312 0.397 0.490 0 1 284 0.387 0.487 0 1 
Corruption control* 312 55.614 25.028 8.13 94.63 284 75.547 28.104 3.9 100 
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Bank-specific Variables 
Log (total assets) 1827 8.161 2.119 -2.37 14.91 2423 8.070 2.107 -2.37 14.91 
Capital ratio 1827 0.140 0.180 0.01 5.23 2423 0.231 0.229 0.00504 5.23 
Loan intensity 1827 0.439 0.352 0 5.32 2423 0.441 0.336 0 5.32 
Credit risk 1827 0.937 12.274 0 518.86 2423 1.124 13.662 0 518.86 
Deposit ratio 1827 0.800 0.473 0 8.17 2423 0.786 0.434 0 8.17 
ROA 1827 0.010 0.035 -0.44 0.86 2423 0.010 0.062 -0.8734 2.19981 
Log (Z-score) 1827 2.985 1.085 -3.27 5.19 2423 3.045 1.134 -3.27 6.2603 
Financial leverage 1827 12.489 13.066 0.19 191.61 2423 12.421 13.204 0.19 198.38 
Operating leverage 1827 0.013 0.016 0 0.12 2423 0.014 0.018 0 0.3743 
Log (age) 1827 3.717 0.724 1.95 5.77 2423 3.619 0.756 1.94591 5.77 
Foreign (Ownership) 1827 0.467 0.499 0 1 2423 0.426 0.495 0 1 
Domestic (Ownership) 1827 0.400 0.490 0 1 2423 0.426 0.495 0 1 
Government (Ownership) 1827 0.137 0.344 0 1 2423 0.162 0.369 0 1 
Listing* 1827 0.408 0.491 0 1 2423 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Macroeconomic Variables Macroeconomic Variables 
Log (GDP) 1827 26.098 1.831 22.25 28.67 2423 26.069 1.815 21.6488 30.3837 
Inflation 1827 0.057 0.086 -0.1 1 2423 0.204 1.243 -0.1 11.0444 
Market capitalisation 1827 0.891 1.908 0 28.67 2423 0.816 1.684 0 28.67 
Global financial crisis 1827 0.391 0.488 0 1 2423 0.392 0.488 0 1 
Corruption control* 1827 62.350 28.046 1.46 94.63 2423 63.030 28.135 1.46 100 
* Additional variable 
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the independent variables are size, capital ratio, loans intensity, credit risk, 
financial leverage, ROA, age, ownership, GDP, inflation, market capitalisation, 
financial crisis (GFC).  
Hypotheses of variables (main test): 
H10: There is no impact between the efficiency and size 
H20: There is no impact between the efficiency and capital ratio 
H30: There is no impact between the efficiency and loans intensity 
H40: There is no impact between the efficiency and credit risk 
H50: There is no impact between the efficiency and financial leverage 
H60: There is no impact between the efficiency and ROA 
H70: There is no impact between the efficiency and age 
H80: There is no impact between the efficiency and foreign ownership 
H90: There is no impact between the efficiency and domestic ownership 
H100: There is no impact between the efficiency and government ownership 
H110: There is no impact between the efficiency and GDP 
H120: There is no impact between the efficiency and inflation 
H130: There is no impact between the efficiency and market capitalisation  
H140: There is no impact between the efficiency and global financial crisis 
 
The hypotheses for the main test can be displayed in Figure 4.3 below, which 
simplifies the model that links efficiency with the explanatory variables 
 
- Additional test: 
Effit = α + β1 LTAit + β2 EQTAit + β3 LOANSTAit + β4 LOANSDEPOit + β5 TAEQit + β6 ROAit + β7 
LAGEt + β8 FOREi + β9 DOMi + β10 GOVi + β11 LISTEDi + β12 LGDPt + β13 INFLATIONt + 
β14 MCAPt + β15 GFCt + β16 CCONTROLt + ɛit…………………………………....(10) 
      i = 1….n; t = 1….n  
 
The additional test has two added variables to the main model: listing and 
corruption control. 
Hypotheses of variables (additional test): 
H10: There is no impact between the efficiency and size 
H20: There is no impact between the efficiency and capital ratio 
H30: There is no impact between the efficiency and loans intensity 
H40: There is no impact between the efficiency and credit risk 
H50: There is no impact between the efficiency and financial leverage 
H60: There is no impact between the efficiency and ROA 
H70: There is no impact between the efficiency and age 
H80: There is no impact between the efficiency and foreign ownership 
H90: There is no impact between the efficiency and domestic ownership 
H100: There is no impact between the efficiency and government ownership 
H110: There is no impact between the efficiency and listing 
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H120: There is no impact between the efficiency and GDP 
H130: There is no impact between the efficiency and inflation 
H140: There is no impact between the efficiency and market capitalisation  
H150: There is no impact between the efficiency and global financial crisis 
H160: There is no impact between the efficiency and corruption control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Hypotheses of efficiency for the main test 
 
Before analysing data, we can conduct an expected sign that can be affecting the 
efficiency for each explanatory variable for Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks as in the Table 4.5 below. The size of bank (total assets) is 
highly expected to affect the efficiency positively due to larger banks have the 
ability to maximise the outputs (e.g. net income) more than smaller banks. Even 
capital ratio can raise the efficiency as well capitalised banks can prove more 
services and operations which lead to higher efficiency. According to loan intensity, 
loans allow banks from achieving more revenues from interests so, greater loans 
would increase the profits and efficiency. 
 
Focusing on credit risk (deposits to loans ratio), this variable can be strongly a 
negative determinant for efficiency due to higher credit risk indicates the disability 
of banks to return the deposits of customers. However, based on the recent 
studies, the majority of studies confirmed that ROA and age of banks are  
Efficiency  
Size 
Capitalisation 
Loan intensity 
Financial leverage 
Credit risk 
Age 
ROA 
Domestic ownership 
Foreign ownership 
Government ownership 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation 
Market capitalisation 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP 
100 
 
Table 4.5: Expected variables’ impact on efficiency 
N Determinants Expected signs 
1 Size Positive 
2 Capital ratio Positive 
3 Loan intensity Positive 
4 Credit risk Negative 
5 Financial leverage Positive 
6 ROA Positive 
7 Age Positive 
8 Foreign banks Positive 
9 Domestic banks Negative 
10 Government banks Positive / Negative 
11 Listing* Positive 
12 GDP Positive 
13 Inflation Negative 
14 Market capitalisation Positive 
15 Global financial crisis Negative 
16 Corruption control* Positive 
* Additional variable 
significantly and positively affecting the efficiency in banking sector. Regarding the 
ownership, foreign banks are expected to support the efficiency due to availability 
of high capital and experience compared to domestic banks which is predicted to 
decrease the efficiency. On the other side, government can affect the efficiency 
positively or negatively based on the literature review. Regarding to the 
macroeconomic variables, GDP growth and market capitalisation predicted to 
enhance the efficiency while, inflation and the global financial crisis are anticipated 
to impact the efficiency negatively. According to the additional variables, listed 
banks in stock market are highly expected to be more efficient due to better control 
and supervision. Moreover, more controlling of corruption can lead to better 
efficiency measures, because corruption discourages employees to be more 
productive. 
4.14 Profitability models and hypotheses 
According to profitability, the relationship between ROA, ROE or NIM and 
independent variables is found through OLS and fixed effects regression. In this 
research, there are 12 hypotheses which could explain the ROA, ROE or NIM. 
However, the regression of profitability and its independent variable is: 
- Main test: 
Proit = α + β1 LTAit + β2 EQTAit + β3LOANSTAit + β4 LOANSDEPOit + β5 DEPOSITSTAit + β6 
LAGEt + β7 LOGZit + β8 FOREi + β9 DOMi + β10 GOVi + β11 LGDPt + β12 INFLATIONt + β13 
MCAPt + β14 GFCt + ɛit………………………………………………………...…..(11) 
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      i = 1….n; t = 1….n                                                                
 
The dependent variables are profitability ratios (ROA, ROE and NIM), i is the 
observations, t is time, α is the constant, β denotes the coefficient of variables and 
ɛit is the error term. While the independent variables are size, capital ratio, loans 
intensity, credit risk, deposit ratio, age, z-score, ownership, GDP, inflation, 
financial crisis (GFC).  
Hypotheses of variables (main test): 
H10: There is no impact between the profitability and size 
H20: There is no impact between the profitability and capital ratio 
H30: There is no impact between the profitability and loans intensity 
H40: There is no impact between the profitability and credit risk 
H50: There is no impact between the profitability and deposit ratio 
H60: There is no impact between the profitability and age 
H70: There is no impact between the profitability and z-score 
H80: There is no impact between the profitability and foreign ownership 
H90: There is no impact between the profitability and domestic ownership 
H100: There is no impact between the profitability and government ownership 
H110: There is no impact between the profitability and GDP 
H120: There is no impact between the profitability and inflation 
H130: There is no impact between the profitability and market capitalisation 
H140: There is no impact between the profitability and global financial crisis 
 
However, Figure 4.4 below explains the frame work of profitability factors. 
- Additional test 
Proit = α + β1 LTAit + β2 EQTAit + β3LOANSTAit + β4 LOANSDEPOit + β5 DEPOSITSTAit + β6 
LAGEt + β7 LOGZit + β8 FOREi + β9 DOMi + β10 GOVi + β11 LISTEDi + β12 LGDPt + β13 
INFLATIONt + β14 MCAPt + β15 GFCt + β16 CCONTROLt + ɛit……...………………..(12) 
      i = 1….n; t = 1….n                                                                
 
The additional test has two added variables to the main model: listing and 
corruption control. 
Hypotheses of variables (additional test): 
H10: There is no impact between the profitability and size 
H20: There is no impact between the profitability and capital ratio 
H30: There is no impact between the profitability and loans intensity 
H40: There is no impact between the profitability and credit risk 
H50: There is no impact between the profitability and deposit ratio 
H60: There is no impact between the profitability and age 
H70: There is no impact between the profitability and z-score 
H80: There is no impact between the profitability and foreign ownership 
H90: There is no impact between the profitability and domestic ownership 
H100: There is no impact between the profitability and government ownership 
H110: There is no impact between the profitability and listing 
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Figure 4.4: Hypotheses of profitability for the main test 
 
H120: There is no impact between the profitability and GDP 
H130: There is no impact between the profitability and inflation 
H140: There is no impact between the profitability and market capitalisation 
H150: There is no impact between the profitability and global financial crisis 
H160: There is no impact between the profitability and corruption control 
 
Before analysing the data, we can anticipate the relationship between the 
profitability ratios and their determinants (see Table 4.6 below). The size is highly 
expected to influence the profits positively, because stronger banks in assets can 
operate more which increase the probability of attaining more profits. In addition, 
the providing more services by banks can reduce the risk of achieving loss.  
 
According to capitalisation, also banks with greater capital are less risky. 
Furthermore, deposits (deposit ratio) and loans (loan intensity) which considered 
being the most important operations in banking sector are predicted to be a 
positive determinants. The reason behind this can be accepting more deposits, 
allow banks to invest and lend more which improve the earnings. However, the 
credit risk can be very risky and can affect the profitability ratios negatively as 
increasing in credit risk could not allow banks from paying the deposits back to the 
customers. Moreover, age of banks is highly important to enhance the profits. The 
Profitability 
Size 
Capitalisation 
Loan intensity 
Deposit ratio 
Credit risk 
Z-score 
Age 
Domestic ownership 
Foreign ownership 
Government ownership 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation 
Market capitalisation 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP 
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Table 4.6: Predicted signs that impact profitability  
N Determinants Expected signs 
1 Size Positive 
2 Capital ratio Positive 
3 Loan intensity Positive 
4 Credit risk Negative 
5 Deposit ratio Positive 
6 Age Positive 
7 Z-score Positive 
8 Foreign banks Positive 
9 Domestic banks Negative 
10 Government banks Positive 
11 Listing* Positive 
12 GDP Positive 
13 Inflation Negative 
14 Market capitalisation Positive 
15 Global financial crisis Negative 
16 Corruption control* Positive 
* Additional variable 
 
older banks have better experience in banking sector than new banks. Regarding 
to the stability ratio (z-score), based on the recent studies, stable banks are 
always more profitable that banks exposing higher insolvency risks. Regarding the 
ownership, foreign and public banks are expected to affect the banking systems 
positively, because foreign and public banks have more capital than domestic 
banks. Focusing on industry-specific factors, the economic (GDP) and stock 
market growth can help banking sector in maximising earnings due to availability 
of higher individual wealth in developed countries. In contrast, inflation and global 
financial crisis are strongly predicted to affect the banking systems negatively. 
Regarding the additional factors, listed banks are anticipated to have greater 
profitability ratios than unlisted banks, because listed banks can get more funds 
from the financial traders in the financial markets. Moreover, control of corruption 
may support the profits as control of corruption allows bankers to be more effective.   
 
4.15 Stability models and hypotheses 
The dependent variable that represents the stability in this study are z-score and 
capital ratio. However, the relationship between stability (z-score and capital ratio) 
and the independent variables is determined by running OLS‟ and fixed effects‟ 
regression as follows: 
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- Main test: 
Stait = α + β1 LTAit + β2 LOGZit/EQTAit + β3 LOANSTAit + β4 LOANSDEPOit + β5 ROAit + β6 
FATAit + β7 LAGEt + β8 FOREi + β9 DOMi + β10 GOVi + β11 LGDPt + β12 INFLATIONt + 
β13 MCAPt + β14 GFCt + ɛit……………………………………………...………...(13) 
      i = 1….n; t = 1….n                                                    
 
As mentioned, Stait denotes the dependent variables which are the z-score or 
capital ratio (stability‟s indicators), i is the observations, t is time, α is the constant, 
β denotes the coefficient of variables and ɛit is the error term. On the other side, 
the independent variables are size, z-score/capital ratio, loans intensity, credit risk, 
ROA, operating leverage, age, ownership, GDP, inflation, market capitalisation, 
financial crisis (GFC).  
Hypotheses of variables (main test): 
H10: There is no impact between the stability and size 
H20: There is no impact between the stability and z-score or capital ratio 
H30: There is no impact between the stability and loans intensity 
H40: There is no impact between the stability and credit risk 
H50: There is no impact between the stability and ROA 
H60: There is no impact between the stability and operating leverage 
H70: There is no impact between the stability and age 
H80: There is no impact between the stability and foreign ownership 
H90: There is no impact between the stability and domestic ownership 
H100: There is no impact between the stability and government ownership 
H110: There is no impact between the stability and GDP 
H120: There is no impact between the stability and inflation 
H130: There is no impact between the stability and market capitalisation 
H140: There is no impact between the stability and global financial crisis 
 
Figure 4.5 below explains the factors that could affect stability. 
 
 
- Additional test: 
Stait = α + β1 LTAit + β2 LOGZit/EQTAit + β3 LOANSTAit + β4 LOANSDEPOit + β5 ROAit + β6 
FATAit + β7 LAGEt + β8 FOREi + β9 DOMi + β10 GOVi + β11 LISTEDi + β12 LGDPt + β13 
INFLATIONt + β14 MCAPt + β15 GFCt + β16 CCONTROLt + ɛit……………………….(14) 
      i = 1….n; t = 1….n    
 
LISTEDi and CCONTROLt  are treated as additional variables. 
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Figure 4.5: Hypotheses of stability for the main test 
 
Hypotheses of variables (additional test): 
H10: There is no impact between the stability and size 
H20: There is no impact between the stability and z-score or capital ratio 
H30: There is no impact between the stability and loans intensity 
H40: There is no impact between the stability and credit risk 
H50: There is no impact between the stability and ROA 
H60: There is no impact between the stability and operating leverage 
H70: There is no impact between the stability and age 
H80: There is no impact between the stability and foreign ownership 
H90: There is no impact between the stability and domestic ownership 
H100: There is no impact between the stability and government ownership 
H110: There is no impact between the stability and listing 
H120: There is no impact between the stability and GDP 
H130: There is no impact between the stability and inflation 
H140: There is no impact between the stability and market capitalisation 
H150: There is no impact between the stability and global financial crisis 
H160: There is no impact between the stability and corruption control 
 
However, before analysing the stability‟s determinants, we can anticipate the 
association between the stability indicators (z-score and capital ratios) and their 
determinants as in Tables 4.7 below. Based on Table 4.7 below, we can 
summarise that z-score and capital ratios can influence each other positively. In 
addition, size, loan intensity, ROA, operating leverage, age, foreign ownership, 
Stability 
Size 
Z-core/Capitalisation 
Loan intensity 
ROA 
Credit risk 
Age 
Operating leverage 
Domestic ownership 
Foreign ownership 
Government ownership 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation 
Market capitalisation 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP 
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public ownership, GDP and market capitalisation could enhance stability. On the 
other side, the stability expected to be influenced negatively by credit risk, 
domestic ownership, inflation and the global financial crisis. For the additional test, 
the listing and control of corruption are highly expected to impact the stability 
positively. 
 
Table 4.7: Anticipated signs of stability determinants 
N Determinants Expected signs 
1 Z-score/Capital ratio Positive 
2 Size Positive 
3 Loan intensity Positive 
4 Credit risk Negative 
5 ROA Positive 
6 Operating leverage Positive 
7 Age Positive 
8 Foreign banks Positive 
9 Domestic banks Negative 
10 Government banks Positive 
11 Listing* Positive 
12 GDP Positive 
13 Inflation Negative 
14 Market capitalisation Positive 
15 Global financial crisis Negative 
16 Corruption control* Positive 
* Additional variable 
 
4.16 Software to measure efficiency  
The researcher found that the most accurate results can be obtained after using 
DEA to find the appropriate efficiencies through Frontier Analyst software, Version 
4.0 (Banxia Holdings Ltd, 2012) which was used by Mostafa (2007a).  
4.17 Comparison between statistical models 
The optimal used statistical models conducted in the literature to find the 
determinants of efficiency, performance and stability are:  
1. Ordinary least squares (OLS). 
2. Fixed effects regression or least squares dummy variables model. 
 
Table 4.8 below shows the difference between OLS and fixed effects models. 
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Table 4.8: The difference between OLS and fixed effects models 
Factor OLS Fixed effects 
Style Linear regression Linear regression 
Model y =  α + βx + u y =  α + δ + βx + u 
characteristic 
Represents linear model 
between dependent and 
independent variables 
The regression varied by a fixed amount for each  
individual 
Ideal Large sample Large sample 
   
Error terms Normally distributed 
Independently normally distributed and correlated with 
independent variables 
 
 
Can be applied 
 
 
Panel data, cross sectional data and time series data Panel data 
Proposed Rao, 1965 Taft & Lewis, 1958 
Source: Adopted from different sources (Rao, 1965; Taft & Lewis, 1958) 
 
The Hausamn test reported a robust evidence to employ fixed-effects model rather 
than random effects model. The fixed effects which run by the least square dummy 
variable (LSDV) procedure is expected to estimate high significance of the 
likelihood ratios test. Furthermore, the fixed effects model is supported by the 
absence of heteroscedasticity which means that the variance of each model‟s 
residual is equal for all banks (Mirzaei, et al., 2013). Referring to the literature, the 
most common models used to analyse the determinants of efficiency, profitability 
and stability in the banking sector are OLS and fixed effects models. For efficiency 
studies, OLS has been used by Han et al. (2012) Fang et al. (2011) and Abu-
Alkheil et al. (2012) and they conclude that OLS assumes normality and 
homoskedasticity of the error term; whereas, fixed effect has been run by Sufian 
and Habibullah (2009) and Hermes and Nhung (2010). Regarding profitability 
studies, Delis (2012) employed OLS to find the determinants of Islamic and 
conventional banks performance in the GCC region, while Lee and Kim (2013) 
used fixed effect regression to analyse bank performance and their determinants 
in Korea. Referring to stability, Jeon and Lim (2013) examined OLS and fixed 
effects in their study to reveal the determinants of stability using z-score as a 
stability indicator. Table 4.9 below shows the recent studies using OLS and fixed 
effect models in efficiency, profitability and stability in banking to find the 
determinants (in efficiency, profitability and stability) based on the literature review. 
 
108 
 
    Table 4.9: Studies used OLS and fixed effects models in the literature review 
Study 
 (Efficiency) 
Study 
(Profitability) 
Study 
(Stability) 
El-Moussawi and Obeid (2010) 
OLS 
Petria et al. (2015) 
Fixed effects 
Tabak et al. (2015) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Yudistira (2004) 
OLS 
Apergis (2014) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Kohler (2015) 
Fixed effects 
Mamatzakis et al. (2015) 
Fixed effects 
Rumler and Waschiczek (2014) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Chalermchatvichienet al. (2014) 
OLS 
Tabak et al. (2013) 
OLS 
Lee and Kim (2013) 
Fixed Effects 
Williams (2014) 
Fixed effects 
Zhang and Matthews (2012) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Shehzad et al. (2013) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Fu et al. (2014) 
Fixed effects 
Han et al. (2012) 
OLS 
Dedu and Chitan (2013) 
Fixed Effects 
Anginer et al. (2014) 
OLS 
Fang et al. (2011) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Kutan et al. (2012) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Dong et al. (2014) 
OLS 
Satub et al. (2010) 
Fixed effects 
Tan and Floros (2012) 
Fixed Effect 
Dima et al. (2014) 
Fixed effects 
Sufian and Habibullah (2009) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Chitan (2012) 
OLS 
Gulamhussen et al. (2014) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Chiou (2009) 
OLS 
Delis et al. (2012) 
OLS 
Jeon and Lim (2013) 
OLS and Fixed effects 
Hermes and Nhung (2010) 
Fixed effects 
Haan and Poghosyan (2012) 
Fixed Effects 
Beck et al. (2013a) 
Fixed effects 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 
Fixed effects 
Barry et al. (2011) 
OLS 
Bertay et al. (2013) 
Fixed effects 
Johnes et al. (2014) 
Fixed effects 
Manlagnit (2011) 
Fixed Effects 
Barakat and Hussainey (2013) 
Fixed effects 
Assaf et al. (2011)  
OLS 
Olson and Zoubi (2011) 
Fixed effects 
Srairi (2013) 
OLS 
 
4.18 Software of statistical models 
The practical software to get the efficiency measures is Frontier Analyst. As a 
second stage, STATA 14 software investigates the determinants of efficiency in 
Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks through the OLS and fixed 
effects models. Most studies used STATA software to find determinants of 
efficiency (Spulbăr & Nitoi, 2014), performance (Mollah & Zaman, 2015) and 
stability (Nguyen, 2012) in the banking sector.  
 
4.19 Summary 
This chapter explained the methodology of gathering data. In addition, the 
methods of estimating efficiency, profitability and stability in banking were shown. 
Furthermore, a brief explanation of independent variables was also indicated. After 
that, the models of estimating the relationship between the dependent variables 
(efficiency, profitability and stability) and independent variables were given. This 
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chapter also described the data including the observations, means, standard 
deviations, minimum values and maximum values.    
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Chapter Five: Results and Discussion of Efficiency 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Three inputs and three outputs are used in this study to calculating DEA measures. 
The inputs are fixed assets, deposits and short-term funding, and equity. The 
outputs are net income, total securities and total loans. However, the results of 
efficiency are divided into two stages in this chapter as the first stage is efficiency 
estimations and the second stage is finding the determinants of efficiency following 
Sufian‟s (2009) approaches (OLS and FEM). In general, DEA method is 
decomposed into three estimators namely, the technical efficiency (CRS), pure 
technical efficiency (VRS) and scale efficiency (SE), the study period of 2005-2012 
for Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks. Table 5.1 concludes a 
description of the efficiency estimators for Islamic, conventional, socially 
responsible and all banks. Appendices 5, 6 and 7 explain full details of efficiency 
estimators.  
It is observable in Table 5.1 that socially responsible banks scored the highest 
averages in efficiency measures during the period as 0.948, 0.978 and 0.966 for 
mean TE, PTE and SE, respectively (H1 is accepted). The reason behind high 
efficiency is due to providing more social services leads to raise the 
competitiveness and customers trust worthy which banks are seeking to achieve 
(Petrovic-Randelovic et al., 2015). In addition, one of the main roles of socially 
responsible banks is saving resources (inputs) so, this could be the reason of 
great efficiency measures. In other words, SRBs use lower amount of inputs to 
generate maximum outputs (services). In contrast, the lowest scores were 
achieved by conventional banks at 0.823, 0.881 and 0.927 for mean TE (CRS), TE 
(VRS) and SE, respectively. Based on Table 5.1, the standard deviation is quite 
low, which means that the measures are relatively consistent. In a comparison 
between the Islamic and conventional banking sectors, Rattab et al. (2010) 
Mokhtar et al. (2007) investigated how Islamic banks attained better efficiencies in 
their studies, which are consistent with this thesis. In contrast, Shahid et al. (2010) 
and Johnes et al. (2009) found that conventional banks were more efficient than 
Islamic banks. According to all banks measures, Table 5.1 shows that mean SE 
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(0.944) is the highest efficiency indicator compared to means TE (0.932) and PTE 
(0.884). 
Table 5.1: A description of the efficiency estimators of the whole sample 
Type Estimator Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Islamic  
Banks 
TE 312 0.883 0.1761 0.240 1 
PTE 312 0.936 0.1375 0.250 1 
SE 312 0.940 0.1081 0.490 1 
Conventional  
Banks 
TE 1827 0.823 0.2450 0.040 1 
PTE 1827 0.881 0.2149 0.140 1 
SE 1827 0.927 0.1336 0.040 1 
Socially 
Responsible 
 Banks 
TE 284 0.948 0.1313 0.090 1 
PTE 284 0.978 0.8663 0.280 1 
SE 284 0.966 0.9392 0.090 1 
All  
Banks 
TE 2423 0.884 0.2302 0.043 1 
PTE 2423 0.932 0.1982 0.043 1 
SE 2423 0.944 0.1271 0.247 1 
 
5.1.1 First stage results: DEA measures 
Referring to the literature review, there are many studies examined DEA indicators 
and used them as dependent variables (for instance, Johnes, et al. 2014; Rosman 
et al., 2014.; Garza García, 2012; Assaf et al. 2011; El-Moussawi & Obeid, 2010; 
Chiou, 2009;  Sufian, 2009; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009; Pasiouras, 2008; Grigorian 
& Manole, 2002; Casu & Molyneux, 2003). According to the efficiency estimation 
in this study, Appendix 5 illustrates that there are 43 Islamic banks in the sample 
from MENA countries and the UK. From the sample, only three Islamic banks 
(6.97% of the sample) were found to be efficient during the period under the 
intermediation approach, e.g. maintained having a perfect efficiency scoring of 1 
for the whole period. These banks are Noor Islamic Bank in the UAE, and Khaleeji 
Bank and Arcapita Bank in Bahrain for the three efficiency measures. The three 
efficient Islamic banks were not affected in 2007 by the global financial crisis. In 
particular, three Islamic banks (6.97%) were efficient under TE (CRS) and three 
banks scored full efficiency for SE, whereas 13 banks (30.23%) were found to be 
efficient under TE (VRS), which means the remaining 30 (69.77%) Islamic banks 
could not reach the VRS frontier. However, the rest of the Islamic banks need to 
increase their efficiency by finding optimal strategies of reducing their inputs and 
increasing outputs. Overall, the mean efficiency scores for Islamic banks are 0.883, 
0.936 and 0.940 for TE (CRS), TE (VRS) and SE, respectively. As a result, Islamic 
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banks can reach the efficiency frontier through reducing their inputs by 11.70%, 
6.40% and 6% for TE, PTE and SE, respectively. 
Appendix 6 reveals 242 conventional banks from the MENA region and the UK. 
According to efficiency, 11 conventional banks (4.54%) were fully efficient during 
the period for the three estimators TE (CRS), TE (VRS) and SE. In particular, 11 
(4.54%) efficient banks for TE (CRS) and 47 (19.42%) banks scored efficient 
measures for TE (VRS). Additionally, 15 conventional banks (6.19%) achieved SE 
efficiently. Overall, the average efficiencies were equal to 0.823, 0.881 and 0.927 
for TE, PTE and SE, respectively. In general, conventional banks need to minimise 
their inputs by 17.70% for TE, 11.90% for PTE and 7.30% for SE. 
Focusing on SRBs, Appendix 7 indicates that 11 (39.28%) socially responsible 
banks were efficient (out of 38 SRBs) over the period 2005-2012 under TE (CRS), 
TE (VRS) and SE approaches. According to efficient socially responsible banks, 
12 (42.85%) socially responsible banks were found to be efficient under the TE 
frontier, 19 (64.28%) banks achieved efficient mean TE (VRS) and 11 (39.28%) 
socially responsible banks scored full efficiency measures following the SE 
approach. Generally, the highest mean efficiency was scored through PTE (0.978), 
then SE (0.966) and TE (0.948) during the period. However, socially responsible 
banks can be fully efficient when they reduce the inputs by 5.20%, 2.20% and 3.40% 
for TE, PTE and SE, respectively. In comparison, socially responsible banks 
achieved the highest mean efficiency measures over the period 2005-2012 
compared to Islamic and conventional banks. In other words, socially responsible 
banks are more efficient than Islamic and conventional banks. 
However, we can explain the efficiency measures by country to find which 
countries have efficient banks in the sample during the period regardless of the 
banking type. Table 5.2 illustrates the difference between the averages of 
efficiency scores for the countries used across the world in descending order of 
GDP. 
Table 5.2 reveals that four (10.81% of the sample) countries have fully efficient 
banks: Germany, Canada, Australia and Spain. However, nine (24.32%) countries 
reached the TE (VRS) efficiency frontier. In contrast, the least technical and scale  
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Table 5.2: Averages of efficiency measures by country 
N Country 
Mean 
TE 
Mean 
PTE 
Mean  
SE 
Banks in the sample Number of Banks 
1 USA 0.982 1 0.982 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
2 Germany 1 1 1 Socially Responsible Banks 3 SRB 
3 France 0.970 0.985 0.984 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
4 UK 0.932 0.978 0.951 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
3 IB, 74 CB and 6 
SRB 
5 Canada 1 1 1 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
6 Australia 1 1 1 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
7 Spain 1 1 1 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
8 Netherlands 0.941 1 0.941 Socially Responsible Banks 2 SRB 
9 Saudi Arabia 0.953 0.983 0.968 Islamic and Conventional Banks 3 IB and 9 CB 
10 Switzerland 0.991 0.996 0.995 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
11 Norway 0.966 0.979 0.986 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
12 Austria 0.997 1 0.997 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
13 UAE 0.960 0.988 0.971 Islamic and Conventional Banks 6 IB and 17 CB 
14 Iran 0.812 0.862 0.939 Islamic and Socially Responsible Banks 7 IB and 1 SRB 
15 Denmark 0.981 1 0.981 Socially Responsible Banks 5 SRB 
16 Israel 0.763 0.902 0.848 Conventional Banks 8 CB 
17 Egypt 0.536 0.577 0.923 Islamic and Conventional Banks 2 IB and 21 CB 
18 Iraq 0.767 0.912 0.842 Conventional Banks 2CB 
19 Algeria 0.516 0.631 0.821 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
1 IB, 9 CB and 3 SRB 
20 Qatar 0.954 0.987 0.965 Islamic and Conventional Banks 3 IB and 6 CB 
21 New Zealand 0.974 0.976 0.998 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
22 Kuwait 0.982 0.991 0.991 Islamic and Conventional Banks 2 IB and 6 CB 
23 Bangladesh 0.942 0.979 0.962 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
24 Morocco  0.910 0.949 0.957 
Conventional and Socially Responsible 
Banks 
8 CB and 1 SRB 
25 Oman 0.972 0.985 0.986 Conventional Banks 7 CB 
26 Syria 0.776 0.866 0.844 Conventional Banks 5 CB 
27 Libya 0.573 0.627 0.901 Conventional Banks 5 CB 
28 Tunisia 0.775 0.908 0.846 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
1 IB, 8 CB and 2 SRB 
29 Lebanon 0.670 0.764 0.869 Conventional Banks 28 CB 
30 Yemen 0.762 0.851 0.893 Islamic and Conventional Banks 4 IB and 1 CB 
31 Jordan 0.915 0.961 0.951 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 7 CB 
32 Bahrain 0.948 0.983 0.963 Islamic and Conventional Banks 9 IB and 15 CB 
33 Bolivia 0.937 1 0.937 Socially Responsible Banks 2 SRB 
34 Nepal 0.942 0.953 0.988 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
35 Mongolia 0.875 0.965 0.899 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
36 Malta 0.897 0.934 0.956 
Conventional and Socially Responsible 
Banks 
4 CB and 1 SRB 
37 Palestine  0.927 0.969 0.955 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 2 CB 
All Banks 0.884 0.932 0.944 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
323 banks (43 IB, 
242 CB and 38 SRB) 
 
efficiency measures were scored by Algeria as 0.516 and 0.821, respectively. 
Regarding the PTE, the minimum average achieved by Egyptian banks 
(0.577).Overall, the efficiency of all 323 banks in the 37 countries in this study 
indicate a relatively high efficiency of 0.884, 0.931 and 0.955 for mean TE, PTE 
SE, respectively, which means that these banks can be fully efficient through 
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reducing average inputs by 11.60%, 6.90% and 4.50% for TE, PTE and SE, 
respectively.   
 
The banks in this study needs to be efficient by reducing a specific amount of 
inputs. Thus, Appendix 8 illustrates averages of TE (CRS), PTE (VRS) and SE, 
which ease calculating the inefficiency measures as a next step for Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks during the period 2005-2012. 
 
Appendix 8 illustrates that the highest average efficiencies were attained by 
socially responsible banks for TE, PTE and SE scoring 0.948, 0.978 and 0.966, 
respectively. After that, the Islamic banks are moderate in achieving average 
efficiencies of 0.883, 0.936 and 0.940 for TE (CRS), TE (VRS) and SE, 
respectively. Lastly, the weakest efficiency scores were attained by the 
conventional banks obtaining the lowest means as TE (CRS), TE (VRS) and SE 
equal to 0.823, 0.881 and 0.927, respectively. Generally, all banks in the sample 
scored a higher mean PTE equals to 0.932 and lower average TE equals 0.932. 
This means that all banks perform under the variable returns assumption better 
than the constant return function, which is consistent with the results of Abu-
Alkheil et al. (2012) and Yudistira (2004). In 2010, the banks experienced the year 
of the greatest technical efficiency (0.904) and scale efficiency (0.959). According 
to pure technical efficiency, the most efficient year was in 2005, scoring mean PTE 
equal to 0.949. 
Overall, in 2008 and 2009 efficiency measures collapsed, which means that there 
was inefficiency in this period due to banks encountering hurdles in finding optimal 
combinations of varied inputs to generate the desired outputs. Another reason for 
collapse could be the influence of the global financial crisis (GFC). This study 
examines the impact of the GFC on efficiency through OLS and fixed effects 
regressions. Additionally, in 2009, the mean TE (CRS) for all banks was the least 
(0.867) because banks in 2009 had no ability to use the available inputs efficiently 
compared with the rest of the period. Also, the low efficiency could be due to the 
GFC. However, the findings show that the inefficiency occurred due to the 
technical efficiency under CRS function rather than the scale efficiency and 
technical efficiency under VRS.  
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Islamic banks in particular experienced a sharp reduction in 2008 according to TE 
and SE measures (0.854 and 0.920, respectively) which affected the Islamic 
banks‟ financial performance negatively. In terms of PTE, the minimum efficiency 
was obtained in 2009 (0.912) as seen in Figure 5.1 below. In contrast, the 
maximum means TE (0.911) and PTE (0.952) were scored in 2012, whereas the 
highest average SE was in 2010, equal to 0.960. Overall, Islamic banks have the 
moderate efficiency measures in the group during the period, scoring means of TE, 
PTE and SE equal to 0.883, 0.936 and 0.940, respectively. Based on Figure 5.1 
below, we can conclude that the TE and SE averages are similar in terms of 
volatility. In detail, the efficiency graphs of means of TE and SE collapsed in 2006, 
2008 and 2011. In contrast, the TE and SE recovered in 2007 and the period 
2008-2010, as well as in year 2012. On the other hand, PTE has a different 
efficiency graph, declining sharply in 2006, 2009 and 2011, whereas there was an 
improvement in 2010 and 2012.  
           Figure 5.1: Graph of average efficiencies of Islamic banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concentrating on conventional banks efficiency, Appendix 8 indicates that the 
maximum mean efficiency attained by conventional banks in 2005 for means TE 
(0.835) and SE (0.836) while, in terms of the PTE approach, the highest average 
efficiency was obtained in 2012 (0.897). On the other hand, the minimum 
averages of TE and PTE were achieved in 2009 (0.810 and 0.868, respectively), 
but for mean SE, the lowest average occurred in 2006 (0.923). Overall, the 
efficiency measures are the lowest over the period compared to Islamic and 
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socially responsible banks, scoring means of 0.823, 0.881 and 0.927 for TE, PTE 
and SE, respectively. However, Figure 5.2 below reveals that there is a similarity 
in fluctuation in the TE and PTE indices as the major breakdown was in 2009 and 
higher efficiency occurred in 2012. According to the SE graph, the efficiency varied 
from 0.923 in 2006 to 0.936 in 2005.  
           Figure 5.2: Graph of average efficiencies of conventional banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focusing on socially responsible banks, the socially responsible banks‟ the most 
efficient year was 2010 according to TE and SE scoring of 0.977 and 0.989, while 
the largest mean PTE was in year 2005 (0.997). In contrast, the lowest efficiency 
was in 2009 for TE (0.927) and PTE (0.956) averages, whereas the minimum 
efficiency was in 2006 for mean SE equal to 0.941 (refer to Table 5.1 above). To 
sum up, Islamic banks perform better than conventional banks, which is consistent 
with the studies of Rattab et al. (2010) and Mokhtar et al. (2007). In contrast, 
Shahid et al. (2010) and Johnes et al. (2009) claim that conventional banks attain 
better efficiencies than Islamic banks do. 
TE and SE indicators have the same volatility over the period (see Figure 5.3 
below). All efficiency graphs fluctuated sharply as the technical and scale 
efficiencies declined for the periods: 2005-2006, 2007-2009 and 2010-2011. 
According to the PTE graph, the efficiency drops over the periods: 2005-2007, 
2008-2009 and 2010-2011. In contrast, the efficiency indicators increased for the 
periods 2006-2007, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 for TE and SE, but PTE rose in the 
2009-2010 and 2011-2012 periods. Overall, the maximum means for TE, PTE and 
SE were attained by socially responsible banks compared to Islamic and 
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conventional banks, where they were equal to 0.948, 0.978 and 0.966, 
respectively. 
          Figure 5.3: Graph of average efficiencies of socially responsible banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, all the banks achieved high relative efficiency as all the mean efficiency 
measures were 0.884, 0.932 and 0.944 for means TE, PTE and SE, respectively. 
In 2010, average TE (0.904) and SE (0.959) were found to be the highest, but the 
maximum mean PTE (0.949) was attained in 2005. On the other hand, the least 
TE and PTE were scored in 2009 as mean TE equal to 0.867 and average PTE is 
0.912 in 2009. According to the SE approach, the minimum efficiency occurred in 
2006 (mean SE = 0.933).  
Figure 5.4 below indicates that all banks experienced similar fluctuations in TE, 
PTE and SE graphs. More accurately, the TE and SE averages collapsed in 2006, 
2009 and 2011 when the TE and SE went up in 2007, 2010 (all banks improved 
their efficiency) and 2012. According to PTE, it is observable that the graph 
declined in 2006, 2009 and 2011, and PTE changed slightly from 2007 to 2008. 
Furthermore, SE graph, increased in 2010 and 2012. Overall, the averages of TE 
in the Islamic and conventional banks were less than PTE and SE over the period 
2005-2012, which is consistent with the results of Abu-Alkheil et al. (2012). 
Banks are like any profitable firm that strives to minimise the inputs i.e. fixed 
assets and maximise the outputs i.e. net income. Appendix 9 explains the input 
waste percentages (inefficiency measures); lower percentage means the waste of 
inputs was low.  
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The inefficiency measures draw a great interest to bankers which can provide 
valuable directions and opportunities for further improves in banks‟ operations 
which increase the capabilities of banks to be more competitive.    
             Figure 5.4: Graph of average efficiencies of all banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, banks need to improve their efficiency by reducing some amounts of 
inputs (level of inefficiency) as in Appendix 9. 
Appendix 9 concludes the reduction ratio of inputs to reach the efficient frontiers 
which are equal to 1. We can see that the marked (highlighted) values in Appendix 
9 indicate the maximum inefficient year, in these years banks need to reduce the 
greatest amount of inputs and generate the current amount of outputs (input-
oriented approach).  
Regarding the Islamic banks, in 2008, the minimum average TE was attained. In 
order to be efficient in 2008, Islamic banks required to reduce 14.60% of inputs. In 
2009, the PTE average was the lowest value scoring inefficiency equal to 8.80%. 
Additionally, 2006 was the most inefficient year for SE as Islamic banks needed to 
minimise the highest inputs (8.80%). Overall, the average inputs for Islamic banks 
could be cut by 11.70%, 6.40% and 6% to reach TE, PTE and SE efficiency 
frontiers, respectively. 
Focusing on the conventional banks, the most inefficient year was in 2009 in terms 
of TE and PTE results and 2006 with respect to the SE measure. In 2009, 
conventional banks could be completely efficient by lowering 19% and 13% of 
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inputs for TE and PTE, respectively. In 2006, inputs had to be reduced by 7.70% 
to reach the SE frontier. Overall, the mean of inefficiency measures for the whole 
period (2005-2012) for the conventional banks are equal to 17.70%, 11.90% and 
7.30% for the TE, PTE and SE, respectively (see Figure 5.5 below).  
However, the socially responsible banks are considered to be the most efficient 
banks in this study. Therefore, the lowest inefficiency scores were attained by 
socially responsible banks as the target of reduction for inputs, with a mean TE 
ratio equalling 5.20%, mean PTE ratio equalling 2.20% and SE ratio equalling 
3.40%. In particular, the most inefficient year for TE (7.30% cut in inputs required) 
and PTE (4.40%) was 2009 as the conventional banks, while the SE inefficiency 
was worst in 2006 (5.90% input reduction needed). 
As a result, all banks needed 11.60%, 6.80% and 5.60% of reduction in inputs for 
TE, PTE and SE, respectively. Generally, the inefficiency occurred due to TE 
under CRS function rather than SE and TE under VRS (PTE) during the period for 
all banks. Input cutting strategies could have helped the policy makers in banks to 
reduce the inputs in the following year to make banks fully efficient by scoring 1 in 
efficiency measures. 
In general, the most inefficient banks are conventional banks followed by Islamic 
banks then socially responsible banks. In other words, socially responsible banks 
were able to be fully efficient by reducing the minimum amount of inputs compared 
to Islamic and conventional banks over the period (refer to Figure 5.5 below).  
However, Figure 5.5 below illustrates the target for reduction as ratios (inefficiency 
measure) of inputs to be fully efficient.   
Figure 5.5: Means of target for reduction (amount) of inputs to be fully efficient 
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5.1.1.1 Correlation analysis 
Correlation matrix explains the relationship between two or more variables. The 
correlation between variables varied from -1 (perfectly negative) to +1 (perfectly 
positive). The value of 0 means there is no relationship between variables. In order 
to have an accurate model, all relationship values need to be under 0.80. If there 
is a correlation value over 0.80, this means that there is Multicollinearity 
(Studenmund, 2005). The Multicollinearity can affect the model as following: 
1. The evaluations can be unbiased. 
2. The variance and standard error can be increased. 
3. Any changes in independent variables could lead to sensitive estimates. 
4. The significance of the model can be affected by Multicollinearity. 
5. The Multicollinearity reduces the reliability and stability of the model 
(Studenmund, 2005). 
 
Appendices 10-12 point that there is no Multicollinearity as all correlation values 
between the explanatory variables are below 0.80 in Islamic, conventional and 
socially responsible banks over the period 2005-2012. This means that all 
independent variables are suitable to be examined through OLS and fixed effects 
models.  
 
5.2 Second stage results: determinants of efficiency  
As mentioned, two main models were examined to find the determinants of 
efficiency: OLS and fixed effects regressions. Appendices 5.3-5.5 show the 
regressions results of the determinants of efficiency measures in Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks.  
 
5.2.1.1 Determinants of efficiency in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), main test  
Focusing on Table 5.3 which analyses Islamic banks as a main test (MT), the 
findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between efficiency and size, 
loan intensity, financial leverage, ROA, GDP and market capitalisation. On the 
other hand, size, capital ratio and age affect efficiency negatively. In detail, 
regarding bank-specific variables, larger banks tended to show increases in the TE 
and SE as predicted. The reason behind this finding could be due to larger banks 
were able to provide higher loans through less deposits which lead to reduce the 
121 
 
Table 5.3: Results of efficiency determinants for Islamic banks (UK and MENA), 
main test (MT)  
Islamic Banks (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Efficiency TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.0205
**
 -0.0303 -0.000005 -0.0578
**
 0.0224
***
 0.0185 
(2.61) (-1.16) (-0.00) (-2.87) (4.63) (1.03) 
EQTA 
-0.0290 -0.111 -0.0358 -0.114
*
 0.00333 -0.0124 
(-0.65) (-1.83) (-1.01) (-2.44) (0.12) (-0.30) 
LOANSTA 
0.115
**
 0.158
*
 0.103
**
 0.0993 0.0237 0.0694 
(2.61) (2.40) (2.94) (1.95) (0.88) (1.53) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.000537 0.000200 0.000313 -0.000001 0.000261 0.000201 
(1.29) (0.54) (0.95) (-0.00) (1.02) (0.78) 
TAEQ 
-0.000434 0.0137
***
 -0.00196 0.00876
***
 0.00163 0.00642
***
 
(-0.23) (5.37) (-1.33) (4.45) (1.43) (3.66) 
ROA 
0.115 0.158
**
 0.0240 0.0532 0.0967
*
 0.114
**
 
(1.70) (2.73) (0.44) (1.19) (2.32) (2.86) 
LAGE 
-0.0571
**
  -0.0183  -0.0436
***
  
(-2.72)  (-1.10)  (-3.38)  
FORE 
 -0.119  -0.0998  -0.0343 
 (-1.27)  (-1.38)  (-0.53) 
DOM 
-0.00275 -0.0811 0.0113 -0.0635 -0.0171 -0.0204 
(-0.11) (-0.94) (0.59) (-0.95) (-1.15) (-0.34) 
GOV 
-0.0314  -0.0236  -0.0139  
(-0.93)  (-0.88)  (-0.67)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.00526 0.0273 0.00159 -0.00778 -0.00751 0.0407 
(-0.68) (0.57) (0.26) (-0.21) (-1.59) (1.25) 
INFLATION 
-0.114 0.0209 -0.0687 0.0267 -0.0514 0.00204 
(-1.06) (0.21) (-0.80) (0.34) (-0.78) (0.03) 
MCAP 
0.0708
***
 0.00502 0.0485
**
 -0.0332 0.0267
*
 0.0306 
(3.39) (0.14) (2.92) (-1.20) (2.08) (1.25) 
GFC 
-0.0222 -0.0204 -0.0206 -0.0208 -0.00183 0.000254 
(-1.14) (-1.30) (-1.33) (-1.71) (-0.15) (0.02) 
sigma 0.973
***
 0.342 0.914
***
 1.577 1.065
***
 -0.320 
_cons (4.75) (0.30) (5.61) (1.79) (8.47) (-0.41) 
R
2 0.1465 0.1646 0.1134 0.1424 0.1479 0.1131 
Number of banks 43 43 43 43 43 43 
N 312 312 312 312 312 312 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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costs and maximise the profits. This result encourages banks to operate more in 
banking services such as opening more branches. This is consistent with the 
results obtained by Vu and Nahm, 2013. Many studies in the literature also 
support this result (see, Wanke & Barros, 2014; Tan & Floros, 2013; Sufian & 
Habibullah, 2009; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007; Yudistira, 2004). In contrast, the 
FEM result found that smaller banks attained better PTE. This result is consistent 
with the results of Chortareas et al. (2012), Han et al. (2012), Satub et al. (2010), 
Ariff and Can (2008) Girardone et al. (2004) and Hasan and Marton (2003) who 
claim that smaller banks are able to achieve more efficiency. The capital ratio has 
a significant and negative impact on efficiency for the PTE measure in Islamic 
banks, which means lower capitalisation leads to achievement of less financial risk 
in capital and more efficiency. The most recent studies come to the same 
conclusion are studies of Mamatzakis et al. (2015), Rosman et al. (2014), Tabak et 
al. (2013), Noor and Ahmed (2012), Chiou (2009), Pasiouras (2008), Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2007), Grigorian and Manole (2006) and Hasan and Marton (2003). 
On the other hand, Rosman et al. (2014) and Pasiouras (2006) find the opposite 
relationship. The loan intensity (LNOANSTA) increases the TE and PTE as 
expected, because banks depend on loans to attain their revenues. This means 
that loans can increase the bank efficiency through lowering costs and serving 
better quality loans. This result is consistent with the findings of Johnes et al. 
(2014), Garza García (2012), Sufian and Habibullah (2009), Pasiouras (2008) and 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007). In contrast, Noor and Ahmed (2012) and Sufian 
(2009) investigated how loans decrease efficiency. With respect to financial 
leverage ratio, the results show that financial leverage influences TE, PTE and SE 
positively at a 0.1% level following the fixed effects model. This means that 
increasing the capacity for owning more total assets (bought by equity) and 
investing them increase efficiency. The result of financial leverage is in contrast 
with the findings of Abu-Alkheil et al. (2012) which suggest a negative relationship 
between efficiency and financial leverage ratio. In addition, the ROA has a positive 
and significant relationship with TE and SE measures as predicted. This suggests 
that more efficient banks are able to achieve more profits in Islamic banks. As a 
result, customers prefer dealing with banks with higher profitability ratios who can 
offer better service quality. Therefore, banks with higher ROA can attract 
significant borrowers and depositors. This is supported by Rosman et al. (2014), 
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Tabak et al. (2013), Fukuyama and Matousek (2011), Sufian (2009) and Hassan 
(2006). On the other hand, the result of Fang et al. (2011) suggest that banks 
achieving lower ROA ratios were found to be more efficient during the period of 
study. According to AGE, the OLS model reveals that new banks are more 
efficient in terms of TE and SE. This is supported by Lee and Chich (2013) but 
contradicted by Satub et al. (2010) and Chiou (2009) who proved that older banks 
achieve higher efficiency measures in their study. According to macroeconomic 
variables, market capitalisation is only the macroeconomic determinant for 
efficiency in Islamic banks. In details, efficiency indicators (TE, PTE and SE) were 
correlated significantly and positively. In other words, development of the stock 
market in countries where there is Islamic banking systems leads to an increment 
in TE, PTE and SE. Johnes et al. (2014) and Vu and Nahm (2013) concern market 
capitalisation as a positive determinant that increase efficiency. This contrasts with 
the findings of Grigorian and Manole (2002) who reveal a negative relationship 
between security markets and efficiency in transitional European nations. In 
general, the ownership (similar to Hou et al., 2014; Vu & Nahm, 2013; Fukuyama 
& Matousek, 2011), GDP (Abul Alkheil et al., 2012), inflation (Tan & Floros, 2013) 
and global financial crisis did not impact the Islamic banks over the period 2005-
2012. According to R-squared measures, the percentages of consistency for 
independent variables are 14.65% and 16.46% for TE-OLS and TE-FEM, 
respectively. Regarding PTE-OLS and PTE-FEM, R2 equal 11.34% and 14.24%, 
respectively. Finally, R2 of SE-OLS = 14.79% and R2 of SE-FEM = 11.31%. Figure 
5.6 below simplifies the relationship between the efficiency and its determinants of 
Islamic banking system.  
The low R2 measures could occur for many reasons, such as the following: 
 Some variables are highly insignificant to efficiency, such as credit risk, 
ownership (foreign, domestic, and public), and GDP. 
 Some banks could have their own determinants of efficiency, which can be 
different to those for other banks. 
 Other unused determinants could strengthen the R2 measures. 
 Higher diversification in countries could lead to lower R2 indicators. 
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However, Figure 5.6 below indicates only the significant variables for the main 
results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Significant variables that impact efficiency for Islamic banks, MT 
5.2.1.2 Determinants of efficiency in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), 
additional test (AT) 
The main differences between the results of the main test in Table 5.3 and the 
results of the additional test (including listing and corruption control as additional 
variables) in Table 5.4 are that the GDP and GFC became significant factors. 
According to the GDP, Islamic banks operated more efficiently in countries with 
lower economic growth (similar to Zhang et al., 2012). Moreover, evidence of a 
significant and negative correlation was found between the global financial crisis 
and pure technical efficiency. Noor and Ahmed (2012) and Moradi-Motlagh and 
Babacan (2015) concluded the same findings. For the additional test, the Islamic 
listed banks were found to be more efficient than unlisted banks. The reason 
behind this could be because listed banks have more control from central banks, 
and have their own shares formally traded on the stock market. This finding is 
consistent with Yudistira (2004), who documents that listed Islamic banks practice 
more effectively than unlisted Islamic banks. Regarding the control of corruption, 
higher corruption control percentages strongly support (at 0.1%) the efficiency of 
Efficiency of IBs 
Size (+/-) 
Capitalisation (-) 
Loan intensity (+) 
Financial leverage (+) 
Credit risk 
Age (-) 
ROA (+) 
Domestic ownership 
Foreign ownership 
Govern. ownership 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation 
Stock market (+) 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP 
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Table 5.4: Results of efficiency determinants for Islamic banks (UK and MENA), 
additional test  
Islamic Banks (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Efficiency TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.00846 -0.0123 -0.0105 -0.0441
*
 0.0191
***
 0.0225 
(1.04) (-0.45) (-1.63) (-2.09) (3.65) (1.19) 
EQTA 
-0.0164 -0.0895 -0.0243 -0.0978
*
 0.00560 -0.00751 
(-0.38) (-1.46) (-0.73) (-2.07) (0.21) (-0.18) 
LOANSTA 
0.0974
*
 0.160
*
 0.0870
**
 0.100
*
 0.0202 0.0697 
(2.31) (2.43) (2.63) (1.97) (0.75) (1.53) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.000346 0.000165 0.000143 -0.000028 0.000219 0.000193 
(0.87) (0.44) (0.46) (-0.10) (0.86) (0.75) 
TAEQ 
0.00270 0.0140
***
 0.000865 0.00902
***
 0.00227 0.00650
***
 
(1.44) (5.53) (0.59) (4.60) (1.88) (3.69) 
ROA 
0.133
*
 0.156
**
 0.0400 0.0519 0.101
*
 0.114
**
 
(2.05) (2.72) (0.78) (1.17) (2.42) (2.85) 
LAGE 
-0.0430
*
  -0.00559  -0.0410
**
  
(-2.12)  (-0.35)  (-3.15)  
FORE 
 -0.116  -0.0968  -0.0334 
 (-1.24)  (-1.35)  (-0.52) 
DOM 
0.00787 -0.0709 0.0216 -0.0557 -0.0165 -0.0181 
(0.33) (-0.82) (1.14) (-0.84) (-1.07) (-0.30) 
GOV 
-0.0117  -0.00606  -0.00968  
(-0.36)  (-0.24)  (-0.47)  
LISTED* 
0.0448
*
  0.0374
*
  0.0153  
(2.03)  (2.16)  (1.08)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0187
*
 0.00937 -0.0105 -0.0214 -0.0103
*
 0.0367 
(-2.39) (0.20) (-1.71) (-0.58) (-2.05) (1.11) 
INFLATION 
0.0446 0.0559 0.0725 0.0534 -0.0149 0.00993 
(0.42) (0.55) (0.86) (0.68) (-0.22) (0.14) 
MCAP 
0.0119 0.00292 -0.00477 -0.0348 0.0149 0.0302 
(0.51) (0.08) (-0.26) (-1.27) (1.00) (1.23) 
GFC 
-0.0283 -0.0267 -0.0261 -0.0256
*
 -0.00304 -0.00117 
(-1.52) (-1.67) (-1.79) (-2.08) (-0.26) (-0.11) 
CCONTROL* 
0.00266
***
 0.00291
*
 0.00240
***
 0.00222
*
 0.000529 0.000656 
(4.85) (2.06) (5.58) (2.03) (1.51) (0.67) 
sigma 1.189
***
 0.482 1.106
***
 1.684 1.114
***
 -0.288 
_cons (5.96) (0.42) (7.05) (1.92) (8.72) (-0.37) 
R
2 0.2258 0.1782 0.2167 0.1560 0.1588 0.1146 
Number of banks 43 43 43 43 43 43 
N 312 312 312 312 312 312 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LISTED: dummy equal 1 if listed bank and 0 
unlisted bank; LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market 
capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise; CCONTROL: Corruption control.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
* Additional variable 
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Islamic banks. In other words, clear supervision from government towards 
corruption allows for better efficiency. This result occurs because corruption leads 
to lower employee productivity, thus reducing competitiveness. Chortareas‟s et al. 
(2012) results show that banks in countries with more corruption control rates 
performed more efficiently than banks in countries with fewer corruption control 
rates. Overall, the R2 measures are slightly increased compared to the main test. 
This means that the listing and corruption control variables are strongly linked to 
efficiency in Islamic banks. 
5.2.2.1 Determinants of efficiency in conventional banks (UK and MENA), MT  
Table 5.5 concentrates on conventional banks over the period 2005-2012. 
According to the internal variables, as anticipated, the results show that larger 
banks scored higher TE, PTE and SE than smaller banks. Capitalisation (capital 
ratio) impacts TE significantly and positively while, capitalisation influence SE 
significantly and negatively. However, loan intensity is found to be highly and 
positively correlated with TE, PTE and SE. In addition, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between financial leverage and efficiency measures. As for 
profitability, Table 5.5 notes a positive association between both PTE and SE, and 
ROA. Furthermore, new commercial banks have operated more efficiently than old 
banks. All the recent results are relatively consistent with Islamic banks in terms of 
influencing on efficiency whether positively or negatively. Regarding ownership, 
foreign banks scored the highest TE (FEM) but OLS shows that domestic banks 
were the most technical efficient banks. Furthermore, domestic banks attained the 
greatest PTE and state-owned banks found to be the highest scale efficient banks. 
However, increasing in concentration for all three types of ownership affected TE 
and PTE significantly and negatively (similar to Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007; 
Girardone et al., 2004). This finding discourages foreign banks to invest and open 
more branches in the MENA region and the UK. Referring to the literature, many 
studies focused on ownership in efficiency studies, such as Gardener (2012) who 
classified banks as foreign, private and state banks. Gardener (2012) concludes 
that foreign banks are found to be more efficient than their local counterparts. 
Moreover, state-owned banks scored better efficiency measures than private 
banks. Additionally, higher levels of foreign ownership raise the TE, CE and AE of 
banks, while higher concentration of state ownership only increases TE. 
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Table 5.5: Results of efficiency determinants for conventional banks (UK and 
MENA), main test 
CBs (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Efficiency TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.0147
***
 0.0255
*
 0.0137
***
 -0.00312 0.00352
*
 0.0220
**
 
(4.69) (2.39) (5.02) (-0.36) (1.97) (2.62) 
EQTA 
0.0593 -0.0685 0.105
**
 -0.0200 -0.0500
*
 -0.0777
**
 
(1.44) (-1.96) (2.93) (-0.70) (-2.12) (-2.83) 
LOANSTA 
0.0798
***
 0.0962
***
 0.0615
***
 0.0466
*
 0.0301
**
 0.0672
***
 
(4.20) (4.33) (3.71) (2.55) (2.77) (3.85) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.000299 0.000143 0.000103 -0.0000407 0.000250 0.000160 
(0.67) (0.51) (0.27) (-0.18) (0.98) (0.73) 
TAEQ 
0.000289 0.00198
***
 0.000161 0.00151
***
 0.000127 0.000684
*
 
(0.62) (4.76) (0.39) (4.43) (0.47) (2.09) 
ROA 
-0.134 -0.00941 0.356
*
 -0.0995 0.239
*
 0.129 
(-0.67) (-0.07) (2.04) (-0.86) (2.09) (1.17) 
LAGE 
-0.0232
**
  -0.028
***
  0.00185  
(-2.78)  (-3.86)  (0.39)  
FORE 
-0.428
***
 0.0270 -0.468
***
 0.0129 0.0346 0.0157 
(-5.11) (0.70) (-6.41) (0.41) (0.72) (0.52) 
DOM 
-0.385
***
 0.0159 -0.414
***
 0.0163 0.0302 0.000661 
(-4.65) (0.48) (-5.74) (0.60) (0.64) (0.03) 
GOV 
-0.389
***
  -0.445
***
  0.0543  
(-4.75)  (-6.24)  (1.16)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0205
***
 0.0351 0.0162
***
 0.0549
***
 0.00743
***
 0.00642 
(6.27) (1.83) (5.65) (3.49) (3.97) (0.43) 
INFLATION 
-0.345
***
 -0.0868 -0.398
***
 -0.105
*
 0.0376 0.0187 
(-4.15) (-1.58) (-5.50) (-2.33) (0.79) (0.43) 
MCAP 
0.0244
***
 0.0431
**
 0.0223
***
 0.0333
**
 0.00408 0.0175 
(6.43) (3.02) (6.73) (2.84) (1.88) (1.56) 
GFC 
-0.00312 -0.0112 -0.00528 -0.0113
*
 0.00284 0.000382 
(-0.28) (-1.76) (-0.55) (-2.18) (0.45) (0.08) 
Sigma 0.615
***
 -0.407 0.863
***
 -0.593 0.645
***
 0.527 
_cons (5.06) (-0.88) (8.13) (-1.55) (9.27) (1.44) 
R
2
 0.1286 0.1045 0.1391 0.0797 0.0421 0.0467 
Number of banks 242 242 242 242 242 242 
N 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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On the other side, higher levels of private ownership reduce both TE and CE. 
Focusing on external variables, the results find that higher GDP led to increase all 
efficiency measures. This result is in line with the findings of Hou et al. (2014), 
Johnes et al. (2014), Tan and Floros (2013), Vu and Nahm (2013), Garza García 
(2012), Zhang et al. (2012), Hermes and Nhung (2010) and Chortareas et al. 
(2012). Higher GDP generated means better economy which leads to improve 
efficiency in banking sector. Thus, banks concentrate on countries with greater 
GDP to invest more. By contrast, Sufian and Habibullah (2009) claimed that GDP 
influenced efficiency negatively and significantly in Korean banking sector. 
Regarding inflation, TE and PTE have a negative and significant relationship to 
inflation, which corresponds by the study of Vu and Nahm (2013) and Garza 
García (2012) and Sufian and Habibullah (2009). In contrast, El-Moussawi and 
Obeid (2010) proved that inflation raises efficiency in their study. The stock market 
growth in conventional banks tended to be as Islamic banks, the expansion in the 
stock market tends to improve efficiency. Finally, the PTE in conventional banks 
were affected by the financial crisis significantly and negatively at 5% level. 
Moradi-Motlagh and Babacan (2015) and Noor and Ahmed (2012) empirically 
found that the global financial crisis influenced the efficiency of banks significantly 
and negatively. Overall, the lowest R squared was attained by SE-OLS equal to 
4.21%, whereas the highest R squared was scored by PTE-OLS equal to 13.91%. 
Figure 5.7 explains the significant variables that affected conventional banks 
efficiency for the main test. 
 
5.2.2.2 Determinants of efficiency in conventional banks (UK and MENA), AT 
Table 5.6 explains that listing in financial markets is highly and strongly correlated 
with TE, PTE, and SE (correlated at 0.1%). This means that the conventional listed 
banks employed the technology professionally in order to increase efficiency. 
Moreover, the managerial skills in the listed banks are better than in the unlisted 
banks. These results are consistent with Islamic banks in the UK and MENA 
regions. In terms of the control of corruption, the findings in Table 5.6 reveal that 
the higher the level of supervision by governments, the better the efficiencies. The 
correlations between these factors are highly important to TE, PTE, and SE 
(associated at 0.1%). These results are also similar to Islamic banks. Overall, the  
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Table 5.6: Results of efficiency determinants for conventional banks (UK and 
MENA), additional test  
CBs (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Efficiency TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
-0.00332 0.0249
*
 -0.00224 -0.00342 -0.000585 0.0218
**
 
(-1.16) (2.31) (-0.90) (-0.39) (-0.32) (2.58) 
EQTA 
-0.0482 -0.0689
*
 0.0111 -0.0202 -0.0746
**
 -0.0778
**
 
(-1.32) (-1.97) (0.35) (-0.70) (-3.17) (-2.83) 
LOANSTA 
0.0211 0.0961
***
 0.00930 0.0465
*
 0.0167 0.0671
***
 
(1.24) (4.32) (0.63) (2.55) (1.53) (3.84) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.000198 0.000145 0.0000151 -0.0000397 0.000227 0.000160 
(0.51) (0.52) (0.04) (-0.17) (0.91) (0.73) 
TAEQ 
0.00155
***
 0.00201
***
 0.00128
***
 0.00152
***
 0.000414 0.000691
*
 
(3.74) (4.81) (3.55) (4.44) (1.55) (2.10) 
ROA 
0.335 -0.00853 0.0544 -0.0991 0.346
**
 0.129 
(1.89) (-0.06) (0.35) (-0.86) (3.04) (1.17) 
LAGE 
-0.00682  -0.0137
*
  0.00560  
(-0.93)  (-2.16)  (1.19)  
FORE 
-0.365
***
  -0.414
***
  0.0490  
(-4.96)  (-6.47)  (1.03)  
DOM 
-0.342
***
 -0.0118 -0.377
***
 0.00312 0.0402 -0.0152 
(-4.70) (-0.44) (-5.97) (0.14) (0.86) (-0.72) 
GOV 
-0.306
***
 -0.0281 -0.374
***
 -0.0133 0.0733 -0.0159 
(-4.25) (-0.73) (-5.98) (-0.42) (1.58) (-0.53) 
LISTED* 
0.0958
***
  0.0859
***
  0.0217
**
  
(8.48)  (8.75)  (2.99)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0174
***
 0.0347 -0.0170
***
 0.0547
***
 -0.00125 0.00630 
(-4.49) (1.81) (-5.06) (3.47) (-0.50) (0.42) 
INFLATION 
-0.0757 -0.0919 -0.161
*
 -0.107
*
 0.0992
*
 0.0173 
(-1.03) (-1.66) (-2.52) (-2.35) (2.09) (0.40) 
MCAP 
0.00826
*
 0.0428
**
 0.00808
**
 0.0332
**
 0.000386 0.0174 
(2.43) (3.00) (2.73) (2.83) (0.18) (1.55) 
GFC 
-0.00660 -0.0111 -0.00833 -0.0113
*
 0.00204 0.000414 
(-0.69) (-1.74) (-1.00) (-2.17) (0.33) (0.08) 
CCONTROL* 
0.00520
***
 -0.000612 0.00457
***
 -0.000262 0.00119
***
 -0.000167 
(20.95) (-0.72) (21.21) (-0.38) (7.44) (-0.25) 
sigma 1.290
***
 -0.324 1.453
***
 -0.556 0.799
***
 0.558 
_cons (11.15) (-0.69) (14.46) (-1.44) (10.73) (1.51) 
R
2 0.3392 0.0724 0.3523 0.0674 0.0791 0.0984 
Number of banks 242 242 242 242 242 242 
N 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LISTED: dummy equal 1 if listed bank and 0 
unlisted bank; LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market 
capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise; CCONTROL: Corruption control.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
* Additional variable 
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Figure 5.7: Significant variables that impact efficiency for conventional banks, MT 
R2 rates are significantly increased after using the listing dummy and corruption 
control factor. 
5.2.3.1 Determinants of efficiency in SRBs (across the world), MT 
Table 5.7 explains the determinants of socially responsible banks over the period 
2005-2012. As expected, the relationship between capital ratio and efficiency 
found to be positive so, higher capitalisation improved TE and PTE. The credit risk 
ratio suggests that an increment in credit risk ratio leads to worse pure technical 
efficiency. Zhang et al. (2012) and Ariff and Can (2008) conclude the same as 
engaging in more lending activities lead to reduce efficiency. This goes against 
Hou et al. (2014) who argued that loans activities enhance efficiency. In addition, a 
positive and significant relationship was found between financial leverage and 
efficiency measures. Regarding ownership, the increment in concentration of 
government and domestic banks increased the SE over the period. Concentrating 
on macroeconomic variables, GDP was found to increase TE, PTE and SE. The 
inflation has a positive and significant correlation with TE and PTE at a 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. Regarding the financial crisis, the results illustrate that the 
financial crisis influenced the pure technical efficiency negatively at the 5% level. 
Finally, R squared ranged between 6.78% (PTE-FEM) and 13.70% (TE-OLS). 
Efficiency of CBs  
Size (+) 
Capitalisation (+/-) 
Loan intensity (+) 
Financial leverage (+) 
Credit risk 
Age (-) 
ROA (+) 
Domestic ownership (-) 
Foreign ownership (-) 
Government ownership (-) 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation (-) 
Stock market (+) 
GFC (-) 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (+) 
131 
 
However, Figure 5.8 explains the important factors to efficiency of SRBs (main 
test). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Significant variables that impact efficiency for SRBs, MT 
 
 
5.2.3.2 Determinants of efficiency in SRBs (across the world), AT 
The results in Table 5.8 for the additional test are consistent with the results in 
Table 5.7 for the main test. Regarding the additional variables (listing and control 
of corruption), the managerial practices (PTE) in listed banks were found to be 
very skilful due to a significant relationship between listing dummy and PTE. For 
the control of corruption factor, similar to Islamic and conventional banks, the 
socially responsible banks in countries with lower percentages of corruption acted 
more effectively. According to the R2 scores, there is a slight increment in R2 
measures due to the high consistency found between the additional factors (listing 
and control of corruption) and efficiency measures (TE, PTE, and SE).  
 
 
 
Efficiency of SRBs 
Size  
Capitalisation (+) 
Loan intensity  
Financial leverage (+) 
Credit risk (+) 
Age  
ROA  
Domestic ownership 
Foreign ownership 
Government ownership (+) 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation (+) 
Stock market (+) 
GFC (-) 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (+) 
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Table 5.7: Results of efficiency determinants for SRBs (across the world), MT 
SRBs (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Efficiency TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
-0.00111 -0.0106 -0.00249 0.000591 0.000352 -0.00868 
(-0.25) (-0.47) (-0.84) (0.04) (0.11) (-0.48) 
EQTA 
0.130
*
 -0.204 0.0868
**
 -0.0756 0.0663 -0.139 
(2.59) (-1.26) (2.60) (-0.78) (1.82) (-1.08) 
LOANSTA 
0.0796 0.0665 0.0349 -0.00490 0.0530 0.0710 
(1.62) (0.90) (1.07) (-0.11) (1.48) (1.21) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.0619 0.0694 0.0291 0.0697
*
 0.0392 0.0179 
(1.53) (1.23) (1.08) (2.05) (1.33) (0.40) 
TAEQ 
0.000798 0.00194
**
 0.000576 0.000720
*
 0.000328 0.00139
**
 
(1.55) (3.23) (1.68) (1.99) (0.88) (2.90) 
ROA 
0.801 0.502 0.624 0.221 0.310 0.325 
(0.99) (0.62) (1.16) (0.46) (0.53) (0.51) 
LAGE 
-0.0109  -0.00056  -0.00905  
(-0.86)  (-0.07)  (-0.98)  
FORE 
0.0292  0.00267  0.0260  
(0.82)  (0.11)  (1.00)  
DOM 
0.0352  -0.0210  0.0502  
(0.76)  (-0.68)  (1.50)  
GOV 
0.0486  -0.00901  0.0554
*
  
(1.34)  (-0.37)  (2.10)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0234
**
 0.103 0.0103
*
 -0.0366 0.0156
**
 0.134
**
 
(3.18) (1.79) (2.10) (-1.06) (2.92) (2.95) 
INFLATION 
0.00865
**
 -0.0769 0.00538
*
 0.0855 0.00411 -0.145 
(2.61) (-0.37) (2.44) (0.69) (1.70) (-0.88) 
MCAP 
0.0463
**
 0.0307 0.0381
**
 -0.0195 0.0159 0.0469 
(2.68) (0.81) (3.31) (-0.85) (1.27) (1.56) 
GFC 
0.000571 -0.00283 -0.0142 -0.0187
*
 0.0117 0.0117 
(0.04) (-0.21) (-1.39) (-2.29) (1.05) (1.08) 
Sigma 0.161 -1.673 0.642
***
 1.818
*
 0.434
**
 -2.407
*
 
_cons (0.76) (-1.23) (4.57) (2.22) (2.83) (-2.22) 
R
2
 0.1370 0.0782 0.1208 0.0678 0.1074 0.0967 
Number of banks 38 38 38 38 38 38 
N 284 284 284 284 284 284 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 5.8: Results of efficiency determinants for SRBs (across the world), 
additional test  
SRBs (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Efficiency TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
-0.000026 -0.00770 -0.00151 0.00351 0.000632 -0.00830 
(-0.01) (-0.34) (-0.54) (0.26) (0.19) (-0.46) 
EQTA 
0.197
***
 -0.177 0.150
***
 -0.0493 0.0823
*
 -0.136 
(3.79) (-1.09) (4.49) (-0.51) (2.12) (-1.05) 
LOANSTA 
0.0510 0.0677 0.00677 -0.00365 0.0466 0.0712 
(1.04) (0.92) (0.22) (-0.08) (1.27) (1.21) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.0651 0.0694 0.0322 0.0696
*
 0.0400 0.0179 
(1.65) (1.23) (1.27) (2.08) (1.35) (0.40) 
TAEQ 
0.00100
*
 0.00199
**
 0.000768
*
 0.000762
*
 0.000378 0.00139
**
 
(1.98) (3.30) (2.36) (2.13) (1.00) (2.91) 
ROA 
0.862 0.552 0.675 0.272 0.328 0.331 
(1.09) (0.69) (1.32) (0.57) (0.55) (0.52) 
LAGE 
-0.0170  -0.00626  -0.0105  
(-1.35)  (-0.78)  (-1.12)  
FORE 
0.0116  -0.0125  0.0212  
(0.30)  (-0.50)  (0.73)  
DOM 
0.0337  -0.0205  0.0491  
(0.70)  (-0.66)  (1.36)  
GOV 
0.0201  -0.0351  0.0482  
(0.53)  (-1.45)  (1.71)  
LISTED* 
0.0419  0.0421
**
  0.00893  
(1.86)  (2.90)  (0.53)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0187
*
 0.0994 0.00605 -0.0401 0.0145
*
 0.134
**
 
(2.46) (1.74) (1.23) (-1.18) (2.54) (2.93) 
INFLATION 
0.00647 -0.0986 0.00343 0.0637 0.00355 -0.147 
(1.83) (-0.48) (1.51) (0.52) (1.34) (-0.89) 
MCAP 
0.0264 0.0277 0.0195 -0.0224 0.0111 0.0465 
(1.46) (0.73) (1.68) (-0.99) (0.82) (1.54) 
GFC 
-0.000867 -0.00181 -0.0156 -0.0177
*
 0.0113 0.0118 
(-0.06) (-0.13) (-1.62) (-2.19) (1.01) (1.09) 
CCONTROL* 
0.00187
***
 0.00391 0.00177
***
 0.00394
**
 0.000445 0.000507 
(3.74) (1.63) (5.50) (2.76) (1.19) (0.27) 
sigma 0.161 -1.882 0.636
***
 1.607
*
 0.437
**
 -2.434
*
 
_cons (0.75) (-1.38) (4.58) (1.98) (2.71) (-2.23) 
R
2 0.1879 0.0885 0.2281 0.0971 0.1128 0.0970 
Number of banks 38 38 38 38 38 38 
N 284 284 284 284 284 284 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LISTED: dummy equal 1 if listed bank and 0 
unlisted bank; LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market 
capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise; CCONTROL: Corruption control.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
* Additional variable 
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5.3 Efficiency of MENA countries (including GCC) 
5.3.1 Efficiency measures description for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Table 5.9 reveals that Islamic banks in MENA countries operated more efficiently 
than conventional banks during the period 2005-2012, scoring DEA measures as 
0.882, 0.935 and 0.940 for TE, PTE and SE, respectively. An explanation for this 
could be that most MENA countries employ Sharia law and primarily consist of 
Muslim communities. For this reason, Islamic banks are viewed as more 
trustworthy and reliable by clients in terms of the share of deposits and borrowing 
activities. The DEA results in this study contradicted Johnes et al. (2014) who 
assert that conventional banks act more effectively than Islamic banks. However, 
the next section explores the reasons behind inefficiencies in MENA countries.  
Table 5.9: Efficiency measures description for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
DEA Mean Std. Dev. Min Max DEA Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TE 0.882 0.177 0.24 1 TE 0.778 0.264 0.06 1 
PTE 0.935 0.140 0.25 1 PTE 0.840 0.240 0.14 1 
SE 0.940 0.107 0.49 1 SE 0.918 0.138 0.08 1 
5.3.2 Determinants of efficiency for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Table 5.10 displays the results of OLS and FEM for Islamic and conventional 
banks in MENA (including GCC) countries. The results suggest that the total 
assets are highly important in improving efficiency in Islamic and conventional 
banks (with the exception of PTE in Islamic banking). More expansion in banking 
operations could effectively allow banks to convert their inputs to outputs (Stewart 
et al., 2016; Chen & Wang, 2015; Pessarossi & Weill, 2015; Xiang et al., 2015). 
Based on the capitalisation coefficient, more equity led to enlarged PTE for Islamic 
and conventional systems. In other words, banks‟ capital supported a raise in 
managerial skills (Pessarossi & Weill, 2015). On the other hand, capital ratio 
proposed a decrease in the scale (volume) of management members in order to 
increase financial capitals in conventional banks, as the correlation between scale 
efficiency and capital intensity is negative (Wijesiri et al., 2015). Lending services 
(LOANSTA) encourage managers of Islamic and conventional banks to perform 
efficiently, resulting in managers choosing to provide more loans. With this in mind, 
the best strategy to attract more clients is to supply loans with fewer lending 
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Table 5.10: Determinants of efficiency for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
DEA TE TE PTE PTE SE SE TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LNTA 
0.0248
*
 -0.0357 0.0002 -0.0470
*
 0.0273
***
 0.00411 0.0315
***
 0.0207 0.0334
***
 0.00557 0.0037 0.0059 
(2.40) (-1.36) (0.03) (-2.23) (4.42) (0.23) (6.79) (1.55) (7.92) (0.46) (1.44) (0.58) 
EQTA 
0.124 0.0976 0.129
*
 0.0929 0.0123 0.0233 0.0594 -0.0446 0.103
*
 -0.017 -0.0509 -0.0598
*
 
(1.64) (0.71) (2.12) (0.83) (0.27) (0.25) (1.22) (-1.18) (2.32) (-0.49) (-1.84) (-2.06) 
LOANSTA 
0.236
***
 0.235
**
 0.211
***
 0.160
**
 0.0482 0.096 0.115
***
 0.0927
***
 0.0966
***
 0.0534
*
 0.0339
**
 0.0569
**
 
(3.79) (3.09) (4.22) (2.61) (1.30) (1.89) (5.22) (3.86) (4.83) (2.42) (2.71) (3.08) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.000403 0.000175 0.0001 -0.00007 0.0002 0.00024 0.0003 0.00013 0.0001 -0.00005 0.0002 0.0001 
(0.97) (0.48) (0.36) (-0.27) (1.21) (1.00) (0.70) (0.50) (0.42) (-0.21) (0.85) (0.79) 
TAEQ 
0.00144 0.0144
***
 0.0004 0.009
***
 0.0013 0.006
***
 0.0009 0.002
***
 0.0008 0.002
***
 0.0002 0.0007 
(0.71) (5.74) (0.28) (4.74) (1.09) (3.84) (1.39) (4.96) (1.34) (4.55) (0.73) (1.82) 
ROA 
0.301 0.478
***
 -0.052 0.0368 0.355
***
 0.465
***
 -0.196 -0.11 -0.375 -0.136 0.212 0.0737 
(1.92) (3.41) (-0.42) (0.33) (3.80) (4.96) (-0.83) (-0.73) (-1.75) (-0.98) (1.59) (0.63) 
LAGE 
-0.0596
**
  
-0.018 
 -0.0457
***
  -0.0515
***
  -0.0534
***
  
-0.00352 
 
(-2.85)  (-1.11)  (-3.66)  (-4.24)  (-4.85)  (-0.51)  
FORE  
-0.0514 
 
-0.0602 
 
0.00591 -0.443
***
 0.044 -0.481
***
 0.0201 0.0314 0.0274 
 (-0.55)  (-0.80)  (0.09) (-5.12) (0.96) (-6.13) (0.48) (0.64) (0.78) 
DOM 
-0.00622 -0.093 0.0131 -0.0651 -0.022 -0.0328 -0.375
***
 0.0227 -0.396
***
 0.0173 0.0239 0.0068 
(-0.24) (-1.11) (0.64) (-0.97) (-1.47) (-0.59) (-4.40) (0.66) (-5.12) (0.55) (0.50) (0.26) 
GOV 
-0.0431 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.015 
 -0.340
***
  -0.400
***
  
0.0619 
 
(-1.28)  (-1.30)  (-0.79)  (-4.03)  (-5.23)  (1.29) (-1.39) 
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0196 0.0756 -0.001 0.00249 -0.020
*
 0.0821
*
 -0.0372
***
 0.0508
*
 -0.0413
***
 0.0553
**
 0.000858 0.0276 
(-1.39) (1.58) (-0.14) (0.06) (-2.37) (2.57) (-5.31) (2.32) (-6.50) (2.75) (0.22) (1.65) 
INFLATION 
-0.0809 0.109 -0.099 0.0352 0.0088 0.0875 -0.065 -0.0937 -0.157 -0.112
*
 0.119
*
 0.0193 
(-0.72) (1.09) (-1.10) (0.43) (0.13) (1.30) (-0.70) (-1.59) (-1.83) (-2.06) (2.22) (0.42) 
MCAP 
0.0533
*
 0.0276 0.0439
*
 -0.0137 0.0122 0.0384 0.137
***
 0.0622
***
 0.102
***
 0.0531
***
 0.0512
***
 0.0217 
(2.22) (0.76) (2.28) (-0.47) (0.86) (1.58) (9.53) (3.60) (7.83) (3.35) (6.28) (1.63) 
GFC 
-0.0305 -0.029 -0.026 -0.0278
*
 -0.005 -0.00269 -0.016 -0.0131 -0.020 -0.0183
**
 0.00243 0.0045 
(-1.54) (-1.84) (-1.68) (-2.19) (-0.44) (-0.26) (-1.19) (-1.73) (-1.64) (-2.63) (0.31) (0.79) 
Sig 1.212
***
 -0.961 0.896
***
 1.126 1.338
***
 -1.288 1.906
***
 -0.777 2.112
***
 -0.666 0.792
***
 0.120 
cons (3.84) (-0.83) (3.53) (1.21) (7.10) (-1.67) (9.87) (-1.58) (12.17) (-1.47) (7.23) (0.32) 
R2 0.1805 0.2048 0.1556 0.1537 0.1999 0.1807 0.2152 0.0614 0.2188 0.0489 0.0717 0.0286 
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Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, 
FORE: dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, 
LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls 
within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
#  of banks 40 40 40 40 40 40 168 168 168 168 168 168 
N 291 291 291 291 291 291 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 
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interests in terms of conventional banks, and lower administrative fees for Islamic 
banks (Johnes et al., 2014). The findings show that the financial leverage 
positively and significantly led to higher efficiency for both Islamic and 
conventional banking systems. As a result, investing more in assets enhanced the 
efficiency measures (Abu-Alkheil et al., 2012). However, the profits in Islamic 
banking are highly remarkable as the more profitable Islamic banks are found to 
be more efficient (similar to Stewart et al., 2016; Rosman et al., 2014). According 
to date of establishment, the more recent Islamic and conventional banks were 
more productive than older banks. This result supports Wijesiri‟s et al. (2015) 
conclusion who confirmed that new banks attained better technical efficiency 
scores (based on the social model). In conventional banks, foreign, domestic, and 
public involvements worsen the technical and pure technical efficiencies 
significantly. This acts as a warning to shareholders to decrease investment in the 
banking sector. Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) point out that foreign ownership 
levels reduce efficiency in the European banking sector. Furthermore, Assaf et al. 
(2011) analyse that private (domestic) banks concentration leads to lower pure 
technical efficiency. Finally, Chen and Wang (2015) prove that a higher number of 
state-owned banks in China raises inefficiency. Focusing on industry-specific 
factors, the fixed effects model underlines that Islamic and conventional banks in a 
developed economy had better efficiency measures (Hou et al., 2014). Based on 
OLS coefficients, the GDP growth affected the efficiency of Islamic and 
conventional banks negatively and significantly (consistent with Sufian, 2009). 
Regarding the significant coefficients of inflation in conventional banks, inflation 
reduces the pure technical efficiency but enlarges the scale efficiency over the 
period. However, the roles of booming of financial markets in MENA countries are 
found to be very significant to the efficiency in the banking sector; especially in 
conventional banks, as MCAP coefficients are strongly and highly correlated with 
TE, PTE and SE at 0.1% levels. This outcome encourages the owners of banks to 
invest more in countries with larger indices of financial markets. The reason 
behind this result could be that banks can issue more securities (shares or bonds) 
in countries with developed stock markets (Tan & Floros, 2013). The financial 
crisis impacted the efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks badly, especially 
with regard to pure technical efficiency, which was found to be a significant 
coefficient. The global financial crisis intensively influenced the efficiency of 
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Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. The coefficients of Islamic banks 
were less than the coefficients of conventional banks. The R2 in Islamic banks 
varied from 15.37% to 20.48%, whereas the R2 in conventional banks ranged 
between 2.59% and 21.88%. 
 
5.4 Efficiency of MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
5.4.1 Efficiency measures description for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
In MENA countries (excluding GCC), the best practice of banking services was 
demonstrated by socially responsible banks (TE= 88%, PTE= 93.5% and SE= 
93.4%), followed by Islamic banks (81.4%, 87.9% and 92.1%, respectively). The 
poorest efficiency measures were attained by conventional banks, which 
experienced difficulties in transferring their inputs to outputs efficiently, which 
could easily maximise the cost of operations (see Table 5.11). The conventional 
banks scored 67.1%, 75.5% and 88.4% for TE, PTE and SE, respectively. 
Table 5.11: Efficiency measures description for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Banks Islamic Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
DEA Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TE 0.814 0.2013 0.26 1 0.671 0.272 0.06 1 0.880 0.1885 0.21 1 
PTE 0.879 0.1746 0.34 1 0.755 0.264 0.14 1 0.935 0.1644 0.28 1 
SE 0.921 0.1147 0.49 1 0.884 0.156 0.08 1 0.934 0.0902 0.67 1 
5.4.2 Determinants of efficiency for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Table 5.12 exhibits the results of OLS and FEM indicating the determinants of 
efficiency in MENA region (excluding GCC) for Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks. In Islamic banks, the size of the bank supported the scale 
efficiency positively and significantly while, in conventional banks, total assets 
significantly increased the technical and pure technical efficiencies. The 
capitalisation of the Islamic banking system affected the SE badly but based on 
the relationship between PTE and capital ratio (EQTA), conventional banks took 
advantage of investing their capitals to maximise outputs effectively. The loan 
intensity coefficients indicate that there are insignificant signs for the Islamic banks,  
as found by Xiang et al. (2015). The lending services confirmed that the 
management generated the loans outstandingly in conventional and socially 
responsible banks (based on the correlation between loan intensity and SE). In 
conventional banks, the managers applied their skills and the technology to 
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Table 5.12: Determinants of efficiency for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
DEA TE TE PTE PTE SE SE TE TE PTE PTE SE SE TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LNTA 
-0.00498 -0.0850 -0.028 -0.0581 0.0281
*
 -0.0351 0.0188
**
 0.0180 0.026
***
 0.00491 -0.00233 -0.007 0.0563 -0.0955 0.0725 -0.135 -0.00112 0.034 
(-0.23) (-1.94) (-1.49) (-1.40) (2.33) (-1.29) (3.29) (0.91) (4.88) (0.25) (-0.62) (-0.51) (1.18) (-1.02) (1.66) (-1.62) (-0.04) (0.68) 
EQTA 
-0.262 -0.643 -0.075 -0.119 -0.192 -0.525
*
 0.165 0.0293 0.257
*
 0.0355 -0.117 -0.118 0.248 0.608 -0.032 0.401 0.302 0.319 
(-0.80) (-1.90) (-0.26) (-0.37) (-1.06) (-2.50) (1.49) (0.26) (2.40) (0.32) (-1.61) (-1.34) (0.67) (1.43) (-0.09) (1.07) (1.40) (1.37) 
LOANS
TA 
-0.0314 0.118 0.137 0.160 -0.151 -0.0102 0.232
**
 0.164
**
 0.102 0.0638 0.177
***
 0.136
**
 0.0192 -0.0967 -0.103 -0.46 0.137 0.357
*
 
(-0.21) (0.84) (1.04) (1.21) (-1.82) (-0.12) (3.14) (2.59) (1.43) (1.04) (3.66) (2.78) (0.07) (-0.31) (-0.40) (-1.64) (0.84) (2.06) 
LOANS 
DEPO 
0.198
**
 0.140
*
 0.110 0.0915 0.100
*
 0.0484 0.0882 0.224
***
 0.172
**
 0.177
**
 -0.0787
*
 0.0951
*
 0.425
**
 0.550
**
 0.243 0.429
**
 0.257
**
 0.228
*
 
(2.77) (2.00) (1.75) (1.39) (2.55) (1.12) (1.55) (3.65) (3.12) (2.95) (-2.11) (2.00) (3.02) (3.48) (1.88) (3.06) (3.15) (2.63) 
TAEQ 
0.00634 0.01
***
 0.00492 0.0089
**
 0.00223 0.0050
**
 0.006
***
 0.004
***
 0.005
***
 0.003
***
 0.0017
**
 0.00137
*
 0.007
***
 0.009
***
 0.0060
**
 0.007
***
 0.00299
*
 0.0041
**
 
(1.78) (4.35) (1.58) (3.31) (1.14) (2.85) (8.02) (5.42) (7.20) (4.46) (3.01) (2.31) (3.69) (4.39) (3.15) (3.65) (2.48) (3.41) 
ROA 
5.482
***
 7.10
***
 3.442
*
 4.397
**
 2.599
**
 3.327
**
 1.716
***
 -0.171 1.185
**
 -0.279 0.957
**
 0.143 8.515
**
 11.41
***
 5.869
*
 9.181
**
 4.107
*
 4.236
*
 
(3.57) (4.21) (2.56) (2.76) (3.07) (3.18) (3.66) (-0.47) (2.61) (-0.78) (3.11) (0.51) (2.98) (3.69) (2.23) (3.35) (2.47) (2.50) 
LAGE 
-0.0114  0.0420  -0.066
*
  0.00822  -0.00868  0.0158  0.0112  
-0.014 
 
0.0243 
 
(-0.19)  (0.79)  (-1.98)  (0.54)  (-0.59)  (1.59)  (0.22)  (-0.31)  (0.83)  
FORE 
0.0158  -0.0477  0.0760
*
  -0.208
*
  -0.289
***
  0.0978  0.0063  
-0.015 
 
0.0331 
 
(0.30)  (-1.03)  (2.61)  (-2.35)  (-3.38)  (1.69)  (0.07)  (-0.17)  (0.58)  
DOM 
      -0.159  -0.205
*
  0.0726  -0.175  
-0.336 
 
0.104 
 
      (-1.84)  (-2.46)  (1.28)  (-0.54)  (-1.13)  (0.55) 
 
GOV 
0.00937  -0.0648  0.0759  -0.129  -0.224
**
  0.116
*
  -0.2  
-0.168 
 
-0.0594 
 
(0.12)  (-0.94)  (1.74)  (-1.54)  (-2.77)  (2.12)   (-1.27)  (-0.71)   
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0343 0.161 -0.00194 -0.0211 -0.040
*
 0.190
***
 -0.117
***
 0.0581 -0.112
***
 0.0677
*
 -0.0168
**
 0.0381 -0.111
*
 0.0736 -0.102
*
 -0.018 -0.0319 0.0674 
(-1.13) (1.88) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-2.42) (3.58) (-12.25) (1.91) (-12.14) (2.29) (-2.67) (1.62) (-2.42) (0.54) (-2.41) (-0.15) (-1.19) (0.91) 
INFLA
TION 
-0.267 -0.126 -0.220 -0.0677 -0.0631 -0.0566 0.118 -0.216 -0.0776 -0.295
**
 0.290
**
 0.0819 0.756 0.118 0.179 0.373 0.709
**
 -0.204 
(-0.85) (-0.47) (-0.80) (-0.27) (-0.37) (-0.34) (0.73) (-1.89) (-0.50) (-2.64) (2.77) (0.92) (1.69) (0.17) (0.44) (0.61) (2.73) (-0.54) 
MCAP 
0.0251 0.0514 0.0251 -0.0138 -0.0003 0.0588 0.073
***
 0.0505
*
 0.0480
**
 0.0563
*
 0.0368
**
 0.00934 0.037 0.144 -0.007 0.0336 0.0155 0.0807 
(0.60) (0.68) (0.68) (-0.19) (-0.01) (1.25) (4.07) (2.02) (2.74) (2.32) (3.09) (0.48) (0.19) (0.71) (-0.04) (0.19) (0.14) (0.73) 
GFC 
0.00930 0.00074 -0.0293 -0.0303 0.0409
*
 0.0322
*
 -0.0129 -0.00213 -0.0235 -0.0187 0.00852 0.0151 -0.055 -0.0505 -0.0703
*
 -0.0633
*
 -0.00055 -0.0007 
(0.27) (0.03) (-0.99) (-1.23) (2.19) (1.99) (-0.77) (-0.19) (-1.46) (-1.75) (0.78) (1.79) (-1.69) (-1.56) (-2.31) (-2.21) (-0.03) (-0.04) 
Sig 1.541
*
 -2.874 0.845 1.602 1.86
***
 -3.655
**
 3.298
***
 -1.150 3.371
***
 -1.121 1.084
***
 -0.122 2.573
**
 -1.259 2.809
**
 1.784 1.112
*
 -1.598 
cons (2.39) (-1.38) (1.50) (0.82) (5.24) (-2.83) (13.12) (-1.72) (13.89) (-1.72) (6.58) (-0.24) (2.75) (-0.43) (3.27) (0.69) (2.05) (-0.99) 
R2 0.2652 0.3854 0.2520 0.2902 0.3144 0.3160 0.3020 0.1230 0.3079 0.0864 0.0855 0.0588 0.6719 0.7519 0.6353 0.5555 0.5169 0.4081 
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Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, 
FORE: dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, 
LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls 
within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
# banks 17 17 17 17 17 17 108 108 108 108 108 108 9 9 9 9 9 9 
N 129 129 129 129 129 129 813 813 813 813 813 813 64 64 64 64 64 64 
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provide the loans very professionally (referring to OLS and FE models). However, 
by comparing loans with deposits, the credit risk was significantly raised in all 
types of banking (Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks). This 
problem could be solved by managers through increasing the shares of deposits 
due to supporting banks‟ efficiencies (e.g. through providing more deposit 
interests). Hou et al. (2014) claim the opposite opinion, stating the relationship 
between efficiency and credit risk was negative. The results of the financial 
leverage and ROA underline that the more banks invest their total assets, the 
more the efficiency could improve for all banks. Regarding the age of banks, new 
Islamic banks practiced their work effectively and applied economies of scale 
strategies properly by providing more banking products and services. In terms of 
ownership, foreign banks increased the scale efficiency significantly in Islamic 
banks but decreased significantly the TE and PTE in conventional banks. In 
addition, the domestic and public conventional banks suffered from the pure 
technical inefficiency, whereas the scale efficiency scores were good. 
Concentrating on macroeconomic determinations, based on FEM‟s findings, we 
can conclude that the economic growth (GDP) was highly important to the scale 
efficiency in Islamic banks and the pure technical efficiency of conventional banks. 
However, OLS‟s coefficients proposed that scale inefficiency occurred in Islamic 
and conventional banks in developed economies. Moreover, the GDP 
development caused technical and pure technical inefficiencies in conventional 
and socially responsible banks. The managers of these banks could not exploit the 
economic growth optimally. The inflation worsened the pure technical efficiency of 
conventional banks, which reduced the skills of management, but increased the 
scale efficiency of conventional and socially responsible banks. The market 
capitalisation coefficients of conventional banking systems could support that the 
growth of the stock market was very important for the generation of more banking 
services. Finally, Table 5.12 illustrates that the global financial crisis (GFC) 
impacted remarkably on the efficiency of socially responsible banks especially the 
PTE (has a negative and significant sign); this is consistent with Moradi-Motlagh 
and Babacan‟s (2015) study. The results also show that the SE increased 
significantly in Islamic banks during the GFC. However, there is no evidence of the 
correlation between GFC and DEA indicators for the conventional banking sector 
(similar to Chortareas et al., 2012). The minimum R2 for Islamic banks is 25.20%, 
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while the maximum R2 is 38.54%. The lowest and highest R2 for conventional 
banks are 5.88% and 30.79%, respectively, and the R2 for socially responsible 
banks are 40.81% and 75.19%, respectively.    
 
5.5 Efficiency of GCC countries  
5.5.1 Efficiency measures description for GCC countries 
The conventional banks in GCC region performed more efficiently than Islamic 
banks over the period 2005-2012 (as in Table 5.13). The efficiency measures for 
conventional banks are 96.5%, 98.8%, and 97.6% for TE, PTE and SE 
respectively, whereas Islamic banks achieved efficiencies as 93.7%, 97.9% and 
95.5% for TE, PTE and SE respectively. However, the determinants of efficiency in 
the next section could indicate the reasons behind the privilege of conventional 
banks. 
Table 5.13: Efficiency measures description for GCC countries 
5.5.2 Determinants of efficiency for GCC countries  
The efficiency of Islamic banks in GCC region were affected positively and 
significantly by size, capitalisation, loans, financial leverage, and profitability (ROA), 
and these factors could impact the efficiency of conventional banks (based on the 
findings in Table 5.14). Comparing the age variable between Islamic and 
conventional banking, the results conclude that the modern Islamic banks could 
practically convert their inputs better than older banks. On the other hand, age 
increased efficiency in conventional banks significantly. Foreign ownership 
supported the technical efficiency actively in conventional banking. Based on the 
external factors, the Islamic banks in countries with higher GDP operated 
inefficiently. Moreover, inflation indicates positive and significant signs for TE and 
SE in Islamic banks. On the contrary, inflation decreased the TE in conventional 
banks significantly at a level of 5%. Furthermore, the market capitalisation was 
found to be very important in strengthening the TE and PTE of conventional banks. 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
DEA Mean Std. Dev. Min Max DEA Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TE 0.937 0.131 0.24 1 TE 0.965 0.084 0.36 1 
PTE 0.979 0.081 0.25 1 PTE 0.988 0.044 0.67 1 
SE 0.955 0.098 0.49 1 SE 0.976 0.066 0.41 1 
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Table 5.14: Determinants of efficiency for GCC countries 
Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
DEA TE TE PTE PTE SE SE TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LNTA 
0.0350
**
 0.0551 0.00564 -0.00895 0.0303
**
 0.0620
**
 -0.00266 0.0168 -0.00321 -0.00432 0.0000210 0.0196 
(2.72) (1.82) (0.65) (-0.43) (3.30) (2.88) (-0.82) (1.15) (-1.89) (-0.56) (0.01) (1.65) 
EQTA 
0.161 0.491
**
 0.0700 0.168 0.102 0.357
**
 -0.0239 -0.00955 -0.00864 -0.00979 -0.0167 -0.000678 
(1.70) (3.26) (1.09) (1.61) (1.50) (3.33) (-1.10) (-0.35) (-0.76) (-0.67) (-0.97) (-0.03) 
LOANSTA 
0.140
*
 0.266
**
 0.0543 0.0610 0.0966
*
 0.220
**
 -0.00143 0.0148 -0.00172 0.00318 0.0000980 0.0115 
(2.06) (2.79) (1.18) (0.93) (2.00) (3.25) (-0.15) (0.82) (-0.34) (0.33) (0.01) (0.78) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.000161 -0.0000641 0.00000739 -0.000134 0.000154 0.0000476 0.000120 0.000231 0.0000207 0.0000326 0.000103 0.000199 
(0.52) (-0.21) (0.04) (-0.64) (0.69) (0.22) (0.74) (1.41) (0.24) (0.38) (0.80) (1.49) 
TAEQ 
0.00623 0.0234
**
 0.00365 0.00654 0.00298 0.0181
**
 0.000574 0.000499 0.000343 0.000344 0.000285 0.000209 
(1.19) (3.02) (1.03) (1.22) (0.80) (3.27) (0.88) (0.74) (1.00) (0.96) (0.55) (0.38) 
ROA 
0.338
**
 0.336
**
 -0.0202 -0.00178 0.367
***
 0.353
***
 0.126 0.0235 0.0497 0.0308 0.0844 -0.00475 
(2.76) (2.76) (-0.24) (-0.02) (4.21) (4.09) (1.17) (0.20) (0.88) (0.50) (0.99) (-0.05) 
LAGE 
-0.0476
*
  -0.00798  -0.0395
**
  0.0376
***
  0.0120
*
  0.0276
***
  
(-2.58)  (-0.64)  (-3.01)  (4.10)  (2.49)  (3.80)  
FORE 
 -0.0134  -0.00789  -0.00327  0.0555
*
  0.0246  0.0339 
 (-0.17)  (-0.14)  (-0.06)  (2.02)  (1.69)  (1.51) 
DOM 
0.0456 -0.0685 0.0286 -0.0133 0.0199 -0.0553 -0.00873 0.0239 -0.00362 0.0174 -0.00718 0.00751 
(1.60) (-0.96) (1.48) (-0.27) (0.97) (-1.09) (-0.92) (1.16) (-0.73) (1.60) (-0.96) (0.45) 
GOV 
0.0728  0.0385  0.0378  0.00929  0.00572  0.00370  
(1.80)  (1.40)  (1.30)  (0.93)  (1.09)  (0.47)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0398
*
 0.0119 -0.0131 0.0392 -0.0286
*
 -0.0177 -0.00815 -0.00599 -0.00122 0.0115 -0.00692 -0.0156 
(-2.53) (0.22) (-1.24) (1.06) (-2.55) (-0.46) (-1.82) (-0.24) (-0.52) (0.88) (-1.96) (-0.78) 
INFLATION 
0.140 0.185
*
 0.0438 0.0577 0.108 0.143
*
 -0.0893
*
 -0.0402 -0.0435 -0.0361 -0.0473 -0.00311 
(1.39) (1.99) (0.64) (0.90) (1.50) (2.16) (-2.03) (-0.90) (-1.88) (-1.52) (-1.36) (-0.09) 
MCAP 
-0.00575 0.0650 -0.0175 0.0163 0.00763 0.0497 0.00380 0.0361
*
 0.0108
*
 0.0207
*
 -0.00654 0.0175 
(-0.19) (1.79) (-0.87) (0.65) (0.36) (1.94) (0.38) (2.02) (2.08) (2.18) (-0.84) (1.20) 
GFC 
-0.0695
***
 -0.0660
***
 -0.0329
*
 -0.0308
*
 -0.0408
**
 -0.0388
**
 -0.0171
*
 -0.0222
**
 -0.00946
*
 -0.0100
*
 -0.00882 -0.0134
*
 
(-3.58) (-3.63) (-2.50) (-2.46) (-2.95) (-3.01) (-2.14) (-2.85) (-2.25) (-2.42) (-1.40) (-2.11) 
Sig 1.631
***
 -0.210 1.224
***
 -0.0500 1.436
***
 0.585 1.073
***
 0.919 1.002
***
 0.707
*
 1.068
***
 1.173
*
 
cons (4.67) (-0.16) (5.17) (-0.06) (5.76) (0.63) (10.12) (1.64) (17.99) (2.37) (12.74) (2.56) 
R2 0.2419 0.2914 0.0908 0.0979 0.2997 0.3628 0.0695 0.0589 0.0589 0.0565 0.0492 0.0342 
# of banks 23 23 23 23 23 23 60 60 60 60 60 60 
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Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, 
FORE: dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, 
LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls 
within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
N 162 162 162 162 162 162 464 464 464 464 464 464 
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Finally, the GFC worsened the TE, PTE and SE in Islamic and conventional banks 
in GCC region. In comparison, the coefficients clarify that Islamic banks suffered 
more from effects the financial crisis, which could be one of the main reasons that 
conventional banks were more efficient than Islamic banks. Overall, the R2 in 
Islamic banks ranged from 9.08% to 36.28%, while in conventional banks, the R2 
varied between 3.42% and 6.95%. 
 
5.6 Efficiency of UK (as a benchmark) 
5.6.1 Efficiency measures description for UK 
Table 5.15 indicates that SRBs are the most efficient banks compared to 
conventional and Islamic banks. However, we can use the efficiency of the UK as 
a benchmark for Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks across the 
world and MENA (including and excluding GCC, and GCC itself) region. 
Depending on Islamic banking efficiency measures, the Islamic GCC banks (TE = 
93.7%, PTE = 97.7% and SE = 95.5%) only performed more efficiently than 
Islamic banks in the UK (90.3%, 95.5% and 94%, respectively). This could be due 
to the fact that managers in GCC region have better ability to deal with Islamic 
communities. Conversely, Islamic banks in MENA (excluding GCC) region 
encountered hurdles when attempting to transform their resources into services 
and profits. The global financial crisis could be one of the main reasons for their 
inefficiency. The same was seen in conventional banks; the highest efficiency 
measures were attained by conventional banks in GCC (96.5%, 98.8% and 97.6%, 
respectively), which are more efficient than conventional banks in the UK (93.1%, 
97.8% and 95%, respectively). In addition, the worst DEA indicators were 
achieved by banks in MENA (excluding GCC) region. Focusing on socially 
responsible banks, managers of banks in the UK have the best managerial skills, 
as they maximise outputs more efficiently compared to banks in MENA (excluding 
GCC) region and SRBs around the world. 
Table 5.15: Efficiency measures description for UK 
Banks Islamic Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
DEA Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TE 0.903 0.170 0.39 1 0.931 0.144 0.04 1 0.969 0.089 0.53 1 
PTE 0.955 0.099 0.57 1 0.978 0.077 0.33 1 0.988 0.038 0.83 1 
SE 0.940 0.129 0.51 1 0.950 0.120 0.04 1 0.980 0.079 0.53 1 
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5.6.2 Determinants of efficiency for UK 
Table 5.16 explains that the size of banks supported Islamic and conventional 
scale efficiency, but weakened the scale efficiency of SRBs. The managerial skills 
(PTE) of conventional banks were affected badly by size. Regarding the 
relationship between TE and size, SRBs only have significant signs, as OLS‟s 
coefficient demonstrates a positive and significant association, while FE generated 
a negative and significant sign between TE and size. Against prediction, Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks with higher capitalisation were found 
to be inefficient. In Islamic banks, the loans increased the efficiency significantly. 
This result is consistent with Islamic banks across the world, Islamic banks in 
MENA (including GCC) region, and Islamic banks in GCC region. According to 
financial leverage, the financial investments in SRBs were found to be very 
important in enhancing TE and SE. The SRBs around the world and SRBs in 
MENA (excluding GCC) region have the same finding. In Islamic banks, more 
experience in the banking sector (AGE) led to better efficiency (similar to Islamic 
banks across countries) while regarding SRBs, newer banks tended to be more 
efficient than older banks (inconsistent with SRBs in MENA countries). Regarding 
the country-specific factors, SRBs acted more efficiently in countries with higher 
inflation rates. This complies with SRBs around the world and MENA region. 
Finally, over the period of the global crisis (2007-2009), SRBs took advantage to 
raise their efficiency, this could be because clients wanted to support more social 
activities during the crisis period. As a result, banks received more deposits in this 
period. The GFC affected the efficiency of SRBs negatively and significantly 
across the world, and also SRBs in MENA region. In Islamic banks, R2 ranged 
between 59.19% and 79.30%, and R2 in conventional banks varied between 3.92% 
and 8.76%, and R2 in SRBs ranged from 23.31% to 72.38%. 
5.7 Determinants of efficiency for the whole sample 
Finally, we can consider the whole sample of banks to find the average 
determinations for all countries and banking types (see Table 5.17). The results 
illustrate that the factors improved the efficiency were sizes of banks, capital ratio 
(TE-OLS and PTE-OLS), loan intensity, financial leverage, ROA, ownership 
(government, foreign and domestic only enhanced SE significantly), inflation and 
market capitalisation. On the contrary, capital ratio (SE), age of banks and the              
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Table 5.16: Determinants of efficiency for UK 
Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
DEA TE TE PTE PTE SE SE TE TE PTE PTE SE SE TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LNTA 
0.594 -0.0221 0.0896 -0.288 0.520
*
 0.167 -0.00606 0.0166 -0.0050
**
 -0.0206 -0.00172 0.0355
*
 0.0403
*
 -0.220
**
 -0.00581 -0.00942 0.0456
**
 -0.212
***
 
(2.23) (-0.03) (0.51) (-0.65) (3.01) (0.38) (-1.85) (0.75) (-2.91) (-1.72) (-0.63) (1.97) (2.18) (-3.00) (-0.64) (-0.22) (3.02) (-3.91) 
EQTA 
-0.587 -1.428 -0.168 -0.684 -0.489
*
 -0.971 -0.270
***
 -0.230 -0.0635 -0.0575 -0.217
**
 -0.180 1.273 -5.037
*
 -0.487 -2.414 1.681 -2.777 
(-2.04) (-1.61) (-0.89) (-1.17) (-2.62) (-1.67) (-3.32) (-1.69) (-1.48) (-0.77) (-3.20) (-1.61) (0.76) (-2.10) (-0.59) (-1.73) (1.23) (-1.57) 
LOANS
TA 
1.883
*
 2.167
*
 0.393 0.567 1.615
*
 1.778
*
 0.00131 0.0247 -0.0105 -0.00917 0.0115 0.0425 0.628 -1.223 -0.0242 -0.490 0.631 -0.764 
(2.51) (2.71) (0.80) (1.07) (3.33) (3.37) (0.03) (0.35) (-0.47) (-0.24) (0.33) (0.73) (0.78) (-1.52) (-0.06) (-1.05) (0.96) (-1.28) 
LOANS 
DEPO 
1.101 0.454 0.317 -0.0803 0.892 0.521 0.0376 0.0273 0.0247 0.0206 0.0166 0.00944 -0.431 1.444 0.0106 0.770 -0.424 0.707 
(1.66) (0.49) (0.73) (-0.13) (2.07) (0.86) (1.58) (1.03) (1.95) (1.42) (0.84) (0.43) (-0.63) (1.71) (0.03) (1.57) (-0.76) (1.13) 
TAEQ 
-0.0218 0.00326 -0.00343 0.0119 -0.0181 -0.00372 -0.00022 0.000852 -0.00017 0.000403 -0.00003 0.000526 0.0109 0.0135
*
 -0.00437 -0.00376 0.0149
**
 0.016
***
 
(-0.94) (0.10) (-0.23) (0.53) (-1.20) (-0.17) (-0.46) (1.31) (-0.67) (1.13) (-0.09) (0.98) (1.87) (2.51) (-1.52) (-1.20) (3.13) (4.24) 
ROA 
0.218 0.229 0.100 0.107 0.137 0.144 0.530 0.567 0.294 0.238 0.262 0.368 2.582 -1.819 -0.375 -1.800 2.906 -0.124 
(1.63) (1.71) (1.14) (1.21) (1.58) (1.63) (1.58) (1.31) (1.66) (1.00) (0.94) (1.03) (0.89) (-0.69) (-0.27) (-1.18) (1.23) (-0.06) 
LAGE 
1.980  0.482  1.705
*
  -0.00536  -0.00572  0.000331  -0.134
**
  0.0194  -0.153
***
  
(1.99)  (0.74)  (2.64)  (-0.68)  (-1.37)  (0.05)  (-2.85)  (0.84)  (-3.97)  
FORE 
0.0996  0.00179  0.0819  -0.0926 0.00221 -0.0449 -0.00256 -0.0528 0.00602       
(0.42)  (0.01)  (0.53)  (-1.08) (0.05) (-0.99) (-0.11) (-0.74) (0.16)       
DOM 
 0.0444  0.0866  0.000687 -0.0878  -0.0495  -0.0453        
 (0.16)  (0.47)  (0.00) (-1.03)  (-1.10)  (-0.64)        
GOV 
        0.0725  0.0359  0.0432      
        (0.66)  (0.60)  (0.48)      
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.793 -0.280 -0.168 0.148 -0.578 -0.284 0.0361 0.0251 0.0777 0.0791 -0.0428 -0.0561 -0.116 -0.0638 -0.0623 0.0846 -0.0561 -0.148 
(-0.96) (-0.29) (-0.31) (0.23) (-1.08) (-0.44) (0.45) (0.32) (1.82) (1.86) (-0.64) (-0.88) (-0.57) (-0.32) (-0.62) (0.74) (-0.34) (-1.02) 
INFLA
TION 
10.05 6.177 10.35 7.967 0.887 -1.334 -0.0346 -0.0425 -0.0196 -0.00879 -0.0148 -0.0366 2.061 4.198 0.544 -2.279 1.535 6.431
*
 
(0.62) (0.37) (0.98) (0.73) (0.08) (-0.12) (-0.24) (-0.30) (-0.25) (-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.31) (0.57) (1.12) (0.31) (-1.04) (0.52) (2.32) 
MCAP 
-0.00385 0.249 0.158 0.313 -0.147 -0.00188 0.00238 0.00611 0.000776 0.00459 0.00162 -0.00005 0.0630 0.0993 0.0123 -0.0772 0.0497 0.173 
(-0.01) (0.41) (0.43) (0.77) (-0.40) (-0.00) (0.49) (0.22) (0.30) (0.30) (0.40) (-0.00) (0.45) (0.75) (0.18) (-1.01) (0.44) (1.78) 
GFC 
0.0435 0.0311 0.104 0.0960 -0.0497 -0.0568 -0.00961 -0.0141 -0.00346 -0.00284 -0.00419 -0.00961 0.0594 0.107
*
 0.0286 0.0167 0.0318 0.0912
*
 
(0.20) (0.15) (0.74) (0.68) (-0.36) (-0.40) (-0.71) (-1.01) (-0.48) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.84) (1.21) (2.33) (1.19) (0.63) (0.79) (2.69) 
Sig 15.17 8.621 3.558 -2.195 10.63 8.199 0.0766 0.0601 -1.127 -1.119 2.246 2.243 4.015 3.836 2.809 -1.159 2.294 6.008 
cons (0.65) (0.34) (0.23) (-0.13) (0.71) (0.48) (0.03) (0.03) (-0.92) (-0.92) (1.17) (1.23) (0.70) (0.67) (1.00) (-0.35) (0.49) (1.42) 
R2 0.5919 0.6749 0.4835 0.7930 0.7028 0.7433 0.0392 0.0406 0.0522 0.0876 0.0428 0.0585 0.4033 0.5896 0.2331 0.3859 0.4954 0.7238 
# banks 3 3 3 3 3 3 74 74 74 74 74 74 5 5 5 5 5 5 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 550 550 550 550 550 550 37 37 37 37 37 37 
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Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, 
FORE: dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, 
LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls 
within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 5.17: Results of efficiency determinants for all banks 
All Banks (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Efficiency TE TE PTE PTE SE SE 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.0154
***
 0.0154 0.0131
***
 -0.00946 0.00477
***
 0.0193
**
 
(6.18) (1.75) (6.11) (-1.34) (3.35) (2.85) 
EQTA 
0.106
***
 -0.0913
***
 0.123
***
 -0.0535
**
 -0.00769 -0.0613
**
 
(4.90) (-3.59) (6.58) (-2.63) (-0.62) (-3.13) 
LOANSTA 
0.0639
***
 0.105
***
 0.0443
***
 0.0542
***
 0.0282
***
 0.0685
***
 
(4.48) (5.36) (3.60) (3.47) (3.46) (4.55) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.000372 0.000194 0.000173 0.0000250 0.000240 0.000158 
(1.14) (0.90) (0.61) (0.14) (1.28) (0.95) 
TAEQ 
0.000723 0.00218
***
 0.000568 0.00141
***
 0.000215 0.000976
***
 
(1.92) (6.34) (1.75) (5.12) (1.00) (3.69) 
ROA 
0.0979 0.0941
*
 -0.00873 0.0193 0.112
**
 0.0858
*
 
(1.34) (1.97) (-0.14) (0.50) (2.68) (2.33) 
LAGE 
-0.0310
***
  -0.028
***
  -0.00602  
(-4.67)  (-5.03)  (-1.58)  
FORE 
-0.0272  -0.0683  0.0495
*
  
(-0.65)  (-1.90)  (2.07)  
DOM 
0.0226 -0.00165 -0.0168 0.00952 0.0538
*
 -0.00933 
(0.54) (-0.07) (-0.46) (0.51) (2.23) (-0.52) 
GOV 
-0.00882 -0.00922 -0.0647 -0.00374 0.0658
**
 -0.00580 
(-0.22) (-0.26) (-1.85) (-0.13) (2.84) (-0.22) 
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0222
***
 0.0391
*
 0.0182
***
 0.0404
**
 0.00667
***
 0.0195 
(8.55) (2.34) (8.11) (3.02) (4.49) (1.52) 
INFLATION 
0.0159
***
 -0.0588 0.0126
***
 -0.0696 0.00505
*
 0.0132 
(4.34) (-1.28) (4.00) (-1.90) (2.41) (0.37) 
MCAP 
0.0146
***
 0.0383
**
 0.0110
***
 0.0198
*
 0.00520
***
 0.0236
*
 
(5.38) (3.09) (4.67) (2.00) (3.35) (2.48) 
GFC 
-0.00778 -0.0114
*
 -0.0114 -0.0135
**
 0.00350 0.00177 
(-0.86) (-2.09) (-1.45) (-3.10) (0.67) (0.42) 
Sigma 0.190
*
 -0.367 0.416
***
 -0.109 0.667
***
 0.218 
_cons (2.34) (-0.91) (5.96) (-0.34) (14.40) (0.70) 
R
2
 0.1105 0.0497 0.1061 0.0488 0.0443 0.0528 
Number of banks 323 323 323 323 323 323 
N 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, ROA: returns on assets, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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global financial crisis affected the efficiency significantly and negatively in whole 
banks. 
 
5.7 Conclusion of efficiency and its determinants 
According to banks across the world, the socially responsible banks scored the 
highest averages of efficiency‟s measures during the period 2005-2012. In 
contrast, the least scores were achieved by conventional banks. Regarding the 
determinants, the variables that increase the efficiency of Islamic banks are size 
(TE and SE), loan intensity, financial leverage, ROA and market capitalisation. In 
contrary, the threats against Islamic banks attained from size (PTE), capital ratio 
and age. According to conventional banks, the results reveal that size, capital ratio 
(PTE), loan intensity, financial leverage, ROA, GDP and market capitalisation 
increase the efficiency. On the other hand, capital ratio (SE), ownership, inflation 
and the global financial crisis reduce the efficiency. In accordance to socially 
responsible banks, there is a positive and significant relationship between 
efficiency and capital ratio, credit risk, financial leverage, ownership (government 
banks), GDP, market capitalisation. However, the global financial crisis influenced 
the efficiency negatively. 
However, Appendix 15 concludes the efficiency averages for Islamic, conventional 
and socially responsible banks. In addition, Appendix 15 states the highest and 
lowest measures over the period 2005-2012. 
Appendix 16 presents the significant variables that affected efficiency in Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks through the 2005-2012 periods. 
Appendix 16 shows that ROA is the most important internal variable and increases 
the efficiency of the Islamic and conventional banks significantly. This is the 
reason behind striving to maximise profits, which improves efficiency in the 
banking sector. Regarding the external variables, market capitalisation was found 
to be the main factor for efficiency (excluding Islamic banks). Thus, governments 
need to be concerned about improving the stock market. Additionally, banks can 
grow their efficiency through investing more in countries with higher market 
capitalisation. However, inflation was found to be affecting negatively the efficiency 
(excluding SRB over the period 2005-2012. This result is a warning to banks 
against operating in countries with higher inflation rates. Regarding the GFC, the 
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efficiency of conventional and socially responsible banks was influenced by the 
GFC significantly and negatively.  
Based on the results of the additional test, the listed banks found to be more 
effective and operated efficiently. This allowed providing better quality of banking 
services. Additionally, higher control of corruption from the governments results to 
have better DEA‟s scores over the period 2005-2012. 
In MENA region including GCC countries, the managers of Islamic banks 
performed more effectively than conventional banks. In MENA region excluding 
GCC countries, we can conclude that the socially responsible banks were found to 
be more efficient by a wide margin compared to Islamic (average efficiency) and 
conventional banks (the worst performance). Finally, in GCC region, conventional 
banks attained better efficiency measures over the period 2005-2012. According to 
the determinants of efficiency, the profitability in banking (ROA) is remarkably 
supported to enhance the efficiency of Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks in terms of bank-specific factors. Regarding the macroeconomic 
variables, efficiency is significantly improved by stock market growth in the MENA 
region banking sector.  
 
In the UK, SRBs operated efficiently compared to conventional and Islamic banks. 
With regards to determinants, size, loans and age were very important to support 
efficiency, whereas capitalisation went against expectations as it influenced 
efficiency inversely. In conventional banks, size and capital ratios have negative 
and significant correlations with efficiency. According to SRBs, financial leverage 
and inflation increased the efficiency significantly. New SRBs were more efficient 
than banks with greater experience (time). Finally, it is very remarkable for SRBs 
to have positive and significant signs for technical and scale efficiencies over the 
crisis period (2007-2009). 
 
Overall, the highest estimator for all banks is the average SE scoring then the 
average PTE achieving and the minimum indicator was the TE means.
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Chapter Six: Results and Discussion of Profitability 
 
6.1 Results of profitability  
Many studies used ROA and ROE ratios as explained variables such as 
Chronopoulos et al. (2015), Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014), Al-Musali and Ismail 
(2014), Rumler and Waschiczek (2014), Lee and Kim (2013), Dedu and Chitan 
(2013), Kanas et al. (2012), Haan and Poghosyan (2012), Barry et al. (2011) and 
Mirzaei et al. (2013). Fewer studies concentrated on NIM, for example, Horváth‟s 
et al. (2014) study. By following the recent studies, this study employs ROA, ROE 
and NIM as dependant variables through the period 2005-2012. Before analysing, 
we can conclude the data description of each profitability ratio to know which type 
of banks have the highest average profitability ratios as in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1: Data description of profitability ratios 
Type Ratio Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Islamic 
 Banks 
ROA 312 0.009 0.150 -0.870 2.200 
ROE 312 0.058 0.172 -1.130 0.530 
NIM 255 3.862 6.511 -26.270 64 
Conventional  
Banks 
ROA 1827 0.103 0.035 -0.440 0.860 
ROE 1827 0.070 0.309 -9.980 1.180 
NIM 1700 2.789 1.845 -4.570 18 
Socially  
Responsible 
 Banks 
ROA 284 0.005 0.011 -0.080 0.039 
ROE 284 0.025 0.682 -11.070 0.900 
NIM 260 3.484 3.063 -5.560 14 
All Banks 
ROA 2423 0.008 0.062 -0.873 2.200 
ROE 2423 0.051 0.361 -11.066 1.180 
NIM 2215 2.994 2.953 -26 63.996 
 
Appendix 13 includes the measures of profitability ratios (ROA, ROA and NIM) for 
all banks (Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks). The conventional 
banks were found to be the most profitable banks (we accept H2). This could be 
due to charging more interest than Islamic and socially responsible banks. The 
calculation of ROA is net income over total assets and ROA represents a 
dependant variable following Apergis‟ (2014) approach. According to ROE, return 
on equity ratio is calculated as net income to total shareholders‟ equity. The ROE 
is also dealt with as a dependent variable in different equations (Lee and Kim, 
2013). The mean ROA for conventional banks is equal to 1%, whereas the 
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average ROE is 7%. However, Islamic banks achieved moderate profitability ratios 
(mean ROA = 0.90% and mean ROE = 5.80%). Furthermore, socially responsible 
banks scored the lowest average ROA (0.50%) and ROE (2.50%) over the period 
2005-2012 as Flammer (2005) states that socially responsible corporations seek 
to support social issues more than profitability. According to NIM ratios in Table 
6.1 above, Islamic banks attained the highest NIM (3.862) due to generating their 
income by not pay interest expenses and through interest-free investment (H2 is 
rejected). Following by socially responsible banks which they scored mean NIM 
equal to 3.484. After that, conventional banks found to be the least profitable in 
terms of NIM (2.789), which can be explained as conventional banks anticipated to 
pay the greatest interest expenses compared to Islamic and socially responsible 
banks or conventional banks could gain less interest income than Islamic and 
socially responsible banks. Appendix 13 illustrates the averages for profitability 
ratios for Islamic, conventional, socially responsible and all banks from 2005-2012. 
Focusing on the profitability of Islamic banks, Figure 6.1 below explains that the 
highest mean ROA attained in 2005 scored 11.07% followed by the average ROA 
in 2006 (2.15%), then the ROA dropped in 2007 (0.16%). However, the lowest 
mean ROA occurred in 2010 (-2.88%) which is the post-crisis period, then the 
profitability improved in 2011 (-2.40) and 2012 (0.70%) compared to recent years. 
Regarding ROE, the mean ratio of ROE ranged between 1.87% in 2012 (the 
minimum) to 3.01% in 2007 (the maximum). Over the period 2008-2011, ROE did 
not change significantly, but it dropped in 2012. Overall, the mean ROE (5.80%) 
was found to be higher than ROA (0.9%) over the period 2005-2012. This means 
that investing in shareholder‟s equity generated more profits than investing in 
banks‟ assets.  
 
Based on the NIM measure, Islamic banks achieved the greatest earnings in 
(7.3536) then drop slightly in 2006 (4.3743). In 2007, the NIM grown to 5.5172, 
after that the profits kept decreasing until 2011 which considered to be the worst 
measure (2.4285). However, the NIM ratios are explained in different figure due to 
high differences between NIM and other profitability ratios (ROA and ROE). Figure 
6.2 below illustrates the means NIM over the period 2005-2012 for the Islamic 
banks.  
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             Figure 6.1: Bar chart of average ROA and ROE ratios for Islamic banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Figure 6.2: Bar chart of average NIM ratios for Islamic banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regard to conventional banks‟ profitability ratios, Figure 6.3 below shows that 
ROA declined slightly in 2006 (1.57%) and 2007 (1.36%) but collapsed in 2008 
(0.69%) and 2009 (0.49%). This could be due to the impact of the global financial 
crisis. After that, ROA improved during the period 2010-2012 (post-crisis) with 
mean scores for ROA equal to 0.85% in 2010 and 1.19% in 2012. However, the 
conventional banks achieved the maximum ROA in 2005 (1.63%) as shown in 
Figure 6.3 below. Regarding ROE measures, the mean ROE ranged between 
1.27% (in 2012) and 1.41% (in 2005 and 2011). In detail, the mean ROE declined 
in 2006 (1.32%) and 2007 (1.29%), then increased in 2008 (1.35%) and 2009 
(1.37%).  
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        Figure 6.3: Bar chart of average ROA and ROE ratios for conventional banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The NIM in conventional banks started in 2005 from 2.7421then decreased to 
2.7259 in 2006. Then the period between 2007 (2.8255) to 2009 (2.8881), the 
interest revenues boomed clearly as in Figure 6.4 below. After that NIM collapsed 
again in 2010 and 2011 scoring average NIM ratios as 2.7464 and 2.7193 (the 
minimum), respectively. Finally, the profits enhanced again in 2012 (2.7621). 
In socially responsible banks, ROA rose in 2006 scoring a mean ROA equal to 
0.69%, which was the highest percentage, then the profitability declined in 2007 
(0.60%) and 2008 (0.15%). In 2009 and 2010, the ROA improved, achieving 
average ROA of 0.48% and 0.60%, respectively. After that, the profitability kept 
decreasing in 2011 (0.52%) and 2012 (0.47%). Focusing on the ROE indicator, but  
     
         Figure 6.4: Bar chart of average NIM ratios for conventional banks 
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Figure 6.5 below illustrates that the highest ROE was attained in 2005 (1.77%). It 
then dropped slightly in 2006 (1.63%). In 2007, the ROE increased to 1.70%, after 
that the returns on equity decreased continuously from 2008 (1.33%) to 2012 (1%) 
which is considered to be the least profitable year in terms of ROE. Overall, ROE 
was found to be higher than ROA over the period 2005-2012, achieving means 
equal to 0.5% and 2.5% for ROA and ROE, respectively. 
 
         Figure 6.5: Bar chart of average ROA and ROE ratios for SRBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concentrating on NIM averages in socially responsible banks, Figure 6.6 below 
concludes that NIM indicator varied between 3.3062in 2012 to 3.7643 in 2006. In 
2007 the earnings collapsed badly and the recovery attained in 2008 (3.7603). 
After 2008, the NIM could not improve until 2012 as in Figure 6.6 below. 
Figure 6.6: Bar chart of average NIM ratios for SRBs 
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In general, the highest overall ROA for all banks was attained in 2005, scoring 
4.39%. After 2005, ROA carried on reducing from 2006 (1.47%) to 2010 (-0.48%), 
but in 2011 and 2012 the ROA index improved by 0.37% and 0.79%, respectively. 
However, the maximum average ROE was found in 2007 (2%) and the minimum 
ROE was attained in 2012 (1.38%). In 2006, the ROE declined to 1.73%, then 
rose in 2007 (2%). After that, the ROE indicator kept decreasing over the period 
2008-2012 from 1.61% to 1.38%. Overall, ROE (5.10%) was found to be higher 
than ROA (0.8%) during the period 2005-2012 as shown in figure 6.7 below.      
               Figure 6.7: Bar chart of average ROA and ROE ratios for all banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average NIM for all banks started strongly in 2005 scoring 4.5688. In 2006, a 
slight difference is observed as NIM dropped to 3.6215. Then, profits recovered in 
2007 (3.9416) but the period of 2008-2011, interest earnings continuously 
reducing from 3.3427 to 2.8183 (the lowest), respectively. In 2012, banks found to 
be achieving better net interest margins (see Figure 6.8).  
Figure 6.8: Bar chart of average NIM ratios for all banks 
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However, Table 6.2 below indicates the averages ROA and ROE ratios for each 
country in the study to find out which country needs to improve its profitability in 
the banking sector. 
Table 6.2 shows that mean ROE was more than mean ROA over the period 2005-
2012, scoring 2.28% and 1.72% for ROE and ROA, respectively. Iranian banks 
achieved the maximum overall ROA equal to 9.87%, whereas banks in the UK 
needed to improve their returns as mean ROA was the minimum, equal to -0.49% 
compared to the rest of the countries. However, Bolivian socially responsible 
banks attained the highest average ROE (21.38%), while the least profitable banks 
were in Morocco (-15.57%).  
According to NIM measure, Table 6.3 below concludes the NIM ratios by country. 
It can be observed that Bolivia invested in interests efficiently (12.660) while, the 
least profitable banks found to be in Austria (1.188). As a result, comparing the 
profitability ratios between countries could encourage banks to operate and invest 
effectively due to increasing in competitiveness in banking sector. 
 
6.2 Determinants of profitability  
The profitability analysis shows the variables (bank-specific and macrocosmic) that 
can improve profitability and the variables that could increase/reduce profitability 
over the period 2005-2012 for Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks 
through the use of OLS and fixed effects models. The following sections conclude 
the relationships between the profitability ratios (ROA, ROE and NIM) and the 
explanatory variables.  
6.2.1 Determinants of profitability in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), MT 
6.2.1.1 Determinants of ROA and ROA in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), MT 
The empirical results of the OLS and fixed effects models are presented in Table 
6.4. After considering the ROA and ROE indicators, the internal determinants are 
size, capital ratio, loan intensity, deposit ratio and z-score, whereas the external 
determinants were found to be GDP and inflation. In detail, the larger sized banks 
are more profitable than smaller sized banks over the period. The reason of this 
result could be due to larger banks are more likely to gain profits from economies  
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Table 6.2: Averages ROA and ROA ratios by country 
N Country Mean ROA Mean ROE Banks in the sample Number of Banks 
1 USA 0.0078 0.0005 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
2 Germany 0.0027 0.0111 Socially Responsible Banks 3 SRB 
3 France 0.0027 0.0022 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
4 UK -0.0049 0.0049 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
3 IB, 74 CB and 6 SRB 
5 Canada 0.0071 0.0011 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
6 Australia 0.0054 0.0021 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
7 Spain 0.0081 0.0159 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
8 Netherlands 0.0039 0.0053 Socially Responsible Banks 2 SRB 
9 Saudi Arabia 0.0620 0.0414 Islamic and Conventional Banks 3 IB and 9 CB 
10 Switzerland 0.0008 0.0164 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
11 Norway 0.0026 0.0169 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
12 Austria -0.0026 0.0107 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
13 UAE 0.0357 0.0262 Islamic and Conventional Banks 6 IB and 17 CB 
14 Iran 0.0987 0.1007 Islamic and Socially Responsible Banks 7 IB and 1 SRB 
15 Denmark 0.0036 0.0114 Socially Responsible Banks 5 SRB 
16 Israel 0.0060 0.0111 Conventional Banks 8 CB 
17 Egypt 0.0150 0.0197 Islamic and Conventional Banks 2 IB and 21 CB 
18 Iraq 0.0361 0.0302 Conventional Banks 2CB 
19 Algeria 0.0316 0.0546 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
1 IB, 9 CB and 3 SRB 
20 Qatar 0.0892 0.0696 Islamic and Conventional Banks 3 IB and 6 CB 
21 New Zealand 0.0019 0.0060 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
22 Kuwait 0.0165 0.0125 Islamic and Conventional Banks 2 IB and 6 CB 
23 Bangladesh 0.0119 0.0158 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
24 Morocco  0.0095 -0.1557 
Conventional and Socially Responsible 
Banks 
8 CB and 1 SRB 
25 Oman 0.0187 0.0105 Conventional Banks 7 CB 
26 Syria 0.0036 0.0371 Conventional Banks 5 CB 
27 Libya 0.0061 0.0128 Conventional Banks 5 CB 
28 Tunisia 0.0149 0.0324 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
1 IB, 8 CB and 2 SRB 
29 Lebanon 0.0078 0.0185 Conventional Banks 28 CB 
30 Yemen 0.0272 0.0281 Islamic and Conventional Banks 4 IB and 1 CB 
31 Jordan 0.0249 0.0254 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 7 CB 
32 Bahrain 0.0008 0.0071 Islamic and Conventional Banks 9 IB and 15 CB 
33 Bolivia 0.0185 0.2138 Socially Responsible Banks 2 SRB 
34 Nepal 0.0054 0.0182 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
35 Mongolia 0.0164 0.0554 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
36 Malta 0.0099 0.0172 
Conventional and Socially Responsible 
Banks 
4 CB and 1 SRB 
37 Palestine  0.0314 0.0358 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 2 CB 
All Banks 0.0172 0.0228 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
323 banks (43 IB, 242 
CB and 38 SRB) 
 
of scale than smaller banks, which it may have a higher degree of production 
differentiation and loan diversification. Many studies proposed that size of banks 
influence the profitability significantly and positivley (e.g., Houston et al., 2010; 
Chronopoulos et al., 2015; Guillén et al., 2014; Bertay et al., 2013; Lee & Kim, 
2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013; Shehzad et al., 2013; Haan & Poghosyan, 2012;  
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Table 6.3: Averages NIM ratios by country  
N Country 
Mean 
NIM 
Banks in the sample Number of Banks 
1 USA 2.8280 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
2 Germany 2.2417 Socially Responsible Banks 3 SRB 
3 France 1.9759 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
4 UK 1.9921 Islamic, Conventional and Socially Responsible Banks 2 IB, 72 CB and 5 SRB 
5 Canada 1.8757 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
6 Australia 1.9216 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
7 Spain 1.6662 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
8 Netherlands 2.2603 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
9 Saudi Arabia 3.4284 Islamic and Conventional Banks 2 IB and 9 CB 
10 Switzerland 1.9008 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
11 Norway 4.8715 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
12 Austria 1.1888 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
13 UAE 3.5089 Islamic and Conventional Banks 5 IB and 15 CB 
14 Iran 3.2033 Islamic and Socially Responsible Banks 6 IB and 1 SRB 
15 Denmark 3.5330 Socially Responsible Banks 5 SRB 
16 Israel 2.5350 Conventional Banks 8 CB 
17 Egypt 2.7620 Islamic and Conventional Banks 2 IB and 20 CB 
18 Iraq 8.4910 Conventional Banks 2 CB 
19 Algeria 5.2607 Islamic, Conventional and Socially Responsible Banks 1 IB, 9 CB and 3 SRB 
20 Qatar 3.4685 Islamic and Conventional Banks 3 IB and 6 CB 
21 New Zealand 3.2330 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
22 Kuwait 3.2217 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 6 CB 
23 Bangladesh 6.2255 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
24 Morocco  3.4299 Conventional Banks 8 CB 
25 Oman 3.6370 Conventional Banks 7 CB 
26 Syria 2.7824 Conventional Banks 5 CB 
27 Libya 2.8006 Conventional Banks 5 CB 
28 Tunisia 2.6017 Islamic, Conventional and Socially Responsible Banks 1 IB, 8 CB and 2 SRB 
29 Lebanon 2.6689 Conventional Banks 24 CB 
30 Yemen 3.1277 Islamic and Conventional Banks 4 IB and 1 CB 
31 Jordan 3.4272 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 7 CB 
32 Bahrain 3.0096 Islamic and Conventional Banks 8 IB and 14 CB 
33 Bolivia 12.660 Socially Responsible Banks 2 SRB 
34 Nepal 3.8867 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
35 Mongolia 9.9633 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
36 Malta 2.2656 Conventional and Socially Responsible Banks 4 CB and 1 SRB 
37 Palestine  4.4618 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 2 CB 
All Banks 3.6301 Islamic, Conventional and Socially Responsible Banks 
301 banks (37 IB, 229 
CB and 35 SRB) 
 
Flamini et al., 2009). On the other side, some studies suggested the opposite 
finding which is smaller sized banks were more profitable (see Căpraru & Ihnatov, 
2014; Haan & Poghosyan, 2012; Barry et al., 2011; Lin & Zhang, 2009; Altunbas & 
Marques, 2008). The empirical findings confirm that capital ratio impacts the ROA 
and ROE negatively at a 0.1% and 1% levels, respectively, which means lowering 
capitalisation leads to an increase in profitability. These results are linked to the 
arguments of a few articles (Chronopoulos et al., 2015; Mollah & Zaman, 2015;  
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Table 6.4: Results of profitability determinants for Islamic banks (UK and MENA), 
MT 
Islamic Banks (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Profitability ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
-0.00182 0.0617
**
 0.0273
***
 0.0700
**
 0.890
**
 2.798
*
 
(-0.27) (3.03) (3.95) (3.12) (2.64) (2.43) 
EQTA 
-0.141
***
 -0.460
***
 -0.0318 -0.198
**
 8.611
*
 -15.42 
(-4.04) (-6.91) (-0.90) (-2.70) (2.58) (-1.61) 
LOANSTA 
-0.0891
*
 0.0590 -0.00433 -0.111 -3.162 -3.506 
(-2.15) (1.01) (-0.10) (-1.72) (-1.33) (-1.06) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.000061 -0.00026 0.000290 0.0000434 0.00442 -0.0382
*
 
(-0.17) (-0.90) (0.82) (0.13) (0.28) (-2.54) 
DEPOSITSTA 
-0.0638
*
 0.0232 0.00189 0.178
**
 -1.262 0.794 
(-2.12) (0.44) (0.06) (3.04) (-0.51) (0.20) 
LAGE 
-0.00900  0.0248  -0.0106  
(-0.49)  (1.34)  (-0.01)  
LOGZ 
0.0266
**
 0.328
***
 0.0496
***
 0.196
***
 0.383 6.698
***
 
(2.92) (14.13) (5.39) (7.65) (0.73) (3.98) 
FORE 
 -0.00990  0.114   
 (-0.13)  (1.41)   
DOM 
-0.0159 -0.00433 -0.00786 0.0853 0.216 2.185 
(-0.78) (-0.06) (-0.38) (1.14) (0.21) (0.97) 
GOV 
-0.0109  -0.0410  -1.772 3.354 
(-0.38)  (-1.42)  (-1.27) (0.76) 
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0147
*
 -0.0884
*
 -0.0147
*
 -0.145
***
 -0.492 -10.61
***
 
(2.10) (-2.37) (-2.08) (-3.54) (-1.39) (-5.36) 
INFLATION 
-0.239
**
 -0.0480 -0.487
***
 -0.371
***
 -7.001 3.587 
(-2.69) (-0.61) (-5.40) (-4.25) (-1.63) (0.81) 
MCAP 
0.0275 -0.0211 0.0160 0.0146 -2.735
**
 -7.613
***
 
(1.48) (-0.74) (0.85) (0.46) (-2.95) (-5.06) 
GFC 
-0.00442 -0.00517 0.0111 0.00735 0.200 -0.0886 
(-0.27) (-0.41) (0.67) (0.53) (0.25) (-0.13) 
Sigma -0.252 1.043 0.0744 2.651
**
 11.25 240.2
***
 
_cons (-1.40) (1.15) (0.41) (2.66) (1.30) (5.16) 
R
2
 0.1745 0.5340 0.3565 0.3729 0.1240               0.2489 
Number of banks 43 43 43 43 37 37 
N 312 312 312 312 255 255 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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Shehzad et al., 2013; Ćurak et al., 2012; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; Altunbas & 
Marques, 2008) but the majority goes to confirm that higher capital strengthen 
financial performance (see Ghosh, 2015; Mamatzakis et al., 2015;  Apergis, 2014;  
Mirzaei et al., 2013; Chitan, 2012; Kutan et al., 2012; Manlagnit  2011; Sufian & 
Habibullah, 2010; Flamini et al., 2009; García-Herrero et al., 2009  Altunbas & 
Marques, 2008; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999). The 
loan intensity has a negative sign and is statistically significant at a 5% level with 
ROA referring to the OLS model. This proves that providing more loans that are 
generated from total assets could raise the risk of lowering ROA. This strongly 
linked to Chronopoulos et al. (2015) finding on US commercial banking system. 
The result is in contrast with Olson and Zoubi (2011) who claimed that providing 
loans maximises the profits of the MENA banking sector. The deposit ratio raises 
the ROE referring to FEM, which explains that operating more deposits to buy 
more assets improves the financial performance in banks. García-Herrero et al. 
(2009) employed the deposit ratio as an explanatory variable and he found the 
same positive relationship between deposit ratio and profitability ratio (ROA) in the 
Chinese banking sector. In contrast, deposit ratio impacted the ROA significantly 
and negatively in this study which is in line with Barry et al. (2011) finding. 
Additionally, the z-score was found to be highly correlated with profitability ratios at 
a 0.1% level. This demonstrates that profits increase the stability and reduce the 
risk of bankruptcy (similar to Mamatzakis et al., 2015; Mollah & Zaman, 2015). The 
ownership did not affect the financial performance as in Table 6.4. Concerning 
macroeconomic factors, gross domestic production development reduces ROA in 
terms of FEM coefficient and ROE. This finding is consistent with the outcome of 
few studies (see; Bertay et al., 2013; Shehzad et al., 2013; Delis et al., 2012; 
Sufian & Habibullah, 2010; Boubakri et al., 2005). On the other side, following OLS 
result, GDP influences the ROA positively and significantly at the level of 5% 
which confirmed by the most recent studies (for example, Chronopoulos et al., 
2015; Guillén et al., 2014; Rumler & Waschiczek, 2014; Bertay et al., 2013; Dedu 
& Chitan, 2013; Lee & Kim, 2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013; Chitan, 2012; Kutan et al., 
2012; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; Houston et al., 2010; Flamini et al., 2009; 
Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; Boubakri et al., 2005). Moreover, inflation negatively 
and significantly affects profitability ratios (ROA or ROE) over the period, as 
Shehzad‟s et al. (2013) results suggest. On the other hand, Rumler and 
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Waschiczek (2014) claim that greater inflation rates led to higher profitability in the 
Austrian banking sector. Market capitalisation was found to be unimportant for 
Islamic banks as there is no relationship between profitability and stock market 
growth. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) could not find any impact on financial 
performance from market capitalisation. Also, there is no proven affect by the 
global financial crisis on profitability in Islamic banks. Apergis‟s (2014) results 
suggest that the financial global crisis influenced ROA positively. In general, the R 
squared measures for the ROA ratio are 17.45% and 53.40% for the OLS and 
fixed effects models, respectively. Additionally, the R squared of ROE ratios are 
35.65% and 37.29% for the OLS and FE models. The R squared measures are 
representing high consistency between explanatory variables.  
6.2.1.2 Determinants of NIM in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), MT 
Based on the NIM in Table 6.4, due to the prohibition in dealing with interests in 
Islamic banking systems, the ratio of NIM can be calculated as financial 
investment (such as trade in stock market) over total earning assets. According to 
NIM determinants, as expected, larger sized banks attained more effective 
investment than smaller sized banks. Liang et al. (2013) and Sufian and 
Habibullah (2009) agreed that banks needed to have huge amount of assets to 
build interest earnings. Many studies confirmed the opposite relationship such as 
Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014), Hussain (2014), Tan and Floros (2012), Havrylchyk 
and Jurzyk (2011), Heffernan and Fu (2010) and Lanine and Vennet (2007) who 
encouraged banks to lower their assets to improve the NIM. Based on the OLS 
results, the association between the capitalisation and NIM is significant and 
positive at level of 5% as predicted. Higher capital allows banks to invest more in 
stock market. This finding is consistent with several studies (e.g., Căpraru & 
Ihnatov, 2014; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2014; Ewijk & Arnold, 2014; Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2011; Heffernan & Fu, 2010; Claeys & Vennet, 2008; Lanine & 
Vennet, 2007). Few studies explained the negative correlation between NIM and 
capital ratio (Zhou & Wong, 2008). Regarding to the credit risk, the NIM reduces 
the credit risk which is a good sign for Islamic banks. This motivates banks to take 
more deposits and provide more loans. This goes against Liang et al. (2013) who 
argued that higher loans increased the credit risk. However, z-score improved the 
NIM which means that having more earning assets kept the Islamic banks stable 
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with less bankruptcy risk. Referring to the macroeconomic factors, against the 
expectations, the GDP (similar to Claeys & Vennet, 2008) and stock market 
growth have significant and negative signs with NIM. According to bank-specific 
variables, the age of banks and ownership are insignificant variables. Considering 
the industry-specific variables, the inflation and global financial crisis did not affect 
the NIM. The recorded R2 are 12.40% and 24.89% for the OLS and FEM. Figure 
6.9 below concludes the significant relationship between profitability and its 
determinants in Islamic banking system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Significant variables that affect profitability for Islamic banks, MT 
6.2.1.3 Determinants of profitability in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), MT 
The relationships between profitability ratios and their determinants in Table 6.4 
and Table 6.5 are consistent. Regarding the listing factor, the Islamic listed banks 
are more profitable than unlisted banks. This could be because listed banks could 
attract more investors and clients than unlisted banks. In addition, listed banks 
have more financial facilities from shareholders than unlisted banks. This result is 
in line with Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi‟s (2015) Lin and Zhang‟s (2009) outcome. 
Based on corruption control, higher public supervision allowed having better NIM 
but less ROE. Sufian and Habibullah (2010) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
Profitability of IBs 
Size (+) 
Capitalisation (+/-) 
Loan intensity (-) 
Deposit ratio (+/-) 
Credit risk (-) 
Z-score (+) 
Age 
Domestic ownership 
Foreign ownership 
Government ownership 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation (-) 
Market capitalization (-) 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (+/-) 
165 
 
Table 6.5: Results of profitability determinants for Islamic banks (UK and MENA), 
AT 
Islamic Banks (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Profitability ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
-0.00310 0.0663
**
 0.0257
***
 0.0700
**
 0.818
*
 3.482
**
 
(-0.44) (3.07) (3.48) (2.94) (2.17) (2.92) 
EQTA 
-0.144
***
 -0.457
***
 -0.00165 -0.197
**
 8.192
*
 -13.27 
(-4.33) (-6.85) (-0.05) (-2.68) (2.43) (-1.38) 
LOANSTA 
-0.0885
*
 0.0590 0.0451 -0.111 -3.585 -3.405 
(-2.20) (1.01) (1.08) (-1.72) (-1.48) (-1.03) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.0000690 -0.000273 0.000245 0.0000433 0.00358 -0.0400
**
 
(-0.20) (-0.93) (0.69) (0.13) (0.22) (-2.67) 
DEPOSITSTA 
-0.0633
*
 0.0259 -0.0404 0.177
**
 -1.073 2.175 
(-2.13) (0.49) (-1.30) (3.02) (-0.42) (0.55) 
LAGE 
-0.0268  0.0215  0.147  
(-1.48)  (1.14)  (0.15)  
LOGZ 
0.0560
***
 0.329
***
 0.0378
***
 0.195
***
 0.556 6.642
***
 
(5.62) (14.16) (3.64) (7.62) (1.01) (3.97) 
FORE 
 -0.00881  0.114   
 (-0.12)  (1.41)   
DOM 
-0.0201 -0.00198 -0.0210 0.0853 0.264 2.142 
(-0.99) (-0.03) (-0.99) (1.13) (0.26) (0.96) 
GOV 
-0.0108  -0.0446  -1.691 3.695 
(-0.39)  (-1.55)  (-1.21) (0.84) 
LISTED* 
0.00518  0.0672
***
  0.161  
(0.27)  (3.41)  (0.16)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0112 -0.0933
*
 -0.0188
**
 -0.145
***
 -0.602 -11.29
***
 
(1.68) (-2.45) (-2.68) (-3.46) (-1.61) (-5.67) 
INFLATION 
-0.195
*
 -0.0385 -0.511
***
 -0.371
***
 -5.462 5.348 
(-2.15) (-0.48) (-5.41) (-4.17) (-1.20) (1.19) 
MCAP 
0.0265 -0.0217 0.0242 0.0146 -3.117
**
 -7.607
***
 
(1.35) (-0.76) (1.18) (0.46) (-3.14) (-5.10) 
GFC 
-0.00491 -0.00666 0.0113 0.00730 0.167 -0.293 
(-0.31) (-0.52) (0.69) (0.52) (0.21) (-0.42) 
CCONTROL* 
0.000340 0.000716 -0.00121
*
 0.00000440 0.0237 0.128
*
 
(0.74) (0.64) (-2.52) (0.00) (1.04) (2.03) 
Sigma -0.202 1.059 0.265 2.635
**
 12.49 243.7
***
 
_cons (-1.19) (1.17) (1.49) (2.63) (1.43) (5.27) 
R
2
 0.2325 0.5356 0.3654 0.3420 0.1283 0.2636 
Number of banks 43 43 43 43 37 37 
N 312 312 312 312 255 255 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LISTED: dummy equal 1 if listed bank and 0 
if unlisted bank, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market 
capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise, CCONTROL: control of corruption.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
* Additional variable 
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(1999) unanimously that corruption freedom increased the profits in banking. 
Depending on R2 measures, after employing the additional variables (listing and 
corruption control), it is observable that a little increment in R2 rates proved due to 
higher consistency between the profitability ratios and the additional factors.   
 
6.2.2 Determinants of profitability in conventional banks (UK and MENA) 
6.2.2.1 Determinants of ROA and ROA in conventional banks (UK and MENA), 
MT 
Table 6.6 explains the determinants (bank characteristics and macroeconomic 
indicators) of profitability (ROA and ROA) in conventional banks over the period 
2005-2012. According to bank size (LTA), the analysis of the OLS model proposes 
that larger size banks achieved better profitability than smaller banks. This 
complies with petria‟s et al. (2015) study which confirmed that more total assets 
led to achieving more profitability. On the other side, Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014) 
found completely opposite aspect as smaller banks were more profitable than 
larger banks in Tunisia. Unlike Islamic banks, capital ratio reveals a positive and 
significant relationship with ROA at a 0.1% level, which is in line with Mamatzakis‟s 
et al. (2015) study on Japanese commercial banks. However, the loans raise the 
ROA ratio referring to loan intensity coefficients which are highly and positively 
correlated with ROA at a 0.1% level. Apergis (2014) estimated the same results in 
the US banking sector. According to credit risk ratio, achieving more returns 
decrease the risk of credit which means that the growth in lending leads to score 
better ROA ratio. Referring to the literature review, Chitan (2012) and Altunbas 
and Marques (2008) found the same finding in their studies. Focusing on deposit 
ratio‟s coefficient, accepting additional deposits enlarges the ROA as deposit ratio 
is highly correlated with ROA at a 0.1 level. According to z-score, all profitability 
ratios are highly and positively correlated at the level of 0.1%. In other words, 
profitability increases the banks‟ stability and reduces the risk of insolvency 
(Mamatzakis et al., 2015; Mollah & Zaman, 2015). However, there was no 
association between the age of banks and ownership with financial performance in 
conventional banks over the period 2005-2012. According to macroeconomic 
indicators, the growth in GDP tends to decrease ROA which is supported by 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) investigations. The stock market development  
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Table 6.6: Results of profitability determinants for conventional banks (UK and 
MENA), MT 
Conventional 
Banks 
(OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Profitability ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.00219
***
 0.0202
***
 0.00606 0.0702
**
 -0.335
***
 -0.526
***
 
(6.36) (10.60) (1.52) (2.95) (-15.13) (-8.08) 
EQTA 
0.0833
***
 0.0941
***
 -0.0251 -0.0725 -0.332 -0.0234 
(20.09) (15.12) (-0.52) (-0.93) (-1.24) (-0.09) 
LOANSTA 
0.0108
***
 0.0178
***
 0.0441 0.0868 3.107
***
 0.705
*
 
(4.12) (3.83) (1.46) (1.49) (16.78) (2.49) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.00011
*
 -0.000011 -0.000428 -0.000069 -0.000147 0.0000830 
(-2.38) (-0.23) (-0.74) (-0.11) (-0.05) (0.04) 
DEPOSITSTA 
0.0183
***
 0.0209
***
 -0.00638 -0.0706 -1.559
***
 -0.657
***
 
(9.83) (5.47) (-0.30) (-1.48) (-12.35) (-3.34) 
LAGE 
0.000697  0.00572  -0.00126  
(0.74)  (0.52)  (-0.02)  
LOGZ 
0.00477
***
 0.0142
***
 0.0716
***
 0.0986
***
 0.182
***
 0.276
***
 
(8.25) (7.18) (10.73) (3.98) (4.88) (3.50) 
FORE 
-0.00698  -0.135  -0.845 0.418 
(-0.74)  (-1.24)  (-1.43) (1.55) 
DOM 
-0.00681 -0.00293 -0.111 0.00247 -0.701 0.201 
(-0.73) (-0.63) (-1.03) (0.04) (-1.20) (0.88) 
GOV 
-0.00485 -0.00963 -0.0904 -0.135 -0.412  
(-0.52) (-1.42) (-0.85) (-1.60) (-0.71)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0013
***
 -0.018
***
 -0.00781 -0.0406 -0.0700
***
 0.0100 
(-3.65) (-5.27) (-1.84) (-0.95) (-3.89) (0.60) 
INFLATION 
0.00601 0.00625 0.0734 0.00290 0.0702 -0.911
*
 
(0.64) (0.65) (0.68) (0.02) (0.12) (-2.35) 
MCAP 
-0.000025 0.00847
***
 0.0000482 0.0802
*
 -0.0908
***
 -0.386
***
 
(-0.06) (3.38) (0.01) (2.56) (-3.48) (-4.35) 
GFC 
-0.00228 -0.00156 -0.0230 -0.0196 0.152 0.157
***
 
(-1.84) (-1.40) (-1.61) (-1.41) (1.90) (3.44) 
Sigma -0.0129 0.231
**
 0.103 0.243 7.496
***
 6.298
***
 
_cons (-0.90) (2.84) (0.62) (0.24) (9.24) (8.23) 
R
2
 0.4594 0.4474 0.0791 0.0757 0.2495 0.1006 
Number of banks 242 242 242 242 229 229 
N 1827 1827 1827 1827 1700 1700 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
 
168 
 
improved the performance over the period. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
examined the market capitalisation to GDP and they could not find any impact on 
profitability in their study. The results conclude that the inflation and global 
financial crisis had no impact on conventional banks during the period 2005-2012. 
In general, the consistency between the explanatory variables in terms of ROA (R2 
= 45.94% and 44.77% for OLS and FEM, respectively) is more than the 
consistency in ROE (7.91% and 7.57%).  
6.2.2.2 Determinants of NIM in conventional banks (UK and MENA), MT 
After covering the ROA‟s and ROE‟s determinants, we can analyse the 
determinants of NIM. The smaller banks achieved more net interest income than 
larger banks. This result is differentiated with the expected sign between NIM and 
banks‟ sizes. However, loan intensity found to be improving the NIM. In this case, 
banks achieved their incomes through lending interests which motivated 
conventional banks to supply more loans. Hence, covering the interest costs could 
be easier for banks. This outcome is in line with Sufian and Habibullah (2009), 
Claeys and Vennet (2008) and Lanine and Vennet (2007). On the other side, 
accepting more deposits decreased the NIM significantly, this could be due to an 
increment in deposit interests which led to attain loss. Lanine and Vennet (2007) 
proposed the same correlation between deposit ratio and NIM. As the Islamic 
banks, the relationship between NIM and z-score found to be significant and 
positive. Regarding to the macroeconomic factors, banks in countries with higher 
GDP, inflation and stock market capitalisation were paying more interest expenses. 
Finally, during the global financial crisis, the conventional banks scored 
outstanding net interest margins; this could be due to imposing large rates of 
lending interests. The R-squared for OLS is 24.95% while, the R-squared for FEM 
is 10.06%. Figure 6.10 below illustrates the significant determinants of profitability 
of conventional banks. 
 
6.2.2.3 Determinants of profitability in conventional banks (UK and MENA), 
AT 
Adding the listing and corruption control factors reveal significant and inverse 
associations between the NIM in conventional banks, and international and local 
ownerships, as in Table 6.7. Based on the additional variables, the listed banks 
were found to be more profitable (ROA and ROE) than the unlisted banks. This   
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Figure 6.10: Significant variables that affect profitability for conventional banks 
finding is similar to the Islamic banks‟ result. Moreover, conventional banks in 
countries with weaker supervision were found to be more profitable, which refers 
completely to unethical matters. In this case, government involvement should be 
increased in order to enhance the banking activities in the short and long term. 
However, the consistency of the independent variables (R2) is greatly improved 
after utilising the additional variables (listing and corruption control).    
6.2.3 Determinants of profitability in SRBs (across the world)  
6.2.3.1 Determinants of ROA and ROE in SRBs (across the world), MT  
Table 6.8 shows the OLS and fixed effects results for the ROA and ROE of 
socially responsible banks over the period 2005-2012. The relationship between 
the capitalisation and profitability (ROE) in socially responsible banks matches 
with Islamic OLS coefficient. According to FEM, z-score has a positive and 
significant relationship with ROA at a level of 0.1%, which explains that higher 
ROA raised the financial settlement of socially responsible banks through the 
whole period. According to ownership, foreign banks were found to be the most 
profitable (ROA) banks, having more capital tends to reduce the ROE referring to 
the banks with the maximum coefficients compared to domestic banks and 
Profitability of CBs 
Size (+/-) 
Capitalisation (+) 
Loan intensity (+) 
Deposit ratio (+/-) 
Credit risk (-) 
Z-score (+) 
Age 
Domestic ownership 
Foreign ownership 
Government ownership 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation (-) 
Market capitalization (+/-) 
GFC (+) 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (-) 
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Table 6.7: Results of profitability determinants for conventional banks (UK and 
MENA), AT 
CBs (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Profitability ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.00204
***
 0.0203
***
 0.00453 0.0707
**
 -0.304
***
 -0.534
***
 
(5.78) (10.60) (1.11) (2.96) (-14.03) (-8.16) 
EQTA 
0.0855
***
 0.0941
***
 -0.0120 -0.0725 0.105 -0.0231 
(20.39) (15.12) (-0.25) (-0.93) (0.40) (-0.09) 
LOANSTA 
0.0101
***
 0.0178
***
 0.0335 0.0868 3.610
***
 0.703
*
 
(3.62) (3.82) (1.03) (1.49) (18.84) (2.48) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.000114
*
 -0.0000113 -0.000385 -0.0000716 -0.000374 0.000107 
(-2.29) (-0.23) (-0.67) (-0.12) (-0.12) (0.06) 
DEPOSITSTA 
0.0175
***
 0.0209
***
 -0.00874 -0.0706 -1.996
***
 -0.657
***
 
(8.87) (5.47) (-0.38) (-1.48) (-15.48) (-3.34) 
LAGE 
0.000507  0.00456  -0.0397  
(0.54)  (0.42)  (-0.68)  
LOGZ 
0.00463
***
 0.0143
***
 0.0708
***
 0.0988
***
 0.137
***
 0.273
***
 
(8.03) (7.19) (10.59) (3.99) (3.81) (3.45) 
FORE 
-0.0124 0.00951 -0.175 0.134 -1.334
*
 0 
(-1.31) (1.40) (-1.60) (1.59) (-2.33) (.) 
DOM 
-0.0119 0.00664 -0.149 0.137 -1.110
*
 -0.223 
(-1.27) (1.14) (-1.37) (1.89) (-1.97) (-1.17) 
GOV 
-0.0104  -0.131  -0.926 -0.429 
(-1.12)  (-1.22)  (-1.66) (-1.59) 
LISTED* 
0.00493
***
  0.0413
*
  -0.0823  
(3.42)  (2.47)  (-0.96)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0000255 -0.0180
***
 0.00163 -0.0402 0.0450
*
 0.0105 
(0.05) (-5.25) (0.28) (-0.94) (2.21) (0.63) 
INFLATION 
-0.000396 0.00688 0.0327 0.00658 -1.831
**
 -0.968
*
 
(-0.04) (0.71) (0.30) (0.05) (-3.13) (-2.48) 
MCAP 
0.000316 0.00850
***
 0.00222 0.0803
*
 0.00309 -0.386
***
 
(0.72) (3.38) (0.44) (2.56) (0.12) (-4.34) 
GFC 
-0.00215 -0.00158 -0.0221 -0.0197 0.191
*
 0.159
***
 
(-1.74) (-1.42) (-1.55) (-1.41) (2.48) (3.49) 
CCONTROL* 
-0.000098
**
 0.0000738 -0.000596 0.000434 -0.0218
***
 -0.00687 
(-2.97) (0.50) (-1.56) (0.23) (-11.78) (-1.14) 
Sigma -0.0362
*
 0.215
**
 -0.0593 0.0674 6.463
***
 7.224
***
 
_cons (-2.35) (2.59) (-0.33) (0.07) (8.21) (8.28) 
R
2
 0.4649 0.4475 0.0830 0.0791 0.3068 0.1129 
Number of banks 242 242 242 242 229 229 
N 1827 1827 1827 1827 1700 1700 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LISTED: dummy equal 1 if listed bank and 0 
if unlisted bank, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market 
capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise, CCONTROL: control of corruption.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
* Additional variable 
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Table 6.8: Results of profitability determinants for SRBs (across the world), MT 
SRBs (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Profitability ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.000375 -0.00188 0.0196 -0.00976 -0.296
***
 -0.899
**
 
(1.04) (-0.98) (0.80) (-0.07) (-3.96) (-3.03) 
EQTA 
-0.00474 -0.0316 -0.668
*
 -2.076 1.406
**
 0.103 
(-1.04) (-1.61) (-2.15) (-1.39) (3.07) (0.18) 
LOANSTA 
-0.00953 0.00145 -0.494 0.172 -0.0287 -0.0200 
(-1.91) (0.18) (-1.45) (0.28) (-1.72) (-1.37) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.00601 -0.00771 0.291 -0.0273 1.408
**
 1.064 
(1.45) (-1.39) (1.04) (-0.06) (3.19) (1.79) 
DEPOSITSTA 
-0.00444 -0.0109 0.114 0.138 -1.392
**
 -0.107 
(-0.94) (-1.88) (0.36) (0.31) (-3.04) (-0.19) 
LAGE 
-0.00039  -0.0229  0.0138  
(-0.40)  (-0.34)  (0.08)  
LOGZ 
0.000697 0.0139
***
 0.0558 0.218 -0.291
*
 -0.710 
(0.96) (3.77) (1.13) (0.78) (-2.29) (-1.71) 
FORE 
-0.00554  -0.420
*
  -1.657
**
  
(-1.87)  (-2.08)  (-3.15)  
DOM 
-0.00817
*
  -0.484  -1.639
*
  
(-2.08)  (-1.81)  (-2.42)  
GOV 
-0.012
***
  -0.555
**
  -3.568
***
  
(-4.43)  (-2.84)  (-6.32)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.00126
*
 0.00703 -0.0285 0.621 -0.417
***
 1.055 
(-2.14) (1.44) (-0.71) (1.68) (-4.13) (1.42) 
INFLATION 
0.000402 -0.0262 0.00932 -0.996 0.0199 -3.274 
(1.45) (-1.52) (0.50) (-0.76) (0.43) (-1.38) 
MCAP 
0.00189 0.00850
**
 0.0481 0.552
*
 -0.905
***
 0.0827 
(1.38) (2.76) (0.52) (2.36) (-3.83) (0.18) 
GFC 
-0.00142 -0.00096 0.0729 0.103 -0.00802 0.183 
(-1.18) (-0.85) (0.89) (1.20) (-0.04) (1.11) 
Sigma 0.0471
*
 -0.169 1.052 -15.87 19.79
***
 -10.89 
_cons (2.51) (-1.48) (0.82) (-1.84) (6.98) (-0.64) 
R
2
 0.1840 0.1600 0.0819 0.0501 0.7266 0.0859 
Number of banks 38 38 38 38 35 35 
N 284 284 284 284 260 260 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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followed by state-owned (government) banks which had the lowest coefficients. 
The concentrations of all types of ownership are reducing the profitability (negative 
relationship) which discourages socially responsible banks from opening more 
banks due to the risk of incurring more losses. Olson and Zoubi (2011) compared 
the financial performance of foreign and government banks in the MENA region 
during the period 2000-2008. Based on Olson and Zoubi‟s (2011) results, foreign 
banks scored more profits than government banks. Additionally, the existence of 
foreign banks had a positive impact on profitability, whereas the concentration of 
government banks decreased profitability. Focusing on the macroeconomic 
variables, GDP growth decreased the ROA over the period. According to market 
capitalisation, the relationship between ROA and market capitalisation is positive 
and significant at the level of 1% in terms of the FEM estimation. In addition, the 
market capitalisation growth strengthens ROE at a 5% level following FEM 
approach. The Inflation and the financial crisis had no significant influence on 
profitability in socially responsible banks. Overall, R squared was equal to 18.40% 
and 16% for ROA referring to the OLS and FEM, respectively. In addition, R 
squared for ROE was 8.19% and 5.01% for OLS and FEM, respectively.  
6.2.3.2 Determinants of NIM in SRBs (across the world), MT  
Focusing on NIM results in Table 6.8, as the conventional banks, smaller banks 
found to be more profitable than larger banks. However, as anticipated, the 
relationship between NIM and capital ratio is significant and positive. 
Comprehensive studies support this relationship like Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014), 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), Ewijk and Arnold (2014), Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2011), Heffernan and Fu (2010), Sufian and Habibullah (2009), 
Claeys and Vennet (2008) and Lanine and Vennet (2007). The results encourage 
the SRBs to reduce the lending activities due to the correlation between the NIM 
and the credit risk (positive sign). In addition, lowering the deposits is preferable as 
deposit ratio influence the NIM significantly and negatively. However, investing in 
interests is highly risky based on the negative coefficient of z-score which is 
against the expectations. Moreover, we can find that the foreign, domestic and 
public ownership decreased the NIM significantly.  Similar to Islamic banks, GDP 
and market capitalisation affected the NIM significantly and negatively. The R2 
measures are 0.7266 and 0.0859 for OLS and FEM, respectively. Finally, Figure 
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6.11 summarises the relationship between profitability and its factors for the 
socially responsible banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Significant variables that affect profitability for SRBs 
 
6.2.3.3 Determinants of profitability in SRBs (across the world), AT  
The main difference between Table 6.8 (main test) and Table 6.9 (additional test) 
is that in the additional test, the socially responsible banks are able to enhance 
their profitability through reduction of lending services due to an inverse and 
significant correlation between ROA and loan intensity. Over the period of the 
global financial crisis, SRBs had better indicators of NIM. According to the 
additional variables (listing and corruption control), unlisted banks achieved more 
interest income compared to listed banks. Finally, higher control of corruption by 
the government led to greater values of NIM. Based on the R2 measures, there is 
evidence of higher consistency after adding listing and corruption control factors to 
the main test. 
6.3 Profitability of MENA countries (including GCC) 
6.3.1 Profitability measures description for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Table 6.10 illustrates that conventional banks were more profitable than Islamic 
banks in terms of ROA (1.48%) and ROE (9.56%) ratios, which can be explained  
SRBs Profitability 
Size (-) 
Capitalisation (+/-) 
Loan intensity  
Deposit ratio (-) 
Credit risk (+) 
Z-score (+/-) 
Age 
Domestic ownership (-) 
Foreign ownership (-) 
Government ownership (-) 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation  
Market capitalization (+/-) 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (-) 
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Table 6.9: Results of profitability determinants for SRBs (across the world), AT 
SRBs (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Profitability ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.000311 -0.00193 0.0191 -0.0171 -0.285
***
 -0.743
**
 
(0.85) (-0.99) (0.77) (-0.12) (-3.77) (-2.97) 
EQTA 
-0.00528 -0.0323 -0.626 -2.198 1.154
*
 0.159 
(-1.08) (-1.63) (-1.87) (-1.47) (2.32) (0.33) 
LOANSTA 
-0.0103
*
 0.00133 -0.505 0.151 -0.0239 -0.0147 
(-2.06) (0.16) (-1.47) (0.24) (-1.43) (-1.20) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.00584 -0.00767 0.279 -0.0203 1.596
***
 0.663 
(1.41) (-1.38) (0.99) (-0.05) (3.50) (1.32) 
DEPOSITSTA 
-0.00476 -0.0108 0.0950 0.157 -1.140
*
 -0.189 
(-1.00) (-1.86) (0.29) (0.36) (-2.29) (-0.39) 
LAGE 
-0.000268  -0.0239  0.00312  
(-0.27)  (-0.35)  (0.02)  
LOGZ 
0.000873 0.0139
***
 0.0543 0.224 -0.315
*
 -0.380 
(1.17) (3.77) (1.07) (0.80) (-2.47) (-1.08) 
FORE 
-0.00333  -0.416  -1.967
**
  
(-0.99)  (-1.81)  (-3.12)  
DOM 
-0.00553  -0.471  -2.051
**
  
(-1.28)  (-1.60)  (-2.65)  
GOV 
-0.0111
***
  -0.562
**
  -3.725
***
  
(-3.53)  (-2.61)  (-5.67)  
LISTED* 
0.00265  0.0448  -0.628
*
  
(1.45)  (0.36)  (-2.04)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.000935 0.00707 -0.0294 0.627 -0.454
***
 0.576 
(-1.45) (1.45) (-0.67) (1.69) (-3.91) (0.92) 
INFLATION 
0.000593 -0.0258 0.00901 -0.917 -0.00548 -3.868 
(1.89) (-1.49) (0.42) (-0.70) (-0.10) (-1.94) 
MCAP 
0.00242 0.00855
**
 0.0414 0.559
*
 -0.948
***
 -0.106 
(1.64) (2.77) (0.41) (2.39) (-3.67) (-0.28) 
GFC 
-0.00140 -0.000983 0.0721 0.0998 -0.0141 0.278
*
 
(-1.16) (-0.87) (0.88) (1.16) (-0.07) (2.01) 
CCONTROL* 
-0.0000202 -0.0000728 0.000862 -0.0128 -0.00178 0.234
***
 
(-0.49) (-0.36) (0.31) (-0.84) (-0.24) (9.50) 
Sigma 0.0366 -0.164 1.028 -15.12 21.20
***
 -16.08 
_cons (1.82) (-1.44) (0.75) (-1.74) (6.47) (-1.12) 
R
2
 0.1913 0.1605 0.0978 0.0862 0.7312 0.3571 
Number of banks 38 38 38 38 35 35 
N 284 284 284 284 260 260 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LISTED: dummy equal 1 if listed bank and 0 
if unlisted bank, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market 
capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise, CCONTROL: control of corruption.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
* Additional variable 
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as conventional banks charge high interests on lending, while Islamic banks 
charge only the administrative fees. However, the Islamic banks attained better 
NIM (3.952) due to non-availability of interest expenses in Islamic banking 
systems. The determinants of profits in Islamic and conventional banks in MENA 
region (including GCC) will be exhibited in the next section. 
Table 6.10: Profitability indicators description of MENA countries (including GCC) 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Ratio Mean Std. Dev. Min Max DEA Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 0.0077 0.0684 -0.59 0.38 ROA 0.0148 0.0390 -0.44 0.86 
ROE 0.0744 0.1593 -1.13 0.53 ROE 0.0956 0.3239 -9.98 1.18 
NIM 3.9523 6.6795 -26.27 64 NIM 3.1224 1.7456 -4.57 17.71 
6.3.2 Determinants of profitability in MENA countries (including GCC) 
The empirical results in Table 6.11 indicates that size played a very important role 
in profitability determination for Islamic banks, as greater total assets led to higher 
profits. This result concludes that the Islamic banks achieved economies of scale, 
which is in line with many recent studies such as Pervan et al. (2015) and Brighi 
and Venturelli (2015). According to conventional banks, the size of a bank has a 
positive and significant relationship with ROA and ROE, but size decreased the 
NIM significantly (consistent with Saghi-Zedek & Tarazi, 2015; Tan, 2015; Terraza, 
2015). The conventional banks with greater capitals performed better financially 
than smaller capitalisation banks in terms of ROA (see Luo et al., 2015). In 
contrast, Islamic banks with lower equity intensity attained better ROA and ROE 
(Chronopoulos et al., 2015). With regards to NIM, Islamic banks scored higher 
capital ratios with positive and significant coefficient (11.40) than conventional 
banks including a negative and significant sign (-0.905). Marinkovića and 
Radovićb (2015) assume that the correlation between capitalisation and NIM was 
positive and significant, while Zhou and Wong‟s (2008) result claimed an inverse 
association with capitalisation. The results of conventional banks assume that the 
banks could increase their ROA (Lin & Zhang, 2009) and NIM (Sufian & 
Habibullah, 2009) through concentrating more on lending services (loan intensity). 
The NIM reduced the credit risk significantly in Islamic banks and ROA in 
conventional banks. This result supports the argument of Chavarín (2015) for the 
Mexico banking sector. The aim of any bank is to reduce their credit risk as much 
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as they can to ensure the ability of repayment to their depositors (more deposits 
decline the credit risks). In conventional banks, the deposits volume is highly and 
strongly correlated with ROA at the level of 0.1% (Saghi-Zedek & Tarazi, 2015), 
whereas a negative coefficient represents an inverse association between the NIM 
and deposits (Barry et al., 2011). Considering z-score, banks with more financial 
stability and less default risk were found to be significantly more profitable (ROA, 
ROE and NIM). This demonstrates how important financial stability is to Islamic 
and conventional banks. Mamatzakis et al. (2015) and Mollah and Zaman (2015) 
found the same in their results. Concentrating on external variables, the GDP, 
inflation (insignificant correlation with NIM), and market capitalisation factors 
(significant association only with NIM) were found to be worsening the Islamic 
banks financial performance. Luo et al. (2015) concluded the same (negative and 
significant) correlation for GDP, Pervan et al. (2015) for inflation, and Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2014) for market capitalisation. In conventional banks, based on OLS 
findings, banks in grown economies attained better profitability (consistent with 
studies of Alessandri & Nelson, 2015; Tan, 2015), but FEM supposed that banks 
in better economies financially performed worse (referring to ROA‟s coefficient). 
As expected, the NIM was impacted negatively and significantly by inflation as in 
countries with higher inflation rates, clients generally deposit less money, hence 
banks cannot generate more loans, which badly reduce earnings (Houston et al., 
2010). The stock market growth was found to be very important to enhance ROA 
and ROE (Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007) in conventional banks but strongly 
decreased the NIM (at a level of 0.1%). The empirical findings reveal that 
conventional banks encountered hurdles to score more ROA measures (Luo et al., 
2015; Haan & Poghosyan, 2012) in the global financial crisis period (2007-2009). 
In contrast, the conventional banks could enhance their NIM thorough 2007-2009 
(Al-Musali & Ismail, 2014; Apergis, 2014). This could be due to imposing more 
lending interests by banks at that time as clients needed more funds (higher 
supply on loans) to compensate their losses by investing more. There is no 
significant evidence of any relationship between GFC and earnings. In Islamic 
banks, the minimum R2 is scored by OLSROA= 25.8%, while the maximum R
2 for 
FEMROA= 40.29%. In conventional banks the R
2 ranged between 5.77% and 
51.42%. 
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Table 6.11: Determinants of profitability for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Ratio ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LNTA 
0.0120
**
 0.0459
***
 0.0213
*
 0.0673
**
 0.979
*
 2.640
*
 0.00128
*
 0.0200
***
 0.00412 0.0782
*
 -0.429
***
 -0.500
***
 
(3.20) (4.36) (2.49) (3.05) (2.21) (2.21) (2.37) (7.70) (0.66) (2.45) (-14.34) (-6.72) 
EQTA 
-0.0147 -0.156
*
 -0.149 -0.428
**
 11.40
**
 -20.57 0.0971
***
 0.106
***
 -0.00266 -0.0813 -0.905
**
 -0.331 
(-0.44) (-2.01) (-1.97) (-2.61) (2.90) (-1.95) (19.97) (14.23) (-0.05) (-0.88) (-3.29) (-1.23) 
LOANSTA 
-0.0216 -0.0240 -0.0930 -0.0982 -2.844 -3.429 0.00952
**
 0.0134
*
 -0.0319 0.0365 2.445
***
 0.607 
(-0.93) (-0.76) (-1.74) (-1.48) (-1.02) (-1.00) (2.77) (2.40) (-0.80) (0.53) (11.06) (1.73) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.0000845 -0.000222 0.000309 0.0000728 0.00123 -0.0373
*
 -0.000164
**
 -0.0000106 -0.000515 -0.0000233 -0.000180 0.000123 
(-0.55) (-1.48) (0.89) (0.23) (0.08) (-2.43) (-3.08) (-0.20) (-0.83) (-0.04) (-0.06) (0.07) 
DEPOSITSTA 
-0.0186 0.0171 -0.0726 0.0944 -1.523 -0.269 0.0150
***
 0.0158
***
 0.0193 -0.0321 -1.028
***
 -0.412 
(-0.81) (0.46) (-1.37) (1.21) (-0.57) (-0.07) (6.47) (3.35) (0.72) (-0.55) (-7.19) (-1.72) 
LAGE 
-0.0113  0.0335  -0.0275  -0.000927  -0.00152  -0.122  
(-1.40)  (1.81)  (-0.03)  (-0.64)  (-0.09)  (-1.49)  
LOGZ 
0.0242
***
 0.126
***
 0.0448
***
 0.259
***
 0.787 7.694
***
 0.00459
***
 0.0183
***
 0.0615
***
 0.120
***
 0.393
***
 0.219
*
 
(4.96) (7.50) (4.01) (7.33) (1.38) (4.02) (5.91) (7.05) (6.84) (3.76) (9.04) (2.37) 
FORE 
      -0.0103 0.000711 -0.188 0.00749 -0.383  
      (-1.01) (0.08) (-1.60) (0.07) (-0.69)  
DOM 
0.00624 0.0206 -0.00527 -0.0153 0.792 4.314 -0.00819 0.00423 -0.163 0.0271 -0.605 -0.0429 
(0.67) (0.79) (-0.25) (-0.28) (0.74) (1.55) (-0.82) (0.63) (-1.42) (0.33) (-1.10) (-0.17) 
GOV 
-0.000317 0.0130 -0.0428 -0.0957 -1.600 4.581 -0.00978  -0.156  -0.148 -0.206 
(-0.03) (0.33) (-1.51) (-1.16) (-1.12) (1.00) (-0.99)  (-1.36)  (-0.27) (-0.63) 
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.00952 -0.0930
***
 0.00376 -0.133
**
 -0.516 -10.74
***
 0.00253
**
 -0.0181
***
 0.0281
**
 -0.0646 0.0710
**
 0.00895 
(-1.77) (-4.86) (0.31) (-3.32) (-0.75) (-5.29) (3.06) (-4.22) (2.94) (-1.22) (3.07) (0.54) 
INFLATION 
-0.239
***
 -0.165
***
 -0.501
***
 -0.353
***
 -6.888 4.195 -0.00231 0.0102 0.0406 0.0379 -1.856
**
 -0.866
*
 
(-6.20) (-4.08) (-5.67) (-4.14) (-1.58) (0.93) (-0.21) (0.88) (0.32) (0.27) (-2.99) (-2.07) 
MCAP 
0.000292 -0.0238 0.0265 0.0159 -2.942
**
 -8.187
***
 0.00254 0.0111
***
 0.0534
**
 0.0722 -0.379
***
 -0.516
***
 
(0.03) (-1.57) (1.29) (0.50) (-2.85) (-5.09) (1.51) (3.31) (2.74) (1.74) (-4.15) (-4.98) 
GFC 
0.00802 0.00463 0.0160 0.00964 0.0760 -0.0898 -0.00269 -0.00321
*
 -0.0283 -0.0285 0.182
*
 0.152
**
 
(1.10) (0.70) (0.96) (0.70) (0.09) (-0.12) (-1.70) (-2.18) (-1.55) (-1.57) (2.03) (2.85) 
Sig 0.167 1.700
***
 -0.244 2.342
*
 9.391 239.7
***
 -0.0917
***
 0.209
*
 -0.674
*
 0.688 4.590
***
 6.731
***
 
cons (1.43) (3.74) (-0.92) (2.45) (0.66) (5.04) (-3.93) (2.19) (-2.50) (0.59) (5.32) (8.37) 
R2 0.2580 0.4029 0.2849 0.3609 0.1425 0.2650 0.5142 0.4995 0.0577 0.1066 0.2708 0.1709 
#  of banks 40 40 40 40 35 35 168 168 168 168 160 160 
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Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: 
dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: 
gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
N 291 291 291 291 241 241 1277 1277 1277 1277 1200 1200 
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6.4 Profitability of MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
6.4.1 Profitability measures description for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Table 6.12 states that conventional banks have the greatest ROA (0.98%) and 
NIM (3.2301) measures, however Islamic banks invested their equity more 
effectively to achieve the best ROE (9.34%) scores in MENA region (excluding 
GCC). The lowest profitability indicators were attained by socially responsible 
banks, because as previously mentioned, the SRBs concentrate on social and 
environment issues rather than profits. The SRBs score means ROA, ROE and 
NIM equal 0.45%, -10.86% and 2.976, respectively. These profitability indicators 
are specified by various internal and external factors, which are clearly outlined in 
the next section. 
Table 6.12: Profitability indicators description of MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Banks Islamic Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Ratio Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 0.0096 0.0123 -0.03 0.05 0.0098 0.0181 -0.24 0.16 0.0045 0.0128 -0.08 0.03 
ROE 0.0934 0.0934 -0.18 0.40 0.0812 0.3913 -9.98 1.18 -0.1086 1.3951 -11.07 0.26 
NIM 3.0779 3.0665 -9.26 13.48 3.2301 1.8275 -2.08 17.71 2.9761 3.0897 -5.56 9.23 
6.4.2 Determinants of profitability in MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Table 6.13 details that larger Islamic banks scored better ROE measures. 
Additionally, larger SRBs attained more ROA and FEM suggests that greater sized 
conventional banks have higher ROA, but OLS model provides a negative and 
significant coefficient of ROA. In contrast, the relationship between the NIM and 
banking volume was found to be negative and significant (smaller sized banks 
were profitable). With regards to capital ratio (EQTA), it is unexpected to find an 
inverse and significant correlation between ROE and capitalisation in Islamic 
banks. This relationship complies in conventional banks with ROA and NIM. The 
results of OLS model encouraged the Islamic banks to focus more on lending 
activities due to significant improvement of their ROA, but the FEM advised a 
reduction in loans to raise significantly ROA and ROE (ElBannan, 2015). In 
addition, loans enhanced the NIM significantly in conventional and socially 
responsible banking sectors. Moreover, higher ROE scores in Islamic banks and 
higher NIM in conventional banks caused the banks to face a potentially higher 
credit risk (Liang et al., 2013). As expected, the deposits had a positive and 
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significant association at the level of 1% in Islamic banks (García-Herrero et al., 
2009). In contrast, against expectations, the deposits played negative and 
significant roles to decrease the ROA in conventional banks, and the NIM in 
Islamic and conventional banks (Barry et al., 2011). The new Islamic banks 
attained better NIM and recent conventional banks had better NIM values. This 
finding supports both previous studies of Mirzaei et al. (2013) and Beck et al. 
(2005). The financial stability of conventional banks is remarkable and influences 
earnings positively (ROA, ROE and NIM). Evermore, more stable Islamic banks 
achieved better NIM scores. The domestic banks concentration led to lower ROA 
and NIM in socially responsible banking systems. Additionally, the public 
ownerships significantly reduced the ROA and ROE in Islamic and socially 
responsible banks (ElBannan, 2015). Based on OLS‟s coefficients, the Islamic 
banks in greater rates of economy growth tended to be more profitable (ROA, 
ROE and NIM), the same with ROA in conventional banks (Marinkovića & 
Radovićb, 2015; Pervan et al., 2015; Guillén et al., 2014). According to FEM‟s 
results, the Islamic banks in higher GDP values performed financially worse in 
terms of ROA and ROE, but FEM proposed that socially responsible banks acted 
financially (NIM) better in the developed economies. The inflation only impacted 
the ROA of Islamic banks significantly and positively. This advantage shows that 
Islamic banks performed effectively even with higher inflation rates, which is 
unexpected as inflation rates realistically reduce firms‟ profits (Tan, 2015). The 
socially responsible banks exploited the growth of stock market capitalisation and 
they could increase their ROA and ROE optimally (Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007). 
On the other hand, the Islamic banks suffered to earn more profits in countries 
with greater stock market indices; even the NIM in conventional banks decreased 
significantly (Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2014). Finally, the global financial crisis did 
not affect the profitability in Islamic banks. Moreover, there are insignificant 
impacts between the crisis and profitability (with the exception of NIM) in 
conventional and socially responsible banks. With regard to NIM, the conventional 
and socially responsible banks financially operated efficiently as both types of 
bank could maximise their interest income (similar to Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2014) 
through the crisis period (2007-2009). Overall, the percentages of R2 started with 
12.80% to 43.99% in Islamic banks, 5.66% to 53.55% in conventional banks, and 
27.88% to 67.94% in socially responsible banks. 
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Table 6.13: Determinants of profitability for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Ratio ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LNTA 
0.00222 -0.0037 0.0280
**
 -0.0157 -0.800
*
 -0.924 -0.001
***
 0.00456
*
 0.00156 0.0765 -0.480
***
 -0.699
***
 0.00493 0.0151
*
 0.583 0.975 -2.768
**
 -6.189
***
 
(1.67) (-1.48) (2.95) (-0.87) (-2.55) (-1.28) (-4.22) (2.39) (0.16) (1.50) (-12.65) (-6.57) (1.17) (2.05) (1.16) (1.01) (-3.20) (-4.23) 
EQTA 
0.0188 -0.0493 -0.168 -0.536
**
 -7.499 -18.08 -0.027
***
 -0.142
***
 0.0950 0.0675 0.440 -1.735
*
 -0.0791 -0.0776 -7.946 -5.914 -6.469 -8.874 
(1.06) (-1.77) (-1.33) (-2.69) (-1.42) (-1.96) (-3.48) (-11.56) (0.53) (0.20) (0.63) (-2.02) (-1.78) (-1.66) (-1.49) (-0.96) (-0.67) (-0.95) 
LOANS
TA 
0.0251
*
 -0.025
*
 0.111 -0.239
**
 0.644 -2.549 0.00509 0.0102 -0.340 -0.0404 -1.003 2.657
*
 -0.0238 0.0125 0.259 3.096 13.09
*
 5.485 
(2.25) (-2.21) (1.39) (-2.94) (0.24) (-0.93) (0.42) (0.59) (-1.23) (-0.09) (-0.93) (2.14) (-0.93) (0.47) (0.08) (0.88) (2.31) (0.93) 
LOANS 
DEPO 
-0.0113 0.00677 -0.0222 0.108
*
 -1.110 0.943 0.00156 -0.00888 0.171 0.0650 2.243
**
 -1.394 0.00514 -0.0282 -0.427 -2.962 0.931 1.989 
(-1.53) (0.94) (-0.42) (2.10) (-0.60) (0.52) (0.17) (-0.73) (0.81) (0.20) (2.74) (-1.63) (0.30) (-1.68) (-0.21) (-1.34) (0.28) (0.57) 
DEPOS
ITSTA 
-0.0241 0.0160 -0.0355 0.267
**
 -7.865
*
 -0.517 -0.0198
*
 -0.00213 0.108 -0.0543 -0.689 -2.062
*
 0.0103 -0.0389 -0.570 -5.147 -4.306 -2.075 
(-1.67) (1.18) (-0.34) (2.75) (-2.36) (-0.16) (-2.15) (-0.17) (0.52) (-0.16) (-0.84) (-2.25) (0.21) (-0.86) (-0.10) (-0.87) (-0.45) (-0.23) 
LAGE 
-0.00493  -0.0553  -2.424
*
  -0.0025
*
  0.00455  0.0293  -0.00604  0.00267  0.531  
(-1.24)  (-1.95)  (-2.58)  (-2.27)  (0.18)  (0.29)  (-1.24)  (0.00)  (0.47)  
LOGZ 
0.000741 0.00874 -0.0135 0.0571 1.76
***
 2.308 0.005
***
 0.021
***
 0.078
***
 0.0619 0.294
***
 0.316
*
 0.00342 -0.00211 0.513 -0.580 -1.561 -0.819 
(0.42) (1.89) (-1.07) (1.72) (4.36) (1.89) (9.28) (11.45) (5.33) (1.26) (5.15) (2.47) (0.74) (-0.22) (0.93) (-0.46) (-0.79) (-0.43) 
FORE 
0.00120  -0.0125  0.145  -0.00591  -0.135  -0.0845  -0.0105  -1.540  -1.749  
(0.38)  (-0.56)  (0.19)  (-0.89)  (-0.90)  (-0.14)  (-1.14)  (-1.40)  (-0.65)  
DOM 
      -0.00844  -0.108  -0.573  -0.0632
*
  -7.003  -16.41
*
  
      (-1.32)  (-0.75)  (-1.01)  (-2.04)  (-1.89)  (-2.57)  
GOV 
-0.015
***
  -0.11
***
  0.0247  -0.00374  -0.108  -0.192  -0.0295
*
  -3.562
*
  -1.519  
(-3.63)  (-3.75)  (0.02)  (-0.60)  (-0.76)  (-0.35)  (-2.31)  (-2.33)  (-0.27)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0056
**
 -0.011
*
 0.0394
**
 -0.0726
*
 2.24
***
 2.310 0.00178
*
 -0.00264 0.0256 -0.0350 0.00692 0.0115 -0.00150 0.0159 -0.326 1.932 2.682 6.956
**
 
(3.14) (-2.24) (3.05) (-2.07) (5.35) (1.88) (2.48) (-0.89) (1.57) (-0.44) (0.28) (0.62) (-0.32) (1.42) (-0.58) (1.31) (1.73) (3.14) 
INFLA
TION 
-0.0249 0.0335
*
 -0.254 0.137 -5.265 -1.721 0.00279 -0.0206 0.176 0.000769 1.074 -0.536 -0.00325 -0.0146 -0.133 -1.444 1.373 9.244 
(-1.35) (2.22) (-1.94) (1.27) (-1.23) (-0.47) (0.24) (-1.86) (0.66) (0.00) (1.04) (-0.69) (-0.05) (-0.26) (-0.02) (-0.19) (0.12) (0.84) 
MCAP 
-0.00062 -0.009
*
 -0.0227 -0.0701
*
 -1.239
*
 1.350 0.00141 0.00150 0.0377 0.0485 -0.118 -0.696
***
 0.0457
**
 0.0420
**
 5.162
**
 5.380
**
 3.681 6.133 
(-0.24) (-2.22) (-1.24) (-2.30) (-2.11) (1.34) (1.05) (0.62) (1.23) (0.75) (-0.99) (-4.62) (2.90) (2.80) (2.73) (2.73) (0.95) (1.65) 
GFC 
-0.00067 0.00100 0.00015 0.00973 -0.396 -0.300 0.000269 0.000275 -0.0328 -0.0242 0.207 0.266
***
 0.00171 0.000452 0.276 0.222 1.816
**
 1.737
**
 
(-0.33) (0.66) (0.01) (0.89) (-0.83) (-0.83) (0.22) (0.26) (-1.17) (-0.85) (1.85) (3.49) (0.57) (0.17) (0.77) (0.62) (2.94) (3.00) 
Sig -0.115
**
 0.287
*
 -0.783
**
 1.770
*
 -35
***
 -51.92 -0.00778 -0.00896 -0.780 0.168 5.715
***
 9.123
***
 0.0718 -0.414 9.503 -44.98 -27.13 -112.2
*
 
cons (-3.06) (2.47) (-2.93) (2.13) (-4.16) (-1.82) (-0.39) (-0.14) (-1.72) (0.10) (5.16) (7.60) (0.57) (-1.78) (0.63) (-1.47) (-0.80) (-2.43) 
R2 0.2908 0.1769 0.3707 0.2030 0.4399 0.1276 0.1420 0.2309 0.0566 0.0701 0.5355 0.2882 0.4008 0.4412 0.2788 0.3151 0.6794 0.5222 
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Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: 
dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: 
gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
 
# banks 17 17 17 17 16 16 108 108 108 108 103 103 9 9 9 9 8 8 
N 129 129 129 129 117 117 813 813 813 813 762 762 64 64 64 64 56 56 
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6.5 Profitability of GCC countries  
6.5.1 Profitability measures description for GCC countries 
It can be seen in Table 6.14 that conventional banks in GCC have more returns on 
assets and equities (2.35% and 12.08%, respectively). This means that 
conventional banks invested their assets and capital more efficiently than Islamic 
banks over the period 2005-2012. On the contrary, the Islamic banks attained 
better NIM (4.77) due to Islamic banks having not had any interest expenses to be 
paid (based on prohibition of Sharia law). On the other hand, the interest expenses 
worsened negatively the NIM of conventional banks (2.935). Table 6.15 reports 
the causes that specifying the profitability of Islamic and conventional banks in 
GCC region. 
 
Table 6.14: Profitability indicators description of GCC countries  
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Ratio Mean Std. Dev. Min Max DEA Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 0.0062 0.0911 -0.59 0.38 ROA 0.0235 0.0591 -0.44 0.86 
ROE 0.0593 0.1956 -1.13 0.53 ROE 0.1208 0.1401 -1.41 0.46 
NIM 4.7773 8.7621 -26.27 64 NIM 2.9351 1.5776 -4.57 10.33 
6.5.2 Determinants of profitability in GCC countries 
In Islamic banks in GCC region, the size of banking was found to be positively 
influential in the support of returns, as shown in Table 6.15. Evermore, size factor 
significantly improved the ROA and ROE in conventional banks but made 
significant decrement in NIM indices. According to equity ratio, the Islamic banks‟ 
lower equities tended to be more profitable in terms of ROA and ROE but well 
capitalised banks attained better NIM values. In conventional banks, the capital of 
banks has a strong and positive correlation with ROA at the level of 0.1% but it is 
unexpected to find that capital affected the ROE and NIM negatively and 
significantly. However, the analysis stimulated the conventional banks to 
concentrate more on providing loans in order to be more profitable, as loans also 
reduce the credit risk. The Islamic banks could attain more ROE by reducing 
deposits acceptance, also conventional banks with fewer deposits had greater 
interest revenues. With regards to the time (LAGE) variable, new Islamic banks 
achieved more ROA than older banks. Furthermore, the relationship between z-
score and profitability‟s indicators in Islamic and conventional banks were found to 
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be strong, high, positive, and significant at a 0.1% level. This shows that financial 
stability is very important to obtain gains in the banking sector. With regard to 
ownership, more local and public conventional banks increased the NIM 
significantly and positively. Based on the coefficients‟ signs of macroeconomic 
factors, there are negative and significant associations between profitability and 
both external factors of GDP and inflation, in the Islamic banking system. In 
addition, the market capitalisation to GDP ratio has a positive and significant 
impact on ROE at the level of 5%, but worsened NIM significantly. Focusing on 
external variables for conventional banks, the GDP variable has two aspects; FE 
model suggests inverse correlations with ROA and ROE, but OLS models propose 
positive relationships with ROE and NIM. The inflation improved ROA significantly 
and decreased the NIM significantly in conventional banks. Additionally, the 
conventional banks took advantage of stock market development to enhance their 
financial returns. Finally, the global financial crisis impacted the profits very badly 
in conventional banks, especially ROA and ROE, which both indicators have 
significant coefficients. Conversely, Islamic banks in GCC were found to be more 
resistant and stable than conventional banks against the financial distress through 
the period 2007-2009. Overall, the consistency between independent variables 
varied between 19.04% and 54.08% in Islamic banks, and 10.78% and 70.93% in 
conventional banks. 
 
6.6 Profitability of UK (as a benchmark) 
6.6.1 Profitability measures description for UK 
Table 6.16 illustrates that Islamic banks in the UK are the leaders in terms of ROA 
and NIM. This means that Islamic banks in the UK invested their total assets 
(3.10%) and earning assets (2.302) more effectively compared to conventional 
and socially responsible banks. In contrast, Islamic banks attained loss in terms of 
investing their capitals (-16.14%). Moreover, the best ROE was achieved by 
socially responsible banks. Additionally, conventional banks were found to be the 
least profitable in regard to ROA and NIM (0.03% and 1.990). By using UK 
profitability as a benchmark for Islamic, conventional and socially responsible 
banks across the world, MENA and GCC, we can conclude that Islamic banks in 
the UK have the best ROA ratios and Islamic banks in GCC have the worst ROA 
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Table 6.15: Determinants of profitability for GCC countries 
Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Ratio ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LNTA 
0.0180
*
 0.0717
***
 0.0380
*
 0.112
***
 2.745
*
 4.053
*
 0.00581
***
 0.0291
***
 0.00663 0.0935
***
 -0.188
***
 -0.193 
(2.13) (4.19) (2.19) (3.38) (2.53) (2.06) (4.36) (5.10) (1.44) (4.96) (-4.00) (-1.51) 
EQTA 
-0.0476 -0.229
*
 -0.138 -0.535
*
 21.47
**
 -28.42 0.121
***
 0.0956
***
 -0.0676
**
 -0.242
***
 -1.081
***
 -0.229 
(-0.74) (-1.98) (-1.05) (-2.39) (2.69) (-1.69) (16.04) (8.75) (-2.59) (-6.69) (-4.24) (-0.93) 
LOANSTA 
-0.0703 -0.0656 -0.164 -0.167 0.981 -2.701 0.0205
**
 0.0116 0.0463 0.0112 2.682
***
 0.741 
(-1.48) (-1.13) (-1.69) (-1.48) (0.16) (-0.36) (2.93) (1.45) (1.91) (0.42) (6.93) (1.78) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.00000384 -0.000223 0.000396 0.0000812 -0.00179 -0.0396 -0.00019
**
 -0.0000224 -0.000294 0.00000442 0.000542 -0.000492 
(-0.02) (-1.22) (0.98) (0.23) (-0.08) (-1.95) (-2.80) (-0.35) (-1.21) (0.02) (0.23) (-0.35) 
DEPOSITSTA 
-0.0507 0.0394 -0.153
*
 0.110 0.637 -1.892 0.00455 0.00852 -0.0100 -0.00413 -1.142
***
 -0.343 
(-1.46) (0.61) (-2.15) (0.88) (0.14) (-0.22) (1.04) (1.34) (-0.66) (-0.20) (-5.15) (-1.37) 
LAGE 
-0.0237
*
  0.0132  -0.0972  0.00493  0.0244  0.0526  
(-1.98)  (0.54)  (-0.07)  (1.21)  (1.73)  (0.39)  
LOGZ 
0.0401
***
 0.196
***
 0.0761
***
 0.410
***
 0.659 9.714
**
 0.00627
***
 0.0652
***
 0.0416
***
 0.298
***
 0.531
***
 0.00806 
(4.16) (7.54) (3.85) (8.14) (0.52) (3.02) (3.58) (9.84) (6.85) (13.62) (8.84) (0.05) 
FORE 
 -0.00358  0.130 -1.707   0.0154  0.0456  0.226 
 (-0.07)  (1.35) (-0.55)   (1.43)  (1.28)  (0.94) 
DOM 
0.0290 0.0126 0.0338 0.103 1.691 5.730 0.00581 0.00896 0.0251 0.0409 0.748
***
 0.127 
(1.61) (0.29) (0.91) (1.23) (0.74) (1.41) (1.42) (1.11) (1.76) (1.54) (5.35) (0.72) 
GOV 
0.0241  0.0293   6.506 -0.00272  0.0106  0.762
***
  
(0.94)  (0.55)   (1.05) (-0.63)  (0.70)  (5.04)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0239
*
 -0.118
***
 -0.00952 -0.122
*
 -3.543
*
 -17.40
***
 0.00145 -0.0215
*
 0.0248
***
 -0.0868
**
 0.260
***
 0.142 
(-2.40) (-3.76) (-0.47) (-2.00) (-2.58) (-4.70) (0.75) (-2.24) (3.69) (-2.73) (3.94) (0.67) 
INFLATION 
-0.316
***
 -0.141
*
 -0.619
***
 -0.309
**
 -6.839 6.471 -0.00293 0.0351
*
 -0.0751 0.0863 -1.580
*
 -0.776
*
 
(-5.35) (-2.53) (-5.12) (-2.87) (-0.96) (0.96) (-0.15) (2.02) (-1.13) (1.50) (-2.43) (-1.99) 
MCAP 
0.00189 -0.0241 0.0893
*
 0.0686 -5.684
*
 -11.65
***
 0.00890
*
 0.0214
**
 0.0734
***
 0.0830
***
 -0.122 -0.107 
(0.10) (-1.10) (2.39) (1.61) (-2.58) (-4.51) (2.07) (3.09) (4.92) (3.63) (-0.83) (-0.70) 
GFC 
0.00603 -0.00858 0.0136 -0.0101 -0.102 -1.891 -0.00976
**
 -0.00759
*
 -0.0251
*
 -0.0167 -0.0141 -0.0781 
(0.49) (-0.78) (0.54) (-0.48) (-0.07) (-1.34) (-2.85) (-2.51) (-2.12) (-1.67) (-0.12) (-1.15) 
Sig 0.522
*
 2.056
**
 -0.0587 1.314 68.03
* 405.5
***
 -0.144
**
 0.0773 -0.825
***
 0.637 -4.428
**
 0.918 
cons (2.40) (2.68) (-0.13) (0.88) (2.38) (4.55) (-3.13) (0.35) (-5.18) (0.88) (-2.85) (0.19) 
R2 0.3617 0.5352 0.4179 0.5408 0.1904 0.3813 0.6473 0.7093 0.2469 0.4124 0.4687 0.1078 
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Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: 
dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: 
gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
# of banks 23 23 23 23 19 19 60 60 60 60 57 57 
N 162 162 162 162 124 124 464 464 464 464 438 438 
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measures (0.62%). The best investors of capitals are Islamic banks in MENA 
(excluding GCC) region (9.34%), while Islamic banks in the UK have very weak 
ROE values. According to NIM, the Islamic banks in GCC highly and efficiently 
invested their earning assets (4.777) compared to Islamic banks in the UK, which 
have the minimum NIM scores. Regarding the profitability of conventional banks, 
the highest ROA ratios were scored by conventional banks around the world 
(10.3%), and the greatest mean ROE attained by conventional banks in GCC. In 
addition, conventional banks in MENA countries (excluding GCC) could maximise 
their interest earnings and minimise their paid interests. Conversely, conventional 
banks were found to be the least profitable banks (in terms of ROA, ROE and 
NIM). Focusing on SRBs allows us to figure that spread globally, they exploited 
their total and earning assets optimally (ROA = 0.5% and NIM = 3.484), whereas 
SRBs in the UK have the lowest ROA and NIM (0.26% and 2.157, respectively). 
On the contrary, the best inventors of capitals (6.76%) were found to be SRBs in 
the UK over the period 2005-2012.  
Table 6.16: Profitability indicators description for UK 
Banks Islamic Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Ratio Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 0.0310 0.5303 -0.87 2.2 0.0003 0.0192 -0.21 0.05 0.0026 0.0083 -0.024 0.01 
ROE -0.1614 0.1931 -0.57 0.31 0.0091 0.2602 -3.98 0.56 0.0676 0.1226 -0.36 0.3 
NIM 2.3029 1.3321 0.64 4.61 1.9904 1.8333 -0.56 18.18 2.1579 0.7676 1.07 4.17 
6.6.2 Determinants of profitability for UK 
Table 6.17 shows the determinants of profitability in the UK for Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks. It can be seen that conventional and 
socially responsible banks with greater total assets attained more ROA but worse 
NIM. The ROA has also been affected positively and significantly in conventional 
banks in GCC (including the UK), MENA and GCC (excluding the UK). 
Furthermore, NIM was found to be decreasing significantly in SRBs across the 
world and SRBs in MENA countries. According to the EQTA variable, lower 
capitalisation led to better ROA and ROE in conventional banks, while higher 
capitalisation allowed conventional banks to achieve higher interest earnings. The 
SRBs across the world, conventional banks in MENA (excluding GCC) and 
conventional banks in GCC also had inverse correlations between capital ratios 
and ROE. The lending operations were found to be highly important to the 
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profitability ratios of conventional banks (similar to GCC [including the UK] and 
MENA banks). In contrast, loans affected the ROE of SRBs significantly and 
negatively. In conventional banks, ROE and NIM reduced the credit risk 
significantly, whereas ROE increased the credit risk significantly in terms of SRBs. 
The empirical results encouraged SRBs to accept more deposits to enhance ROA 
and ROE, but encouraged conventional banks to lower deposits to raise ROE. 
Moreover, the relationship between age and NIM in SRBs was found to be 
negative and significant. This means that interest expenses significantly increases 
over time in SRBs. Referring to Islamic, conventional and socially responsible 
banks, banks with higher stability scored better ROA and ROE measures (in line 
with banks around the world, bank in MENA region, and banks in GCC countries), 
but in conventional banks interest income led to instability and higher risks. 
Regarding ownership, conventional banks are the only type of bank that are 
affected by ownerships as foreign and domestic levels increased ROA and ROE, 
but public ownerships let to lower ROA and ROE. The FEM suggests that foreign 
concentration decreased ROE significantly. Additionally, increment in foreign 
levels lower NIM significantly. Focusing on external determinants allow us to find 
that only conventional banks in the UK were influenced by industry-specific 
variables. In detail, more economic development (GDP) and financial market 
growth support profitability of conventional banks. Finally, during the crisis period, 
the conventional banks in the UK acted effectively in terms of investing earning 
assets. Overall, in Islamic banks, the minimum R2 is 51.57% and the highest is 
74.24%; the R2 in conventional banks varied between 15.88% and 33.95%; and in 
SRBs the R2 ranged between 56.08% and 80.80%. 
 
6.7 Determinants of profitability for the whole sample 
Generally, the whole sample results can be shown in Table 6.18. The findings 
point that in accordance to ROA and ROE ratios, size, loan intensity, deposit ratio 
(ROA), z-score and market capitalisation were supporting the profits positively. On 
the other side, banks were influenced significantly and negatively by capital ratio, 
ownership (foreign, domestic and public), GDP and inflation. However, in terms of 
raising the NIM, banks could increase the capitalisation. Finally, the relationship 
between NIM and size, credit risk, deposit ratio, ager, ownership (foreign, 
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Table 6.17: Determinants of profitability for UK 
Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Ratio ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LNTA 
-0.396 0.0803 0.325 0.593 -1.884 -1.884 0.000545 0.0069
**
 -0.00412 0.0246 -0.181
***
 -0.354
*
 0.0034
**
 -0.00656 0.0231 -0.0314 -1.052
*
 -0.459 
(-0.94) (0.07) (1.39) (0.88) (-0.23) (-0.23) (1.21) (3.07) (-0.66) (0.71) (-4.15) (-2.26) (3.20) (-1.44) (1.41) (-0.42) (-2.44) (-0.56) 
EQTA 
-0.654 -0.101 -0.227 0.0844 -88.09 -88.09 -0.046
***
 -0.085
***
 -0.413
**
 -0.554
*
 5.517
***
 7.283
***
 -0.130 -0.635
***
 -1.173 -6.872
***
 -2.274 -16.51 
(-0.84) (-0.07) (-0.53) (0.10) (-2.06) (-2.06) (-4.55) (-5.02) (-2.93) (-2.13) (5.29) (5.54) (-1.53) (-6.02) (-0.90) (-4.00) (-0.13) (-0.98) 
LOANS
TA 
-3.856 -2.526 -0.980 -0.232 -28.75 -28.75 0.00556 0.035
***
 0.162
*
 0.497
***
 2.720
***
 2.005
***
 -0.203 0.0552 -6.246
**
 -3.119 20.51 16.87 
(-1.04) (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.08) (-0.60) (-0.60) (0.99) (4.17) (2.09) (3.82) (5.13) (3.54) (-1.39) (0.55) (-2.79) (-1.90) (0.90) (0.70) 
LOANS 
DEPO 
0.276 0.156 1.067 0.999 -49.31 -49.31 0.00116 0.000942 -0.0237 -0.127
**
 0.294 -0.868
***
 0.189 -0.0584 5.642
*
 2.427 -21.42 -19.76 
(0.14) (0.08) (0.99) (0.87) (-2.59) (-2.59) (0.35) (0.30) (-0.52) (-2.61) (0.97) (-4.25) (1.42) (-0.62) (2.76) (1.58) (-1.00) (-0.86) 
DEPOS
ITSTA 
2.257 1.339 1.026 0.509 -126.8 -126.8 0.00636 -0.00515 -0.153 -0.523
***
 -0.634 -0.709 0.198
*
 -0.0418 4.379
**
 2.026 -8.918 -9.956 
(1.24) (0.46) (1.01) (0.31) (-2.45) (-2.45) (1.02) (-0.68) (-1.76) (-4.50) (-1.03) (-1.30) (2.16) (-0.55) (3.13) (1.64) (-0.36) (-0.37) 
LAGE 
-6.124  -2.794  161.1  0.00123  0.00717  -0.00375  -0.00635  -0.0421  -1.376
*
  
(-2.04)  (-1.68)  (1.59)  (1.35)  (0.57)  (-0.04)  (-1.63)  (-0.70)  (-2.65)  
LOGZ 
0.594
*
 0.578
*
 0.313
*
 0.304
*
 -0.526 -0.526 0.007
***
 0.014
***
 0.097
***
 0.0457 -0.222
***
 -0.187 0.00176 0.029
***
 0.0678 0.511
***
 -0.487 1.574 
(3.01) (2.73) (2.86) (2.59) (-0.72) (-0.72) (11.32) (5.93) (10.29) (1.22) (-3.34) (-1.13) (0.67) (6.06) (1.67) (6.55) (-1.97) (1.59) 
FORE 
-0.148  0.299  -12.07  0.0313
**
 -0.00002 0.780
***
 -0.157
*
 -0.570
***
 0.968       
(-0.34)  (1.24)  (-1.83)  (3.19) (-0.01) (5.75) (-2.24) (-3.64) (1.48)       
DOM 
 0.0904  -0.331  12.07 0.0291
**
  0.818
***
   0.371       
 (0.19)  (-1.25)  (1.83) (2.96)  (6.04)   (0.52)       
GOV 
       -0.0368
**
  -1.129
***
 -1.435        
       (-3.31)  (-6.64) (-1.60)        
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.583 -0.911 -0.629 -0.813 10.99 10.99 0.0205
*
 0.0204
*
 0.136 0.233 0.673 1.248
*
 0.0196 0.00727 0.162 -0.0657 0.447 -0.784 
(-0.43) (-0.56) (-0.84) (-0.90) (1.05) (1.05) (2.20) (2.56) (1.05) (1.91) (0.76) (2.32) (1.47) (0.72) (0.79) (-0.40) (0.31) (-0.49) 
INFLA
TION 
-39.76 -29.74 21.52 27.16 -224.9 -224.9 -0.0207 -0.0158 -0.281 -0.164 -1.786 -1.039 -0.191 -0.143 -0.625 0.411 -5.158 7.891 
(-1.40) (-0.77) (1.36) (1.28) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.23) (-1.07) (-1.21) (-0.72) (-1.16) (-1.10) (-0.79) (-0.74) (-0.17) (0.13) (-0.20) (0.32) 
MCAP 
-1.218 -1.196 0.541 0.553 -7.926 -7.926 0.000997 0.00474 0.00946 0.130
**
 0.0129 0.237 -0.00139 -0.00246 0.0264 0.0260 -0.515 -0.238 
(-1.28) (-1.19) (1.02) (0.99) (-1.57) (-1.57) (1.77) (1.62) (1.21) (2.91) (0.25) (1.20) (-0.15) (-0.36) (0.18) (0.23) (-0.54) (-0.26) 
GFC 
-0.456 -0.369 0.192 0.241 0.716 0.716 -0.00263 -0.00163 -0.0276 -0.0113 0.200 0.254
**
 -0.00132 0.000799 0.0439 0.0627 0.0191 0.123 
(-1.28) (-0.86) (0.97) (1.01) (0.38) (0.38) (-1.67) (-1.12) (-1.27) (-0.51) (1.34) (2.63) (-0.41) (0.34) (0.88) (1.64) (0.06) (0.42) 
Sig 34.40 26.91 19.68 17.34 -536.7 -170.3 -0.646
*
 -0.687
**
 -4.797 -6.740 -16.07 -31.80
*
 -0.726 -0.154 -8.720 -0.611 12.45 34.55 
cons (0.91) (0.63) (0.94) (0.73) (-2.65) (-0.73) (-2.43) (-3.03) (-1.31) (-1.94) (-0.63) (-2.08) (-1.86) (-0.49) (-1.46) (-0.12) (0.21) (0.54) 
R2 0.6692 0.5157 0.6937 0.6163 0.7154 0.7424 0.2755 0.2343 0.2443 0.1588 0.3395 0.2459 0.6894 0.8080 0.6676 0.7921 0.7560 0.5608 
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Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: 
dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: 
gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
 
# banks 3 3 3 3 2 2 74 74 74 74 68 68 5 5 5 5 4 4 
N 21 21 21 21 14 14 550 550 550 550 500 500 37 37 37 37 29 29 
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Table 6.18: Results of profitability determinants for all banks 
All banks (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Profitability ROA ROA ROE ROE NIM NIM 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.00135
*
 0.0366
***
 0.00653 0.0741
**
 -0.192
***
 -0.377
**
 
(2.00) (9.30) (1.66) (3.06) (-6.01) (-2.81) 
EQTA 
0.00260 -0.0263
*
 -0.103
**
 -0.0872 0.533
***
 0.303 
(0.43) (-2.04) (-2.89) (-1.10) (3.86) (1.07) 
LOANSTA 
0.0169
***
 0.0171 0.0587
*
 0.0803 0.00451 -0.0218 
(3.40) (1.67) (2.02) (1.28) (0.16) (-0.86) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.00012 -0.00015 -0.00013 -0.000183 0.00482 -0.0148
***
 
(-1.35) (-1.69) (-0.26) (-0.32) (1.16) (-4.08) 
DEPOSITSTA 
0.0176
***
 0.0120 -0.00466 -0.0656 -0.524
***
 -0.311 
(4.56) (1.43) (-0.21) (-1.28) (-3.78) (-1.10) 
LAGE 
-0.00224  -0.00381  -0.266
**
  
(-1.21)  (-0.35)  (-3.01)  
LOGZ 
0.00677
***
 0.0680
***
 0.0596
***
 0.113
***
 0.114
*
 0.656
***
 
(6.09) (15.95) (9.21) (4.32) (2.13) (4.22) 
FORE 
-0.0167 0.0113 -0.480
***
 0.129 -1.968
***
  
(-1.46) (0.75) (-7.24) (1.38) (-3.34)  
DOM 
-0.0188 0.0108 -0.455
***
 0.134 -1.720
**
 0.0467 
(-1.64) (0.82) (-6.81) (1.65) (-2.89) (0.12) 
GOV 
-0.0128  -0.451
***
  -1.637
**
 -0.360 
(-1.16)  (-7.00)  (-2.86) (-0.60) 
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.00113 -0.049
***
 -0.0114
**
 -0.00678 -0.121
***
 -0.0224 
(-1.58) (-6.79) (-2.74) (-0.15) (-4.30) (-0.56) 
INFLATION 
-0.00104 -0.0535
**
 -0.00333 -0.115 0.0205 -2.129
**
 
(-1.03) (-2.70) (-0.57) (-0.94) (0.44) (-2.68) 
MCAP 
0.000513 -0.00480 0.00312 0.115
***
 -0.0692
*
 -0.899
***
 
(0.68) (-0.89) (0.71) (3.45) (-2.01) (-4.67) 
GFC 
-0.00399 -0.00173 -0.00864 -0.00355 0.0326 0.0992 
(-1.60) (-0.74) (-0.59) (-0.24) (0.27) (1.03) 
Sigma 0.0125 0.796
***
 0.608
***
 -0.853 10.43
***
 6.042
***
 
_cons (0.56) (4.54) (4.65) (-0.79) (10.74) (3.69) 
R
2
 0.0643 0.1435 0.0683 0.0421 0.1284 0.0404 
Number of banks 323 323 323 323 301 301 
N 2423 2423 2423 2423 2215 2215 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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domestic and public), GDP, inflation and stock market growth found to be 
significant and negative.  
 
6.7 Conclusion of profitability and its determinants  
The conventional banks found to be the most profitable banks scoring mean ROA 
equals to 1% whereas, average ROE is 7%. However, Islamic banks achieved 
moderate profitability ratios (mean ROA = 0.90% and mean ROE = 5.80%). Finally, 
socially responsible banks scored the least average ROA (0.50%) and ROE 
(2.50%) over the period 2005-2012. 
In conclusion of NIM ratios, Islamic banks attained the highest NIM (3.862) 
followed by socially responsible banks which they scored mean NIM equal to 
3.484. After that, conventional banks found to be the least profitable in terms of 
NIM (2.789). However, we can conclude the NIM determinants, Islamic banks 
determined positively by size of bank, capitalisation and z-score. On the other side, 
credit risk, GDP and market capitalisation had negative signs. According to the 
conventional banks, the relationship between the NIM and loan intensity, z-score 
and GFC were significant and positive. In contrast, size, deposit intensity, inflation, 
GDP and market capitalisation decreased the NIM significantly. Finally, the 
socially responsible banks were affected significantly negatively by size, deposit 
ratio, z-score, foreign ownership, domestic ownership, public ownership, GDP and 
market capitalisation. On the contrary, the capital ratio and credit risks had positive 
coefficient. 
Overall, the size, deposit ratio (ROE), z-score and GDP (ROA-OLS) found to be 
affecting the Islamic banks‟ profitability positively. On the contrary, the capital ratio, 
loan intensity, GDP (ROA-FEM and ROE) and inflation influence the performance 
negatively. Concerning conventional banks, there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the profitability ratios (ROA/ROA) and the size, capital ratio, 
loan intensity, deposit ratio, z-score and market capitalisation. On the other side, 
the credit risk and GDP impacted ROA negatively and significantly. According to 
socially responsible banks, capital ratio, concentration of ownership and GDP 
minimised profitability, whereas z-score and market capitalisation development 
enhanced ROA and ROE over the period 2005-2012. According to NIM ratios, 
Islamic banks attained the highest NIM (3.862) followed by socially responsible 
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banks which they scored mean NIM equal to 3.484. After that, conventional banks 
found to be the least profitable in terms of NIM (2.789). However, we can conclude 
the NIM determinants, Islamic banks determined positively by size of bank, 
capitalisation and z-score. On the other side, credit risk, GDP and market 
capitalisation had negative signs. According to the conventional banks, the 
relationship between the NIM and loan intensity, z-score and GFC were significant 
and positive. In contrast, size, deposit intensity, inflation, GDP and market 
capitalisation decreased the NIM significantly. Finally, the socially responsible 
banks were affected significantly negatively by size, deposit ratio, z-score, foreign 
ownership, domestic ownership, public ownership, GDP and market capitalisation. 
On the contrary, the capital ratio and credit risks had positive coefficient. 
However, Appendix 15 concludes the profitability averages for Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks. In addition, Appendix 15 states the 
highest and lowest measures over the period 2005-2012. 
Appendix 16 presents the significant variables that influenced profitability in 
Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks through the 2005-2012 
periods. Appendix 16 shows that market capitalisation was found to be the main 
factor for profitability. Thus, governments need to be concerned about improving 
the stock market. Additionally, banks can grow their profitability through investing 
more in countries with higher market capitalisation. However, inflation was found 
to be affecting significantly and negatively the profitability. This result is a warning 
to banks against operating in countries with higher inflation rates. The GFC has 
not affected profitability in Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks. 
In general, the additional variables (listing and corruption control) estimated that 
listed banks were more profitable and the corruption supervision increasing the 
returns of banks effectively in Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks. 
In MENA region including GCC countries, the conventional banks attained better 
ROA and ROE measures than Islamic banks. In contrast, Islamic banks had the 
advantage where NIM values are concerned. In MENA region without GCC 
countries, we can conclude that the socially responsible banks were found to be 
the least profitable banks compared to conventional (which have the highest ROA 
and NIM ratios) and Islamic banks (that have the best ROE measures). Finally, in 
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GCC region, conventional banks attained better ROA and ROE ratios but worse 
NIM values than Islamic banks over the period 2005-2012. According to the 
determinants of profitability, the stability in banking (z-score) is vitally important to 
improve profitability in Islamic, conventional, and socially responsible banks in 
terms of bank-specific factors. Regarding the macroeconomic variables, over the 
period of the global financial crisis (2007-2009), the socially responsible banks 
were found to be more profitable, which is against all expectations. Additionally, 
the profitability of Islamic banks was not influenced significantly by the global 
financial crisis. 
 
In the UK, Islamic banks were found to be the most profitable banks in terms of 
ROA and NIM ratios but attained the worst ROE measures. The SRBs invested 
their capitals more efficiently compared to Islamic and conventional banks. Finally, 
the conventional banks attained very weak ROA and NIM over the period 2005-
2012. According to determinants, the financial stability in Islamic, conventional and 
socially responsible banks was found to be very important to ROA and ROE. In 
addition, the results concluded that lending services are supportive to profitability 
ratios of conventional banks. Overall, conventional banks attained outstanding 
interest profits during the global financial crisis period.  
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Chapter Seven: Results and Discussion of Stability 
 
7.1 Results of stability 
Most studies in the recent studies estimated the financial stability by using z-score 
and utitlised it as a dependant variable to find the determinants of insolvency risk 
(see Kohler, 2015; Tabak et al., 2015; Anginer et al., 2014; Chalermchatvichien et 
al., 2014; Cubillas & González, 2014; Diaconu & Oanea, 2014; ; Dima et al., 2014; 
Dong et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2014; Ghosh, 2014; Gulamhussen et al., 2014; Lee & 
Hsieh, 2014; Rumler & Waschiczek, 2014; Williams, 2014). Furthermore, many 
studies focused on determinants of capitalisation (Horvàth et al., 2014; Schaeck 
and Cihàk, 2014; DeYound & Torna, 2013). In this study, z-score and capital ratio 
are employed to find the factors of stability over the period 2005-2012 in Islamic, 
commercial and socially responsible banks. Table 7.1 below shows the data 
description of stability ratios (z-score and capital ratio), which specify the most 
stable type of banks. Table 7.1 concludes that the most stable banks are the 
socially responsible banks scoring 3.898 and 0.305 for log (z-score) and 
capitalisation, respectively (H3 is accepted). In contrast, Islamic banks found to be 
the most unstable banking systems in terms of z-score measures (2.622), which 
mean that Islamic banks were highly exposed insolvency (default) risks compared 
to socially responsible and conventional banks. Finally, conventional banks had 
the minimum capital ratios (0.140); this result threated the conventional banks to 
have more debts than equity (capital risk). However, the empirical results of the 
correlation between z-score (explained variable) and the explanatory variables can 
be shown in this chapter. This relationship estimates the determinants of stability 
in Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks through the period 2005-
2012. Appendix 14 shows the average natural logarithms of z-score measures in 
yearly order.  
 
With regard to Islamic banks, it is clear from Figure 7.1 below that the z-score in  
Islamic banks started very high in 2005, achieving a log (z-score) equal to 3.0680, 
then the graph kept decreasing until 2010 (2.4829, which is the minimum value). In 
2011, the z-score increased slightly to 2.5096, then dropped again in 2012 (2.490). 
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Table 7.1: Data description of stability ratios 
Type Ratio Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Islamic 
Banks 
Log (z-score) 312 2.622 1.002 -1.72 5.51 
Capital ratio 312 0.249 0.309 0.02 4.01 
Conventional 
Banks 
Log (z-score) 1827 2.985 1.085 -3.27 5.19 
Capital ratio 1827 0.140 0.18 0.01 5.23 
Socially  
Responsible 
 Banks 
Log (z-score) 284 3.898 1.165 0.92 6.26 
Capital ratio 284 0.305 0.326 0.01 0.96 
All Banks 
Log (z-score) 2423 3.045 1.134 -3.27 6.26 
Capital ratio 2423 0.231 0.229 0.005 5.23 
 
Overall, Islamic banks were very settled in 2005, but more at risk of going 
bankrupt in 2010 due to scoring the lowest value of mean log (z-score). 
 
Figure 7.1: Graph of average logs (z-scores) for Islamic banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Later, the results of OLS and fixed effects regressions explain the factors that 
increased or reduced the stability of Islamic banks over the period 2005-2012. 
 
According to capital ratios, Figure 7.2 below demonstrates that in Islamic banking, 
the capitalisation was increased from 2005 (0.210) to 2007 (0.240, the highest 
value). After that the capital ratio collapsed over the period 2007-2012 (0.219). 
These reductions threaten the stability in Islamic banks very badly. Therefore, 
finding the reasons of collapsing allow banks to improve their stability.  
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       Figure 7.2: Graph of average capital ratios for Islamic banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As regards conventional banks, the highest overall log (z-score) attained in 2012 
was a score of 3.0877, whereas the lowest was achieved in 2008 (2.9049), as 
seen in Figure 7.3 below. This may have been due to the global financial crisis. As 
a result, the OLS and FEM could find if there is an impact of the financial crisis on 
stability. During the period 2005-2007, stability rose continuously (3.0680, then 
2.8038 and 2.7063 in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively) but collapsed in 2008. 
After 2008, the z-score graph kept improving from 2.9731 in 2009 to 3.0877 in 
2012.  
               Figure 7.3: Graph of Average Logs (z-scores) for Conventional Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the capital ratios in conventional banks, Figure 7.4 below illustrates 
how capitalisation kept dropping from 0.145 in 2005 to 0.127 in 2008. Then slightly 
the capital ratios improved over the period 2008- 2011 (0.141). After that, majorly, 
 
 
  198 
 
3.75
3.8
3.85
3.9
3.95
4
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Socially Responsible Banks 
Logs (z-scores)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Conventional Banks 
Capital Ratios
the capitalisation maximise in 2012 scoring 0.163 which considered being the 
highest measure.  
      Figure 7.4: Graph of Average capital ratio for Conventional Banks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focusing on socially responsible banks, Figure 7.5 below illustrates that the mean 
log (z-score) ranged between 3.8434 in 2006 and 3.9792 in 2012. However, 
stability grew outstandingly in 2007 (3.9226) then reduced in 2008 (3.8447). After 
that, the z-score improved in 2009 (3.9004), but in 2010 the graph dropped slightly 
to 3.8944. Over the period 2011-2012, Figure 7.5 below shows that these years 
were financially steady compared to the rest of the years, scoring an average log 
(z-score) equal to 3.9415 and 3.9792 for 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
Figure 7.5: Graph of average logs (z-scores) for SRBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The capital ratios for SRBs in Figure 7.6 below started in 2005 very low (0.282) 
then improved in 2006 (0.285) and 2007 (0.302). In 2008, the capitalisation faintly 
decreased (0.300) but after 2008, the capital constantly enlarged from 2009-2012 
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scoring average capital ratios equal to 0.310 in 2009 and 0.326 (the largest) in 
2012.   
Figure 7.6: Graph of average capital ratios for SRBs 
 
 
 
 
Overall, all banks confirm that the most stable year was 2005 (as shown in Figure 
7.7 below), scoring average logs (z-scores) equal to 3.2755. In 2006, the risk of 
insolvency increased as the z-score was reduced (3.1941), but in 2007 all banks 
attained a higher z-score (3.2069). The riskiest year was 2008 (3.1236), which 
may have been due to the global financial crisis. Over the period 2009-2012, the 
financial stability of all banks carried on improving from a mean log (z-score) equal 
to 3.1250 in 2009 to 3.1857 in 2012. 
 
               Figure 7.7: Graph of average logs (z-scores) for all banks 
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Referring to capitalisation ratios, Figure 7.8 indicates varied between 0.212 in 
2005 to 0.262 in 2007. In 2008, the average capital ratio declined to 0.227 and 
weakly changed over the period 2009-2012 (0.232-0.236). 
 
Figure 7.8: Graph of average capital ratios for all banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 below compares the stability between the countries in the sample to 
demonstrate which country faced high or low risk of insolvency (bankruptcy). In 
addition, it determines the highest and lowest banking capitalisation. Table 7.2 
however indicates that Nepalese socially responsible bank found to be the most 
well capitalised bank (0.850), which means that this capital includes 85% of 
owners‟ equity and 15% debts. In comparison, a majority of capital in German 
banks in the sample derived from debts, which is very risky for the banks to 
obligate with liabilities. 
The Bolivian socially responsible banks (Banco FIE and Banco Solidario) attained 
the highest mean log (z-score), scoring 5.3783, which means the most stable 
banking sector in this study was in Bolivia. However, the socially responsible 
Canadian bank, namely the Citizens Bank of Canada, was exposed to a very high 
risk of failure compared to the rest of the banks. In general, all banks strove to 
maximise their z-score (stability) by increasing capitalisation and ROA and 
minimising the risk of failure.  
7.2 Determinants of stability 
The natural logarithm of z-score dealt as an explained variable (following the 
approach of Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014) in Table 7.3. Regarding the capital  
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Table 7.2: Averages stability ratios by country  
N Country 
Mean 
 Log (z) 
Mean 
Capital R. 
Banks in the sample Number of Banks 
1 USA 2.223 0.408 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
2 Germany 4.530 0.047 Socially Responsible Banks 3 SRB 
3 France 3.945 0.083 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
4 UK 2.737 0.126 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
3 IB, 74 CB and 6 SRB 
5 Canada 1.666 0.098 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
6 Australia 3.667 0.081 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
7 Spain 2.312 0.091 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
8 Netherlands 4.075 0.059 Socially Responsible Banks 2 SRB 
9 Saudi Arabia 2.720 0.249 Islamic and Conventional Banks 3 IB and 9 CB 
10 Switzerland 4.798 0.064 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
11 Norway 3.504 0.111 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
12 Austria 3.458 0.460 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
13 UAE 2.890 0.187 Islamic and Conventional Banks 6 IB and 17 CB 
14 Iran 3.763 0.240 Islamic and Socially Responsible Banks 7 IB and 1 SRB 
15 Denmark 3.136 0.137 Socially Responsible Banks 5 SRB 
16 Israel 3.479 0.061 Conventional Banks 8 CB 
17 Egypt 2.554 0.104 Islamic and Conventional Banks 2 IB and 21 CB 
18 Iraq 2.528 0.230 Conventional Banks 2CB 
19 Algeria 3.340 0.264 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
1 IB, 9 CB and 3 SRB 
20 Qatar 3.001 0.331 Islamic and Conventional Banks 3 IB and 6 CB 
21 New Zealand 3.382 0.083 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
22 Kuwait 2.543 0.138 Islamic and Conventional Banks 2 IB and 6 CB 
23 Bangladesh 3.090 0.071 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
24 Morocco 3.853 0.197 
Conventional and Socially Responsible 
Banks 
8 CB and 1 SRB 
25 Oman 3.246 0.140 Conventional Banks 7 CB 
26 Syria 2.897 0.129 Conventional Banks 5 CB 
27 Libya 3.293 0.076 Conventional Banks 5 CB 
28 Tunisia 3.252 0.233 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
1 IB, 8 CB and 2 SRB 
29 Lebanon 3.734 0.091 Conventional Banks 28 CB 
30 Yemen 3.091 0.135 Islamic and Conventional Banks 4 IB and 1 CB 
31 Jordan 3.457 0.152 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 7 CB 
32 Bahrain 2.258 0.303 Islamic and Conventional Banks 9 IB and 15 CB 
33 Bolivia 5.378 0.832 Socially Responsible Banks 2 SRB 
34 Nepal 4.891 0.850 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
35 Mongolia 4.863 0.666 Socially Responsible Banks 1 SRB 
36 Malta 3.806 0.322 
Conventional and Socially Responsible 
Banks 
4 CB and 1 SRB 
37 Palestine 3.263 0.143 Islamic and Conventional Banks 1 IB and 2 CB 
All Banks 3.368 0.216 
Islamic, Conventional and Socially 
Responsible Banks 
323 banks (43 IB, 242 
CB and 38 SRB) 
 
ratio, equity to total assets formula is employed (Nguyen & Nghiem, 2015) as in 
Table 7.4. However, the statistical models employed are OLS and FEM to find the 
association between stability ratios (z-score and capitalisation) and their 
determinants (as in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4) over the period 2005-2012 for 
Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks.  
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7.2.1 Determinants of stability in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), MT 
7.2.1.1 Determinants of z-score in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), MT 
The empirical results for Islamic banks of the OLS and FEM are presented in 
Table 7.3. The main aim is to find which variables affected stability over the period 
2005-2012. According to bank-specific variables, OLS finding suggest that larger 
banks were more stable and less risky than smaller banks. Many studies 
confirmed that higher total assets enhance stability such as studies of for Tabak et 
al. (2015), Cubillas and González (2014), Beck et al. (2013a), Srairi (2013), 
Nguyen et al. (2012), Soedarmono et al. (2011), Houston et al. (2010) and Berger 
et al. (2009). Regarding FEM result, larger-sized Islamic banks engaged in more 
risk-taking than smaller banks. This was proposed by Kohler (2015), Zhang et al. 
(2015), Dong et al. (2014), Fu et al. (2014), Beck et al. (2013b), Mirzaei et al. 
(2013), Tan and Floros (2013), Agoraki et al. (2011) and Barry et al. (2011). 
However, the coefficients of capital ratio are highly and significantly correlated with 
z-score at a 0.1% level, which means that higher banks‟ capitalisation raises the 
capabilities of banks to be more stabilised, like Ghosh (2015), Kohler (2015), 
Tabak et al. (2015), Williams (2014), Mirzaei et al. (2013), Nguyen et al. (2012) 
and Zhang et al. (2012) who have the same result. Regarding the loan intensity, 
two aspects have been generated by OLS and FEM. The OLS finding shows that 
providing more loans tends to increase stability. This encourages banks to raise 
their lending activities due to be further from insolvency risk which supported by 
Kohler (2015). On the other side, FEM supposes that higher loans raise the threat 
of insolvency, which agrees with Rumler and Waschiczek‟s (2014), Beck‟s et al. 
(2013), Bourkhis and Nabi‟s (2013), Berger‟s et al. (2009) findings. Concerning 
profitability, ROA was found to be a major determinant of stability as there is a 
positive and significant relationship between ROA and z-score (similar to Anginer 
et al., 2014) at the level of 0.1% and 1% for OLS and FEM, respectively. As a 
result, banks strive to generate the maximum profits by using the minimum amount 
of inputs. Ghosh (2014) could not prove any relationship between ROA and z-
score. Concentrating on operating leverage ratio, there is a negative association 
between operating leverage and bank risk (OLS). In other words, greater 
concentration of fixed assets against total assets leads to a decrease in stability. 
The assumption is the same with Berger‟s et al. (2009) argument. This underlines  
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Table 7.3: Results of z-score determinants for Islamic (UK and MENA), 
conventional (UK and MENA) and SRBs (across the world), MT 
Stability 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Socially responsible 
Banks 
(OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Log(z) Log(z) Log(z) Log(z) Log(z) Log(z) 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.180
***
 -0.182
***
 -0.056
***
 -0.329
***
 -0.107
***
 -0.0924
**
 
(4.37) (-4.05) (-4.07) (-13.89) (-3.52) (-2.84) 
EQTA 
1.557
***
 1.432
***
 -0.371
*
 0.823
***
 0.931
**
 3.347
***
 
(5.88) (12.50) (-2.02) (10.63) (2.79) (14.48) 
LOANSTA 
0.844
***
 -0.511
***
 -0.278
**
 -0.102
*
 0.298 -0.101 
(3.50) (-4.56) (-3.18) (-2.06) (0.91) (-0.96) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.00127 0.000501 0.00443
*
 0.000218 0.0300 0.565
***
 
(-0.58) (0.81) (2.22) (0.35) (0.11) (7.06) 
ROA 
1.066
**
 1.439
***
 7.422
***
 2.065
***
 4.339 4.427
***
 
(3.01) (14.89) (8.23) (6.63) (0.84) (4.12) 
FATA 
-7.718
**
 -1.333 2.009 3.295
***
 0.354 2.984 
(-2.88) (-1.27) (1.16) (3.78) (0.08) (1.92) 
LAGE 
0.643
***
  -0.00480  0.173
*
  
(5.99)  (-0.13)  (2.03)  
FORE 
 0.0405 -1.842
***
 -0.114 -1.245
***
  
 (0.26) (-4.92) (-1.34) (-5.16)  
DOM 
0.447
***
 0.0298 -1.636
***
 -0.0755 -2.078
***
  
(3.58) (0.21) (-4.42) (-1.03) (-6.73)  
GOV 
0.357
*
  -1.747
***
  -0.924
***
  
(2.00)  (-4.77)  (-3.81)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.292
***
 0.129 -0.089
***
 0.438
***
 -0.176
***
 0.293
***
 
(-7.31) (1.61) (-5.99) (10.38) (-3.54) (3.45) 
INFLATION 
-0.422 -0.245 -1.975
***
 -0.0276 -0.153
***
 -0.563 
(-0.75) (-1.47) (-5.32) (-0.23) (-7.06) (-1.90) 
MCAP 
-0.696
***
 0.00738 0.0278 0.154
***
 -0.163 0.0235 
(-6.30) (0.12) (1.63) (4.89) (-1.40) (0.43) 
GFC 
-0.0385 0.000955 -0.00806 -0.0317
*
 -0.0150 0.0149 
(-0.38) (0.04) (-0.16) (-2.26) (-0.15) (0.76) 
Sigma 6.201
***
 0.560 7.708
***
 -5.941
***
 10.39
***
 -3.940 
_cons (5.81) (0.29) (13.92) (-5.80) (7.28) (-1.92) 
R
2
 0.5095 0.7139 0.1101 0.3706 0.5126 0.6109 
Number of banks 43 43 242 242 38 38 
N 312 312 1827 1827 284 284 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: operating leverage, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global Financial Crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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strategies against fixed assets such as selling (or depreciation) more fixed assets 
due to higher costs (of fixed assets). According to age of banks, older banks 
scored better z-score than new banks, which means that older banks were less 
risky than new banks. Lee and Chich‟s (2013) and Mirzaei‟s et al. (2013) studies 
proved the same result. As regards ownership, OLS regression confirms that 
Islamic domestic banks are more settled than government banks, but OLS could 
not determine a coefficient for foreign banks. The FEM failed to estimate the 
coefficient of government banks, but FEM claims that Islamic foreign banks were 
less risky than domestic banks over the period 2005-2012. Overall, the Islamic 
domestic and government banks concentration level raise stability. In the literature, 
many studies analysed the effect of ownership upon stability in banking, such as 
Mirzaei et al. (2013) who found that increment in foreign bank levels tends to 
reduce the risk-taking percentages and Agoraki et al. (2011) approved that public 
ownership enhanced the stability. In contrast, Agoraki et al. (2011) and Berger et 
al. (2009) assumed that foreign ownership concentration increased the risk of 
insolvency. Referring to the macrocosmic variables, OLS findings states that GDP 
growth decreases the stability of Islamic banking, which is consistent with the 
results of Cubillas and González (2014). In contrast, Nguyen et al. (2012) confirm 
that GDP development leads to more stable banks. Finally, market capitalisation 
was found to have a negative and significant relationship to stability at the level of 
0.1% following the OLS coefficient. This contrast with Nguyen et al. (2012) who 
noted that growth in the stock market makes banks steadier against any loss.  
In general, Islamic banks have not been influenced by inflation and the global 
financial crisis. These two indicators represent the main challenges to any 
profitable or non-profitable firm. Williams (2014) did not find a relationship between 
inflation rate and z-score. In addition, Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) could not find any 
impact of the global financial crisis on banking stability. 
According to R squared values, the consistency between the explanatory variables 
is very high, with log (z-score) measures as R2OLS equal to 50.95% and R
2
FEM 
equal to 71.39%. Figure 7.9 draws the association between z-score and its factors. 
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Figure 7.9: Significant variables that influence z-score for Islamic banks, MT 
7.2.1.2 Determinants of capital ratio in Islamic banks (UK and MENA), MT 
According to capital ratio determinants, Table 7.4 displays the empirical results of 
OLS and FEM for Islamic banks. Based on the Table 7.4 results of capital ratio 
determinants for Islamic banks, smaller sized found to be better capitalised than 
greater sized banks, which is opposite the expectation. This could be due to 
Islamic banks used their own equity to invest rather than borrowing. Many studies 
estimated the same result, e.g. Ghosh (2014), Schaeck and Cihàk (2014), Horvàth 
et al. (2014), Beck et al. (2013a), Bertay et al. (2013) and Berger et al. (2009). But, 
as anticipated, loan intensity has a strong influence on capitalisation at a 0.1% 
level. This encourages banks to raise lending activities. Berger et al. (2009) found 
inverse association between capital ratio and loan intensity. However, credit risk 
shows a significant and positive relationship with capital ratio. In this case, banks 
could accept more deposits due to reduce the credit risk. This finding is consistent 
with Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) argument. However, there is a negative and 
significant correlation between capitalisation and ROA. This relationship shows 
that costs of banks found to be greater than income. Banks could find strategies to 
cut costs due to achieving more stability and avoid any default risks. According to 
operating leverage, fixed assets intensity supported the stability positively and  
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Domestic ownership (+) 
Foreign ownership 
Government ownership (+) 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation 
Market capitalization (-) 
Global Financial Crisis 
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Table 7.4: Results of capital ratio determinants for Islamic (UK and MENA), 
conventional (UK and MENA) and SRBs (across the world), MT 
Stability 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Socially responsible 
Banks 
(OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Capital 
ratio 
Capital 
ratio 
Capital 
ratio 
Capital 
ratio 
Capital 
ratio 
Capital 
ratio 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
-0.0518
***
 -0.0194 -0.021
***
 -0.0621
***
 0.0121
*
 -0.0126 
(-6.19) (-0.98) (-12.47) (-8.03) (2.18) (-1.87) 
LOANSTA 
0.00904 0.348
***
 0.121
***
 0.230
***
 -0.457
***
 0.0919
***
 
(0.17) (7.74) (11.11) (15.85) (-8.78) (4.42) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.00104
*
 0.0000269 0.00176
***
 0.0000038 0.175
***
 -0.151
***
 
(2.25) (0.10) (7.00) (0.02) (3.79) (-9.96) 
ROA 
-0.211
**
 -0.347
***
 2.230
***
 1.657
***
 -1.615 -0.564
*
 
(-2.68) (-6.63) (21.23) (18.38) (-1.75) (-2.51) 
FATA 
5.828
***
 3.177
***
 0.870
***
 0.104 1.382 -0.451 
(12.49) (7.83) (3.96) (0.38) (1.76) (-1.41) 
LAGE 
-0.0996
***
  -0.0213
***
  -0.00330  
(-4.12)  (-4.48)  (-0.21)  
LOGZ 
0.0491
***
 0.264
***
 -0.00607
*
 0.0814
***
 0.0302
**
 0.141
***
 
(3.57) (12.51) (-2.02) (10.63) (2.79) (14.48) 
FORE 
 -0.0456 -0.0480 -0.0336 0.106
*
  
 (-0.68) (-1.00) (-1.25) (2.36)  
DOM 
-0.0540
*
 -0.0378 -0.0634 -0.0121 -0.0518  
(-2.01) (-0.61) (-1.33) (-0.53) (-0.86)  
GOV 
-0.0261   -0.0101 0.0475  
(-0.68)   (-0.21) (1.06)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0207
*
 0.0148 0.00637
***
 0.0490
***
 -0.049
***
 0.00897 
(2.41) (0.43) (3.32) (3.58) (-5.75) (0.50) 
INFLATION 
0.00153 -0.0408 -0.0204 -0.0476 -0.00677 0.0708 
(0.01) (-0.57) (-0.43) (-1.25) (-1.60) (1.16) 
MCAP 
0.151
***
 0.0172 -0.000275 -0.0216
*
 -0.0107 0.00624 
(6.57) (0.67) (-0.13) (-2.16) (-0.51) (0.56) 
GFC 
0.0308 0.0154 -0.00232 0.00346 -0.00204 -0.00206 
(1.43) (1.37) (-0.37) (0.78) (-0.11) (-0.51) 
Sigma 0.0859 -0.884 0.208
**
 -0.954
**
 1.487
***
 -0.391 
_cons (0.37) (-1.07) (2.80) (-2.94) (5.59) (-0.92) 
R
2
 0.6533 0.8236 0.4689 0.5661 0.7976 0.6051 
Number of banks 43 43 242 242 38 38 
N 312 312 1827 1827 284 284 
Notes: LTA: bank size, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, ROA: returns on 
assets, FATA: operating leverage, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, 
INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; 
dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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significantly and further Islamic banks from insolvency risks. Berger et al. (2009) 
and Beck et al. (2013a) underlined how fixed assets could effectively enhance the 
stability and capitalisation. Regarding age of banks, on the contrary of anticipation, 
new banks found to be well capitalised compared to older banks. This finding is 
confirmed by Schaeck and Cihàk (2014) for European commercial banks. 
However, a strong positive and significant association at the level of 0.1% found to 
be between capital ratio and z-score. Banks with higher capital were more stable 
and less risky. Horvàth‟s et al. (2014) study also attained that capital ratio was 
highly correlated with z-score in Czech Republic banking sector. Furthermore, 
domestic banks only had a significant and negative sign, due to high competition 
in banking sector, Islamic banks suffered from decreasing in capitalisation, which 
increase bankruptcy risks. Regarding to industry-specific variables, banks 
operating in countries with higher GDP growth and stock market development 
were more constant and able to reduce default risk. Finally, we can conclude that 
the independent variables are highly consistent with the dependent variable 
(capital ratio) scoring R2 = 65.33% and 82.36% for OLS and FE models.  
The recent significant results for capital ratio can explained in Figure 7.10 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Significant variables that influence capital ratio for Islamic banks, MT 
Islamic Stability 
Size (-) 
Loan intensity (+) 
Credit risk (+) 
Operating leverage (+) 
ROA (-) 
Z-score (+) 
Age (-) 
Domestic ownership (-) 
Foreign ownership 
Government ownership  
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation 
Market capitalization (+) 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (+) 
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7.2.2 Determinants of stability in conventional banks (UK and MENA), MT 
7.2.2.1 Determinants of z-score in conventional banks (UK and MENA), MT 
The recent Table 7.3 demonstrates the results of OLS and FEM for conventional 
banks over the period 2005-2012. Focusing on the determinants of stability (z-
score) in conventional banks, banks with lower total assets were found to be more 
resistant against bankruptcy, like Islamic banks. The capital ratio has a negative 
and significant relationship with stability at a 5% level in terms of OLS coefficient 
(see Tabak et al., 2013). Further, capital ratio has a high correlation with z-score at 
a 0.1% level. More capitalisation leads to more stability in conventional banks. The 
determinant relationship with z-score is also consistent with Islamic banks. 
Moreover, loan intensity affects the stability negatively and significantly at 0.1% 
referring to OLS regression. Thus, conventional banks need to reduce loans that 
are generated by total assets due to raise the stability. The z-score increases the 
credit risk referring to the OLS results. Jeon and Lim (2013) found the same 
relationship between z-score and credit risk. On the other hand, Lee and Chih 
(2013) argue that there is a negative and significant correlation between z-score 
and credit risk (loans to deposits ratio). Concerning the profitability ratio, ROA is 
found to be affecting stability positively and ROA is strongly correlated with z-score 
at 0.1% as with Islamic banks. According to operating leverage ratio, FEM 
proposes that higher fixed assets make conventional banks less risky and more 
stable. Consequently, banks need to invest in necessary fixed assets to achieve 
their goals (consistent with Williams, 2014; Srairi, 2013). With regard to ownership, 
the OLS model confirms that the existence of domestic, foreign and government 
banks raises the risk of insolvency. The most stabilised conventional banks are 
domestic banks which have a higher coefficient (-1.636) than government banks (-
1.747) and the riskiest banks are foreign commercial banks (-1.842) following the 
OLS regression. All macroeconomic variables determine the stability of 
conventional banks. In detail, the OLS model noted that countries which have less 
gross domestic production tend to have steadier banks referring to  the OLS 
coefficient (-0.0892). On the contrary, the FEM coefficient (0.438) identifies that 
GDP influences stability positively and significantly at a 0.1% level. Moreover, 
inflation increases the overall risk and makes banks nearer from failure. This 
relationship is consistent with Cubillas and González‟s (2014) conclusion. In 
contrast, Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) proved that inflation determines stability 
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positively in Islamic and commercial banks in their study. However, the growth in 
the stock market (the market capitalisation variable) stabilises the conventional 
banks (less risk). Nguyen et al. (2012) confirm that market capitalisation 
development leads to making banks more resistant to bankruptcy. The global 
financial crisis affected the stability significantly and negatively. This correlation 
between GFC and stability is in line with Anginer‟s et al. (2014) and Williams‟s 
(2014) point of view demonstrating that the GFC decreased z-scores and 
increased the risk-taking in their studies. 
Overall, the R squared of OLS regression was 11.01%, whereas the R squared of 
FEM scored 37.06%. In other words, the independent variables following FEM are 
more appropriate than the OLS model. Figure 7.11 simplifies the relationship 
between the stability and its factors for conventional banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.11: Significant variables that influence z-score for conventional banks 
7.2.2.2 Determinants of capital ratio in conventional banks (UK and MENA), 
MT 
Focusing on the capitalisation determinations as mentioned earlier in Table 7.4. As 
Islamic banks, conventional smaller banks found to be steadier than larger banks. 
Furthermore, the relationship between capital ratio and loan intensity is significant 
Conventional Stability 
Size (-) 
Capitalisation (+/-) 
Loan intensity (-) 
ROA (+) 
Credit risk (+) 
Age  
Operating leverage (+) 
Domestic ownership (-) 
Foreign ownership (-) 
Government ownership (-) 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation (-) 
Market capitalization (+) 
GFC (-) 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (+/-) 
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and positive. Evermore, credit risk has a significant and positive sign. As expected, 
ROA was significantly and positively improving capitalisation in conventional 
banking sector. The profits allowed banks to invest more, which made banks 
financially stabilised and able to face any financial distress. This outcome is in line 
Ghosh (2012) finding for GCC banking systems. According to fixed assets 
intensity, operating leverage had a positive and significant relationship with 
capitalisation, like Islamic banks. Also, new banks scored better capital ratios than 
older banks. Regarding to z-score‟s coefficients, OLS suggests that increasing 
capital resulted to raise instability (more default risk). On the other side, FEM 
proposes that banks higher capital were steadier and less risky. In this case, we 
can confirm that FEM is more accurate and more realistic. However, based on the 
macroeconomic variables, GDP growth is highly and strongly having a positive 
and significant correlation (at the level of 0.1%) with capital ratio. In contrast, 
market capitalisation decreased the stability (capitalisation) significantly at the 5% 
level. This result discourages conventional banks to invest and operates in 
countries with depression in financial markets. Finally, R-squared equal 46.89% 
and 56.61% for OLS and FE regressions. These recent significant variables 
(influencing capitalisation) are presented in as a summary in Figure 7.12 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12: Significant variables that influence capital ratio for conventional banks, MT 
Stability of CBs 
Size (-) 
Loan intensity (+) 
Credit risk (+) 
Operating leverage (+) 
ROA (+) 
Z-score (+/-) 
Age (-) 
Domestic ownership  
Foreign ownership  
Government ownership  
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation  
Market capitalization (-) 
GFC  
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (+) 
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7.2.3 Determinants of stability in SRBs (across the world), MT 
7.2.3.1 Determinants of z-score in SRBs (across the world), MT 
The recent Table 7.3 indicates the determinants of stability (z-score) in socially 
responsible banks over the period 2005-2012. The statistical models‟ findings 
suggest that smaller socially responsible banks were found to be more resistible 
against risk of insolvency than larger-sized banks, which match the results for 
Islamic and conventional banks. This outcome is in line with the study by Beck et 
al. (2013a) but conflicts with the relationship between size and z-score seen by 
Nguyen et al. (2013). As for Islamic and commercial banks, capital ratio is the 
main indicator of stability as capitalisation improves the socially responsible banks‟ 
stability and reduces the risk of bankruptcy. Regarding the FEM coefficient (0.565), 
credit risk affects stability positively, which matches with conventional banks. 
Additionally, the ROA (profitability ratio) coefficient (4.427) has a positive and 
significant correlation with the log (z-score) at 0.1% with respect to the fixed 
effects model. As in Islamic and conventional banks, profitability is very important 
as ROA is highly correlated with z-score in all banks at a level of 0.1%. In other 
words, achieving higher profits leads to more stability in the banking sector. As for 
conventional banks, ownership concentration was found to lower stability (z-score) 
in accordance with the OLS results. The most stable banks are governmental 
banks, scoring a coefficient equal to -0.924, and the riskiest banks are domestic 
banks which scored the minimum coefficient (-2.078). According to the external 
variables, the GDP variable has two different associations with z-score. The OLS 
model provides evidence that countries achieving additional GDP growth tend to 
threaten socially responsible banks with bankruptcy. In contrast, the FEM 
estimator demonstrates a statistically positive correlation at a level of 0.1% 
between GDP and stability, which means socially responsible banks in countries 
generating more GDP were able to resist the insolvency risk. As for conventional 
banks, inflation exposes banks to a high risk of failure referring to the OLS result. 
However, the results confirmed that the market capitalisation and global financial 
crisis did not affect the socially responsible banks‟ stability, which raises the 
importance of the study for the socially responsible banking sector. Ghosh (2014) 
proved that the global financial crisis did not impact stability in GCC Islamic and 
commercial banks. 
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Generally, the R2 of OLS is 51.26% and the R2 of FEM is 61.09%, which is 
relatively high. Figure 7.13 shows the factors of stability for the socially responsible 
banks. Figure 7.13 details the significant variables that affect stability of SRBs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.13: Significant variables that influence z-score for SRBs, MT 
7.2.3.2 Determinants of capital ratio in SRBs (across the world), MT 
Concentrating on capital ratios and their determinants in Table 7.4 for socially 
responsible banks, as anticipated, larger sized banks were more stable (capital) 
than smaller sized banks. Two results attained in accordance to loan intensity, 
positive (FEM) and negative (OLS) signs but the most result was the fixed effects 
model which suggests the positive relationship. Like Islamic and conventional 
banks, socially responsible banks had a positive relationship between capital 
ratios and credit risk. As Islamic banks, ROA decreased the capitalisation, which 
increased the instability (insolvency risk). Moreover, z-score affected he 
capitalisation significantly and positively. With regards to ownership, foreign bank 
concentration (level) found to be supporting stability positively. Berger et al. (2009) 
found the same relationship between capitalisation and foreign ownership. 
Regarding the external factors, GDP variable only indicates significance (negative 
sign with capital ratio). However, R-squared indicates a high consistency between 
Stability of SRBs 
Size (-) 
Capitalisation (+) 
Loan intensity  
ROA (+) 
Credit risk (+) 
Age (-) 
Operating leverage 
Domestic ownership (-) 
Foreign ownership (-) 
Government ownership (-) 
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation (-) 
Market capitalization 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (+/-) 
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expletory variables scoring R2OLS = 79.76% and R
2
FEM = 60.51% Figure 7.14 below 
displays the determinants of capitalisation of socially responsible banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14: Significant variables that influence capital ratio for SRBs, MT 
7.3.1 Determinants of stability in Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks (UK and MENA), AT 
7.3.1.1 Determinants of z-score in Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks (UK and MENA), AT 
According to the additional test in Table 7.5 below, the results are similar to the 
main test in Table 7.3. For the listing factor, there is no such evidence for any 
relationship between z-score and listing on the stock market. Nguyen et al. (2012) 
and Barry et al. (2011) estimate an insignificant correlation between z-score and 
listing. Regarding corruption, the Islamic and conventional banks were found to be 
more stable and less risky in the countries with lower corruption supervision from 
the government. On the other hand, the socially responsible banks are financially 
more resistible in countries with higher corruption control. Hoque et al. (2015) 
found that corruption did not affect the conventional banks in Europe in their study. 
Overall, the advantage of examining the additional variables (listing and corruption 
control) is that R2 values are remarkably improved compared to the MT (Table 7.3). 
Stability of SRBs 
Size (+) 
Loan intensity (+/-) 
Credit risk (+) 
Operating leverage 
ROA (-) 
Z-score 
Age 
Domestic ownership  
Foreign ownership (+) 
Government ownership  
Efficiency (DEA) 
Inflation  
Market capitalization 
Global Financial Crisis 
Bank-specific variables Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (-) 
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Table 7.5: Results of z-score determinants for Islamic (UK and MENA), 
conventional (UK and MENA) and SRBs (across the world), AT 
Stability 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Socially responsible Banks 
(OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Log(z) Log(z) Log(z) Log(z) Log(z) Log(z) 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
0.112
**
 -0.189
***
 -0.0525
***
 -0.331
***
 -0.0815
**
 -0.0924
**
 
(2.94) (-4.01) (-3.64) (-13.96) (-2.69) (-2.83) 
EQTA 
0.957
***
 1.423
***
 -0.295 0.821
***
 1.349
***
 3.347
***
 
(4.19) (12.25) (-1.58) (10.61) (3.95) (14.38) 
LOANSTA 
0.553
**
 -0.512
***
 -0.248
**
 -0.103
*
 0.305 -0.101 
(2.67) (-4.57) (-2.74) (-2.07) (0.94) (-0.96) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.000193 0.000516 0.00448
*
 0.000231 -0.0336 0.565
***
 
(-0.10) (0.83) (2.25) (0.37) (-0.13) (7.04) 
ROA 
1.718
***
 1.442
***
 7.109
***
 2.069
***
 5.196 4.427
***
 
(5.67) (14.91) (7.77) (6.64) (1.03) (4.11) 
FATA 
-3.860 -1.307 1.278 3.322
***
 5.524 2.986 
(-1.67) (-1.24) (0.73) (3.81) (1.14) (1.88) 
LAGE 
0.578
***
  -0.0132  0.101  
(6.13)  (-0.35)  (1.18)  
FORE 
 0.0388 -1.899
***
 -0.109 -1.562
***
  
 (0.25) (-5.03) (-1.28) (-5.98)  
DOM 
0.263
*
 0.0258 -1.684
***
 -0.0734 -2.368
***
  
(2.37) (0.18) (-4.51) (-1.00) (-7.28)  
GOV 
0.134  -1.813
***
  -1.239
***
  
(0.87)  (-4.91)  (-4.95)  
Listing* 
-0.0935  -0.00988  -0.130  
(-0.90)  (-0.17)  (-0.81)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0637 0.136 -0.0670
***
 0.435
***
 -0.234
***
 0.293
***
 
(-1.78) (1.67) (-3.38) (10.30) (-4.55) (3.43) 
INFLATION 
-0.899 -0.259 -2.117
***
 -0.0514 -0.189
***
 -0.563 
(-1.79) (-1.53) (-5.60) (-0.42) (-8.12) (-1.89) 
MCAP 
-0.232
*
 0.00798 0.0357
*
 0.153
***
 -0.334
**
 0.0235 
(-2.14) (0.13) (2.04) (4.85) (-2.78) (0.43) 
GFC 
0.00322 0.00363 -0.00663 -0.0311
*
 -0.0319 0.0149 
(0.04) (0.14) (-0.13) (-2.21) (-0.32) (0.75) 
CCONTROL* 
-0.0105
***
 -0.00115 -0.00275
*
 -0.00283 0.0138
***
 -0.0000226 
(-4.32) (-0.49) (-2.12) (-1.51) (3.84) (-0.01) 
Sigma 1.896
*
 0.584 7.344
***
 -5.667
***
 11.31
***
 -3.940 
_cons (2.04) (0.30) (12.32) (-5.46) (7.60) (-1.91) 
R
2
 04760 0.7147 0.1125 0.3716 0.5421 0.6109 
Number of banks 43 43 242 242 38 38 
N 312 312 1827 1827 284 284 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: operating leverage, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LISTING: dummy equal 1 if listed bank and 0 
unlisted, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market 
capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global Financial Crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise; CCONTROL: Control of corruption.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
* Additional variable 
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7.3.1.2 Determinants of capital ratio in Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks (UK and MENA), AT 
The determinants of capitalisation for the main test in Table 7.4 are similar to the 
determinants of capitalisation for the additional test in Table 7.6 below. The 
difference is that governmental involvement benefits the capital of socially 
responsible banks. This positive result occurs because the government has more 
financial abilities than local and foreign banks. Based on the additional variables, 
unlisted conventional banks were found to be better capitalised compared to 
conventional listed banks. This result is in line with the outcome of Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2015) and Ghosh (2014). For the corruption supervision factor, the findings 
of the additional test show that the association between corruption supervision and 
capital ratio is significant and positive in Islamic and conventional banks. This 
contradicts with the result of the socially responsible banks, which indicates that 
corruption control impacts capital ratios significantly and negatively. Generally, 
testing the additional variables (listing and corruption control) allows for more 
consistency between the independent factors. 
 
7.4 Stability of MENA countries (including GCC) 
7.4.1 Stability measures description for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Table 7.7 shows that conventional banks are further from bankruptcy (3.078) 
compared to Islamic banks, which attained lower z-scores values (2.715). On the 
opposite side, Islamic banks were more stable than conventional banks in terms of 
having better invested capitalisation (15.04%) over the period 2005-2012. 
However, there are many reasons behind these stability measures, which are 
explained in detail in the following section. 
 
Table 7.7: Stability measures description for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Stability Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Stability Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log (z-score) 2.7151 0.8836 -0.17 5.51 Log (z-score) 3.0786 1.0504 -3.27 5.19 
Capital ratio 0.2264 0.2150 0.02 0.99 Capital ratio 0.1504 0.2020 0.01 5.23 
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Table 7.6: Results of capital ratio determinants for Islamic (UK and MENA), 
conventional (UK and MENA) and SRBs (across the world), AT 
Stability 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Socially responsible Banks 
(OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Capital R. Capital R. Capital R. Capital R. Capital R. Capital R. 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA 
-0.0581
***
 -0.0305 -0.0212
***
 -0.0623
***
 0.00570 -0.0129 
(-6.48) (-1.47) (-12.18) (-8.02) (1.07) (-1.91) 
LOGZ 
0.0585
***
 0.260
***
 -0.00464 0.0813
***
 0.0409
***
 0.140
***
 
(4.19) (12.25) (-1.58) (10.61) (3.95) (14.38) 
LOANSTA 
-0.00930 0.340
***
 0.109
***
 0.230
***
 -0.389
***
 0.0913
***
 
(-0.18) (7.56) (9.91) (15.84) (-7.55) (4.39) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.000907
*
 0.0000499 0.00165
***
 0.00000466 0.172
***
 -0.150
***
 
(1.98) (0.19) (6.68) (0.02) (3.95) (-9.93) 
ROA 
-0.219
**
 -0.339
***
 2.300
***
 1.657
***
 -1.575 -0.568
*
 
(-2.81) (-6.47) (22.26) (18.38) (-1.81) (-2.53) 
FATA 
5.875
***
 3.171
***
 1.199
***
 0.106 -0.561 -0.380 
(12.73) (7.85) (5.48) (0.39) (-0.66) (-1.16) 
LAGE 
-0.0899
***
  -0.0167
***
  0.0140  
(-3.71)  (-3.55)  (0.94)  
FORE 
 -0.0475 -0.000353 -0.0333 0.163
***
  
 (-0.71) (-0.01) (-1.24) (3.45)  
DOM 
-0.0518 -0.0434 -0.0198 -0.0120 0.0245  
(-1.88) (-0.71) (-0.42) (-0.52) (0.40)  
GOV 
-0.0155  0.0398  0.120
**
  
(-0.41)  (0.85)  (2.67)  
Listing* 
0.0247  -0.0195
**
  -0.0126  
(0.97)  (-2.71)  (-0.45)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
0.0137 0.0257 -0.00720
**
 0.0488
***
 -0.0302
**
 0.0105 
(1.55) (0.73) (-2.90) (3.57) (-3.31) (0.59) 
INFLATION 
0.107 -0.0630 0.0572 -0.0491 0.00354 0.0753 
(0.86) (-0.87) (1.20) (-1.28) (0.78) (1.23) 
MCAP 
0.114
***
 0.0182 -0.00440
*
 -0.0216
*
 0.0323 0.00705 
(4.35) (0.72) (-2.01) (-2.16) (1.53) (0.63) 
GFC 
0.0271 0.0191 -0.00311 0.00349 0.00346 -0.00238 
(1.27) (1.68) (-0.50) (0.79) (0.20) (-0.59) 
CCONTROL* 
0.00168
**
 -0.00180 0.00137
***
 -0.000175 -0.00364
***
 -0.000764 
(2.74) (-1.80) (8.56) (-0.30) (-6.07) (-1.07) 
Sigma 0.171 -0.957 0.415
***
 -0.937
**
 1.073
***
 -0.377 
_cons (0.74) (-1.17) (5.37) (-2.85) (3.86) (-0.89) 
R
2
 0.6377 0.8258 0.4901 0.5662 0.8223 0.6070 
Number of banks 43 43 242 242 38 38 
N 312 312 1827 1827 284 284 
Notes: LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit 
risk, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: operating leverage, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 
if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: 
dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LISTING: dummy equal 1 if listed bank and 0 
unlisted, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market 
capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global Financial Crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within 
year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise; CCONTROL: Control of corruption.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
* Additional variable 
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7.4.2 Determinants of stability in MENA countries (including GCC) 
Table 7.8 concludes the significant factors that impact on financial stability 
(positively or negatively) in MENA countries (including GCC) using OLS and FE 
regressions. The statistical findings show that both stability indicators are very 
important to each other as they both correlated robustly at 0.1%. Large capitalised 
banks were found to face less insolvency risk (Carretta et al., 2015). In addition, 
more stable banks had greater capitals (Kick & Prieto, 2015; Baselga-Pascual et 
al., 2015). Against our predictions and hypothesis, smaller banks were found to be 
more resistant against banking risk-taking with higher standards of capital (Kohler, 
2015; Ghosh, 2014). However the OLS estimated that conventional banks with 
more total assets tended to be steadier with higher capital rates (Fazio et al., 
2015). The OLS model advised the Islamic banks to raise their stability (based on 
z-score) by focusing more on lending operations (Keffala, 2015) but alerted the 
conventional banks to provide more loans (Kasman & Kasman, 2015). With 
regards to capital ratios, generating more loans led to strengthening of the 
conventional banking shares but worsened the standards of capitalisation in 
Islamic banks (ElBannan, 2015). The credit risk encouraged the Islamic banks to 
accept more deposits in order to maintain their stability (Chiaramonte et al., 2015; 
Nguyen & Nghiem, 2015). The relationship between profits (ROA) and log (z-score) 
in Islamic and conventional banks is distinctly positive at 0.1%. This estimation 
shows how important it is for banks to maximise their returns to achieve financial 
stability and to avoid any failure. Using capital ratio as a benchmark, the 
conventional banks with greater equities had lower earnings than low-capital 
banks. Baselga-Pascual et al. (2015) and Anginer et al. (2014) investigated the 
same result. On the other hand, lower capitalised Islamic banks tended to be more 
profitable than higher capitalised banks. It is a very rare situation to find that well-
capitalised banks attain worse profits, as lack of recent studies found the same 
relationship between capitalisation and profitability. This can be an important 
disadvantage to the performance of Islamic banking in MENA region (including 
GCC), and also warned that financial stability will struggle and incur losses. As 
predicted, the operating leverage ratio indicates that conventional banks with more 
invested fixed assets are less risky. Srairi (2013) argues that operating leverage 
also has a positive and significant effect on stability. Based on OLS‟s results, a 
powerful and positive link was found between capital ratio and operating leverage 
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Table 7.8: Determinants of stability for MENA countries (including GCC) 
Notes: LOGZ: z-score, EQTA: capital ratio, LTA: bank size, LOANSTA: loans intensity, 
LOANSDEPO: credit risk, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: operating leverage, LAGE: bank age, FORE: 
dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 
otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic 
production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial 
crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Banks Islamic Conventional 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Indicator Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. 
Bank-specific variables 
LOGZ 
  -0.00199 0.163
***
   -0.00285 0.0839
***
 
  (-0.16) (12.82)   (-0.72) (8.21) 
EQTA 
-0.0491 2.492
***
   -0.143 0.691
***
   
(-0.16) (12.82)   (-0.72) (8.21)   
LTA 
-0.0121 -0.0980
*
 -0.053
***
 -0.0216
*
 0.0715
***
 -0.29
***
 -0.0274
***
 -0.048
***
 
(-0.27) (-2.50) (-6.32) (-2.15) (3.51) (-10.02) (-9.83) (-4.63) 
LOANSTA 
0.594
*
 -0.129 -0.279
***
 -0.0744
**
 -0.289
**
 -0.0828 0.131
***
 0.260
***
 
(2.24) (-1.19) (-5.47) (-2.70) (-2.98) (-1.53) (9.89) (15.16) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.000051 0.00012 0.00106
**
 0.000192 0.00523
**
 0.00019 0.0017
***
 -0.00003 
(-0.03) (0.23) (2.97) (1.45) (2.74) (0.32) (6.44) (-0.19) 
ROA 
3.471
***
 1.551
***
 0.237 -0.132
*
 5.597
***
 2.258
***
 2.552
***
 1.822
***
 
(4.93) (7.45) (1.61) (-2.26) (5.70) (6.72) (21.13) (17.19) 
FATA 
1.652 0.703 2.800
***
 0.0131 4.092
*
 3.000
**
 0.343 -0.560 
(0.65) (0.75) (5.79) (0.05) (2.03) (3.24) (1.20) (-1.73) 
LAGE 
0.569
***
  -0.0585
**
  0.155
**
  -0.0142
*
  
(6.38)  (-3.10)  (3.09)  (-2.00)  
FORE 
 0.0996   -1.858
***
 -0.171 -0.0187 0.00150 
 (0.74)   (-5.18) (-1.68) (-0.37) (0.04) 
DOM 
0.103 0.0556 -0.0693
**
 0.0210 -1.505
***
 -0.109 -0.0529 -0.00740 
(0.95) (0.46) (-3.21) (0.95) (-4.26) (-1.43) (-1.05) (-0.28) 
GOV 
0.105  -0.00642 0.0488 -1.752
***
  0.0248  
(0.70)  (-0.21) (1.43) (-5.00)  (0.50)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0372 0.128 0.054
***
 -0.0180 -0.178
***
 0.420
***
 -0.00467 0.0306 
(-0.61) (1.86) (4.60) (-1.02) (-6.12) (8.80) (-1.12) (1.78) 
INFLATION 
0.200 -0.131 0.0983 -0.00404 -1.750
***
 -0.0436 0.0446 -0.0525 
(0.41) (-0.91) (1.01) (-0.11) (-4.47) (-0.33) (0.80) (-1.15) 
MCAP 
-0.331
**
 0.0570 0.138
***
 -0.0284
*
 -0.212
***
 0.150
***
 0.0286
***
 -0.0332
*
 
(-3.16) (1.09) (6.99) (-2.14) (-3.55) (3.91) (3.38) (-2.48) 
GFC 
-0.0142 -0.0216 0.0233 0.0140
*
 0.0315 -0.00774 -0.00241 0.00546 
(-0.16) (-0.96) (1.35) (2.44) (0.56) (-0.46) (-0.30) (0.94) 
Sig 1.738 -0.329 -0.543
*
 0.433 8.328
***
 -5.20
***
 0.447
***
 -0.599 
cons (1.27) (-0.20) (-1.98) (1.05) (10.33) (-4.83) (3.79) (-1.58) 
R2 0.3818 0.6290 0.5775 0.5693 0.1445 0.3665 0.5384 0.6109 
#  of banks 40 40 40 40 168 168 168 168 
N 291 291 291 291 1277 1277 1277 1277 
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in Islamic banks. Bank age is significant and positive with log (z-score) but 
significant and negative with capital ratio. In the literature, Schaeck and Cihàk 
(2014), Lee and Chih (2013), and Mirzaei et al. (2013) go with the concept that 
older banks have more stability, but no studies prove that new banks are more 
stable than older banks. In Islamic banks, the concentration of private (domestic) 
banks was significantly decreasing capitalisation. In conventional banks, higher 
levels of foreign (consistent with Kasman & Kasman, 2015), private and public 
(ElBannan, 2015) ownership led to destabilisation with higher risks. Focusing on 
country-specific data, In Islamic banks, the GDP tended to have a positive, strong 
and significant correlation at the level of 0.1% with capital levels. With regards to 
conventional banks, higher GDP levels strongly and significantly increased the 
default risk based on OLS‟s coefficient (-0.178) but the FE models estimated a 
positive coefficient (0.420), which supported the stability. Most studies agreed with 
the positive relationship between GDP and stability (z-score), e.g. Chen et al. 
(2015), Doumpos et al. (2015), Keffala (2015) and Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015). 
On the contrary, very few studies investigated the negative impact on stability such 
as Wang et al. (2015). The conventional banks in countries with greater inflation 
rates were easily breakable due a strong and inverse association between inflation 
and z-score (similar to Baselga-Pascual et al., 2015). The financial development 
(market capitalistion to GDP ratio) has several different estimations. In detail, OLS 
suggests Islamic and conventional banks face a very high bankruptcy risk in 
countries with more financial investments. This result is completely contrary to 
expectations, but FE model estimated a positive and significant coefficient that 
represents conventional banking (in line with Carretta et al., 2015). Depending on 
capital ratio as a stability indicator, OLS proposed that stock market growth led to 
better stability, but FEM confirmed a negative relationship between capitalisation 
and stock market development. Lastly, the FE regression underlines that Islamic 
banks operated their capitals effectively (significant and positive relationship 
between capital ratio and GFC variable) than conventional banks over the period 
of the global financial crisis (2007-2009) but no correlation was found between the 
rest of OLS‟s and FEM‟s coefficients for log (z-score) and capital ratio. According 
to R2 measures, Islamic banks scored values between 38.18% and 62.90%, while 
conventional banks achieved between 14.45% and 61.09%. 
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7.5 Stability of MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
7.5.1 Stability measures description for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Based on both stability‟s indicators (z-score and capital ratio), the socially 
responsible banks were found to be the most financial settled type of banking by 
far (scoring averages 4.876 and 69.58% for log (z-score) and capital ratio, 
respectively) compared to Islamic and conventional banks as in Table 7.9 below. 
According to z-score‟s measures, the conventional banks (3.228) were more 
resistant against risk than Islamic banks (3.158) but the capital ratio confirmed an 
opposite point as Islamic banks (13.57%) operated their equities more efficiently 
than conventional banks (11.39%) over the period 2005-2012. 
Table 7.9: Stability measures description for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
 
7.5.2 Determinants of stability in MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
To find the positive and negative causes of the financial stability, Table 7.10 
exhibits the factors that impact stability. The empirical findings in Table 7.10 go 
with the previous results of MENA countries including GCC region in Table 7.8, 
which concludes that the log (z-score) and capital ratio influence each other 
positively, significantly, and strongly at a level of 0.1%. According to the size 
variable‟s results, the smaller Islamic and conventional banks were found to be 
more highly capitalised (in line with Schaeck & Cihàk, 2014). Following the OLS 
method led us to know that large-sized conventional and socially responsible 
banks were further from bankruptcy (similar to Brighi & Venturelli, 2015), however 
FE model approved that conventional banks with lower total assets tended to be 
steadier. The loan intensity was significant only with capital ratios of those in the 
Islamic and conventional banking sectors. In particular, OLS suggests that loans 
threatened the stability of Islamic and conventional banking. The FEM proposed 
that loans strengthened the capitals in conventional banks but worsened Islamic 
banking stability. ElBannan (2015), Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) and Berger et al. 
(2009) also claim that loan intensity is a negative and important determination of 
capitalisation in the banking sector. The credit risk factor shows that more 
stabilised Islamic banks tended to have fewer default risks. With regards to capital 
ratio, Islamic and conventional banks (OLS) with higher capitalisation levels 
Banks Islamic Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Stability Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log (z-score) 3.1585 0.6819 1.53 5.51 3.2287 1.0454 -3.27 5.19 4.8767 0.9487 2.74 6.1 
Capital ratio 0.1357 0.1047 0.02 0.57 0.1139 0.0918 0.01 1.29 0.6958 0.2553 0.03 0.96 
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Table 7.10: Determinants of stability for MENA countries (excluding GCC) 
Banks Islamic Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Indicator Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. 
Bank-specific variables 
LOGZ 
  0.0425
***
 0.124
***
   0.0172
***
 0.0862
***
   0.0139 0.144
***
 
  (4.98) (11.16)   (5.70) (18.62)   (0.78) (4.98) 
EQTA 
4.177
***
 4.422
***
   2.267
***
 3.862
***
   0.883 2.429
***
   
(4.98) (11.16)   (5.70) (18.62)   (0.78) (4.98)   
LTA 
0.126 -0.0950 -0.0388
***
 0.00450 0.162
***
 -0.129
***
 -0.0177
***
 -0.0364
***
 0.293
*
 0.0897 0.0128 0.0217 
(1.81) (-1.69) (-6.33) (0.47) (7.01) (-3.62) (-8.94) (-7.00) (2.42) (0.85) (0.80) (0.84) 
LOANSTA 
-0.947 -0.0618 -0.117
*
 -0.0632
*
 -0.0143 -0.0581 -0.0966
***
 0.0611
***
 -1.066 0.494 0.139 0.00705 
(-1.95) (-0.36) (-2.41) (-2.22) (-0.05) (-0.49) (-3.81) (3.47) (-1.38) (1.39) (1.44) (0.08) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.0234 -0.175
*
 0.139
***
 0.0697
***
 -0.224 0.157 0.122
***
 -0.0234 0.194 0.292 -0.166
***
 -0.174
***
 
(0.10) (-2.04) (7.39) (5.41) (-1.02) (1.39) (6.50) (-1.39) (0.52) (1.71) (-4.05) (-5.04) 
ROA 
0.741 2.995 0.589 -0.508 16.28
***
 7.537
***
 -0.465
**
 -1.131
***
 10.16 3.610 -2.250
***
 -1.913
***
 
(0.15) (1.41) (1.19) (-1.43) (9.22) (11.46) (-2.89) (-11.52) (1.98) (1.65) (-3.83) (-4.07) 
FATA 
11.04
*
 2.524 0.0723 -0.167 10.99
***
 2.351
*
 0.441
*
 0.235 17.33
*
 11.99
***
 -2.876
**
 -2.648
***
 
(2.09) (1.19) (0.13) (-0.47) (4.36) (2.11) (1.99) (1.41) (2.45) (4.04) (-3.39) (-3.55) 
LAGE 
0.891
***
  -0.0763
***
  0.273
***
  -0.0206
***
  -0.569
***
  0.0329  
(4.69)  (-3.88)  (4.67)  (-4.02)  (-3.86)  (1.60)  
FORE 
0.0947  -0.0216  -1.842
***
  0.0287  -0.567
*
  0.0252  
(0.57)  (-1.30)  (-5.40)  (0.95)  (-2.11)  (0.72)  
DOM 
    -1.398
***
  -0.0116  -0.832  -0.721
***
  
    (-4.20)  (-0.40)  (-0.89)  (-12.20)  
GOV 
-0.553
*
  0.0744
**
  -1.670
***
  0.0359  -0.427  0.0329  
(-2.25)  (3.06)  (-5.17)  (1.26)  (-1.04)  (0.63)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.136 0.102 0.0345
***
 0.0133 -0.222
***
 0.300
***
 -0.00135 0.0220
**
 -0.885
***
 0.137 0.0518
*
 0.00755 
(-1.42) (0.96) (3.75) (0.74) (-6.02) (5.49) (-0.41) (2.65) (-6.41) (0.90) (2.32) (0.20) 
INFLATION 
0.382 -0.252 0.102 0.0539 -0.790 0.475
*
 -0.0403 -0.0648
*
 9.784
***
 0.182 -0.0872 0.158 
(0.40) (-0.75) (1.06) (0.96) (-1.29) (2.27) (-0.75) (-2.07) (8.22) (0.24) (-0.38) (0.85) 
MCAP 
0.168 -0.000598 -0.0263 0.0188 0.00699 0.0961
*
 0.0158
*
 0.00507 -0.930 0.0377 0.120 0.0510 
(1.22) (-0.01) (-1.92) (1.21) (0.10) (2.10) (2.52) (0.74) (-1.86) (0.17) (1.92) (0.96) 
GFC -0.0581 -0.0567 0.000383 0.00822 0.0401 0.0177 -0.0103 -0.00625
*
 -0.0759 -0.0102 0.0224 0.00755 
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Notes: LOGZ: z-score, EQTA: capital ratio, LTA: bank size, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: operating leverage, 
LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank 
and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the 
study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
(-0.55) (-1.73) (0.04) (1.49) (0.62) (0.89) (-1.84) (-2.10) (-0.75) (-0.25) (1.82) (0.76) 
Sig 2.367 0.853 -0.393 -0.652 7.659
***
 -3.912
**
 0.266
**
 -0.431
*
 25.86
***
 -1.543 -0.683 -0.204 
cons (1.16) (0.33) (-1.93) (-1.53) (7.83) (-3.26) (3.02) (-2.40) (8.73) (-0.47) (-1.17) (-0.26) 
R2 0.3654 0.6541 0.7256 0.7067 0.2931 0.4792 0.3023 0.5307 0.9011 0.6109 0.9785 0.7633 
# of banks 17 17 17 17 108 108 108 108 9 9 9 9 
N 129 129 129 129 813 813 813 813 64 64 64 64 
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struggled with great credit risk rates but in accordance to socially responsible 
banks, the more capital achieved the lower credit risk rates recorded. Soedarmono 
et al. (2011) argue that credit risk is significantly and positively related with z-score 
and capital ratio for an Asian study. The ROA factor indicates that profitable banks 
were found to be less risky as the correlation between z-score and ROA is very 
strong and significant at a level of 0.1%. On the other hand, low-capitalised 
conventional and socially responsible banks tended to have better profitability than 
high-capitalised banks. However, the results of fixed assets intensity (FATA) 
encouraged all banks to invest more in fixed assets in an attempt to avoid any 
insolvency risk. In addition, the capital in conventional banks was affected by fixed 
assets significantly and positively while, fixed assets decreased the capital 
significantly in socially responsible banks. The age of bank (AGE) factor is very 
important variable to determine the stability in banking. In detail, there is a robust 
and positive association at the level of 0.1% between age and z-score in Islamic 
and conventional banks. On the contrary, age impacted the stability of socially 
responsible banks inversely and significantly. With regard to capitalisation, new 
Islamic and conventional banks attained greater capital levels than older banks. 
Schaeck and Cihàk (2014) investigated that age of bank is highly important to 
support z-score and capital ratio to a significant level. Based on the coefficients of 
ownership, public possession significantly increased bankruptcy probabilities and 
capitalisation. All type of (private, foreign and public) ownerships affected the 
stability (z-score) significantly and negatively in conventional banking systems. 
Finally, in socially responsible banks, higher levels of international banks neared 
the banks from failure and domestic banks concentrations significantly reduced the 
capitalisation. Based on macroeconomic factors, the only variable that affects 
Islamic banks is GDP, and the relationship between capital ratio and GDP is 
positive and strong at a level of 0.1%. The GDP also enhanced the capitals of 
conventional and socially responsible banks significantly. With regards to log (z-
score), the OLS estimated negative and significant coefficients of GDP for 
conventional and socially responsible banks, but FEM provided a positive and 
significant coefficient in the conventional banking sector. However, higher rates of 
inflations influenced the stability of conventional socially responsible banks 
positively and significantly but decreased the capitalisation badly in conventional 
banks. The conventional banks exploited the growth of stock market efficiently as 
 
 
  224 
 
conventional banks in better rates of market capitalisation tend to be more fixed 
(based on z-score and capital ratio). The empirical results of GFC shows that only 
conventional banks‟ capitalisation was affected inversely and significantly over the 
period 2007-2009, but there is no evidence of any impact on the capitalisation of 
Islamic and socially responsible banks. Over the period of the global financial 
crisis, the stability of all banks was not affected due to insignificant correlations 
between GFC and log (z-score). Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) also found 
insignificant relationships between stability (z-score and capitalisation) and GFC. 
Overall, the consistency percentage in Islamic banks ranged between 36.54% and 
72.56%, conventional banks recorded 29.31% to 53.07%, and socially responsible 
banks scored 76.33% to 97.85%. 
7.6 Stability of GCC countries  
7.6.1 Stability measures description for GCC countries 
Table 7.11 reports that conventional banks (2.815) are further from insolvency risk 
than Islamic banks (2.361). In contrast, the Islamic banks achieved better 
capitalisation levels (29.86%) than conventional banks (21.45%) in GCC region 
through the period 2005-2012. As a result, OLS and FEM reveal the causes that 
determine the stability‟s indicators in Table 7.9 (this is discussed in the next part). 
Table 7.11: Stability measures description for GCC countries 
7.6.2 Determinants of stability in GCC countries 
Table 7.12 explains that the stability estimators (z-score and capitalisation) are 
positively and significantly influential to each other. This complies with the recent 
results of MENA countries including and excluding GCC region. The fixed effects 
model summarises that smaller Islamic and conventional banks tended to be more 
stable and less risky. Regarding the OLS‟s findings, large-sized Islamic banks 
were more resistant against failure. In addition, OLS concludes that smaller 
Islamic and conventional banks had better capital standards than larger banks. 
The lending activities were found to be very important in raising the stability of 
Islamic banks. Additionally, loans impacted the capital ratio of Islamic banks  
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Stability Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Stability Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log (z-score) 2.3619 0.8681 -0.17 4.34 Log (z-score) 2.8155 1.0074 -1.06 4.82 
Capital ratio 0.2986 0.2504 0.06 0.99 Capital ratio 0.2145 0.3021 0.01 5.23 
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Table 7.12: Determinants of stability for GCC countries 
Notes: LOGZ: z-score, EQTA: capital ratio, LTA: bank size, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: 
credit risk, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: operating leverage, LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 if 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 
1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, 
MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls 
within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Banks Islamic Conventional 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Indicator Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. 
Bank-specific variables 
LOGZ 
  0.0562
***
 0.178
***
   -0.00820 0.133
***
 
  (3.85) (8.49)   (-0.92) (4.05) 
EQTA 
1.620
***
 2.033
***
   -0.231 0.301
***
   
(3.85) (8.49)   (-0.92) (4.05)   
LTA 
0.265
***
 -0.121
*
 -0.101
***
 -0.0288 -0.0101 -0.20
***
 -0.0612
***
 -0.0229 
(3.96) (-2.25) (-9.87) (-1.80) (-0.27) (-5.25) (-9.35) (-0.85) 
LOANSTA 
1.581
***
 0.0279 -0.477
***
 -0.161
***
 -0.00398 0.0450 0.105
***
 0.257
***
 
(4.53) (0.17) (-8.33) (-3.47) (-0.03) (0.90) (4.81) (8.43) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.000969 0.00028 0.00087
**
 0.000195 0.00424
*
 0.00021 0.0015
***
 -0.00017 
(-0.60) (0.54) (3.00) (1.27) (2.25) (0.49) (4.46) (-0.59) 
ROA 
2.697
***
 1.590
***
 0.0750 -0.181
*
 4.057
**
 3.049
***
 3.104
***
 2.159
***
 
(4.13) (7.36) (0.58) (-2.42) (3.25) (9.82) (16.52) (10.61) 
FATA 
2.629 0.243 0.889 0.0567 -6.062
*
 -1.336 0.320 -1.397 
(1.04) (0.23) (1.91) (0.19) (-1.97) (-1.19) (0.55) (-1.88) 
LAGE 
0.389
***
  -0.00630  -0.495
***
  -0.000325  
(4.14)  (-0.34)  (-4.65)  (-0.02)  
FORE 
 0.0144  -0.0463  -0.198
**
  0.00279 
 (0.11)  (-1.15)  (-2.70)  (0.06) 
DOM 
0.140 -0.0286 -0.123
***
 -0.0181 0.267
*
 -0.130
*
 -0.0479
*
 0.00349 
(0.95) (-0.23) (-4.79) (-0.50) (2.45) (-2.36) (-2.33) (0.09) 
GOV 
0.335  -0.162
***
  0.172  0.0330  
(1.60)  (-4.38)  (1.48)  (1.51)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0523 0.0627 0.0660
***
 -0.0222 0.0535 0.116 0.00473 0.0764 
(-0.64) (0.66) (4.64) (-0.80) (1.03) (1.75) (0.48) (1.74) 
INFLATION 
0.625 -0.129 -0.130 -0.0383 -0.715 -0.202 0.0387 -0.0467 
(1.20) (-0.81) (-1.35) (-0.81) (-1.41) (-1.70) (0.40) (-0.59) 
MCAP 
0.150 0.0358 0.0114 -0.0439
*
 -0.157 0.0299 0.0150 -0.0434 
(1.02) (0.57) (0.41) (-2.42) (-1.37) (0.62) (0.69) (-1.36) 
GFC 
0.0227 0.0118 0.0114 0.00572 -0.0406 -0.0320 0.0251 0.0285
*
 
(0.23) (0.38) (0.61) (0.62) (-0.44) (-1.54) (1.45) (2.07) 
Sig -1.199 1.102 -0.380 0.808 3.344
**
 1.608 0.484
*
 -2.072
*
 
cons (-0.66) (0.49) (-1.13) (1.22) (2.73) (1.07) (2.09) (-2.08) 
R2 0.5351 0.6962 0.8060 0.6186 0.1334 0.6484 0.6476 0.7176 
#  of banks 23 23 23 23 60 60 60 60 
N 162 162 162 162 464 464 464 464 
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inversely and significantly at the level of 0.1% but the conventional banks invested 
their loans very efficiently to support their capitals. The credit risk ratio encouraged 
Islamic banks to accept more deposits to reduce risks. Thus, lower credit risk led 
to more stability in Islamic and conventional banks. Based on profitability ratio 
(ROA), there are strong associations between log (z-score) and profits in Islamic 
and conventional banks; this result allowed banks to have lower risks. The profits 
had a significant effect on the shareholders, encouraging them to support equities 
in conventional banks. Conversely, high-capitalised Islamic banks tended to be 
less profitable. With regards to fixed assets intensity, owning more fixed assets 
threatened the stability of conventional banks and significantly maximised their 
risks. With regard to time of establishment, the age of the bank significantly 
supported the stability of Islamic banks but considerably worsened the stability of 
conventional banks. Considering ownerships, the results conclude that 
international conventional banks were financially very fragile due to a negative and 
significant correlation between foreign ownership and z-score. Focusing on 
domestic ownership, more investment in local banking led to weak capitals in 
Islamic and conventional banking sectors. The OLS suggest that the increment in 
local banks enhanced stability and reduced risk-taking significantly. In contrast, 
FEM proposed that domestic banks were instable with higher rates of risks. Finally, 
in Islamic banks, the relationship between capital ratio and public ownership was 
found to be negative and significant at the level of 0.1%. Focusing on external 
factors, higher levels of economic development (GDP) affected the capital ratio of 
Islamic banks robustly and positively at 0.1%; however, oppositely, Islamic banks 
could not improve their capitals in countries with developed stock markets. The 
GFC shows a very interesting outcome as conventional banks invested their 
equities effectively (based on a positive and significant coefficient) at the crisis 
period (2007-2009). In Islamic banks, there is no statistical evidence for any 
impact from GFC on stability. The R2 in Islamic banks varied from 53.51%- 80.60%, 
and 13.34%-71.76% in conventional banks.  
7.7 Stability of UK (as a benchmark)  
7.7.1 Stability measures description for UK 
Based on Table 7.13, the social responsible banks are financially the most stable 
banking system (2.872), unlike Islamic banking which faced very high risks (1.339) 
over the period 2005-2012. In contrast, Islamic banks invested the most through 
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their equities (56.14%) while, SRBs have the minimum capitalisation (6.30%). In 
MENA (excluding GCC) region, banks (Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks) are highly ready to solve any risks due to high measures of z-
scores. Unfortunately, banks in UK (Islamic, conventional and socially responsible 
banks) found to be instable and risky compared to banks across the world, banks 
in MENA and GCC areas. According to capital ratios, in Islamic banking, banks in 
UK have the greatest capital ratio (56.14%) compared to capital ratio of Islamic 
banks in MENA (excluding GCC) countries 13.60%. In conventional banks, the 
best capitalisation is recorded in GCC countries scoring 21.45% whereas, the 
lowest capital ratio attained by conventional banks in UK scoring 11.44%. In the 
SRBs, banks in MENA countries are well capitlaised 69.58% but in UK, SRBs 
have very weak capitals. 
Table 7.13: Stability measures description for UK 
Banks Islamic Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Stability Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log (z-score) 1.3395 1.5628 -1.72 4.34 2.7663 1.1333 -2 5.15 2.8724 0.8583 1.14 4.36 
Capital ratio 0.5614 0.8402 0.08 4.01 0.1145 0.1069 0.01 0.94 0.0630 0.0357 0.03 0.18 
 
7.7.2 Determinants of stability in UK 
Table 7.14 shows that stability‟s indicators (z-score and capital ratio) were found to 
be very important to each other within Islamic and conventional banks. According 
to SRBs, OLS suggests that lower capitalisation banks are risky and unstable, but 
FEM proposes that higher-capitalised banks are more resistant against insolvency 
risks. These results comply with Islamic and conventional banks in MENA and 
GCC regions. Regarding the size, smaller conventional banks are bound to be 
more stable and better capitalised. In SRBs, the relationship between size and 
capital ratio is negative and significant. The conventional banks in the UK 
(including GCC) and GCC regions have the same conclusions. Focusing on loans, 
in conventional and SRBs, banks with greater loans were found to be stable, 
whereas in conventional banks, fewer loans led to lower capitalisation (similar to 
conventional banks in GCC region). In conventional banks, those with higher 
stability have fewer credit risks and more capitalisation, allowing for more crediting 
risks (consistent to conventional banks in the UK [including GCC], MENA 
[including GCC] and GCC banks). Based on profitability ratio, the more profitable 
Islamic, conventional and SRB banks were found to be fixed and less risky (in line 
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Table 7.14: Determinants of stability for UK 
Banks Islamic Conventional Banks Socially Responsible Banks 
Model (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Indicator Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. Log(z) Log(z) Cap. R. Cap. R. 
Bank-specific variables 
LOGZ 
  0.209
**
 -0.0210   0.0174
***
 0.0790
***
   -0.0122
*
 0.0334
***
 
  (4.47) (-0.36)   (5.01) (13.75)   (-2.13) (5.39) 
EQTA 
3.414
**
 -0.852   2.570
***
 3.665
***
   -12.57
*
 17.05
***
   
(4.47) (-0.36)   (5.01) (13.75)   (-2.13) (5.39)   
LTA 
-0.661 -1.884 0.433 -0.220 -0.0754
***
 -0.188
***
 -0.0173
***
 -0.0449
***
 -0.0407 0.147 -0.00692
*
 -0.0179
***
 
(-0.51) (-1.43) (1.50) (-1.00) (-3.69) (-4.47) (-11.34) (-7.55) (-0.36) (1.13) (-2.10) (-3.92) 
LOANSTA 
-1.896 -1.509 -0.0943 -0.0818 0.0752 0.552
***
 -0.0569
**
 -0.0796
***
 8.026
*
 0.0664 -0.164 -0.0838 
(-0.45) (-0.41) (-0.09) (-0.14) (0.30) (4.19) (-2.79) (-4.12) (2.38) (0.06) (-1.48) (-1.77) 
LOANSDEPO 
0.227 -1.213 0.589 -0.160 -0.185 -0.265
***
 0.101
***
 0.0559
***
 -5.935 0.522 0.173 0.0667 
(0.08) (-0.48) (0.90) (-0.40) (-1.23) (-5.40) (8.80) (8.03) (-2.02) (0.43) (1.87) (1.28) 
ROA 
1.211
*
 1.053
*
 -0.271
*
 -0.0161 25.28
***
 4.857
***
 -1.045
***
 -0.472
***
 3.073 22.60
***
 -0.370 -1.036
***
 
(2.80) (2.72) (-2.34) (-0.18) (11.49) (5.83) (-5.31) (-3.78) (0.22) (6.19) (-0.85) (-6.87) 
FATA 
-22.08 6.361 14.11 8.725 3.258 -0.337 1.288
***
 1.830
***
 15.84 6.447 -1.167 -0.601
*
 
(-0.51) (0.16) (1.47) (1.60) (1.09) (-0.14) (5.35) (5.53) (0.61) (0.99) (-1.51) (-2.28) 
LAGE 
6.007  -1.787  -0.0763  -0.0224
***
  -0.557  -0.0195
*
  
(1.16)  (-1.45)  (-1.47)  (-5.40)  (-1.92)  (-2.21)  
FORE 
-0.201  0.0345  0.628 0.108 -0.0145 -0.0399
**
     
(-0.26)  (0.18)  (1.12) (1.29) (-0.31) (-3.27)     
DOM 
 0.461  0.0671 0.607  -0.000899      
 (0.67)  (0.62) (1.08)  (-0.02)      
GOV 
     0.0780  -0.0389     
     (0.38)  (-1.29)     
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
3.407 2.587 -0.772 -0.136 -0.325 0.0904 0.000159 0.00680 -0.0609 -0.133 0.0616 0.0190 
(1.26) (1.08) (-1.13) (-0.33) (-0.61) (0.61) (0.00) (0.31) (-0.05) (-0.43) (1.63) (1.46) 
INFLATION 
-13.74 -19.15 -0.832 -2.549 0.231 -0.0397 -0.0245 0.0127 -10.14 3.002 -1.237 -0.236 
(-0.27) (-0.44) (-0.07) (-0.37) (0.24) (-0.15) (-0.31) (0.32) (-0.47) (0.55) (-1.97) (-1.00) 
MCAP 
0.502 0.821 -0.288 0.0357 -0.0389 0.0753 -0.000669 -0.00537 -0.275 0.0629 -0.0391 -0.00599 
(0.29) (0.53) (-0.68) (0.14) (-1.22) (1.40) (-0.25) (-0.68) (-0.37) (0.34) (-1.77) (-0.73) 
GFC 
0.0731 -0.112 -0.0961 -0.0635 -0.0464 -0.0603* -0.0102 0.00114 0.142 -0.00369 -0.00397 0.00134 
(0.11) (-0.19) (-0.60) (-0.71) (-0.52) (-2.28) (-1.39) (0.29) (0.55) (-0.06) (-0.49) (0.49) 
 
 
  229 
 
Notes: LOGZ: z-score, EQTA: capital ratio, LTA: bank size, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: operating leverage, 
LAGE: bank age, FORE: dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank 
and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the 
study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
Sig -107.1 -62.00 23.96 5.496 12.17 1.133 0.266 0.0966 7.867 4.040 -1.458 -0.430 
cons (-1.34) (-0.94) (1.19) (0.51) (0.80) (0.27) (0.21) (0.16) (0.22) (0.47) (-1.36) (-1.17) 
R2 0.8823 0.9161 0.9750 0.8050 0.3285 0.5549 0.4891 0.6728 0.8288 0.8720 0.9040 0.9275 
# of banks 3 3 3 3 74 74 74 74 5 5 5 5 
N 21 21 21 21 550 550 550 550 37 37 37 37 
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with banks across the world, MENA banks and GCC banks). In contrast, banks 
with large capitals attained less profit. The assets intensity was found to be highly 
important to capitalisation in conventional banking systems (similar to banks in the 
UK [including GCC] and MENA [excluding GCC]) but assets affected the capital 
ratio in SRBs inversely and significantly (the same as MENA banks [excluding 
GCC]). New conventional banks and SRBs were well capitalised compared to 
older banks. Foreign banks‟ investment led to worse capitalisation. Finally, over 
the period of global financial crisis, conventional banks faced a very high 
probability of failure due to a significant correlation between z-score and GFC. 
Overall, the R2 in Islamic banks varied between 80.50% and 97.50%, the R2 in 
conventional banks scored between 32.85% and 67.28%, and finally, SRBs had 
consistency measures between 82.88% and 92.75%. 
7.8 Determinants of stability for the whole sample 
Considering the full sample, we can conclude the determinants of stability (z-score 
and capitalisation) in Table 7.15. Firstly, the positive determinants of z-score for 
the full sample are capital ratio, size, ROA, age, GDP (FEM) and market 
capitalisartion (FEM). Secondly, there are inverse relationships between z-score 
and loan intensity, GDP (OLS) and market capitalisation.  
 
Focusing on capital ratios‟ results for the full sample allow us to find that z-score, 
loan intensity, credit risk, ROA, operating leverage, banking (foreign, domestic and 
public) ownerships GDP and market capitalisation were supporting the 
capitalisation significantly and positively. In contrast, size and age unsecured the 
financial stability due to an inverse correlation with capital ratios. 
 
7.9 Conclusion of stability and its determinants   
The socially responsible banks are the most stabilised banks scoring average log 
(z-score) equals to 3.896 following by conventional banks (2.981) then Islamic 
banks (2.647). On other words, Islamic banks are highly exposed a threat to 
bankrupt over the period 2005-2012. 
This chapter explained that the stability (z-score) of Islamic banks is affected 
positively and significantly by size (OLS), bank capitalisation, loans (OLS), ROA, 
age and ownership (domestic and stat-owned banks), while total assets (FEM),  
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Table 7.15: Results of stability determinants for all banks 
Stability 
All Banks All Banks 
(OLS) (FEM) (OLS) (FEM) 
Log(z) Log(z) Capital ratio Capital ratio 
Bank-specific variables 
LOGZ 
  0.0262
***
 0.127
***
 
  (7.28) (17.00) 
EQTA 
0.822
***
 0.955
***
   
(7.28) (17.00)   
LTA 
-0.0211 -0.291
***
 -0.00804
***
 -0.0360
***
 
(-1.70) (-15.32) (-3.64) (-4.96) 
LOANSTA 
-0.266
***
 -0.111
**
 0.0958
***
 0.336
***
 
(-3.66) (-2.66) (7.45) (25.22) 
LOANSDEPO 
-0.000450 0.000249 0.00172
***
 0.0000789 
(-0.27) (0.54) (5.90) (0.47) 
ROA 
2.269
***
 1.661
***
 0.245
***
 0.0413 
(6.09) (15.92) (3.67) (1.02) 
FATA 
-0.547 1.063 3.590
***
 2.346
***
 
(-0.38) (1.80) (14.61) (11.19) 
LAGE 
0.162
***
  -0.0530
***
  
(4.89)  (-9.07)  
FORE 
-0.167 -0.0850 0.372
***
 -0.0226 
(-0.80) (-1.15) (10.25) (-0.83) 
DOM 
0.0206 -0.0533 0.328
***
 -0.00565 
(0.10) (-0.83) (8.89) (-0.24) 
GOV 
0.0468  0.405
***
  
(0.23)  (11.55)  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
-0.0690
***
 0.392
***
 -0.00206 0.0346
**
 
(-5.26) (11.06) (-0.87) (2.60) 
INFLATION 
-0.000384 -0.103 -0.00480 -0.0300 
(-0.02) (-1.05) (-1.47) (-0.84) 
MCAP 
-0.0491
***
 0.136
***
 0.00520
*
 0.00276 
(-3.59) (5.18) (2.13) (0.29) 
GFC 
-0.0286 -0.0220 -0.000132 0.00463 
(-0.63) (-1.90) (-0.02) (1.10) 
Sigma 4.496
***
 -4.994
***
 -0.0609 -0.993
**
 
_cons (10.93) (-5.80) (-0.81) (-3.14) 
R
2
 0.0791 0.4119 0.2824 0.5209 
Number of banks 323 323 323 323 
N 2423 2423 2423 2423 
Notes: LOGZ: z-score, EQTA: capital ratio, LTA: bank size, LOANSTA: loans intensity, 
LOANSDEPO: credit risk, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: operating leverage, LAGE: bank age, 
FORE: dummy equal 1 if foreign bank and 0 otherwise, DOM: dummy equal 1 if domestic bank 
and 0 otherwise, GOV: dummy equal 1 if government bank and 0 otherwise, LGDP: gross 
domestic production, INFLATION: inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: 
Global financial crisis; dummy equal 1 if the study period falls within year 2007-2009 and 0 
otherwise.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, t statistics in parentheses. 
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loans (FEM), operating leverage, GDP (OLS) and market capitalisation impact 
stability negatively.  
With regard to conventional banks, there were positive and significant 
relationships between z-score and capital ratio (FEM), loans to deposits ratio 
(OLS), ROA, operating leverage, GDP (FEM) and market capitalisation. On the 
contrary,  
a negative and significant relationship was found between z-score and size, 
capitalisation (OLS), loan intensity, ownership, GDP (OLS), inflation and GFC. 
Focusing on socially responsible banks, the factors found to be decreasing the 
threats of risk insolvency and raise the stability were as capitalisation, loans to 
deposits ratio, ROA, age and GDP (FEM). In contrast, the variables increasing the 
probability of failure are total assets, ownership and GDP (OLS) and inflation. 
Overall, ROA increased the stability (z-score) of Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks during the period of study, 2005-2012. The financial crisis 
influenced only the stability of conventional banks and the effect was positive and 
significant. 
Based on the capital ratios‟ results, we can conclude that the positive and 
significant determinants in Islamic banking sector are loan intensity, credit risk, 
operating leverage, z-score, GDP and market capitalisation. On the other side, 
capital ratios decreased from size, ROA and age.  
Regarding to conventional banks, the capitalisation was affected positively and 
significantly by loan intensity, credit risk, ROA, operating leverage, z-score (FEM) 
and GDP. In contrast, the capital ratios had a negative and significant relationship 
with size, age, z-score (OLS) and market capitalisation.  
Finally, socially responsible banks‟ capitalisations were influenced positively and 
significantly through size, loan intensity (FEM), credit risk, z-score and foreign 
ownership. By the contrary, loan intensity (OLS), ROA and GDP growth threaten 
the stability of SRBs. 
In conclusion, the bank-specific variables that increase stability are important for 
bank which leads to make policy makers in banks to focus on drawing better 
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strategies (plans) such as increasing the capital of bank. Regarding the countries 
that increase stability, banks always try to invest in countries which raise stability. 
However, Appendix 15 concludes the stability averages for Islamic, conventional 
and socially responsible banks. In addition, Appendix 15 states the highest and 
lowest measures over the period 2005-2012. 
Appendix 16 presents the significant variables that impacted stability of Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks through the 2005-2012 periods. 
Appendix 16 shows that ROA supported stability (z-score) and lowered the risk of 
bankruptcy for all banks over the period 2005-2012. This is the reason behind 
striving to maximise profits, which improves stability in the banking sector. 
Regarding the external variables, market capitalisation was found to be the main 
factor for stability (excluding Islamic banks). Thus, governments need to be 
concerned about improving the stock market. However, inflation was found to be 
affecting negatively stability over the period 2005-2012. This result is a warning to 
banks against operating in countries with higher inflation rates. In addition, the 
GFC made the conventional banks suffering from high insolvency risk over the 
period of the crisis (2007-2009). 
In MENA region including GCC countries, the conventional banks attained better 
z-scores than Islamic banks. In contrast, Islamic banks had the advantage of 
capitalisation (better than conventional banks). In MENA region without GCC 
countries, we can conclude that the socially responsible banks were found to be 
the most stabilised compared to conventional (which have the lowest capital ratios) 
and Islamic banks (that have the minimum z-scores). Finally, in GCC region, 
conventional banks attained better z-scores but Islamic banks were found to be 
more highly capitalised over the period 2005-2012. Based on the determinants of 
stability, the most remarkable results cover that stability‟s indicators (z-score and 
capitalisation) influence each other strongly, positively and significantly in MENA 
banking system. 
 
In the UK, the most stabilised banking system is the socially responsible, while 
Islamic banks were found to be unstable. On the contrary, Islamic banks have the 
best capital ratios but SRBs attained the worst capitalisation. Overall, stability‟s 
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indicators (z-score and capital ratio) were found to be very important to each other 
in Islamic and conventional banks. Regarding SRBs, OLS suggests that lower 
capitalisation banks are risky and unstable, but FEM proposes that higher-
capitalised banks are more resistant against insolvency risks.  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the determinants of Islamic, 
conventional, and socially responsible banks through the period 2005-2012. The 
statistical models were OLS and FEM. However, the structure of this thesis was 
divided as follows:  
Chapter One presented an overview of efficiency, profitability, and stability within 
the banking sector. It provided a comparison between Islamic, conventional, and 
socially responsible banks. Additionally, the objectives of the study and research 
questions were shown in Chapter One. Furthermore, the contributions of this 
thesis were explained. Finally, a brief explanation of data selection, including 
regions of banks, was included.  
Chapter Two introduced the recent studies on efficiency in banking, which helped 
in selecting the most suitable approaches and models. Additionally, Chapter Two 
noted the dependant variables and independent variables used by the researchers 
which simplified selection of the determinants of efficiency before running any 
statistical model. 
Chapter Three provided the literature review of profitability and its determinants in 
banking. In addition, the literature review of stability and its determinants was 
explained in detail. Finally, the conceptual framework was covered in this chapter.   
Chapter Four presented the sample of banks which included Islamic, 
conventional and socially responsible banks for the period 2005-2012. This 
chapter also outlined the indicators of efficiency, profitability, and stability and their 
determinants. 
Chapter Five included the results and discussion of efficiency and its 
determinants. A comparison between Islamic, conventional and socially 
responsible banks was conducted in this chapter using OLS and FEM. 
Chapter Six compared the profitability between Islamic, conventional, and socially 
responsible banks. Furthermore, this chapter analysed the data to find the 
determinants of profitability. 
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Finally, Chapter Seven exhibited the differences in stability between Islamic, 
conventional, and socially responsible banks. The determinants of stability were 
then identified through statistical models. 
8.2 Conclusion of efficiency results 
The socially responsible banks scored the highest averages of efficiency 
measures during the period 2005-2012, because SRBs aim to minimise the inputs 
in their operations. In contrast, the least scores were achieved by conventional 
banks due to higher interest expenses. Regarding the determinants, the variables 
which increase efficiency in Islamic banks have more total assets, and provide 
more loans to support outputs. Furthermore, investing more in financial markets as 
well as higher profitability resulted in greater efficiency. Finally, banks in countries 
with better stock market indices operated more efficiently. On the contrary, the 
threats against Islamic banks were attained from capital ratio and age. Lower 
capitalised banks were found to be more efficient. Moreover, newer banks 
operated more efficiently than older banks. With regards to conventional banks, 
the results reveal that size of bank matters in terms of more total assets, which 
help banks to provide better services and diversify risks. Capitals also supported 
efficiency effectively. In addition, lending services were found to increase 
efficiency in conventional banks. Similar to Islamic banks, financial investment and 
earnings influenced the efficiency significantly and positively. Finally, wealthier 
countries had more efficient banks in terms of GDP and stock market growth. On 
the other hand, inflation and the global financial crisis significantly reduced 
efficiency, which reveals that conventional banks are not resistant to economic 
distress. In terms of the socially responsible banks, well-capitalised banks were 
found to be more efficient. The threat of credit risk was higher due to a positive 
and significant correlation between efficiency and credit risk, which discouraged 
SRBs from providing more loans and accepting more deposits. According to 
macroeconomic variables, similar to conventional banks, richer countries (GPD 
and market capitalisation) included more efficient banks. Finally, GFC influenced 
the efficiency significantly and negatively. 
8.3 Conclusion of profitability results 
The highest ROA and ROE were attained by conventional banks, due to charging 
high interest expenses. On the other side, SRBs scored the lowest ROA and ROE, 
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as the aim of SRBs is to provide social and environmental services rather than 
profitability. According to NIM, the Islamic banks had the highest NIM measures in 
this study, because Islamic banks do not have interest expenses; while 
conventional banks had the minimum NIM ratios due to higher interest expenses. 
Focusing on Islamic banks, larger Islamic banks were found to be more profitable 
than smaller banks. Additionally, accepting more deposits increased the profits 
significantly. Further, more stable banks could maximise their earnings. Finally, 
banks in richer countries performed better financially. On the contrary, lower 
capitalised banks had more ROA and ROE, and providing more loans decreased 
the returns badly. Additionally, the Islamic banks in countries with higher inflation 
rates were not able to achieve outstanding profits. Concerning conventional banks, 
there is a positive and significant relationship between profitability ratios 
(ROA/ROA) and size. Contrary to Islamic banks, higher capitalised conventional 
banks attained greater earnings. The findings show that attracting more depositors 
supports the profitability significantly. In addition, stable banks were more 
profitable than unstable banks. Moreover, growth in the stock market allowed 
banks to financially perform better. On the other side, the development in 
economies impacted ROA negatively and significantly. According to socially 
responsible banks, capital ratio minimised profitability significantly, whereas the 
financial stability and financial markets development enhanced ROA and ROE 
over the period 2005-2012. However, we can conclude from the NIM determinants 
that Islamic banks are impacted positively by size of bank, capitalisation, and 
financial stability. On the other side, GDP and market capitalisation had negative 
signs. In terms of conventional banks, the relationship between NIM and loan 
intensity, z-score, and GFC were significant and positive. In contrast, size, deposit 
intensity, inflation, GDP, and market capitalisation decreased the NIM significantly. 
Finally, the socially responsible banks were affected significantly and negatively by 
size, deposit ratio, z-score, foreign ownership, domestic ownership, public 
ownership, GDP, and market capitalisation. On the contrary, capital ratio and 
credit risks had positive coefficients. 
8.4 Conclusion of stability results 
Socially responsible banks were the most stable (due to higher efficiency) 
compared to conventional and Islamic banks (highly risky) over the period 2005-
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2012. The stability of Islamic banks is affected positively and significantly by size 
of bank. Better capitalisation leads to stability in Islamic banking. Lending activities 
allow higher stability. Also, older banks were found to be more stable than new 
banks. Profitability also strongly supported financial stability in Islamic banking. 
Moreover, public and domestic ownership increased stability, however fixed assets 
intensity affected the stability badly due to the high expenses of fixed assets. 
Regarding the macroeconomic factors, Islamic banks could not exploit the growth 
of economies (GDP and market capitalisation), which resulted in worse financial 
stability measures in developed economies. In conventional banks, there is a 
positive and significant relationship between stability and profitability. Furthermore, 
operating leverage increased the stability significantly. Conventional banks, 
however, were more stable in countries with better economies (GDP and stock 
market development). On the contrary, conventional larger sized banks were 
found to be unstable compared to smaller sized banks. Inflation and GFC badly 
influence the financial stability of conventional banks. Focusing on socially 
responsible banks, the main factors were found to decrease the threat of 
insolvency risk, and raise the stability. In contrast, the variables increasing the 
probability of failure are total assets, and growth of economies. Regarding the 
capital ratio measures, the highest capitalised banks are socially responsible 
banks, and the most unstable banks are conventional banks. Focusing on the 
determinants of capitalisation, the positive and significant determinants in the 
Islamic banking sector are lending facilities, fixed assets intensity, and z-score. In 
addition, economic development (GDP and market capitalisation) allowed banks to 
maximise their capitals efficiently. On the other side, capital ratios of Islamic banks 
decreased from age of banks; new banks were more stable than older banks. 
Regarding conventional banks, capitalisation was affected positively and 
significantly by loan intensity. Also, profitability strongly enhances capitalisation. 
Finally, the wealthier countries had more constant banks against crisis. In contrast, 
the banks in countries with lower stock market rates were found to be steadier 
than countries with developed stock markets. Finally, socially responsible banks‟ 
capitalisation was influenced positively and significantly through size of banks. 
Moreover, supplying more loans tends to move banks further from bankruptcy. 
Regarding the ownership, foreign banks were found to be the best capitalised 
banks compared to domestic and public banks. On the contrary, economy growth 
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(GDP) threatens the stability of SRBs due to an inverse and significant correlation 
between capital ratios and GDP. 
8.5 Implications 
Studying efficiency, profitability, and stability in the banking sector can be helpful 
for policymakers, managers, and market analysts due to rising competition 
between banks. Thus, better upper management strategies increase the 
probability of achieving better efficiency, profitability, and stability in banks. 
According to clients, banking investors prefer dealing with efficient, profitable, and 
stable banks that are able to provide better interest rates than other banks. 
Regarding the determinants of efficiency, profitability, and stability, the effect of 
internal variables, whether positive or negative, allows banking regulators to apply 
strategies to raise the efficiency, profitability, and stability. Whereas, the impact of 
macroeconomic variables makes banks able to invest more by establishing more 
or fewer branches in any country. 
8.6 Limitations of study 
The limitations of this thesis are:  
 Bank governance (e.g. board size, gender of directors, duality of chair and 
CEO, duality of shareholders and directors) has not been considered. 
 OLS methodology has key weakness points as following: 
1. The OLS model is likely to be a biased approach in some cases. 
2. The OLS does not overcome the problem of multicollinearity. 
3. The OLS is an inconsistent regression in terms of the presence of time 
invariant characteristics-omitted variable bias problem. 
4. The algorithms for the computation of variance components using OLS 
are not optimal when data are missing. 
 Arab Spring (revolutions period as 2010-2012) has not been included. 
 The poor availability of data for Islamic and socially responsible banks, 
which reduces the number of banks. 
 Some results have low R2 for larger samples. 
8.7 Recommendations for future research  
Many studies can be conducted based on this thesis and relevant literature review. 
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However, based on the limitations mentioned above, recommendations for further 
research can be as follows: 
 Bank governance variables can be examined. 
 More statistical models can be run, such as the Tobit model for efficiency, 
generalised least square (GLS), and generalised method of moments 
(GMM), which may increase the R2 indicators. 
 Arabic revolutions‟ (Arab Spring) effects can be tested. 
 More regions could be considered, such as South American countries. 
 An updated period can be covered until 2015.  
 Additional efficiency indicators can be employed (for instance, stochastic 
frontier analysis [SFA]). 
 Further profitability ratios (i.e. non-interest income) may be beneficial for 
further research.  
 More stability measures (such as non-performing loans) would be 
significant.  
 Consideration of more country governance variables (accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of 
law) would contribute to the literature of efficiency, profitability and stability 
in banking. 
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Appendix 1: Studies on determinants of efficiency in banking 
Study 
(Efficiency) 
Banks 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent Variables 
Rosman et al. 
(2014)   
12 Middle Eastern 
countries 
(DEA) 
2007-2010 
Islamic 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
ROA (+), Size (+/-), Capital ratio (+), Credit Risk. 
Noor and Ahmed 
(2012) 
25 Countries 
(DEA) 
1992-2009 
Islamic 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
ROE, operating expenses/ total assets (+), Capital 
ratio (+), Size (+), Loan intensity (-), Market power 
(logarithm of deposits), Bank’s market share (+), 
GDP (+), Inflation (-), Stock market capitalisation, 
Asian financial crisis (+), Global financial crisis (-). 
El-Moussawi and 
Obeid (2010) 
GCC countries 
(DEA and SFA) 
2005-2008 
Islamic 
TE 
AE 
CE 
GDP (-), Inflation (+), Capital ratio (-), Size (-), 
Credit risk (-), ROA (+/-). 
 
Hassan (2006) 
21 Countries 
(DEA) 
1995-2001 
Islamic 
CE 
TE 
AE 
PTE 
SE 
Total assets (+), ROA (+), ROE (+), Loans (+). 
Yudistira (2004) 
(DEA) 
12 Countries 
1997-2000 
Islamic 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
Risk taking propensity (+), ROA, Size (+), Market 
power (-), Location (Middle East dummy) (-), 
Publicly listed Islamic banks (-). 
Stewart et al. 
(2016) 
Vietnam 
(DEA) 
1999-2009 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
ROA (+), Cost to assets ratio, City commercial banks 
(-), Size (+), Non-performing loans, Number of 
branches (-), Age of banks (-). 
Chen and Wang 
(2015) 
China 
(DEA) 
1994-2010 
Commercial EE 
Size (+), Capital adequacy (+), Loan intensity (+/-), 
State ownership (-), GDP (+), Inflation (+/-).  
Pessarossi and 
Weill (2015) 
China 
(SFA) 
2004-2009 
Commercial CE 
Capital ratio (+), large state-owned banks, City 
commercial banks, Joint-stock banks, Foreign banks, 
Size (+). 
Wijesiri et al. 
(2015) 
Sri Lanka 
(DEA) 
2010 
Commercial TE 
Financial model: Age (+), Capital ratio (-), ROA, 
Institutional type. 
Social model: Age (-), Capital ratio, ROA (-), 
Institutional type (+). 
Xiang et al. 
(2015) 
Australia, Canada 
and UK 
(DEA and SFA) 
1988-2008 
Commercial 
TE 
CE  
PE 
TE: Intangible assets (-), Loans to deposits ratio (-), 
Loan intensity (-), Net margin (-), Size (+), Debt to 
equity ratio (+). 
CE: Intangible assets, Loans to deposits ratio (-), 
Loan intensity (-), Net margin (-), Size (-), Debt to 
equity ratio. 
PE: Intangible assets (+), Loans to deposits ratio, 
Loan intensity, Net margin (-), Size (+), Debt to 
equity ratio. 
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Mamatzakis et al. 
(2015) 
Japan 
(DEA) 
2000-2012 
Commercial TE 
- OLS: Capital ratio (+), Net interest margin (+), 
Nikkei index (+), Industrial production (+), 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (-), Quantitative easing 
(+/-), Z-score (-), Bankrupt loans, Restructured loans. 
- FEM: Capital ratio, Net interest margin (+), Nikkei 
index (+), Industrial production (+), Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (-), Quantitative easing (-), Z-score, 
Bankrupt loans (+), Restructured loans (+). 
Moradi-Motlagh 
and Babacan 
(2015) 
Australis 
(DEA) 
2006-2012 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
Global financial crisis (-). 
Wanke and Barros 
(2014) 
Brazil 
(DEA and SFA) 
2012 year 
Commercial 
Productive 
Efficiency 
and 
CE 
 
- Productive efficiency: Mergers and acquisition (-), 
Size, Ownership (public (+), domestic and foreign).  
- Cost efficiency: Mergers and acquisition (-), Size 
(+), Ownership (public, domestic and foreign). 
Hou et al. (2014) 
China 
(DEA) 
2006-2010 
Commercial TE 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index in deposits (+), Capital 
ratio, Loan loss provisions to total loans (-), Ratio of 
total loans to deposits (-), Size (-), Ownership: state-
owned banks, Time trend, GDP growth (+), ROA (-). 
 
Tan and Floros, 
(2013) 
China 
(DEA) 
2003-2009 
 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
Book value of capital to total assets (+), ROA, Size 
(+), Liquidity ratio (-), Taxation (-), Ratio of off-
balance sheet items to total assets, Ratio of gross total 
revenue to number of employees (-), Concentration (-
), Ratio of banking industry assets over GDP, Stock 
market capitalization to GDP ratio, Inflation, GDP 
growth (+). 
Vu and Nahm 
(2013) 
Vietnam 
(SFA) 
2000-2006 
Commercial PE 
Capital ratio (-), Size (+), Non-performing loans (-), 
Loan intensity, Non-interest expense to total assets, 
Costs to total assets (+), ROE (+), Ownership: state-
owned (+) and joint-venture (+) banks, International 
commitments (-), Reform process, Stock market 
capitalisation (+), GDP (+), Inflation (-), Difference 
between lending and deposits rates (+), Loans to 
deposits. 
Lee and Chih 
(2013) 
China 
(SFA) 
2004-2011 
Commercial PE 
- For large banks: Operating costs to operating 
income (-), Current ratio (-), Age (-).  
- For small banks: Operating costs to operating 
income (-), Loan to deposit ratio (-), Leverage ratio 
(+), Capital adequacy ratio. 
Tabak et al. 
(2013) 
17 Latin American 
countries 
(SFA) 
2001-2008 
Commercial 
Profit  
inefficiency 
and 
Cost 
inefficiency 
- Profit inefficiency: Capital ratio (-), Credit risk, 
ROA, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, Market share (-), 
Ownership: foreign (-) and private (+/-) banks. 
- Profit inefficiency: Capital ratio (+), Credit risk (+/-
), ROA (-), Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (+), Market 
share (-), Ownership: foreign (-) and private (-) 
banks. 
Zhang and 
Matthews (2012) 
Indonesia 
(SFA) 
1992-2007 
Commercial CE 
Ownership: foreign banks (-), Herfindahl index (+/-), 
Size (+/-), Diversification = Noninterest income/total 
assets (-), Efficiency ratio = cost to income (+), GDP 
growth (+/-). 
Zhang et al. 
(2012) 
China 
(SFA) 
1999-2008 
Commercial 
Profit 
inefficiency 
Legal environment (-), Efficiency of the legal system 
(-), Protection of intellectual property right (-), 
Loans/GDP (-), GDP (+), GDP growth (-), Selection 
governance (-), Dynamic governance (+), Capital 
ratio (-), Non-performing loans ratio (+), Loans to 
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deposits (-), Interbank funds/ (interbank funds + 
deposits) (+), Long-term loans to loans (-), 
Securities/earning assets (-). 
Chortareas et al. 
(2012) 
22 EU countries 
(DEA) 
2000-2008 
 
Commercial 
Productive 
inefficiency 
Capital regulatory index (+/-), Official supervisory 
power (+/-), Activity restrictions (+), Private 
monitoring (+), Size (-), Loans to deposits, Capital 
ratio, Z-score (-), Herfindahl index (+), GDP growth 
(+), Voice and accountability (-), Control of 
Corruption (-), Ownership: foreign banks (-) and 
government banks (-), Deposit money bank 
assets/GDP (-), Financial crisis. 
Gardener et al. 
(2012) 
5 East Asian 
countries 
(DEA and SFA) 
1998-2004 
Commercial 
TE 
CE 
Size (-), Profit (+/-), Capital (+), Bank private credit 
(+), Regulation (+/-), Economic growth (+), Inflation, 
Ownership: state-owned (-), foreign (+) and private 
banks (-). 
Garza García 
(2012) 
Mexico 
(DEA) 
2001-2009 
 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
Degree of capitalisation (+/-), Net interest rate margin 
(-), ROA (+), Credit risk (-), Market share (+/-), Size, 
Loan intensity (+), GDP (+), Market capitalisation 
(+/-), Market concentration, Ownership: foreign 
banks (+), Inflation (-), Market interest rate volatility. 
Han et al. (2012) 
Korea 
(SFA) 
2002-2008 
Commercial PE 
Size (-), Interest rate (+), Credit loan ratio (-), 
Branches, Liquidity ratio, Financial affiliate. 
Fukuyama and 
Matousek (2011) 
Turkey 
(DEA and SFA) 
1991-2007 
 
Commercial 
CE 
TE 
Net interest margin (-), Net non-interest margin (+), 
Market share on loan market (+), Market share on 
deposit Market, ROA (+), Number of branches (-), 
Ownership: foreign and domestic banks, Time trend 
(analysed year) (-), Age, Capital to total equity. 
Fang et al. (2011) 
South Eastern 
Europe 
(SFA) 
1998-2008 
Commercial 
CE 
PE 
- CE: Ownership: foreign (-) and government banks, 
Market power (lerner index) (+), Privatisation (+), 
Banking reform, Enterprise re-structuring, Time trend 
(-), Loan ratio (+), Capital ratio (-), Non-performing 
loan ratio (-), ROA (-).  
- PE: Ownership: foreign (+) and government (-) 
banks, Market power (lerner index) (+), Privatisation 
(+), Banking reform (+), Enterprise re-structuring (+), 
Time trend, Loan ratio, Capital ratio, Non-performing 
loan ratio, ROA (-). 
Satub et al. (2010) 
Brazil 
(DEA and SFA) 
2000-2007 
Commercial 
CE 
TE 
AE 
Non-performing loans over total loans (-), Market 
share (+), Equity (-), Age (+), Specialisation of bank, 
Size (-), Ownership: foreign, domestic private (+) and 
state-owned (+) banks. 
Sufian (2009) 
Malaysia 
(DEA) 
1990-1999 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
Bank's market share (-), Loan intensity (-), Size (+), 
Bank’s risk (+), Bank’s management quality (+), 
Bank’s diversification (-), Leverage intensity (-), 
ROA (+), GDP (-). 
Sufian and 
Habibullah (2009) 
Korea 
(DEA) 
1992-2003 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
Capital ratio, Loan intensity (+), Market power (-), 
Size (+), Loan loss provisions to total loans (-), Non-
interest expense to total assets (+), Non-interest 
income to total assets, ROA, Loans to deposits, GDP 
(-), Inflation (-), Assets concentration, Stock market 
capitalisation (+/-), Financial crisis (-). 
Chiou (2009) 
Taiwan 
(DEA) 
1999-2004 
Commercial 
TE  
PTE 
SE 
Age (+), Size (+/-), Capital ratio (+), Overdue ratio (-
), Business Diversification (-), Loan to deposit ratio 
(+/-), ROE, Business monitoring indicators. 
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Hermes and 
Nhung (2010) 
Latin America and 
Asia 
(DEA) 
1991-2000 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
Liberalisation (+), Capital ratio (-), Density of 
demand (-), Growth rate of GDP (+), Inflation, Loans 
to deposits ratio, ROE (+). 
 
Pasiouras (2008) 
Greece 
(DEA) 
2000-2004 
Commercial 
PTE 
SE 
Capital ratio (+), ROAA, Loan intensity(+), Market 
share in terms of total assets (+), ATM, Branches (+), 
Branch abroad, Subsidiaries abroad (+). 
Ariff and Can 
(2008) 
China 
(SFA) 
1995-2004 
Commercial 
CE 
PE 
Ownership: state-owned (-) and stock-joint (+), Size 
(-), Gross loans to total assets (-), Assets quality = 
provisions / gross loans (-), Capital ratio (-), Liquidity 
risk (loans to deposits) (+), ROA, Non-interest 
income to total income (+), Operating costs (-), AFC, 
WTO accession (+).  
Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2007) 
12 EU Countries 
(SFA) 
1993-2000 
Commercial 
CE 
PE 
- CE: Size (+), Capital ratio (+), Loan intensity (+), 
Loan Loss Reserves / Gross Loans (-), GDP growth 
(+), Foreign ownership (+), Listed banks. 
- PE: Size, Capital ratio, Loan intensity, Loan Loss 
Reserves / Gross Loans (-), GDP growth (-), Foreign 
ownership (-), Listed banks. 
Grigorian and 
Manole (2002) 
17 Countries 
(DEA) 
1995-1998 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
GDP per capita (+), Inflation, Size of financial sector, 
Capital ratio (+), Market concentration (+), Age, 
Foreign ownership (+), Capital adequacy (+), 
Enterprise re-structuring (+), Market capitalisation (-
), Securities market (-), Maximum exposure to a 
single borrower, Limit on foreign exchange (+), 
Legal/Institutional quality. 
Havrylchyk 
(2006)  
Poland 
(DEA and SFA) 
1997-2001 
Commercial 
TE 
AE 
CE 
Type of bank (greenfield (+), take over, target (+), 
state (+) and public listing banks), Location of bank 
(Germany (+), USA (-), Netherlands (+) and France), 
Assets growth, Loans loss provisions to loans (-), 
Loan intensity (+/-), Variance of ROA (+), Size. 
Girardone et al. 
(2004) 
Italy  
(SFA) 
1993-1996 
Commercial CE 
Size (-), Interest margin (-), Number of branches (+), 
Retail that equals to (customer loans + customer 
deposits) / total assets (+), Private ownership (-), 
Performance (+), Capital ratio (-), Area (-), Type of 
banks (+/-). 
Casu and 
Molyneux (2003) 
5 European 
countries: France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and the UK 
(DEA) 
1993-1997 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
Average capital ratio (-), Return on average equity (-
). 
 
Hasan and Marton 
(2003) 
Hungary 
(SFA) 
1993-1998 
 
Commercial 
CE 
PE 
Current assets to total assets (+), Short-term loan to 
total assets, Financial investment to total assets (+/-), 
Loan intensity, Credit risk, Capital ratio (+), Cost 
inefficiency (+), Size (-), Age, Number of hours of 
bank service available, Asset owned by foreign 
banks, Acquisition (-), Foreign involvement (-), 
Dummy of year. 
Johnes et al. 
(2014) 
18 Countries 
(DEA) 
2004-2009 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
TE 
Assets (-), Loan loss to loans (+), Loan intensity (+), 
Net loans over assets (-), Herfindahl index (-), Market 
capitalisation (+), GDP growth (+), Inflation, GDP 
per capita. 
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Abul Alkheil et al. 
(2012) 
Malaysia, UK, 
Turkey and GCC 
(DEA) 
2005-2008 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
TE 
PTE 
SE 
ROA (+), Salaries to total assets (-), Liquid asset ratio 
(+/-), Size (+), Loan intensity, Bank’s market share 
(+), Effect of independency (+/-), Age (+), Financial 
leverage (-), GDP (+/-), Diversification effect (+), 
Geographical location (+), Bank’s type (+/-). 
Assaf et al. (2011) 
Saudi Arabia 
(DEA) 
1999-2006 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
PTE 
Size, Liquidity (+), Net profit margin (+), Pay-out 
ratio, Domestic ownership (-), Time trend (+). 
* TE: Technical Efficiency, PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency, SE: Scale Efficiency, AE: Allocative Efficiency, PE: Profit Efficiency, CE: 
Cost Efficiency, EE: Economic Efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  270 
 
Appendix 2: Studies on determinants of profitability in banking 
Study 
(Profitability) 
Banks 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent Variables 
Petria et al. 
(2015) 
27 EU countries 
2004-2011 
Commercial 
ROAA 
ROAE 
Size (+), Capital ratio (+), Credit risk = Impaired loans / 
Gross loans (-), Efficiency ratio (-), Liquidity risk = Loans / 
costumer deposits (-), Other operating income to assets ratio 
(+), Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (market concentration) (-), 
Inflation, GDP per capita growth (+). 
Mamatzakis et 
al. (2015) 
Japan 
2000-2012 
Commercial ROA 
- OLS: Capital ratio (+), Net interest margin (-), Nikkei index 
(+/-), Industrial production (+/-), Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (+), Quantitative easing (+/-), Z-score (+), Bankrupt 
loans (-), Restructured loans. 
- FEM: Capital ratio (+), Net interest margin (-), Nikkei 
index (+), Industrial production (+), Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (+), Quantitative easing (+), Z-score (+), Bankrupt 
loans (-), Restructured loans (-). 
Chronopoulos et 
al. (2015) 
US 
1984-2010 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Size (+), Assets growth (+), Capital ratio (-), Net charge off 
over loans ratio (+), Loan intensity (-), Income 
diversification (-), Loan Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (-), 
GDP growth (+), Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (-), Tier 1 
capital ratio (-), Total capital ratio (-), Bank competition (+). 
Akhmedjonov 
and Izgi (2015) 
Turkey 
2006-2009 
Commercial ROA 
Capital ratio during crisis (+), Capital ratio out of crisis 
period (+), Liquidity ratio (+), Size, Private banks, State-
owned banks (+). 
Alessandri and 
Nelson (2015) 
UK 
1992-2009 
Commercial NIM 
Lagged NIM (+), Leverage ratio (debts to assets ratio) (+), 
Total assets growth (-), GDP (+), Herfindahl index capturing 
sector concentration (-). 
Brighi and 
Venturelli 
(2015) 
Italy 
2006-2012 
Commercial ROA 
Size (+), Capital adequacy, Loan loss provisions (-), Non-
performing loans (-), Financial crisis: 2008-2009 period (-), 
Sovereign crisis: 2010-2011 period (-). 
Chavarín (2015) 
Mexico 
2007-2011 
Commercial 
ROAA 
ROAE 
Branches (+), Regulatory capital (+/-), Loans to deposits 
ratio (-), Market share (-), Family ownership, Foreign 
ownership.  
Tan (2015) 
China 
2003-2011 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
NIM 
Size (-), Liquidity (+), Taxation (-), Capitalisation (-), Stock 
market development (+), GDP (+), Inflation (+), Joint-stock 
banks (-), City commercial banks (-). 
Terraza (2015) 
1270 European 
banks 
2005-2012 
Commercial ROAA 
Large banks: Size, Capital ratio (+), Equity to loans ratio, 
Loan intensity, Ratio of liquid assets to deposits, loans to 
deposits ratio   (-). 
Medium banks: Size, Capital ratio (+), Equity to loans ratio, 
Loan intensity, Ratio of liquid assets to deposits, loans to 
deposits ratio. 
Small banks: Size (-), Capital ratio (+), Equity to loans ratio 
(+), Loan intensity, Ratio of liquid assets to deposits, loans to 
deposits ratio. 
Saghi-Zedek 
and Tarazi 
(2015) 
17 Western 
European 
countries 
2002-2010 
Commercial ROA 
Size (-), Capital ratio (+), Deposits to assets ratio (+), Loan 
intensity, Net non-interest income (+), Efficiency ratio (-), 
GDP (+), Listed banks (+). 
Pervan et al. 
(2015) 
Commercial ROA 
Lagged ROA (+), Size (+), Market share, Solvency risk (+), 
Reserve to loans ratio (-), Loans over liabilities ratio (+), 
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Croatia 
2002-2010 
GDP (+), Inflation (-). 
Luo et al. 
(2015) 
China 
2002-2011 
Commercial ROA 
Foreign ownership (+), Capital ratio (+), GDP (-), Inflation, 
WTO entry, Global financial crisis (-). 
ElBannan 
(2015) 
Egypt 
2005-2011 
Commercial ROAA 
 
Reform period (+), Size, Public ownership (-), Efficiency 
ratio (-), Liquidity ratio, Loan intensity (-), Fixed assets 
intensity, GDP, Inflation. 
 
Marinkovića 
and Radovićb 
(2015) 
Serbia 
2003-2010 
Commercial NIM 
Loan loss reserves to loans ratio (-), Capital ratio (+), Liquid 
assets to deposits ratio (+), Efficiency ratio, Ratio of earning 
assets to total assets (-), GDP (+), Inflation. 
Apergis (2014) 
US  
2000-2013 
Commercial  
Investment 
ROA 
Insolvency risk index (-), Total non-traditional activities (+), 
Ratio of loans to assets (+), Capital ratio (+), Ratio of non-
performing loans (-), Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (+), 
Consumer prices (+), Real per capita income (+), Global 
fnancial crisis (+). 
Căpraru and 
Ihnatov (2014) 
5 CEE countries 
2004-2011 
Commercial 
 
ROA 
ROE 
NIM 
 
- ROA and ROE: Size (-), Capital ratio (+), Credit risk = 
Impaired loans / Gross loans (-), Efficiency ratio (-), 
Liquidity risk = Loans / costumer deposits, Other operating 
income to assets ratio, Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (market 
concentration), Inflation (+), GDP per capita growth, GFC (-
). 
- NIM: Size (-), Capital ratio (+), Credit risk = Impaired 
loans / Gross loans, Efficiency ratio (-), Liquidity risk = 
Loans / costumer deposits, Other operating income to assets 
ratio (-), Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (market 
concentration), Inflation, GDP per capita growth, GFC (-). 
Guillén et al. 
(2014) 
12 Latin 
American 
countries 
1989-2005 
Commercial ROE 
Powerful banks: largest 3 banks, Technical efficiency (+), 
GDP (+), Size (+). 
Al-Musali and 
Ismail (2014) 
Saudi Arabia 
2008-2010 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Value added intellectual coefficient (+), Efficiency of human 
capital (+), Efficiency of capital employed (+), Efficiency of 
structural capital, Size, Global financial crisis (+). 
Shah and Jan 
(2014) 
Pakistan 
2006-2010 
Commercial ROA 
Size, Asset management = operational income / total assets 
(+), Efficiency ratio = total operating expenses / interest 
income (-).  
Rumler and 
Waschiczek 
(2014) 
Austria 
1995-2010 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Profitability of previous year (+), Loan intensity (+/-), 
Ownership: government (+) and foreign banks, Foreign 
lending in total assets, Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (+), 
GDP growth (+), Interest rate spread (+), Inflation (+), Core 
capital ratio (-), Size: bank share, foreign currency lending. 
Dietrich and 
Wanzenried 
(2014) 
118 Countries 
1998-2012 
Commercial  
ROAA 
ROAE 
NIM 
- ROAA: Capital ratio (+), Efficiency ratio (-), Loan loss 
provisions (-), Deposits growth (+), Large bank, Small bank 
(-), Interest income share (-), Funding costs, State ownership 
(-), Foreign ownership (+), Effective tax rate (-), Inflation 
(+), GDP growth (-), GDP per capita (-), Stock market 
capitalisation to GDP (-), Bank concentration (-), Financial 
crisis (-). 
- ROAE: Capital ratio (-), Efficiency ratio (-), Loan loss 
provisions (-), Deposits growth (+), Large bank (-), Small 
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bank (+), Interest income share (-), Funding costs, State 
ownership (-), Foreign ownership, Effective tax rate (-), 
Inflation (-), GDP growth (+), GDP per capita, Stock market 
capitalisation to GDP (-), Bank concentration (-), Financial 
crisis (+). 
- NIM: Capital ratio (+), Efficiency ratio (+), Loan loss 
provisions, Deposits growth, Large bank (+), Small bank (-), 
Interest income share (+), Funding costs, State ownership, 
Foreign ownership, Effective tax rate, Inflation (+), GDP 
growth (-), GDP per capita (-), Stock market capitalisation to 
GDP, Bank concentration (-), Financial crisis (-). 
Hussain (2014) 
Pakistan 
2001-2010 
Commercial NIM 
Size (-), Liquidity (-), Foreign and local ownership, 
Operating costs (+), Diversification (-), Industry 
concentration (+), Market share (+), Economic growth, Stock 
market development (-), Credit market development, real 
depreciation (+), Inflation (+), Industrial growth (+). 
Ewijk and  
Arnold (2014) 
US 
1992-2010 
Commercial  NIM 
Intercept (+), Retail deposits to liabilities (+), Loan 
intensity(+), Interest income to total income, Branches to 
loans (+), Capital ratio (+), GDP (+), Inflation (+/-), Interest 
rate level (+), Interest rate volatility (-), Credit risk, 
Operating costs (+), Concentration (-), Implicit interest 
payments (+), Managerial efficiency (-), Risk exposure (-), 
Loans to transactions (-). 
Lee and Kim 
(2013) 
Korea 
2003-2010 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Size (+), Risk ratio, Ownership: government (-) and foreign 
(-) banks, GDP growth (+), Mergers and acquisitions 
transactions (-). 
Shehzad et al. 
(2013) 
148 Countries 
1988-2010 
Commercial ROAE 
ROE (+), Bank growth (+), Size (+), Capital ratio (-), 
Efficiency ratio (-), Off balance sheet items over assets ratio 
(+/-), Liquidity (-), GDP growth (-), Inflation (-), 
Concentration (-). 
Ćurak et al. 
(2012) 
Macedonia 
2005-2010 
Commercial ROA 
Size, Capital ratio (-) (Solvency ratio), Liquidity (+), Credit 
risk (-), Fee income, Operating expense of management (-), 
Concentration (+), Economic growth (+) (GDP growth). 
Dedu and 
Chitan (2013) 
Romania 
2004-2011 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Internal corporate governance index (-), Proportion of 
independent members (+), Proportion of members of other 
nationality than Romanian (+), Gender: men, Proportion of 
members with experience in the banking and insurance 
sectors (+), Proportion of the non-executive members, 
Proportion of members holding shares (-), Age, Foreign 
ownership (-), Shareholder shares, GDP (+). 
Liang et al. 
(2013) 
194 European 
banks 
2000-2007 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
NIM 
- ROA: Size (-), Loans to deposits ratio, Loan-loss reserve 
over total assets, Interest payments (-), Credit risk = Loan-
loss provisions/loans (-), Non-interest revenues, Off-balance 
sheet (+), Market share, Other operating income (+), 
Inflation, GDP (+). 
- ROE: Size (-), Loans to deposits ratio, Loan-loss reserve 
over total assets, Interest payments, Credit risk = Loan-loss 
provisions/loans (-), Non-interest revenues, Off-balance 
sheet (+), Market share, Other operating income (+), 
Inflation, GDP (+). 
- NIM: Size (+), Loans to deposits ratio (+), Loan-loss 
reserve over total assets, Interest payments (+), Credit risk = 
Loan-loss provisions/loans (-), Non-interest revenues (+), 
Off-balance sheet, Market share, Other operating income (+), 
Inflation (-), GDP (-). 
Kutan et al. 
(2012) 
36 Emerging 
Commercial ROA 
Intermediation spread = Difference between average lending 
and borrowing rate in the country (+), Inflation (+), GDP 
growth (+), Credit risk (-), Capital ratio (+), Institutional 
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countries 
(economies) 
1991-2006 
quality (+), Dollarization. 
Kanas et al. 
(2012) 
US 
1988-2011 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Business cycle (+), Monetary policy (+), Inflationary 
expectations (+), Bank loan portfolio (+/-), Diversification, 
Credit risk (+/-), Inflation (-), Capital ratio (+), Financial 
structure: Herfindahl index (-). 
Tan and Floros 
(2012) 
China 
2003-2009 
Commercial 
 
ROA 
NIM 
 
- ROA: Size, Credit risk (-), liquidity, Taxation (-), Capital 
ratio, Cost efficiency = overhead expenses/total assets (+), 
Non-traditional activity (-), Labour productivity (+), 
Concentration (-), Banking sector development (+), Stock 
market development (+), Inflation (+). 
- NIM: Size (-), Credit risk (+), liquidity (+), Taxation (-), 
Capital ratio, Cost efficiency = overhead expenses/total 
assets (+), Non-traditional activity (-), Labour productivity, 
Concentration, Banking sector development (+), Stock 
market development (+), Inflation (+). 
 
Chitan (2012) 
Romania 
2004-2011 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Banking regulations: capital (-), guaranty (-), classify (-), 
provision (+) and liquidity regulations, Capital ratio (+), 
Loans to deposits ratio (-), Ratio of overdue and doubtful 
receivables to total assets, Liquidity ratio, Nominal GDP (+). 
Delis et al. 
(2012) 
14 Countries 
1998-2008 
Commercial ROA 
Capital ratio, Other regulations: official supervisory power, 
activity restrictions and private monitoring (-), Liquidity (-), 
Market power: lerner index, Efficiency ratio (-), Size, 
Revenue growth, Concentration (+), GDP growth (-), 
Inflation (+). 
Haan and 
Poghosyan 
(2012) 
US 
2004-2009 
Commercial 
Savings 
Cooperative 
ROA 
ROE 
Size (-), Market concentration (+), Interaction: 
concentration-size (+), Cost to income ratio (+), Financial 
leverage: total assets over equity (+), Diversification (+), 
Global financial crisis (-). 
Barry et al. 
(2011) 
16 West 
European 
countries 
1999-2005 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Shareholders: mangers (+), families, companies and banks 
holders, Size (-), Capital ratio (+ ROA and - ROE), Deposits 
to total assets ratio (-), ratio of total operating expenses to 
total operating income (-), Listed banks. 
Manlagnit 
(2011) 
Philippines 
1990-2006 
Commercial ROA 
Foreign banks (-), Foreign shares (-), Capital ratio (+), Loan 
intensity (-), Customer funding (-), Overhead cost, Market 
share (+), Loan loss provision (-), Market concentration (-). 
Dietrich and 
Wanzenried 
(2011) 
Switzerland 
1999-2009 
Commercial 
ROAA 
ROAE 
NIM 
- ROAA: Capital ratio (-), Efficiency ratio (-), Loan loss 
provisions over total loans, Deposits growth (-), Difference 
between bank and market growth of total loans (+), Size 
dummy: large and small (+) banks, Interest income share (-), 
Funding costs (-), Age dummy: Old (+) and new banks (+), 
Ownership dummy: co-owned (+), foreign (-) and listed (-) 
banks, Effective tax rate (-), Real GDP growth (+), Term 
structure of interest rates (+), Herfindahl Index (+). 
- ROAE: Capital ratio, Efficiency ratio (-), Loan loss 
provisions over total loans, Deposits growth (+), Difference 
between bank and market growth of total loans (+), Size 
dummy: large (+) and small  (+) banks, Interest income share 
(-), Funding costs (-), Age dummy: Old and new (-) banks, 
Ownership dummy: co-owned, foreign and listed banks, 
Effective tax rate (-), Real GDP growth (+), Term structure 
of interest rates, Herfindahl Index. 
NIM: Capital ratio (+), Efficiency ratio (-), Loan loss 
provisions over total loans (+), Deposits growth, Difference 
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between bank and market growth of total loans (+), Size 
dummy: large (-) and small  (+) banks, Interest income share 
(-), Funding costs (+), Age dummy: Old (+) and new banks, 
Ownership dummy: co-owned (+), foreign and listed banks (-
), Effective tax rate, Real GDP growth (+), Term structure of 
interest rates (+), Herfindahl Index. 
Westman (2011)  
37 European 
Countries 
2003-2006 
Commercial 
Investment 
 
ROA 
ROE 
Bank type (traditional, non-traditional (+) and diversified 
(+)), Level of management ownership, Size (+), Deposits, 
Capital ratio (+/-), Investment. 
Havrylchyk and 
Jurzyk (2011) 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
1993-2004 
Commercial NIM 
Foreign ownership, Efficiency ratio (-), Size (-), HHI index, 
Exchange rate (+), GDP growth (-), Interest rate,  
Sufian and 
Habibullah 
(2010) 
Malaysia 
1999-2007 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Loans intensity (+), Credit risk (-), diversification = non-
interest income to total assets (+), costs ratio = non-interest 
expenses to total assets (+), Capital ratio (+), GDP (-), 
Inflation (+), Economic freedom (+), Business freedom (+), 
Monetary freedom (-), Financial freedom, Corruption 
freedom (+). 
Houston et al. 
(2010) 
69 Countries 
2000-2007 
Commercial  
ROA 
NIM 
- ROA: Diversification (+), Deposit insurance coverage (-), 
Size (+), Bank growth (+), Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (+), 
GDP per capita (+), GDP (+), Inflation (-). 
- NIM: Diversification (-), Deposit insurance coverage (+), 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (+), GDP per capita (-), GDP 
(+), Inflation (+). 
Heffernan and 
Fu (2010) 
China 
1999-2006 
Commercial NIM 
Efficiency ratio (-), Capital ratio (+), Liquidity, Loan loss 
provisions (+), Loans intensity (+), Other operating income 
(-), Size (-), Listed banks, Foreign banks (-), Unemployment, 
GDP growth (+), Inflation, age.  
Flamini et al. 
(2009) 
41 Sub-Saharan 
African 
countries 
 
Commercial ROA 
Size (+), Capital ratio (+), Loans over deposits and short-
term funding (+), Cost management, Net interest revenues to 
other operating income, Individual bank’s loans / country’s 
domestic credit, Ownership: private (-) and foreign banks, 
GDP per capita (-), GDP growth (+), Inflation (+), Petroleum 
(fuel) price (-), Non-fuel commodity price (+), Regulatory 
environment. 
Lin and Zhang 
(2009) 
China 
1997-2004 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Foreign ownership (+), Listing banks (+), Size (-), Non-
interest revenue in total revenue (+), Loan intensity (+), 
Deregulation (+). 
García-Herrero 
et al. (2009) 
China 
1997-2004 
 
Commercial 
 
ROA 
Loan growth (-), Loan intensity, Deposits to assets (+), 
Capital ratio (+), Technical inefficiency (-), Foreign capital, 
Listed banks, Recapitalised, Market share on assets (-), 
Concentration, Real interest on loans (+), Maximum spread, 
Real GDP growth, Inflation (+), Volatility of interest rates (-
), Type of banks: state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock 
commercial banks (+), city commercial banks and trust and 
investment corporations (+), Policy banks (-). 
Sufian and 
Habibullah 
(2009)  
Bangladesh 
1997-2004 
Commercial NIM  
Loan intensity (+), Size (+), Loan loss provisions, Non-
interest income, Non-interest expense (+), Capital ratio (+), 
GDP, Inflation (-). 
Altunbas and 
Marques (2008) 
EU banking 
sector 
207 Domestic 
Commercial ROE 
- Domestic mergers: Relative size (-), Bidder performance 
level (-), Efficiency ratio (-), Capital ratio (+), Loan intensity 
(-), Credit risk (-), Diversity of earnings (-), Off-balance 
sheet activity (+), Loans to deposits ratio (-), Other expenses 
to total assets ratio (+), Liquidity = liquid assets / total 
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mergers and 55 
Cross-borders 
mergers  
1992-2001 
deposits. 
- Cross-borders mergers: Relative size (+), Bidder 
performance level (-), Efficiency ratio (-), Capital ratio (-), 
Loan intensity (+), Credit risk, Diversity of earnings, Off-
balance sheet activity (-), Loans to deposits ratio (-), Other 
expenses to total assets ratio (-), Liquidity = liquid assets / 
total deposits (-). 
Athanasoglou et 
al. (2008) 
Greece 
1985-2001 
Commercial ROA 
Capital ratio (+), Credit risk = loan loss provisions / loans (-), 
Rate of change in inflation-adjusted gross total 
revenue/personnel (+), Operating expenses to assets ratio (-), 
Size, Private ownership (+), Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 
Inflation, Cyclical output (+). 
Zhou and Wong 
(2008) 
China 
1996-2003 
Commercial NIM 
Operating cost (+), Capital ratio (-), Loan intensity, Size of 
loans (-), Net noninterest expenses (+), Opportunity cost of 
bank reserves (+), Efficiency ratio (-). 
Claeys and 
Vennet (2008) 
Central and 
Eastern Europ 
1994-2001 
Commercial NIM 
Foreign banks: Concentration (+), Market share (+), X-
efficiency (+), Constant returns to scale efficiency (-), 
Capital ratio (+), Loan intensity (+), Demand and savings 
deposits to total deposits ratio (+), GDP (-), Inflation (+/-), 
Interest rate (-), Number of foreign banks (+/-). 
State-owned banks: Concentration (-), Market share (+), X-
efficiency (+), Constant  returns to scale efficiency (-), 
Capital ratio (+), Loan intensity, Demand and savings 
deposits to total deposits ratio (+), GDP (+), Inflation (+/-), 
Interest rate (+/-), Number of state-owned banks (+/-). 
Micco et al. 
(2007) 
179 Countries 
1995-2002 
Commercial ROA 
Ownership: public (-) and foreign (+) banks, Non-interest 
income to total assets (+), Deposits (+), Size (-), Share of 
bank’s total assets over total banking assets in the country. 
Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou 
(2007) 
15 EU 
Countries 
1995-2001 
Commercial ROAA 
Capital ratio (+), Efficiency ratio (-), Liquidity = loans to 
customers and short term funding (+), Size (-), Inflation (+), 
GDP growth (+), Concentration (+), Assets to GDP ratio (-), 
Market capitalisation to total assets ratio (+), The ratio of 
Market capitalisation to GDP (+). 
Lanine and 
Vennet (2007) 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
1995-2002 
Commercial NIM 
Loan intensity (+), Deposits to assets ratio (-), Size (-), 
Capital ratio (+), Takeover. 
Boubakri et al. 
(2005) 
22 Developing 
countries 
1986-1998 
Commercial ROE 
Private ownership, Post-privatisation period (+), Time since 
privatisation, Privatisation through private sales (-), 
Privatised banks under government control, Privatised banks 
under foreign investors control, Privatised banks under 
industrial group control, ratio of total assets standardized for 
size of the economy (GDP), Law and order, Financial 
liberalisation, GDP per capita, Real GDP growth (+), Overall 
budget deficit of GDP (-). 
Beck et al. 
(2005) 
Nigeria 
1990-2001 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Assets (+), Eventually Privatised (-), Privatised (+), Time 
since Privatisation, State control (-), Age (-), Branches (+), 
Fee income (+), Government bonds (+), Loans to banks (-), 
Fixed assets (-), Overhead costs (-). 
Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga 
(1999) 
80 Countries 
1988-1995 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROA 
Capital ratio (+), Loan intensity (-), Non-interest earning 
assets to total assets (-), Customer and short-term funding 
over total assets (-), Overhead / total assets (-), Foreign 
ownership (+), GDP per capita (+), Growth rate, Inflation, 
Real interest rate (+), Reserves (-), Tax rate (+), Deposit 
insurance, Banks assets to GDP (financial structure) (-), 
Stock market capitalization / GDP, Number of banks, Market 
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concentration, Total assets, Contract enforcement (-), Law 
and order index (-), Corruption (-). 
Mollah and 
Zaman (2015) 
25 Countries 
2005-2011 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
ROAA 
ROAE 
- Islamic banks: Shari’ah board size (+), Directors number (-
), Independent board (-), The same chair and CEO, The CEO 
recruited internally, Z-score (+), Capital ratio (-), Loan 
intensity, Size (-), GDP per capita (+), Muslim population 
(+), Inflation. 
- Commercial: Directors number, Independent board, The 
same chair and CEO, The CEO recruited internally, Z-score 
(+), Capital ratio (-), Loan intensity, Size, GDP per capita 
(+), Muslim population, Inflation. 
Ghosh (2015) 
12 MENA 
countries 
2000-2012 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
ROA 
NIM 
- ROA: Arab Spring period (-), Size, Capital ratio (+), Ratio 
of liquid asset to total asset (-), Diversification. 
- NIM: Arab Spring period (-), Size, Capital ratio, Ratio of 
liquid asset to total asset, Diversification. 
Beck et al. 
(2013a) 
22 Countries 
1995-2009 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
ROA  
ROE 
Bank type (Islamic) (+), Size (-), Non-loan earnings assets, 
Fixed assets (+). 
Mirzaei et al. 
(2013) 
40 Countries 
1999-2008 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
- Emerging economies: Market share, Concentration (-), 
Interest rate spread (+), Size (-), Capital ratio (+), Overheads 
to total assets (-), Off-balance to total assets (+), Loan 
growth (+), Age (+), Foreign ownership (+), Domestic credit 
provide by banking (-), Stock turnover ratio (+), Inflation, 
GDP growth (+), Banking type: Islamic (+), real estate (+), 
savings (+) and cooperative banks. 
- Advanced economies: Market share (+), Concentration, 
Interest rate spread (+), Size (+), Capital ratio (+), Overheads 
to total assets (-), Off-balance to total assets (-), Loan growth 
(+), Age (-), Foreign ownership (-), Domestic credit provide 
by banking (+), Stock turnover ratio (+), Inflation (-), GDP 
growth (+), Banking type: Islamic, real estate (-), savings (-) 
and cooperative banks (-). 
Bertay et al. 
(2013) 
90 Countries 
1991-2011 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Size (+), Liabilities over GDP (-), Equity (+), Short term debt 
(+), Investment banks (-), Inflation (+), GDP growth (+), 
GDP per capita (-). 
Olson and 
Zoubi (2011) 
10 Countries in 
MENA 
2000-2008 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
ROA 
ROE 
Size, Loans intensity (+), security specialization ratio = other 
interest bearing assets (non-loans)/total assets, 
Deposit specialization ratio = total deposits/total liabilities, 
inefficiency ratio = operating expenses/gross income (-), 
Ratio of overhead (depreciation plus other expenses) to total 
assets, Ratio of non-interest bearing assets to total assets, 
Labour cost to income, Credit risk (+/-), Capital ratio (+/-), 
Change in GDP, Inflation (+), Concentration ratio = ratio of 
a bank's total assets to the total assets of all banks, 
Ownership: foreign and government (-) banks, Bank’s type, 
Location of bank, Trade of stocks (if bank listed in stock 
market or not).   
* ROA: Return on Asset, ROE: Return on Equity, ROAA: Return on Average Assets, ROAE: Return on Average Equity, NIM: Net 
Interest Margin. 
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Appendix 3: Studies on determinants of stability in banking 
Study  
(Stability) 
Banks 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent Variables 
Tabak et al. (2015) 
Brazil 
2001-2011 
Commercial Z-score 
Capital ratio (+), Market share (+/-), ROA, Size (+), 
Efficiency ratio. 
Kohler (2015) 
15 EU Countries 
2002-2011 
Cooperative, 
Savings, 
Commercial, 
Investment 
Banks 
-Banking 
corporation 
Securities 
houses 
 
Z-score 
Non-interest income share (+), Non-deposit funding share, 
Size (-), Capital ratio (+), Loan intensity (+), Net interest 
margin (+), Liquid assets to total Assets ratio, GDP growth 
(+), GDP per capita (+), Inflation (-), Deposit money bank 
assets to GDP (-), Concentration of market share of the 
three largest banks over total banking sector assets, Real 
long-term interest rate (-). 
 
Zhang et al. (2015) 
USA 
2003-2012 
 
Bank 
holding 
companies 
Z-score 
House price index (+), Size (-), ROA, Short-term 
wholesale funding (-), Non-performing loan ratio (-), Loan 
loss reserve ratio (+), Institutional shareholding, Net 
interest income ratio (-). 
Nguyen and Nghiem 
(2015) 
India 
1990-2011 
Commercial 
Capital 
ratio 
Public banks: Efficiency ratio (+/-), Loans to deposits ratio 
(+), GDP growth (-), Inflation (-). 
Private banks: Efficiency ratio (-), Loans to deposits ratio 
(+), GDP growth, Inflation (+). 
Brighi and 
Venturelli (2015) 
Italy 
2006-2012 
Commercial Z-score 
Size (+), Capital adequacy (+), Loan loss provisions (-), 
Non-performing loans (-), Financial crisis: 2008-2009 
period, Sovereign crisis: 2010-2011 period (-). 
Carretta et al. 
(2015) 
15 EU countries 
1999-2011 
Commercial Z-score 
Lagged z-score (+), Non-performing loans, Loan intensity, 
Size (-), Inefficiency ratio = operation expenses / operating 
income, Culture values, Market capitalisation (+), 
Domestic credit, GDP. 
Chen et al. (2015) 
35 Emerging 
economies 
(countries) 
2000-2012 
Commercial Z-score 
Size (-), Liquidity ratio (+), Efficiency ratio (-), Fee income 
share (-), Assets growth (-), Capital (+), GDP (+), Inflation 
(-), Global financial crisis (-), Deposit insurance existence 
(-). 
Chiaramonte et al. 
(2015) 
12 EU Countries 
2001-2011 
Commercial Z-score 
ROAA (-), Capital ratio (+/-), Impaired loans to gross loans 
ratio (+), Cost to income ratio, Liquidity ratio = loans to 
deposits ratio (+). 
Saghi-Zedek and 
Tarazi (2015) 
17 Western 
European countries 
2002-2010 
Commercial Z-score 
Size (-), Capital ratio (+), Deposits to assets ratio (+), Loan 
intensity (+), Net non-interest income (-), Efficiency ratio 
(-), GDP (+), Listed banks (-). 
Wang et al. (2015) 
China 
2006-2012 
Commercial Z-score 
Government stake, Listed banks (+), Size (-), Loan loss 
provisions (-), Fixed assets intensity = fixed assets / total 
assets (+), GDP (-), Changes in monetary policies. 
Kick and Prieto 
(2015) 
Germany 
1994-2010 
Commercial Z-score 
Capital ratio (+), Bank reserve, ROE (+), Non-performing 
loans (-), Off-balance sheet activity, GDP per capita 
growth, Local market share (-). 
Doumpos et al. 
(2015) 
94 Countries 
2000-2011 
Commercial Z-score 
Supervision unification, Size (-), Efficiency ratio (-), 
Liquidity ratio (-), Impaired loans to gross loans ratio (-), 
Global financial crisis (-), GDP (+), Inflation (-), 
Deregulations (freedom) (+). 
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García-Kuhnert et 
al. (2015) 
All European banks 
1999-2008 
Commercial Z-score 
Number of owned firms by banks (+), Size (-), Capital ratio    
(-), Net interest marginal revenues (-), Loan loss provisions 
(+), Private ownership, Foreign ownership, Financial 
statements transparency. 
Fazio et al. (2015) 
70 Countries 
1998-2012 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
Capital 
ratio 
Size (+), Liquidity ratio (-), The ratio of costs on total 
assets, Financial freedom, Economic Openness (sum of 
total exports and total imports), Inflation (-), GDP cycle 
(+), Domestic credit (-). 
ElBannan (2015) 
Egypt 
2005-2011 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Reform period (+), Size (+), Public ownership (-
), Efficiency ratio (-), Liquidity ratio, Loan intensity (-), 
Fixed assets intensity (-), GDP, Inflation. 
- Capital ratio: Reform period (+), Size (-), Public 
ownership, Efficiency ratio (-), Liquidity ratio (-), Loan 
intensity (-), Fixed assets intensity (+), GDP (-), Inflation 
(+). 
 
Hoque et al. (2015) 
12 EU countries 
2000-2012 
 
Commercial Z-score 
Deposit ratio, Loan intensity, Size (-), NIM, GDP per 
capita (-), Corruptions. 
Keffala (2015) 
25 Emerging 
(countries) 
economies  
2003-2011 
Commercial Z-score 
Size (+), Loan intensity (+), Capital adequacy (-), Loan 
loss provisions (-), Efficiency ratio, Net interest income 
(+), Non-interest income, GDP (+), Inflation (+). 
Kasman and 
Kasman (2015) 
Turkey 
2002-2012 
Commercial Z-score 
GDP growth (-), Size (-), Loan intensity (-), foreign 
ownership (-), public ownership, Global financial crisis (-). 
Baselga-Pascual et 
al. (2015) 
14 European 
countries 
2001-2012 
Commercial Z-score 
Loan intensity, Capital ratio (+), ROA (+), Efficiency ratio 
(-), Size (+), GDP growth (+), Inflation (-), 
Unemployment, Interest rates (+). 
Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2015) 
30 Countries 
2000-2009 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
Capital 
ratio 
Z-score: Size (+), Loan loss provisions (+), Capital ratio, 
State-owned banks (+), Listed banks, GDP per capita (-), 
Global financial crisis. 
Capital ratio: Loan intensity (-), State-owned banks, Listed 
banks (-), GDP per capita. 
Chalermchatvichien
et al. (2014) 
68 Asian Countries 
2005-2009 
Commercial Z-score 
Net stable funding ratio (+), Ownership concentration (-), 
Loan loss provision (-), Tobins Q, Revenue growth (-), 
Deposits, GDP, GDP per capita. 
Williams (2014) 
20 Asian Countries 
1998-2012 
Commercial Z-score  
Capital ratio (+), Franchise value = fixed assets / total 
assets (+), Size, Loan growth, Non-interest income (+), 
Government effectiveness, GDP growth (+), Inflation rate, 
GDP per capita, Deposit rate (+), Revenue concentration, 
AFC (-), GFC (-). 
Fu et al. (2014) 
14 Asian Pacific 
Countries 
2003-2010 
Commercial Z-score 
Competition efficiency (+), Concentration (fraction of 
assets held by the three largest banks in each country) (-), 
Size (-), Loan -loss provision, Net interest margin (+), GDP 
growth, Financial crisis. 
Cubillas and 
González (2014) 
83 Countries 
1991-2007 
Commercial 
 
Z-score 
 
Bank market power (affects z-score negatively (-)), 
Location if the bank in developed (+) or developing 
country, Size (+), Revenue growth, Concentration (the 
fraction of assets of the three largest banks over assets of 
all commercial banks in a country), Overhead (personnel 
expenses and other non-interest expenses to total assets), 
Non-interest income to total income, GDP (-), GDP growth 
(-), Inflation (-). 
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Lee and Hsieh 
(2014) 
27 Asian countries 
1995-2009 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
 Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Ownership: foreign banks, Size, Liquidity assets 
to total assets ratio, non-interest expenses to total assets 
ratio, GDP growth (+), inflation rate, Private credit by 
deposit money banks to GDP ratio, Stock market turnover 
ratio. 
Capital ratio: Ownership: foreign banks, Size, Liquidity 
assets to total assets ratio (+), non-interest expenses to total 
assets ratio (+), GDP growth, inflation rate, Private credit 
by deposit money banks to GDP ratio (-), Stock market 
turnover ratio (-). 
Anginer et al. 
(2014) 
96 Countries 
2004-2009 
Commercial Z-score 
Size, Leverage (-), Deposits (+), Provisions (-), ROA (+), 
GDP per capita, GDP growth volatility, Population (-), 
Trade to GDP ratio, Stock market capitalisation to GDP 
ratio, Private credit over GDP (+), GFC (-). 
Dong et al. (2014) 
China 
2003-2011 
Commercial Z-score 
Size (-), Efficiency ratio (-), Asset diversity, Loans to 
deposits ratio, GDP growth (-), Foreign strategic 
investment, Listed banks (+), Post-global, financial crisis 
(+), State-owned controlled banks (+), Private controlled 
banks (+), Ownership Herfindahl index (-), Ownership 
concentration ratio (-), Independent risk committee, Female 
directors (+). 
Dima et al. (2014) 
63 Countries 
1997-2010 
Commercial Z-score 
Bank concentration (+), Stock market capitalization to 
GDP (+), Loans to deposits (+), Non-interest income (+/-). 
Rumler and 
Waschiczek (2014) 
Austria 
1995-2010 
Commercial Z-score 
Z-score of previous year (+), Loan intensity (-), 
Ownership: government (+) and foreign banks, Foreign 
lending in total assets (-), Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (+), 
GDP growth (+), Interest rate spread (+), Inflation (+), 
Core capital ratio, Size: bank share, foreign currency 
lending. 
Diaconu and Oanea 
(2014) 
Romania 
2008-2012 
Commercial 
Co-operative 
Z-score 
Commercial Banks: GDP growth, Interbank offering rate 
for 3 months, rate of modification of BET index, Inflation. 
Co-operative Banks: GDP growth (+), Interbank offering 
rate for 3 months (+), Rate of modification of BET index, 
Inflation. 
Gulamhussen et al. 
(2014) 
56 Countries 
2001-2007 
Listed 
Banks 
Z-score 
International share (+), Size, Deposits to liabilities ratio (-), 
Employees to assets, Income diversity (-), Tobin’s Q (-), 
International concentration (HHI) (-). 
Schaeck and Cihàk 
(2014) 
10 European 
Countries 
1995-2005 
Commercial 
Z-score  
& 
Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Size (-), Assets growth (+), Diversification index 
(-), Loan loss provisions (-), HHI index (-), Banking 
system assets (+), GDP per capita (+), Unemployment, Age 
(+). 
- Capital ratio: Size (-), Assets growth, Diversification 
index (-), Loan loss provisions, HHI index (-), Banking 
system assets (+), GDP per capita (+), Unemployment, Age 
(+). 
Horvàth et al. 
(2014) 
Czech Republic 
2000-2010 
Commercial 
Capital 
ratio 
Non-performing loans (-), Credit risk (-), Z-score (+), 
Earnings volatility (-), Market share, Size (-), 
Unemployment (-), Inflation (+). 
Jeon and Lim 
(2013) 
Korea 
1999-2011 
Commercial 
Savings 
Z-score 
Competition (+), Size, Profit ratio (+), Loan to deposit (+), 
Market volatility (-), Interception (-). 
Lee and Chih 
(2013) 
China 
2004-2011 
Commercial Z-score 
- For large banks: Capital adequacy ratio, Operating costs 
to operating income (-), Loan to deposit ratio, Leverage 
ratio, Current ratio, Age (+).  
- For small banks: Capital adequacy ratio (-), Operating 
costs to operating income, Loan to deposit ratio (-), 
 
 
  280 
 
Leverage ratio (+), Current ratio, Age. 
 
Tan and Floros 
(2013) 
China 
2003-2009 
 
Commercial Z-score 
DEA measures (TE, PTE and SE), Book value of capital to 
total assets (+), ROA, Size (-), Liquidity ratio, Taxation, 
Ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets, Ratio of 
gross total revenue to number of employees (-), 
Concentration, Ratio of banking industry assets over GDP 
(+), Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, Inflation (+), 
GDP growth. 
Dedu and Chitan 
(2013) 
Romania 
2004-2011 
Commercial Z-score 
Internal corporate governance index (-), Proportion of 
independent members (+), Proportion of members of other 
nationality than Romanian (+), Gender: men, Proportion of 
members with experience in the banking and insurance 
sectors (+), Proportion of the non-executive members (-), 
Proportion of members holding shares (+), Age, Foreign 
ownership, Shareholder shares (-), GDP (+). 
Gropp et al. (2013) 
Germany 
1996-2006 
Commercial Z-score 
Number of state guarantees (+), Size (-), GDP per capita 
(+), Direct competition (-), Number of mergers, Risk-free 
interest rate. 
DeYound and 
Torna (2013) 
US 
2007-2010 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Stakeholder (+), Stakeholder distressed, 
Liquidity (+), Loan concentration, Cost inefficiency, ROA, 
Non-performing loans, Equity (+), Size, Age, Brokered 
deposits (+), Core deposits, Goodwill (+).  
- Capital ratio: Stakeholder (+), Stakeholder distressed (+), 
Liquidity (+), Loan concentration, Cost inefficiency, ROA, 
Non-performing loans (+), Equity (+), Size, Age, Brokered 
deposits (+), Core deposits, Goodwill (+). 
Beck et al. (2013b) 
USA 
1994-2009 
Commercial Z-score 
Lerner index (+), Share of wholesale funding, Loan 
intensity (-), Non-interest revenue share (-), Size (+), Loan 
loss provisions to interest income (-), Total assets growth (-
). 
Barakat and 
Hussainey (2013) 
20 EU Countries 
2008-2010 
 
Commercial 
Savings 
Investment  
Co-operative 
Banks 
& 
Bank  
holding 
companies 
 
Z-score 
Efficiency ratio (-), Cash to deposits ratio, GDP per capita, 
Inflation (+), Political stability, Size, Concentration (-), 
Outside board, Government ownership (-), Executive 
ownership. 
Tabak et al. (2013) 
17 Latin American 
countries 
2001-2008 
Commercial 
Z-score 
inefficiency 
 
Capital ratio (-), Credit risk (+), Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (+), Market share (+), Ownership: foreign (+) and 
private (+) banks. 
 
Nguyen et al. 
(2012) 
4 South Asian 
Countries 
1998-2008 
Commercial 
 
Z-score 
 
Total non-interest income (+), Size (+), Efficiency ratio, 
Loan loss provisions divided by net loans ratio (ex-post 
credit losses) (-), Interest margin (Net interest income to 
total earning assets), Capital ratio (+), Ownership, Islamic 
banking activities, Listed banks, Concentration (market 
share of 3 largest banks) (-), Banking freedom, 
Restrictions, GDP Growth Rate (business cycle) (+), 
Financial development (market capitalisation to GDP) (+), 
AFC, GFC. 
Zhang et al. (2012) 
China 
1999-2008 
Commercial Z-score 
Legal environment (-), Efficiency of the legal system, 
Protection of intellectual property right (-), Loans/GDP (-), 
GDP, GDP growth (+), Operating income growth rate (-), 
Non-interest income to operating income ratio (+), Capital 
ratio (+), Non-performing loans ratio (-), Interbank funds / 
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(interbank funds + deposits) (-), Securities /earning assets 
(+). 
Delis et al. (2012) 
14 Countries 
1998-2008 
Commercial Z-score 
Capital ratio, Other regulations: official supervisory power, 
activity restrictions and private monitoring (+), Liquidity, 
Market power: lerner index (+), Efficiency ratio (+), Size 
(+), Revenue growth, Concentration, GDP growth (+), 
Inflation (-). 
Soedarmono et al. 
(2011) 
12 Asian countries 
2001-2007 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Lerner index (-), GDP growth (-), Inflation, 
Loans to deposits ratio (+), Ratio of loss reserves to total 
loans (-), Annual loan growth rate (-), Operating expenses 
to total assets ratio (-), Size (+). 
- Capital ratio: Lerner index (+), GDP growth, Inflation, 
Loans to deposits ratio (+), Ratio of loss reserves to total 
loans (-), Annual loan growth rate (-), Operating expenses 
to total assets ratio, Size. 
Agoraki et al. 
(2011) 
13 EU Transition 
countries 
1998-2005 
Commercial Z-score 
Lagged Z-score (+), Market power (-), Non-interest 
expenses to total revenue, Size (-), GDP growth (-), 
Nominal interest rate (-), Foreign ownership (-), Public 
ownership (+), Market discipline index (-). 
Barry et al. (2011) 
16 West European 
countries 
1999-2005 
Commercial Z-score 
Shareholders: mangers (-), families (+), companies  and 
banks (+), Size (-), Capital ratio, Deposits to total assets 
ratio, ratio of total operating expenses to total operating 
income, Listed banks. 
Houston et al. 
(2010) 
69 Countries 
2000-2007 
Commercial  Z-score 
Diversification (+), Deposit insurance coverage (-), Size 
(+), Bank growth, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (-), GDP 
per capita (+), GDP (+), Inflation (-). 
Berger et al. (2009) 
23 Countries 
1999-2005 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Degree of market power (+), Loan intensity (-), 
Fixed assets to total assets (-), Size (+), Foreign ownership 
(-), Legal rights, GDP per capita (+). 
Capital ratio: Degree of market power (+), Loan intensity (-
), Fixed assets to total assets (+), Size (-), Foreign 
ownership (+), Legal rights (-), GDP per capita (+). 
Ghosh (2015) 
12 MENA 
countries 
2000-2012 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
Z-score 
Arab Spring period (-), Size (+), Capital ratio (+), Ratio of 
liquid asset to total asset, Diversification. 
Mirzaei et al. 
(2013) 
Middle East and 
Eastern Europe 
1999-2008 
Islamic 
Real estate 
Savings 
Cooperative 
Z-score 
- Emerging economies: Market share (+), Concentration, 
Interest rate spread (+), Bank size (-), Capital ratio (+), 
Overheads to total assets (+), Off-balance sheet to total 
assets, Market growth (loan growth), Bank age, Foreign 
ownership (+),  Stock turnover ratio, Inflation (-), GDP 
growth, Banking type: Islamic, real estate, savings  and 
cooperative banks. 
- Advanced economies: Market share (+), Concentration (-
), Interest rate spread (+), Bank size, Capital ratio (+), 
Overheads to total assets (+), Off-balance sheet to total 
assets (+), Market growth (loan growth) (+), Bank age (+), 
Foreign ownership (+),  Stock turnover ratio, Inflation (-), 
GDP growth (+), Banking type: Islamic, real estate (-), 
savings  and cooperative banks. 
Ghosh (2014) 
GCC Countries 
1996-2011 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
Z-score 
&  
Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Size, ROA, Loan intensity, Funding (+), 
Efficiency ratio, Income diversification (-), Regulatory, 
Listing banks (+), GFC. 
- Capital ratio: Size (-), ROA (+), Loan intensity, Funding, 
Efficiency ratio, Income diversification, Regulatory (-), 
Listing banks (-), GFC. 
Bourkhis and Nabi 
(2013) 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
Z-score 
Size (-), Loan intensity (-), Efficiency ratio (-), Income 
diversity, Inflation (+), GDP growth, GFC. 
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16 Countries 
1993-2009 
Srairi (2013) 
10 MENA 
Countries  
2005-2009 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
 
Z-score 
 
Ownership (+), Size (+), Efficiency ratio (-), Operating 
leverage = fixed assets to total assets (+), ROA, 
Diversification = non-interest income to total operating 
income, Assets growth (assets - assetst-1/assetst-1), Loan 
growth, Capital ratio, GDP per capita, Inflation, Deposit 
insurance system, Shareholders rights (+), Banking sector 
development  =  credit to private sector/GDP (+), Bank 
concentration (+), Interest (3 months interbank) rate. 
Beck et al. (2013a) 
22 Countries 
1995-2009 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Size (-), Non-loan earnings assets (+), Fixed 
assets (+). 
- Capital ratio: Size (-), Non-loan earnings assets, Fixed 
assets (+). 
 
Bertay et al. (2013) 
90 Countries 
1991-2011 
Islamic & 
Commercial 
Z-score 
& 
Capital 
ratio 
- Z-score: Size, Liabilities over GDP, Equity (+), Short 
term debt (+), Investment banks (-), Inflation (+), GDP 
growth (+), GDP per capita. 
- Capital ratio: Size (-), Liabilities over GDP (-), Short term 
debt, Investment banks (+), Inflation, GDP growth, GDP 
per capita. 
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Appendix 4: Other efficiency measures  
1. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is a parametric or econometric measure that 
can analyse the efficiency of the decision making unit (the DMU, e.g. banks or 
schools), in particular cost and profit efficiency (Fang et al. 2011). SFA was first 
employed by Aigner et al. (1977) to estimate the technical efficiency, and was first 
used on saving banks by Sherman and Gold (1985). The main measures of SFA 
are cost efficiency, profit efficiency and revenue efficiency as follows: 
1.1 Cost Efficiency (CE) 
Cost efficiency measures the level of how bank managing costs, low costs and 
high profits indicate that a firm attains high cost efficiency. However, the objective 
of cost efficiency is to reduce the amount of inputs and the model of cost efficiency 
that Wanke and Barros (2014) applied in the Brazilian banking sector assumed 
minimising the cost.  
The minimum cost of output in terms of producing is: 
C (w‟y0) = min w‟x: (x,y0) ϵ T 
C* = min w‟x 
s.t.                            ∑        y 
j
 ≥ y; 
∑        x 
j
 ≤ x;  
∑                                                                                                                                
λj ≥ 0;                ( j = 1,2,.....,N); 
The final cost efficiency of firm model can be as follows: 
ɣ = 
  
  
  ≤ 1                                                                                     
Actual cost: C0 = w‟x0 
C* = min w‟x 
Where x,y: inputs  
y0: output 
 
1.2 Profit Efficiency (PE) 
Profit efficiency measures the level of efficiency of how a bank uses their financial 
inputs (such as gained interests) to generate the financial profits (such as 
 
 
  284 
 
investment earnings); high profits and low costs mean that the profit efficiency is 
high like the study of Vu and Nahm (2013) that assumed maximising profits in 
Vietnamese commercial banks as follows: 
The maximum profit can be as follows: 
π (w, p) = max p‟ y - w‟ x: (x,y) ϵ T 
π * = max p‟ y - w‟ x 
s.t.               ∑        y 
j
 ≥ y;              
∑        x 
j
 ≤ x;  
∑                                                                                                                                
λj ≥ 1;                ( j = 1,2,.....,N); 
The final profit efficiency of firm model can be as follows: 
ð = 
  
  
  = 1                                                                                               
Where w, x: inputs  
p: output 
 
1.3 Revenue Efficiency (RE) 
Revenue efficiency calculates the level of efficiency including the gross profit. 
However, the objective of revenue efficiency is to maximise the amount of outputs 
and the model of revenue efficiency Mohan and Ray (2004) applied to Indian 
banks assumed maximising the revenue as follows: 
The attainable revenue: 
R (p,x0) = max p‟ y: (x0,y) ϵ T 
R* = max p‟ y 
s.t.                ∑        y 
j
 ≥ y; 
∑        x 
j
 ≤ x
0;  
∑                                                                                                                                
λj ≥ 0;                ( j = 1,2,.....,N); 
The final revenue efficiency of firm model can be as follows: 
p = 
  
  
  ≤ 1                                                                                                 
Where p, x: inputs  
              x0: output 
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Based on the literature review, there are some studies used both approaches of 
DEA and SFA (such as Gardener et al., 2012; Satub et al., 2010; Havrylchyk, 2006; 
Hassan & Hussein, 2003). 
1.3 The correlation between the cost and profit efficiencies 
Berger and Mester (1997) found in their study that there is not always a positively 
significant relationship between the cost and profit efficiency scores, and found 
that the relationship between the cost and revenue inefficiency scores can be 
negatively correlated.  
2. Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) 
Berger (1993) used DFA on the American banking industry from 1980-1989 and 
he defined DFA as a measure that estimates the cost inefficiency for each bank 
during a determined period following a Trans log system of costs. In DFA, the 
efficiency of banks was assumed to be stable during the period. One of the 
disadvantages of DFA is that the time is invariant in terms of cost efficiency. In 
addition, DFA could not break down into allocative and technical efficiencies. 
3. Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) 
TFA can use a panel data and cross sectional data easily. There are two shared 
characteristics of TFA and DFA, both measures could not decompose into their 
allocative and technical efficiencies, and both of them are based on a Trans log 
system of costs. Referring to the literature review in chapter 2, only one study 
used TFA, on Spanish savings banks (Dietsch & Lozano-vivas, 2000). The 
advantage of TFA is that there is no need for independent assumptions and 
restrictive distributional error terms.   
4. Free Disposal Hull (FDH)  
FDH has rarely been used to find efficiency and is defined as a measure that 
compares inputs with outputs to find the dominant points and is distributed as 
frontier of production for FDH (Sousa & Schwengber, 2006). However, FDH has 
been used by Sousa and Schwengber (2006) to measure the efficiency of courts 
in Brazil using three inputs and six outputs. The inputs were post of judge, office 
staff and stock of cases; whereas, the outputs were civil cases, criminal cases, 
civil minor offenses, criminal minor offenses, children and youth cases and 
 
 
  286 
 
criminal executions. The FDH measure varied from 0 which indicates non-
efficiency to 1 which shows a maximum efficiency.  
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Appendix 5: Efficiency measures of Islamic banks 
N Islamic Banks Year TE PTE SE N Islamic Banks Year TE PTE SE 
1 
Al Rajhi Bank 
 
Saudi Arabia 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
23 
Kuwait International Bank 
 
Kuwait 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 0.66 0.77 0.85 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.68 0.79 0.86 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.67 1.00 0.67 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.69 0.80 0.86 2009 0.83 0.84 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.77 0.78 0.98 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.82 1.00 0.82 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 
Alinma Bank 
 
Saudi Arabia 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
24 
European Islamic Investment Bank 
 
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.39 0.57 0.68 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.94 1 0.96 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.97 0.99 0.98 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
3 
Bank AlBilad 
 
Saudi Arabia 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
25 
Qatar Islamic Bank 
 
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.74 0.89 0.83 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.51 1.00 0.51 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.96 1.00 0.96 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
4 
Albaraka Banking Group 
 
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
26 
Alrayan 
Bank 
 
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 0.85 0.90 0.94 2006 0.89 0.92 0.97 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.84 0.89 0.94 
2008 0.89 0.90 0.99 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.95 0.96 0.99 2009 0.92 0.92 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.81 1.00 0.81 
2012 0.97 1.00 0.97 2012 0.87 0.87 1.00 
5 
Arcapita Bank 
 
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
27 
Banque Al Baraka  
 
Algeria 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.85 1.00 0.85 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.94 0.95 0.99 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.71 0.71 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.62 0.73 0.84 
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2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.67 0.77 0.87 
2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2012 0.72 0.85 0.84 
6 
Al-Salam Bank 
 
Bahrain 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
28 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 
 
Egypt 
2005 0.87 0.92 0.94 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.82 1.00 0.82 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.89 1.00 0.89 
2010 0.98 1.00 0.98 2010 0.65 0.66 0.98 
2011 0.95 1.00 0.95 2011 0.95 0.97 0.98 
2012 0.82 1.00 0.82 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
7 
Khaleeji Bank 
 
Bahrain 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
29 
Al Baraka Bank  
 
Egypt 
2005 0.57 0.87 0.66 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.75 0.98 0.76 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.64 0.78 0.82 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.90 0.90 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
8 
ABC Islamic Bank 
 
Bahrain 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
30 
Islamic International Arab Bank 
 
Jordan 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.92 1.00 0.92 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.81 1.00 0.81 2008 0.85 0.87 0.97 
2009 0.88 1.00 0.88 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.97 1.00 0.97 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.81 0.88 0.93 
9 
Bank Alkhair 
 
Bahrain 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
31 
Karafarin Bank 
 
Iran 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.84 1.00 0.84 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.72 1.00 0.72 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.63 1.00 0.63 
10 
Venture Capital Bank 
 
Bahrain 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
32 
Bank of Industry and Mine 
 
Iran 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.88 0.96 0.92 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.77 1.00 0.77 2009 0.74 0.80 0.92 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
11 
Capivest 
 
Bahrain 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
33 
Bank Sepah 
 
Iran 
2005 0.28 0.40 0.69 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.43 0.51 0.85 
2007 0.46 0.59 0.77 2007 0.59 0.64 0.93 
2008 0.24 0.25 0.97 2008 0.51 0.59 0.88 
2009 0.48 0.71 0.67 2009 0.51 0.62 0.82 
2010 0.97 1.00 0.97 2010 0.51 0.63 0.80 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.73 0.86 0.85 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
12 
Investors Bank 
 
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
34 
Export Development Bank of Iran 
 
Iran 
2005 0.84 1.00 0.84 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.92 1.00 0.92 2007 0.62 0.78 0.79 
2008 0.58 1.00 0.58 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.61 0.96 0.63 2009 0.51 0.52 0.98 
2010 0.64 1.00 0.64 2010 0.68 0.71 0.97 
2011 0.61 1.00 0.61 2011 0.82 0.83 0.99 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.46 0.58 0.80 
13 
Dubai Islamic Bank 
 
UAE 
2005 0.98 1.00 0.98 
35 
Bank Tejarat 
 
Iran 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.45 0.51 0.88 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.71 0.71 0.99 
2008 0.94 1.00 0.94 2008 0.64 0.66 0.97 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.60 0.61 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.72 0.72 0.99 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
 
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
36 
Bank Mellat 
 
Iran 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.72 0.74 0.98 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.69 0.69 1.00 
2009 0.98 1.00 0.98 2009 0.78 0.79 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.99 1.00 0.99 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.70 0.70 0.99 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
15 
Al Hilal Bank 
 
UAE 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
37 
Bank Maskan 
 
Iran 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 0.91 0.93 0.98 
2008 0.49 1.00 0.49 2008 0.70 0.77 0.91 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.72 1.00 0.72 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.57 1.00 0.57 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
16 Emirates Islamic Bank 2005 0.64 1.00 0.64 38 Arab Islamic Bank 2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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UAE 
2006 0.77 0.95 0.81  
Palestine 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.82 1.00 0.82 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.71 1.00 0.71 2011 0.69 0.71 0.97 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.81 0.90 0.90 
17 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 
 
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
39 
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 
 
Tunisia 
2005 0.69 1.00 0.69 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.94 1.00 0.94 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.92 1.00 0.92 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.85 0.91 0.93 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.90 0.97 0.93 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.92 1.00 0.92 2011 0.90 1.00 0.90 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.96 1.00 0.96 
18 
Noor Islamic Bank 
 
UAE 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
40 
Shamil Bank of Yemen and 
Bahrain 
 
Yemen 
2005 0.63 1.00 0.63 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.45 0.92 0.49 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 0.38 0.62 0.61 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.63 0.77 0.82 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.51 0.62 0.83 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.49 0.55 0.90 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.26 0.34 0.74 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.36 0.53 0.68 
19 
Qatar Islamic Bank 
 
Qatar 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
41 
Saba Islamic Bank 
 
Yemen 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.80 0.83 0.97 
2007 0.95 1.00 0.95 2007 0.79 0.81 0.98 
2008 0.81 0.84 0.97 2008 0.70 0.70 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.70 0.70 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.41 0.41 0.99 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.42 0.42 0.99 
20 
Masraf Al Rayan 
 
Qatar 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
42 
Tadhamon International Islamic 
Bank 
 
Yemen 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.86 1.00 0.86 
2009 0.83 0.97 0.86 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.50 0.50 0.99 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.87 1.00 0.87 
21 
Qatar International Islamic 
Bank 
 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
43 
Islamic Bank of Yemen for Finance 
and Investment 
 
2005 0.74 1.00 0.74 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.93 1.00 0.93 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Qatar 2008 0.83 1.00 0.83 Yemen 2008 0.84 1.00 0.84 
2009 0.67 0.79 0.85 2009 0.72 1.00 0.72 
2010 0.97 1.00 0.97 2010 0.86 1.00 0.86 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.87 1.00 0.87 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.66 1.00 0.66 
22 
Boubyan Bank 
 
Kuwait 
2005 0.67 0.91 0.74 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Appendix 6: Efficiency measures of conventional banks 
 
N 
Commercial 
Banks 
Year  TE  PTE  SE N 
Commercial 
Banks 
Year  TE PTE  SE 
1 
National Commercial Bank 
  
Saudi 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
122 
Tungsten Bank, 
formerly 
FIBI Bank  
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.89 0.96 0.93 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.88 0.91 0.97 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.95 0.95 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 
Samba Financial Group 
  
Saudi 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
123 
DB UK Bank Limited 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.67 0.86 0.78 
2008 0.92 0.93 0.99 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.97 1.00 0.97 2009 0.78 1.00 0.78 
2010 0.76 0.80 0.95 2010 0.76 1.00 0.76 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
3 
Riyad Bank 
  
Saudi 
2005 0.97 1.00 0.97 
124 
Aldermore Bank  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.84 0.93 0.90 
2007 0.98 1.00 0.98 2007 0.30 1.00 0.30 
2008 0.97 0.98 0.99 2008 0.61 1.00 0.61 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.70 0.85 0.82 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
4 
Banque Saudi Fransi 
  
Saudi 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
125 
EFG Private Bank Limited 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 0.96 0.98 0.98 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.95 0.96 0.99 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.88 0.93 0.94 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5 
Saudi British Bank 
  
Saudi 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
126 
Isle of Man Bank Limited 
  
UK 
2005 0.81 0.84 0.96 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.94 1.00 0.94 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2008 0.90 0.93 0.97 2008 0.92 1.00 0.92 
2009 0.90 0.98 0.92 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 
Arab National Bank 
  
Saudi 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
127 
Bank of New York Mellon 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.97 1.00 0.97 
2007 0.95 1.00 0.95 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.74 0.77 0.96 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.70 1.00 0.70 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.70 1.00 0.70 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.77 1.00 0.77 2011 0.88 0.94 0.93 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
7 
Saudi Holandi Bank 
  
Saudi 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
128 
Bank of London and The 
Middle East 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.96 0.96 1.00 2008 0.73 1.00 0.73 
2009 0.95 1.00 0.95 2009 0.86 0.94 0.91 
2010 0.92 1.00 0.92 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
8 
Saudi Investment Bank 
  
Saudi 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
129 
Bank of China  
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.89 1.00 0.89 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.80 1.00 0.80 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
9 
Bank Al-Jazira 
  
Saudi 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
130 
HFC Bank Limited 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.81 0.84 0.97 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.88 1.00 0.88 
2008 0.57 0.85 0.68 2008 0.70 0.97 0.71 
2009 0.68 0.93 0.72 2009 0.71 0.94 0.75 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.86 1.00 0.86 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
10 
Bank Muscat  
  
Oman 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
131 
Weatherbys Bank Limited 
  
UK 
2005 0.87 0.94 0.93 
2006 0.97 1.00 0.97 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.95 1.00 0.95 2008 0.85 0.99 0.86 
2009 0.95 0.96 0.99 2009 0.95 1.00 0.95 
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2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
11 
National Bank of Oman 
  
Oman 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
132 
Union Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.80 0.98 0.81 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.90 1.00 0.90 
2010 0.99 1.00 0.99 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
12 
Bank Dhofar 
  
Oman 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
133 
Jordan International Bank  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.87 1.00 0.87 2009 0.68 1.00 0.68 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 0.93 1.00 0.93 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
13 
Bank Sohar 
  
Oman 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
134 
Kexim Bank  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.94 1.00 0.94 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.88 0.88 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14 
HSBC Bank Oman 
  
Oman 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
135 
Trust Bank  
  
Algeria 
2005 0.47 1.00 0.47 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.28 1.00 0.28 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.61 0.80 0.76 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.93 1.00 0.93 2009 0.37 0.38 0.98 
2010 0.92 1.00 0.92 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.40 1.00 0.40 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.30 0.30 1.00 
15 
Oman Arab Bank 
  
Oman 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
136 
BNP Paribas 
  
Algeria 
2005 0.30 0.33 0.90 
2006 0.93 1.00 0.94 2006 0.40 0.46 0.88 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.54 0.56 0.96 
2008 0.92 0.94 0.97 2008 0.39 0.42 0.93 
2009 0.92 0.92 1.00 2009 0.33 0.36 0.91 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.35 0.38 0.93 
2011 0.99 1.00 0.99 2011 0.37 0.38 0.97 
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2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.32 0.34 0.94 
16 
Alahli Bank 
  
Oman 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
137 
Housing Bank for Trade and 
Finance 
  
Algeria 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.08 1.00 0.08 
2007 0.69 0.72 0.97 2007 0.11 0.25 0.46 
2008 0.75 0.78 0.96 2008 0.45 1.00 0.45 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.06 0.27 0.23 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.10 0.26 0.37 
2011 0.90 1.00 0.90 2011 0.48 0.58 0.83 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.54 0.63 0.86 
17 
Qatar National Bank 
  
Qatar 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
138 
Natixis Algerie 
  
Algeria 
2005 0.13 0.14 0.94 
2006 0.84 0.90 0.93 2006 0.25 0.29 0.88 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.18 0.21 0.86 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.27 0.29 0.92 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.44 0.45 0.98 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.56 0.77 0.74 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.39 0.39 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.47 0.52 0.89 
18 
Commercial Bank of Qatar 
  
Qatar 
2005 0.88 1.00 0.88 
139 
Banque Extérieure  
  
Algeria 
2005 0.51 0.54 0.93 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.53 0.56 0.95 
2007 0.86 1.00 0.86 2007 0.31 0.44 0.72 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.30 0.33 0.89 
2009 0.98 0.99 0.99 2009 0.30 0.52 0.58 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.24 0.26 0.90 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.28 0.42 0.67 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.28 0.56 0.49 
19 
Doha Bank 
  
Qatar 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
140 
Gulf Bank  
  
Algeria 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 0.92 1.00 0.92 2007 0.39 0.48 0.82 
2008 0.84 0.93 0.90 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.87 0.93 0.94 2009 0.43 0.44 0.99 
2010 0.92 0.97 0.95 2010 0.41 0.42 0.99 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.66 0.80 0.82 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.77 1.00 0.77 
20 
International Bank of Qatar 
  
Qatar 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
141 
Banque Nationale  
  
Algeria 
2005 0.76 0.94 0.81 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.81 0.97 0.83 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.60 0.80 0.75 
2008 0.91 0.93 0.98 2008 0.58 0.74 0.79 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.52 1.00 0.52 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.39 1.00 0.39 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.39 0.81 0.48 
2012 0.69 1.00 0.69 2012 0.41 0.64 0.64 
21 Ahli Bank 2005 0.95 1.00 0.95 142 ABC Bank 2005 0.21 0.21 1.00 
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Qatar 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00   
Algeria 
2006 0.17 0.25 0.69 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.31 0.31 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.21 0.21 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.13 0.20 0.67 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.17 0.25 0.69 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.12 0.20 0.62 
2012 0.87 1.00 0.87 2012 0.24 0.31 0.76 
22 
Qatar Development Bank 
  
Qatar 
2005 0.99 1.00 0.99 
143 
Banque Crédit Populaire 
  
Algeria 
2005 0.39 0.40 0.98 
2006 0.47 1.00 0.47 2006 0.35 0.35 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.19 0.25 0.78 
2008 0.92 1.00 0.92 2008 0.23 0.29 0.78 
2009 0.97 0.97 1.00 2009 0.24 0.28 0.86 
2010 0.90 0.90 1.00 2010 0.28 0.31 0.90 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.32 0.34 0.93 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.35 0.38 0.91 
23 
Emirates National Bank of 
Dubai 
  
UAE 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
144 
Suez Canal Bank 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.82 0.86 0.95 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.49 0.49 1.00 
2007 0.87 1.00 0.87 2007 0.40 0.40 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.49 0.49 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.29 0.29 0.99 
2010 0.76 0.89 0.86 2010 0.36 0.36 1.00 
2011 0.75 0.85 0.88 2011 0.24 0.27 0.90 
2012 0.78 1.00 0.78 2012 0.29 0.32 0.92 
24 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
145 
Arab African International 
Bank 
  
Egypt 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.95 0.95 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.96 1.00 0.96 
2008 0.84 0.98 0.85 2009 0.86 1.00 0.86 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.99 1.00 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.81 0.81 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.60 0.60 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2005 0.50 0.50 0.99 
25 
Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
146 
Bank Audi 
  
Egypt 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.20 0.39 0.52 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.15 0.15 0.99 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.24 0.25 0.94 
2009 0.95 1.00 0.95 2009 0.26 0.28 0.92 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.36 0.39 0.92 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.42 0.44 0.95 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.41 0.44 0.94 
26 
First Gulf Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
147 
BLOM Bank  
  
Egypt 
2005 0.29 0.30 0.97 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.39 0.40 0.98 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.31 0.35 0.89 
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2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.25 0.28 0.89 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.20 0.23 0.89 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.21 0.22 0.94 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.26 0.26 0.98 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.24 0.26 0.92 
27 
Union National Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 0.89 1.00 0.89 
148 
Société Arabe Internationale 
de Banque 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.35 0.47 0.75 
2006 0.95 0.99 0.96 2006 0.37 0.48 0.77 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.37 0.43 0.85 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.54 0.56 0.96 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.47 0.48 0.98 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.76 0.79 0.96 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.76 0.78 0.98 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
28 
Mashreq Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
149 
HSBC Bank Egypt  
  
Egypt 
2005 0.50 0.51 1.00 
2006 0.98 1.00 0.98 2006 0.37 0.38 0.99 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.70 0.73 0.96 
2008 0.78 0.84 0.94 2008 0.63 0.69 0.92 
2009 0.65 0.74 0.87 2009 0.43 0.48 0.90 
2010 0.57 0.69 0.83 2010 0.48 0.51 0.94 
2011 0.60 0.67 0.89 2011 0.50 0.52 0.97 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.54 0.55 0.97 
29 
Commercial Bank of Dubai 
   
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
150 
Ahli United Bank  
  
Egypt 
2005 0.61 0.83 0.74 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.29 0.42 0.68 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.33 0.36 0.93 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.41 0.42 0.98 
2009 0.81 0.88 0.93 2009 0.37 0.38 0.96 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.40 0.44 0.89 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.42 0.46 0.93 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.37 0.42 0.89 
30 
National Bank of Ras Al-
Khaimah 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
151 
Egyptian Gulf Bank 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.23 0.33 0.69 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.26 0.33 0.79 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.26 0.31 0.85 
2008 0.91 1.00 0.91 2008 0.33 0.34 0.97 
2009 0.88 1.00 0.88 2009 0.27 0.28 0.95 
2010 0.84 1.00 0.84 2010 0.37 0.42 0.87 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.33 0.38 0.86 
2012 0.97 1.00 0.97 2012 0.70 0.76 0.93 
31 
Bank of Sharjah 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
152 
Barclays Bank 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.59 0.68 0.87 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.61 0.62 0.99 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.49 0.49 0.99 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.34 0.38 0.91 
2009 0.98 1.00 0.98 2009 0.35 0.35 0.98 
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2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.52 0.52 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.37 0.37 0.98 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.51 0.52 0.99 
32 
National Bank of Fujairah 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
153 
Banque du Caire 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.62 0.64 0.96 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.64 0.64 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.53 0.53 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.66 0.66 1.00 
2009 0.92 0.97 0.95 2009 0.61 0.61 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.55 0.55 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.77 0.77 0.99 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.82 0.83 0.99 
33 
Al Masraf Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
154 
The National Bank of Kuwait  
  
Egypt 
2005 0.61 0.62 0.99 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.45 0.46 0.99 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.39 0.39 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.38 0.38 1.00 
2009 0.94 1.00 0.94 2009 0.48 0.48 0.99 
2010 0.98 1.00 0.98 2010 0.47 0.47 1.00 
2011 0.87 0.99 0.88 2011 0.43 0.43 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.48 0.48 0.99 
34 
National Bank of Umm Al-
Qaiwain 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
155 
Commercial International 
Bank 
  
Egypt 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.44 0.49 0.91 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.42 0.44 0.95 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.44 0.47 0.93 
2009 0.97 1.00 0.97 2009 0.43 0.48 0.89 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.45 0.66 0.68 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.48 0.71 0.68 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.51 0.88 0.58 
35 
Commercial Bank 
International 
  
UAE 
2005 0.92 1.00 0.92 
156 
Union National Bank 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.34 0.38 0.90 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.24 0.24 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.15 0.18 0.82 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.18 0.19 0.91 
2009 0.83 0.84 0.99 2008 0.22 0.22 0.99 
2010 0.91 0.91 1.00 2010 0.14 0.15 0.91 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.15 0.16 0.91 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.27 0.28 0.98 
36 
United Arab Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
157 
Arab International Bank 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.65 0.70 0.93 
2006 0.91 0.93 0.99 2006 0.80 0.89 0.89 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.79 0.90 0.87 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.79 0.88 0.90 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.62 0.66 0.95 
2010 0.88 1.00 0.88 2010 0.23 0.24 0.96 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.22 0.23 0.97 
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2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.33 0.33 0.98 
37 
Invest Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 0.82 1.00 0.82 
158 
Arab Banking Corporation 
(ABC Bank) 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.16 0.21 0.75 
2006 0.90 0.95 0.95 2006 0.16 0.23 0.68 
2007 0.93 0.98 0.95 2007 0.19 0.24 0.81 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.27 0.28 0.95 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.20 0.22 0.94 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.15 0.16 0.94 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.24 0.27 0.90 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.28 0.31 0.92 
38 
Emirates Investment Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
159 
Bank of Alexandria 
  
Egypt 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.69 0.69 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.58 0.59 1.00 
2008 0.79 1.00 0.79 2008 0.61 0.61 1.00 
2009 0.94 1.00 0.94 2009 0.62 0.67 0.92 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.66 0.69 0.95 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.69 0.78 0.89 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.45 0.47 0.96 
39 
Credit Europe Bank 
  
UAE 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
160 
Piraeus Bank  
  
Egypt 
2005 0.30 0.32 0.94 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.38 0.39 0.95 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 0.36 0.40 0.91 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.41 0.44 0.93 
2009 0.89 1.00 0.89 2009 0.28 0.36 0.78 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.24 0.29 0.81 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.28 0.36 0.77 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.26 0.32 0.82 
40 
National Bank of Kuwait 
  
Kuwait 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
161 
The United Bank 
  
Egypt 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.39 0.39 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.65 0.75 0.86 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.57 1.00 0.57 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.46 0.56 0.83 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.89 1.00 0.89 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
41 
Gulf Bank 
  
Kuwait 
2005 0.99 1.00 0.99 
162 
Banque Misr  
  
Egypt 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.88 0.92 0.95 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.80 0.86 0.93 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.95 1.00 0.95 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.99 0.99 1.00 2011 0.89 0.91 0.98 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
42 Burgan Bank 2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 163 Emirates National Bank of 2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Kuwait 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. Dubai  
  
Egypt 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.22 0.22 0.98 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.23 0.25 0.95 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.19 0.22 0.85 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.20 0.27 0.75 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.20 0.26 0.79 
43 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait 
  
Kuwait 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
164 
National Bank of Egypt 
  
Egypt 
2005 0.93 1.00 0.93 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.92 1.00 0.92 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.89 0.99 0.90 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.95 0.97 0.97 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.93 1.00 0.93 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.95 1.00 0.95 
2011 0.97 0.99 0.98 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
44 
Al Aahli Bank of Kuwait 
  
Kuwait 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
165 
Union Bank of Israel  
  
Israel 
2005 0.74 0.91 0.80 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.72 0.86 0.83 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.73 0.85 0.86 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.72 0.87 0.83 
2009 0.92 0.94 0.98 2009 0.62 0.72 0.86 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.66 0.77 0.86 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.70 0.83 0.84 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.66 0.77 0.86 
45 
Ahli United Bank 
  
Kuwait 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
166 
Bank Hapoalim 
  
Israel 
2005 0.80 1.00 0.80 
2006 0.97 1.00 0.97 2006 0.64 1.00 0.64 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.62 0.95 0.65 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.69 1.00 0.69 
2009 0.99 1.00 0.99 2009 0.59 0.86 0.69 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.72 1.00 0.72 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.70 1.00 0.70 
2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2012 0.62 1.00 0.62 
46 
Ahli United Bank  
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
167 
Mercantile Discount Bank 
  
Israel 
2005 0.77 0.80 0.95 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.66 0.71 0.93 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.64 0.68 0.94 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.61 0.65 0.93 
2009 0.96 0.96 1.00 2009 0.50 0.58 0.85 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.51 0.60 0.85 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.53 0.64 0.83 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.53 0.64 0.83 
47 
Arab Banking Corporation  
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
168 
Israel Discount Bank  
  
Israel 
2005 0.70 0.98 0.71 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.61 0.85 0.72 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.67 0.85 0.79 
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2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.79 1.00 0.79 
2009 0.96 0.98 0.97 2009 0.72 0.97 0.74 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.71 1.00 0.71 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.63 0.89 0.70 
2012 0.79 1.00 0.79 2012 0.67 0.94 0.71 
48 
Gulf International Bank  
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
169 
Ubank 
  
Israel 
2005 0.71 0.75 0.94 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.92 0.93 0.99 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.81 0.81 1.00 
2010 0.82 0.99 0.84 2010 0.91 0.94 0.97 
2011 0.76 0.82 0.92 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.69 0.75 0.92 
49 
BBK Bank 
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
170 
Bank Leumi  
  
Israel 
2005 0.73 0.99 0.74 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.72 1.00 0.72 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.70 1.00 0.70 
2008 0.98 0.98 1.00 2008 0.70 1.00 0.70 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.61 0.90 0.68 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.64 1.00 0.64 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.66 1.00 0.66 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.64 1.00 0.64 
50 
Ithmaar Bank  
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
171 
Mizrahi Tefahot Bank 
  
Israel 
2005 0.87 0.94 0.93 
2006 0.87 1.00 0.87 2006 0.90 0.93 0.96 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.92 0.93 0.99 
2008 0.85 0.89 0.96 2008 0.91 0.94 0.97 
2009 0.98 1.00 0.98 2009 0.94 0.94 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.97 1.00 0.97 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.95 1.00 0.95 
51 
National Bank of Bahrain 
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
172 
Bank of Jerusalem 
  
Israel 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.98 0.98 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.97 1.00 0.97 2009 0.88 0.89 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.81 1.00 0.81 2011 0.96 0.97 0.99 
2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
52 
Investcorp Bank  
  
Bahrain 
2005 0.97 1.00 0.97 
173 
Arab Bank 
  
Jordan 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.81 0.84 0.96 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.89 0.95 0.94 
2008 0.91 1.00 0.91 2008 0.98 1.00 0.98 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.88 1.00 0.88 
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2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.84 0.95 0.88 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.87 1.00 0.87 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.87 1.00 0.87 
53 
United Gulf Bank 
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
174 
Housing Bank for Trade and 
Finance  
  
Jordan 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.75 1.00 0.75 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.75 1.00 0.75 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.79 0.84 0.95 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.70 0.80 0.88 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.75 0.83 0.91 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.90 0.96 0.93 
2012 0.95 1.00 0.95 2012 0.96 1.00 0.96 
54 
BMI Bank 
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
175 
Bank of Jordan 
  
Jordan 
 
2005 0.99 1.00 0.99 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.41 1.00 0.41 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.36 0.69 0.52 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.99 1.00 0.99 
2010 0.77 0.82 0.94 2010 0.89 1.00 0.89 
2011 0.82 1.00 0.82 2011 0.86 1.00 0.86 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.83 0.86 0.97 
55 
Future Bank 
  
Bahrain 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
176 
ABC Bank 
  
Jordan 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.91 0.98 0.93 
2007 0.99 1.00 0.99 2007 0.83 0.90 0.92 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.82 0.88 0.93 
2009 0.93 0.94 0.99 2009 0.81 0.86 0.94 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.89 0.92 0.97 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
56 
Alubaf Arab International 
Bank 
  
Bahrain 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
177 
Capital Bank of Jordan 
  
Jordan 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.83 1.00 0.83 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.76 1.00 0.76 2009 0.62 0.75 0.82 
2010 0.72 0.77 0.94 2010 0.72 0.93 0.78 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.79 0.84 0.94 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
57 
Bahraini Saudi Bank 
  
Bahrain 
Merged with Al-Salam 
Bank-Bahrain 
in 2011 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
178 
Société générale de Banque 
  
Jordan 
2005 0.87 1.00 0.87 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.89 1.00 0.89 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.72 0.87 0.82 
58 
Bahrain Development Bank 
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
179 
Jordan Commercial Bank 
  
Jordan 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.93 0.94 0.99 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.98 1.00 0.98 
2008 0.89 0.92 0.97 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.91 0.92 0.98 
2010 0.93 1.00 0.93 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.84 1.00 0.84 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.92 0.92 1.00 
59 
Taib Bank 
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
180 
IBL Bank  
  
Lebanon 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.85 0.87 0.98 
2008 0.98 1.00 0.98 2008 0.82 0.82 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.76 0.79 0.97 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.83 0.86 0.97 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.86 0.92 0.94 
2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2012 0.91 0.97 0.93 
60 
BMB Investment Bank-
Bahrain 
Middle East Bank 
  
Bahrain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
181 
Banque BEMO 
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.87 0.95 0.92 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.78 0.79 0.99 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.98 0.99 0.98 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.97 1.00 0.97 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.86 0.88 0.98 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
61 
Barclays Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
182 
MEAB Bank 
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.51 0.61 0.84 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.47 0.57 0.82 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.56 0.63 0.88 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.74 0.81 0.91 
2009 0.65 0.65 1.00 2009 0.89 0.92 0.97 
2010 0.61 0.62 0.99 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.98 0.98 1.00 2011 0.87 0.88 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
62 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
183 
Banque Misr Liban 
   
Lebanon 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.77 0.77 1.00 2008 0.63 0.71 0.89 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.58 0.65 0.90 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.52 0.53 0.97 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.46 0.48 0.96 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.43 0.44 0.97 
63 Lloyds TSP Bank 2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 184 Fransabank  2005 0.65 0.83 0.78 
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UK 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00    
Lebanon 
2006 0.65 0.81 0.81 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.67 1.00 0.67 
2008 0.73 0.83 0.88 2008 0.63 0.95 0.67 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.59 1.00 0.59 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.64 1.00 0.64 
2011 0.94 0.96 0.97 2011 0.73 1.00 0.73 
2012 0.94 1.00 0.94 2012 0.66 1.00 0.66 
64 
HSBC Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
185 
Byblos Bank 
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.49 0.62 0.79 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.52 0.65 0.80 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.64 0.78 0.82 
2008 0.85 0.92 0.92 2008 0.62 0.92 0.68 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.62 1.00 0.62 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.63 1.00 0.63 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.61 1.00 0.61 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.63 1.00 0.63 
65 
Goldman Sachs 
International 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
186 
Bank Audi  
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.72 0.72 0.99 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.62 0.63 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.73 0.74 0.99 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.80 0.82 0.97 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.98 1.00 0.98 
2010 0.91 0.91 0.99 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.45 0.49 0.92 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
66 
Bank of Scotland 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
187 
Federal Bank of Lebanon 
   
Lebanon 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.48 0.48 1.00 2008 0.92 0.94 0.98 
2009 0.49 0.55 0.90 2009 0.96 1.00 0.96 
2010 0.50 0.60 0.83 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.47 0.59 0.79 2011 0.86 0.97 0.89 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.65 0.69 0.94 
67 
Credit Suisse International 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
188 
Bank of Beirut 
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.66 0.73 0.89 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.74 0.81 0.91 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.72 0.83 0.86 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.86 1.00 0.86 2010 0.94 1.00 0.94 
2011 0.89 1.00 0.89 2011 0.89 1.00 0.89 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.90 1.00 0.90 
68 
 
Standard Chartered Bank 
  
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
189 
Lebanon and Gulf Bank 
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.67 0.69 0.96 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.54 0.55 0.99 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.47 0.47 0.99 
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UK 2008 0.89 0.93 0.95 2008 0.60 0.60 1.00 
2009 0.93 1.00 0.93 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.95 1.00 0.95 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.86 1.00 0.86 2011 0.78 0.82 0.95 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.77 0.84 0.92 
69 
National Westminster Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
190 
BBAC Bank 
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.68 0.68 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.57 0.58 0.98 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.64 0.66 0.96 
2008 0.78 0.91 0.86 2008 0.71 0.80 0.89 
2009 0.88 0.95 0.92 2009 0.74 0.83 0.89 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.74 0.82 0.90 
2011 0.71 0.81 0.87 2011 0.74 0.85 0.88 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.70 0.79 0.89 
70 
Santander Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
191 
Bankmed 
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.34 0.50 0.68 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.41 0.76 0.55 
2007 0.88 1.00 0.88 2007 0.49 0.75 0.65 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.71 0.99 0.72 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.61 0.83 0.73 
2010 0.52 1.00 0.52 2010 0.71 1.00 0.71 
2011 0.49 0.66 0.75 2011 0.80 1.00 0.80 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.63 1.00 0.63 
71 
Ulster Bank Limited 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
192 
Banque Pharaon and Chiha  
   
Lebanon 
2005 0.41 0.49 0.83 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.32 0.47 0.69 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.36 0.44 0.83 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.37 0.47 0.79 
2009 0.81 1.00 0.81 2009 0.35 0.43 0.81 
2010 0.83 0.92 0.90 2010 0.72 1.00 0.72 
2011 0.78 1.00 0.78 2011 0.74 0.83 0.90 
2012 0.70 1.00 0.70 2012 0.74 1.00 0.74 
72 
Clydesdale Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
193 
Société Générale de Banque 
  
Lebanon 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.98 1.00 0.98 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.62 0.74 0.84 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.80 0.80 0.99 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.92 1.00 0.92 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.70 1.00 0.70 
2012 0.89 1.00 0.89 2012 0.82 1.00 0.82 
73 
RBC Europe Bank 
  
UK 
2005 0.76 1.00 0.76 
194 
Banque Libano-Francaise 
  
Lebanon 
2005 0.64 0.77 0.84 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.72 0.84 0.85 
2007 0.98 1.00 0.98 2007 0.80 0.95 0.84 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.91 1.00 0.91 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.74 0.88 0.83 
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2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.79 0.97 0.81 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.81 1.00 0.81 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.85 1.00 0.85 
74 
Mizuho International 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
195 
B.L.C. Bank  
  
Lebanon 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 0.66 1.00 0.66 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.49 0.54 0.89 2007 0.66 0.66 1.00 
2008 0.70 1.00 0.70 2008 0.82 0.84 0.97 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.82 0.83 0.98 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.81 0.89 0.90 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.93 1.00 0.93 
75 
Coutts Bank 
  
UK 
2005 0.91 0.91 0.99 
196 
First National Bank  
  
Lebanon 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.67 0.67 1.00 
2008 0.95 1.00 0.95 2008 0.74 0.75 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.66 0.68 0.97 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.77 0.83 0.92 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.90 1.00 0.90 
2012 0.99 1.00 0.99 2012 0.77 0.87 0.89 
76 
Allied Irish Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
197 
Crédit Libanais  Bank 
  
Lebanon 
2005 0.36 0.40 0.90 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.35 0.38 0.94 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.47 0.52 0.91 
2008 0.80 0.86 0.93 2008 0.71 0.80 0.89 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.64 0.81 0.79 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.89 1.00 0.89 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.83 1.00 0.83 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.71 0.92 0.77 
77 
Investec Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
198 
Near East Commercial Bank  
  
Lebanon 
2005 0.08 1.00 0.08 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.08 0.65 0.12 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.07 0.61 0.12 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.35 0.70 0.49 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.43 0.60 0.71 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.48 0.58 0.82 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.45 0.63 0.72 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.57 0.72 0.80 
78 
Standard Bank 
  
UK 
2005 0.96 1.00 0.96 
199 
Emirates Lebanon Bank 
  
Lebanon 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.79 1.00 0.79 
2009 0.68 0.71 0.97 2009 0.87 1.00 0.87 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.96 1.00 0.96 
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2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.79 0.79 1.00 
79 
Citibank International 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
200 
Ahli International Bank  
  
Lebanon 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.49 0.69 0.72 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.48 0.75 0.64 
2008 0.95 1.00 0.95 2008 0.50 0.56 0.90 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.43 0.48 0.91 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.74 0.75 0.98 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.48 0.51 0.94 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.60 0.62 0.97 
80 
MBNA Europe Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
201 
National Bank of Kuwait 
  
Lebanon 
2005 0.14 0.38 0.36 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.10 0.37 0.26 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.11 0.36 0.30 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.12 0.35 0.35 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.34 0.35 0.99 
2010 0.97 0.97 1.00 2010 0.39 0.39 0.98 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.26 0.28 0.93 
2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2012 0.21 0.29 0.75 
81 
Sainsbury's Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
202 
Société Nouvelle de la 
Banque de Syrie et du Liban 
  
Lebanon 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 0.86 1.00 0.86 2007 0.36 0.40 0.90 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.38 0.41 0.92 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.44 0.47 0.94 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.33 0.34 0.95 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.31 0.32 0.98 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.33 0.34 0.98 
82 
ABC International Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
203 
Jammal Trust Bank 
  
Lebanon 
2005 0.16 0.28 0.59 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.16 0.27 0.57 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.35 0.35 0.99 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.41 0.43 0.96 
2009 0.88 0.90 0.97 2009 0.39 0.42 0.93 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.26 0.28 0.94 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.53 0.55 0.96 
2012 0.82 1.00 0.82 2012 0.46 0.49 0.94 
83 
Gulf International Bank  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
204 
Audi Saradar Private Bank 
  
Lebanon 
2005 0.43 0.47 0.91 
2006 0.75 1.00 0.75 2006 0.33 0.35 0.94 
2007 0.04 1.00 0.04 2007 0.44 0.44 0.99 
2008 0.22 1.00 0.22 2008 0.57 0.57 1.00 
2009 0.38 1.00 0.38 2009 0.74 0.74 1.00 
2010 0.81 1.00 0.81 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.78 0.78 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
84 Ahli United Bank 2005 0.90 1.00 0.90 205 Banque de l'Industrie et du 2005 0.29 0.46 0.62 
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UK 
2006 0.84 1.00 0.84 Travail 
  
Lebanon 
2006 0.28 0.40 0.71 
2007 0.79 1.00 0.79 2007 0.32 0.40 0.82 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.31 0.38 0.83 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.31 0.36 0.86 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.38 0.41 0.93 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.36 0.39 0.94 
2012 0.65 0.97 0.67 2012 0.42 0.44 0.95 
85 
British Arab Commercial 
Bank  
  
UK 
2005 0.80 0.82 0.97 
206 
BLOM Bank 
  
Lebanon 
2005 0.82 1.00 0.82 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.98 1.00 0.98 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.98 1.00 0.98 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.99 1.00 0.99 
2009 0.91 0.98 0.93 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.68 1.00 0.68 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.98 1.00 0.98 
86 
EFG Private Bank Limited 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
207 
Lebanese Swiss Bank  
  
Lebanon 
2005 0.71 0.71 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.61 0.61 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.61 0.61 0.99 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.84 0.88 0.95 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.99 1.00 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.94 0.96 0.98 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 0.88 0.93 0.94 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
87 
Bank Leumi 
   
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
208 
Bank of Baghdad 
  
Iraq 
2005 0.48 1.00 0.48 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.34 0.38 0.91 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.81 1.00 0.81 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.68 0.80 0.85 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.72 1.00 0.72 
2011 0.88 1.00 0.88 2011 0.74 1.00 0.74 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.51 1.00 0.51 
88 
SG Hambros Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
209 
Investment Bank of Iraq 
  
Iraq 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 0.15 0.33 0.46 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.33 0.42 0.80 
2010 0.77 0.96 0.80 2010 0.86 1.00 0.86 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.80 1.00 0.80 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
89 
Standard Bank Jersey 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
210 
Libyan Foreign Bank 
  
Libya 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 0.79 0.86 0.91 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.43 0.99 0.43 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.43 0.43 1.00 
2009 0.50 0.51 0.97 2009 0.33 0.33 1.00 
2010 0.66 1.00 0.66 2010 0.29 0.29 0.99 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.31 0.32 0.99 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.63 1.00 0.63 
90 
National Bank of Kuwait  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
211 
Bank of Commerce and 
Development 
  
Libya 
2005 0.76 0.79 0.96 
2006 0.85 1.00 0.85 2006 0.63 0.64 0.98 
2007 0.77 1.00 0.77 2007 0.17 0.18 0.99 
2008 0.72 1.00 0.72 2008 0.58 0.58 1.00 
2009 0.83 1.00 0.83 2009 0.97 0.97 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.55 0.62 0.89 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.45 0.54 0.83 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.17 0.22 0.77 
91 
National Bank of Egypt 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
212 
National Commercial Bank 
  
Libya 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.66 0.67 0.99 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.72 0.74 0.98 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.97 0.98 0.99 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.94 0.95 1.00 2010 0.33 0.60 0.55 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.46 0.51 0.90 
2012 0.84 1.00 0.84 2012 0.57 0.66 0.86 
92 
Punjab National Bank  
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
213 
Sahara Bank 
  
Libya 
2005 0.35 0.36 0.99 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.35 0.35 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.50 0.58 0.87 
2008 0.87 1.00 0.87 2008 0.51 0.59 0.87 
2009 0.87 0.93 0.94 2009 0.37 0.62 0.59 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.81 0.82 0.98 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
93 
Butterfield Bank 
  
UK 
2005 0.98 1.00 0.98 
214 
Wahda Bank 
  
Libya 
2005 0.32 0.34 0.95 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.45 0.46 0.98 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.42 0.45 0.93 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.55 0.59 0.93 
2009 0.93 1.00 0.93 2009 0.37 0.53 0.70 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.18 0.33 0.56 
2012 0.70 1.00 0.70 2012 0.19 0.38 0.50 
94 
Crown Agents Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
215 
Banque Centrale Populaire 
  
Morocco 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.95 1.00 0.95 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.92 1.00 0.92 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.74 0.80 0.92 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.68 0.73 0.93 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.56 0.63 0.88 
95 
Julian Hodge Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
216 
Crédit du Maroc 
  
Morocco 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.93 0.94 1.00 
2008 0.95 1.00 0.95 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.94 1.00 0.94 2010 0.88 0.89 0.99 
2011 0.94 1.00 0.94 2011 0.90 0.90 0.99 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
96 
Rothschild Bank 
International 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
217 
Citibank-Maghreb 
  
Morocco 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.83 1.00 0.83 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.91 0.93 0.98 
2010 0.70 1.00 0.70 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.79 1.00 0.79 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.92 1.00 0.92 
97 
Alpha Bank London  
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
218 
Banque Marocaine du 
Commerce Extérieu 
  
Morocco 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 0.79 0.83 0.96 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.69 0.81 0.86 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.90 1.00 0.90 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.91 1.00 0.91 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.66 0.76 0.87 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.72 0.87 0.82 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.73 1.00 0.73 
98 
Unity Trust Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
219 
Banque Marocaine pour le 
Commerce et l'Industrie 
  
Morocco 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.81 0.82 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.93 0.94 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.92 0.92 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.96 0.97 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
99 
Ghana International Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
220 
Attijariwafa Bank 
  
Morocco 
2005 0.78 0.79 0.99 
2006 0.74 1.00 0.74 2006 0.74 0.76 0.98 
2007 0.83 1.00 0.83 2007 0.78 0.82 0.95 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.92 0.95 0.96 
2009 0.93 0.96 0.96 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.68 0.73 0.92 2010 0.96 1.00 0.96 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
100 
Danske Bank, formerly 
Northern Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
221 
Société Générale Marocaine 
de Banques 
  
Morocco 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.98 1.00 0.98 2008 0.90 0.90 1.00 
2009 0.96 0.98 0.99 2009 0.90 0.94 0.96 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.81 1.00 0.81 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
101 
Morgan Stanley Bank 
International  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
222 
Chaabi International Bank 
  
Morocco 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.42 1.00 0.42 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
102 
Europe Arab Bank  
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
223 
BAWAG Malta Bank  
  
Malta 
2005 0.77 0.84 0.91 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.85 1.00 0.85 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.82 1.00 0.82 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
103 
Kleinwort Benson Bank 
  
UK 
2005 0.75 0.82 0.91 
224 
Lombard Bank 
  
Malta 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 0.86 0.91 0.95 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.74 1.00 0.74 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.57 0.76 0.75 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.52 0.63 0.83 
2011 0.64 0.81 0.79 2011 0.45 0.51 0.88 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.38 0.42 0.92 
104 
United National Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
225 
APS Bank  
  
Malta 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.98 0.98 0.99 
2007 0.71 1.00 0.71 2007 0.99 0.99 1.00 
2008 0.71 1.00 0.71 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.89 0.89 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.93 0.95 0.98 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 0.80 1.00 0.80 2012 0.86 0.88 0.98 
105 Bank of Beirut 2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 226 HSBC Bank  2005 0.98 0.99 0.99 
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UK 
2006 0.78 1.00 0.78   
Malta 
2006 0.93 0.94 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.69 1.00 0.69 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.68 0.73 0.93 2010 0.99 1.00 0.99 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
106 
Melli Bank  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
227 
Palestine Commercial Bank 
  
Palestine 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.44 1.00 0.44 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.59 0.95 0.62 
2012 0.65 0.91 0.72 2012 0.71 1.00 0.71 
107 
Habibsons Bank  
  
UK 
2005 0.93 0.93 0.99 
228 
Bank of Palestine 
  
Palestine 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.87 0.88 0.98 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.84 0.91 0.92 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.96 1.00 0.96 
2009 0.97 1.00 0.97 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
108 
BMCE Bank International 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
229 
Syria Gulf Bank 
  
Syria 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 0.88 1.00 0.88 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 0.68 0.91 0.75 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.77 1.00 0.77 2009 0.24 0.48 0.50 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.41 0.59 0.70 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
109 
Kookmin Bank International  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
230 
Banque Bemo Saudi Fransi  
  
Syria 
2005 0.69 0.94 0.73 
2006 0.73 1.00 0.73 2006 0.89 0.98 0.91 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.89 0.90 0.99 
2010 0.57 0.77 0.74 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.68 0.75 0.90 
2012 0.93 1.00 0.93 2012 0.61 0.64 0.95 
110 
Bank Saderat 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
231 
Bank of Syria and Overseas 
  
Syria 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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2008 0.90 0.93 0.97 2008 0.71 0.71 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.82 0.83 0.99 
2010 0.59 1.00 0.59 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.27 1.00 0.27 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.65 0.75 0.86 
111 
United Trust Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
232 
Byblos Bank Syria 
  
Syria 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.34 0.78 0.44 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.62 0.86 0.72 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.74 0.79 0.94 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.97 0.97 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.62 0.71 0.88 
112 
Reliance Bank 
  
UK 
2005 0.87 0.98 0.89 
233 
Bank Audi  
  
Syria 
2005 0.22 1.00 0.22 
2006 0.77 0.83 0.93 2006 0.44 0.61 0.72 
2007 0.97 1.00 0.97 2007 0.73 0.82 0.89 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.89 0.89 1.00 
2009 0.99 1.00 0.99 2009 0.84 0.85 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.95 0.97 0.97 
2012 0.53 1.00 0.53 2012 0.69 0.76 0.91 
113 
Persia International Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
234 
Attijari Bank 
  
Tunisia 
2005 0.88 0.88 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.85 0.86 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.81 0.88 0.92 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.65 0.83 0.78 
2009 0.79 0.84 0.94 2009 0.42 0.55 0.76 
2010 0.50 0.66 0.75 2010 0.46 0.70 0.66 
2011 0.37 0.84 0.44 2011 0.36 0.55 0.66 
2012 0.29 1.00 0.29 2012 0.42 0.66 0.64 
114 
Anglo-Romanian Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
235 
Arab Tunisian Bank 
  
Tunisia 
2005 0.87 0.97 0.89 
2006 0.94 1.00 0.94 2006 0.84 0.98 0.86 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.81 1.00 0.81 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.74 0.77 0.96 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.93 1.00 0.93 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.93 1.00 0.93 
2011 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
115 
Airdrie Savings Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
236 
Banque Internationale Arabe 
de Tunisie  
  
Tunisia 
2005 0.44 0.53 0.84 
2006 0.95 1.00 0.95 2006 0.44 0.48 0.93 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.50 0.68 0.74 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.40 0.55 0.72 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.45 1.00 0.45 
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2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.39 0.65 0.60 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.43 1.00 0.43 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.55 1.00 0.55 
116 
Turkish Bank  
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
237 
Amen Bank 
  
Tunisia 
2005 0.52 0.52 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.53 0.58 0.92 
2007 0.84 1.00 0.84 2007 0.55 0.68 0.81 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.69 0.82 0.84 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.62 0.88 0.71 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.81 1.00 0.81 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.75 1.00 0.75 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.87 1.00 0.87 
117 
Bank Mandiri 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
238 
Union Internationale de 
Banques 
  
Tunisia 
2005 0.66 0.67 0.99 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.81 0.84 0.97 
2007 0.95 0.98 0.97 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.97 1.00 0.97 2009 0.73 0.75 0.97 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.90 0.93 0.96 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 0.58 1.00 0.58 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
118 
Harrods Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
239 
Banque de Tunisie 
  
Tunisia 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.91 0.93 0.98 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.87 0.89 0.98 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 0.81 0.82 0.98 2012 0.65 0.83 0.78 
119 
Consolidated Credits Bank  
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
240 
ABC Bank 
  
Tunisia 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.59 1.00 0.59 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.67 0.91 0.74 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.37 0.99 0.38 
2009 0.85 1.00 0.85 2009 0.14 0.56 0.24 
2010 0.74 0.99 0.75 2010 0.45 1.00 0.45 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.22 0.61 0.37 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.60 1.00 0.60 
120 
Diamond Bank 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
241 
Banque de l'Habitat 
  
Tunisia 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 0.96 1.00 0.96 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.95 0.95 1.00 2009 0.71 1.00 0.71 
2010 0.69 0.69 1.00 2010 0.66 1.00 0.66 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.59 1.00 0.59 
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2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.52 1.00 0.52 
121 
Bank of St. Helena 
  
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
242 
National Bank of Yemen 
  
Yemen 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.88 0.88 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.88 0.89 0.99 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Appendix 7: Efficiency measures of socially responsible banks 
 
N Socially responsible Banks Year TE PTE SE N Socially responsible Banks Year TE PTE SE 
1 
Andelskassen OIKOS 
  
Denmark 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
20 
Caja Rural de Navarra Sociedad Cooperativa 
de Crédito 
  
Spain 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.96 1.00 0.96 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 
Merkur Bank 
  
Denmark 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
21 
RSF Social Finance 
  
USA 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 0.71 1.00 0.71 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.77 1.00 0.77 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 0.86 1.00 0.86 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.91 1.00 0.91 
3 
Dragsholm Sparekasse 
  
Denmark 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
22 
Citizens Bank of Canada 
  
Canda 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
4 
Arbejdernes Landsbank 
  
Denmark 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
23 
The Co-operative Bank Limited 
  
New Zealand 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.90 0.90 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.95 0.96 0.99 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5 
Folkesparekassen 
  
Denmark 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
24 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited 
  
Australia 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 
GLS Gemeinschaftsbank 
   
Germany 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
25 
BRAC Bank  
   
Bangladesh 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.81 0.84 0.97 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.73 1.00 0.73 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
7 
UmweltBank  
  
Germany 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
26 
XacBank  
  
 Mongolia 
2005 0.78 1.00 0.78 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.47 0.85 0.55 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.75 0.87 0.86 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
8 
Vereinigte Volksbank 
   
Germany 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
27 
Sunrise Bank  
  
 Nepal 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 0.72 0.82 0.87 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.93 0.97 0.95 
2009 0.91 0.95 0.96 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.73 0.75 0.98 
2012 0.89 0.89 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
9 
Charity Bank Limited  
   
UK 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
28 
Banco FIE  
  
 Bolivia 
2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
10 
Co-operative Bank Plc  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
29 
Banco Solidario  
   
Bolivia 
2005 0.59 1.00 0.59 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.59 1.00 0.59 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.85 0.85 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
11 
Reliance Bank Limited 
  
UK 
2005 0.87 0.98 0.89 
30 
Société Générale  
  
Algeria 
2005 0.82 1.00 0.82 
2006 0.77 0.83 0.93 2006 0.87 1.00 0.87 
2007 0.97 1.00 0.97 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.99 1.00 0.99 2009 0.70 0.70 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 0.53 1.00 0.53 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
12 
Unity Trust Bank 
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
31 
Banque de l'Agriculture et du Developpement 
Rural 
  
Algeria 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.83 1.00 0.83 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.77 0.98 0.79 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.76 1.00 0.76 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 0.85 1.00 0.85 
13 
Ecology Building Society  
  
UK 
2005 0.92 0.92 1.00 
32 
Banque de Développement Local 
  
Algeria 
2005 0.95 1.00 0.95 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.81 1.00 0.81 
2007 0.98 1.00 0.98 2007 0.30 0.45 0.67 
2008 0.98 0.99 0.99 2008 0.21 0.28 0.75 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.24 0.32 0.77 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.90 1.00 0.90 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.35 0.45 0.78 
2012 0.99 1.00 0.99 2012 0.52 0.58 0.90 
14 
ICIC Bank  
  
UK 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
33 
Bank Keshavarzi-Agricultural Bank of Iran 
  
Iran 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.93 0.94 0.99 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.95 0.95 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.96 0.96 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.71 0.76 0.93 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.80 0.87 0.92 
2012 0.76 1.00 0.76 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
15 
Cultura Sparebank 
  
Norway 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
34 
Crédit Agricole du Maroc 
  
Morocco 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.79 0.83 0.95 2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.96 0.97 0.99 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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2012 0.94 1.00 0.94 2012 0.89 1.00 0.89 
16 
Crédit Coopératif 
  
France 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
35 
Volksbank 
  
Malta 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.99 0.99 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.91 0.92 0.99 2008 0.96 1.00 0.96 
2009 0.86 0.98 0.88 2009 0.88 0.90 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 0.80 0.88 0.91 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 0.90 0.99 0.91 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
17 
Alternative Bank Schweiz ABC 
  
Switzerland 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
36 
Oesterreichische Volksbanken 
  
Austria 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2008 0.94 0.97 0.97 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.98 1.00 0.98 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 0.99 1.00 0.99 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
18 
Algemene Spaarbank voor  
  
Netherlands 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
37 
Société Tunisienne de Banque 
  
Tunisia 
2005 0.87 1.00 0.87 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.87 1.00 0.87 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.83 0.89 0.93 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 0.96 1.00 0.96 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.99 1.00 0.99 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 0.09 1.00 0.09 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
19 
Triodos Bank 
  
Netherlands 
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 
38 
Banque Nationale Agricole 
  
Tunisia 
2005 0.72 1.00 0.72 
2006 1.00 1.00 1.00 2006 0.73 1.00 0.73 
2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 2007 0.87 0.98 0.89 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 1.00 1.00 1.00 2009 0.89 1.00 0.89 
2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 2010 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 2011 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2012 0.97 1.00 0.97 2012 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Appendix 8: Averages TE, PTE and SE for IB, CB, SRB and all banks 
 
Average Efficiencies 
Type Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Socially responsible 
Banks 
Mean All Banks 
DEA TE PTE SE TE PTE SE TE PTE SE TE PTE SE 
2005 0.890 0.968 0.912 0.835 0.883 0.936 0.952 0.997 0.955 0.892 0.949 0.934 
2006 0.873 0.926 0.936 0.815 0.872 0.923 0.934 0.990 0.941 0.874 0.929 0.933 
2007 0.895 0.931 0.954 0.819 0.876 0.926 0.958 0.973 0.980 0.891 0.927 0.953 
2008 0.854 0.930 0.920 0.828 0.882 0.935 0.956 0.975 0.976 0.879 0.929 0.944 
2009 0.863 0.912 0.943 0.810 0.868 0.924 0.927 0.956 0.966 0.867 0.912 0.944 
2010 0.909 0.945 0.960 0.825 0.885 0.927 0.977 0.987 0.989 0.904 0.939 0.959 
2011 0.874 0.933 0.936 0.826 0.886 0.925 0.930 0.969 0.956 0.877 0.929 0.939 
2012 0.911 0.952 0.952 0.833 0.897 0.924 0.952 0.986 0.965 0.899 0.945 0.947 
Mean 0.883 0.936 0.940 0.823 0.881 0.927 0.948 0.978 0.966 0.884 0.932 0.944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  321 
 
Appendix 9: Target of reduction (amount) of inputs to be fully efficient 
Target of Reduction (amount) of inputs to be fully efficient 
Type Islamic Banks  Conventional Banks 
Socially responsible 
Banks 
Mean All Banks 
DEA  TE PTE SE TE PTE SE TE PTE SE TE PTE SE 
2005 0.110 0.032 0.088 0.165 0.117 0.064 0.048 0.003 0.045 0.108 0.051 0.066 
2006 0.127 0.074 0.064 0.185 0.128 0.077 0.066 0.010 0.059 0.126 0.071 0.067 
2007 0.105 0.069 0.046 0.181 0.124 0.074 0.042 0.027 0.020 0.109 0.073 0.047 
2008 0.146 0.070 0.080 0.172 0.118 0.065 0.044 0.025 0.024 0.121 0.071 0.056 
2009 0.137 0.088 0.057 0.190 0.132 0.076 0.073 0.044 0.034 0.133 0.088 0.056 
2010 0.091 0.055 0.040 0.175 0.115 0.073 0.023 0.013 0.011 0.096 0.061 0.041 
2011 0.126 0.067 0.064 0.174 0.114 0.075 0.070 0.031 0.044 0.123 0.071 0.061 
2012 0.089 0.048 0.048 0.167 0.103 0.076 0.048 0.014 0.035 0.101 0.055 0.053 
Mean 0.117 0.064 0.060 0.177 0.119 0.073 0.052 0.022 0.034 0.116 0.068 0.056 
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Appendix 10: Correlation between the independent variables for Islamic banks 
N 
Independent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Variables 
1 Size 1 
               
  2 Capital ratio -0.481 1 
              
  3 Loan intensity 0.397 -0.001 1 
             
  4 Credit risk -0.067 0.145 -0.070 1 
            
  5 Financial leverage 0.415 -0.486 0.200 -0.076 1 
           
  6 Deposit ratio 0.153 -0.035 0.527 -0.159 0.374 1 
          
  7 ROA 0.103 -0.259 -0.163 -0.066 0.001 -0.176 1 
         
  8 Operating leverage -0.153 0.623 0.317 0.047 -0.080 0.327 -0.291 1 
        
  9 Age 0.511 -0.382 0.371 -0.084 0.496 0.210 0.031 -0.048 1 
       
  10 Z-score 0.351 -0.189 0.320 -0.075 0.130 0.127 0.220 -0.009 0.530 1 
      
  11 Foreign banks -0.419 0.271 -0.333 0.088 -0.148 -0.117 -0.020 0.033 -0.256 -0.311 1 
     
  12 Domestic banks -0.061 -0.097 0.078 -0.047 -0.214 0.007 0.014 -0.183 -0.204 0.019 -0.592 1 
      
13 Government banks 0.519 -0.180 0.269 -0.041 0.403 0.117 0.005 0.173 0.507 0.312 -0.400 -0.502 1 
     
14 Listing 0.477 -0.231 0.241 -0.049 0.111 0.176 0.059 -0.149 0.183 0.121 -0.336 0.233 0.096 1 
    
15 GDP 0.339 0.000 0.222 -0.067 0.135 0.252 0.052 0.081 0.027 -0.035 -0.127 -0.140 0.296 0.198 1 
   
16 Inflation 0.041 0.019 -0.079 0.247 0.115 -0.114 -0.166 0.112 0.145 0.024 0.008 -0.145 0.156 -0.169 -0.217 1 
  
17 Market capitalisation -0.195 0.289 -0.184 0.042 -0.299 -0.197 0.018 -0.055 -0.295 -0.337 0.244 0.087 -0.361 -0.036 -0.064 -0.098 1 
 
18 Financial crisis -0.026 0.090 0.026 -0.031 -0.016 -0.029 -0.043 0.046 -0.025 -0.014 0.018 0.015 -0.036 -0.011 -0.009 0.019 0.020 1 
19 Corruption control -0.040 0.244 -0.028 0.036 -0.401 -0.130 0.027 -0.033 -0.348 -0.400 0.193 0.022 -0.232 0.127 0.294 -0.319 0.553 0.050 
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Appendix 11: Correlation between the independent variables for conventional banks 
N 
Independent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Variables 
1 Size 1 
               
  2 Capital ratio -0.236 1 
              
  3 Loan intensity 0.163 0.440 1 
             
  4 Credit risk -0.011 0.139 0.010 1 
            
  5 Financial leverage 0.358 -0.316 -0.161 -0.028 1 
           
  6 Deposit ratio -0.029 0.408 0.696 -0.054 -0.075 1 
          
  7 ROA 0.021 0.557 0.496 0.013 -0.148 0.505 1 
         
  8 Operating leverage -0.292 0.249 0.242 -0.002 -0.209 0.234 0.112 1 
        
  9 Age 0.361 -0.178 0.063 -0.033 0.221 0.083 0.005 -0.116 1 
       
  10 Z-score -0.111 0.070 -0.003 0.048 -0.272 0.025 0.179 0.077 -0.015 1 
      
  11 Foreign banks -0.198 0.035 -0.092 -0.028 -0.087 -0.078 -0.065 0.066 -0.259 -0.065 1 
     
  12 Domestic banks 0.093 -0.151 -0.032 -0.025 0.146 -0.010 -0.050 -0.067 0.277 0.065 -0.765 1 
      
13 Government banks 0.153 0.161 0.177 0.076 -0.082 0.129 0.160 0.000 -0.022 -0.019 -0.373 -0.299 1 
     
14 Listing 0.222 0.049 0.282 -0.017 -0.129 0.062 0.172 0.092 0.050 0.016 -0.079 0.016 0.106 1 
    
15 GDP 0.183 -0.054 0.000 -0.004 0.186 -0.005 -0.098 -0.277 0.100 -0.167 0.033 0.021 -0.079 -0.331 1 
   
16 Inflation -0.136 0.026 -0.004 -0.012 -0.092 -0.023 -0.004 0.027 -0.078 -0.097 -0.025 -0.014 0.063 0.034 -0.141 1 
  
17 Market capitalisation -0.049 -0.002 0.049 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.021 -0.120 0.067 -0.073 -0.045 0.101 -0.081 -0.084 0.209 0.579 1 
 
18 Financial crisis -0.008 -0.032 -0.015 -0.013 0.034 -0.001 -0.051 -0.004 -0.009 -0.021 0.025 -0.010 -0.023 -0.013 0.004 0.041 -0.007 1 
19 Corruption control 0.207 0.059 0.110 0.030 0.074 -0.097 -0.062 -0.299 0.050 -0.148 -0.018 0.072 -0.090 -0.093 0.677 -0.134 0.248 0.005 
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Appendix 12: Correlation between the independent variables for socially responsible banks 
N 
Independent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Variables 
1 Size 1 
               
  2 Capital ratio 0.287 1 
              
  3 Loan intensity -0.217 -0.722 1 
             
  4 Credit risk 0.159 0.261 0.163 1 
            
  5 Financial leverage 0.131 -0.044 -0.119 -0.306 1 
           
  6 Deposit ratio -0.237 -0.110 0.276 -0.419 0.085 1 
          
  7 ROA 0.076 0.152 -0.188 0.119 -0.325 -0.152 1 
         
  8 Operating leverage -0.102 0.371 -0.296 0.211 0.009 -0.090 0.109 1 
        
  9 Age 0.333 -0.210 0.129 -0.112 0.209 0.005 -0.166 -0.069 1 
       
  10 Z-score 0.109 0.594 -0.434 0.257 -0.193 -0.040 0.173 0.308 -0.202 1 
      
  11 Foreign banks 0.288 0.460 -0.284 0.085 0.067 -0.089 0.087 -0.076 -0.172 0.246 1 
     
  12 Domestic banks -0.266 -0.590 0.420 -0.174 0.025 0.136 -0.078 -0.102 0.070 -0.417 -0.729 1 
      
13 Government banks 0.104 0.451 -0.357 0.202 0.028 -0.195 -0.103 0.198 0.158 0.282 0.126 -0.644 1 
     
14 Listing 0.166 0.240 -0.077 0.273 -0.081 -0.015 0.175 -0.033 -0.192 0.255 0.027 -0.178 0.082 1 
    
15 GDP -0.006 -0.720 0.542 -0.297 0.115 0.125 -0.221 -0.450 0.398 -0.516 -0.263 0.391 -0.369 -0.304 1 
   
16 Inflation -0.331 -0.170 0.176 -0.163 -0.188 0.184 -0.024 0.004 0.099 -0.222 -0.017 -0.247 0.236 -0.171 -0.032 1 
  
17 Market capitalisation 0.008 -0.395 0.288 -0.090 0.128 0.022 -0.078 -0.309 0.139 -0.308 -0.231 0.436 -0.286 -0.222 0.488 -0.352 1 
 
18 Financial crisis -0.008 -0.003 0.006 0.007 0.022 -0.033 -0.068 0.058 0.002 -0.007 -0.013 0.019 -0.014 0.002 0.003 -0.007 -0.050 1 
19 Corruption control -0.217 -0.706 0.570 -0.220 0.016 0.160 -0.228 -0.509 0.357 -0.444 -0.209 0.270 -0.115 -0.367 0.666 0.302 0.436 -0.001 
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Appendix 13: Averages ROA, ROE and NIM for IB, CB, SRB and all banks 
 
Average Profitability Ratios 
Type IB CB SRB All Banks 
Ratio ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE MIM 
2005 0.1107 0.0241 7.3536 0.0163 0.0141 2.7421 0.0048 0.0177 3.6107 0.0439 0.0186 4.5688 
2006 0.0215 0.0223 4.3743 0.0157 0.0132 2.7259 0.0069 0.0163 3.7643 0.0147 0.0173 3.6215 
2007 0.0016 0.0301 5.5172 0.0136 0.0129 2.8255 0.0060 0.0170 3.4822 0.0071 0.0200 3.9416 
2008 0.0108 0.0214 3.3844 0.0069 0.0135 2.8835 0.0015 0.0133 3.7603 0.0064 0.0161 3.3427 
2009 -0.008 0.0220 3.5844 0.0046 0.0137 2.8881 0.0048 0.0124 3.3440 0.0002 0.0161 3.2722 
2010 -0.028 0.0216 2.7095 0.0085 0.0135 2.7464 0.0060 0.0115 3.3637 -0.004 0.0155 2.9399 
2011 -0.002 0.0226 2.4285 0.0082 0.0141 2.7193 0.0052 0.0105 3.3070 0.0037 0.0157 2.8183 
2012 0.0070 0.0187 3.4642 0.0119 0.0127 2.7621 0.0047 0.0100 3.3062 0.0079 0.0138 3.1775 
Mean 0.009 0.058 3.862 0.010 0.070 2.789 0.005 0.025 3.484 0.008 0.051 2.994 
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Appendix 14: Averages stability ratios for IB, CB, SRB and all banks 
 
Averages stability ratios 
Type Islamic Banks Conventional Banks SRBs Mean All Banks 
Ratio Log (z) Capital R. Log (z) Capital R. Log (z) Capital R. Log (z) Capital R. 
2005 3.068 0.210 2.912 0.145 3.846 0.282 3.275 0.212 
2006 2.803 0.240 2.935 0.131 3.843 0.285 3.194 0.218 
2007 2.706 0.353 2.991 0.133 3.922 0.302 3.206 0.262 
2008 2.621 0.256 2.904 0.127 3.844 0.300 3.123 0.227 
2009 2.501 0.248 2.973 0.138 3.900 0.310 3.125 0.232 
2010 2.482 0.229 3.022 0.140 3.894 0.313 3.133 0.227 
2011 2.509 0.229 3.027 0.141 3.941 0.317 3.159 0.229 
2012 2.490 0.219 3.087 0.163 3.979 0.326 3.185 0.236 
Mean 2.622 0.249 2.985 0.140 3.898 0.305 3.045 0.231 
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Appendix 15: Summary of efficiency, profitability and stability measures for 
Islamic, conventional and socially responsible banks 
Banking   Islamic Banks 
Indicator Efficiency Profitability Stability 
Measure TE PTE SE ROA ROE NIM Z-score Capital 
Mean 0.883 0.936 0.940 0.009 0.058 3.862  2.648 0.249  
Highest 
2012 2005 2010 2005 2007 2005  2005  2007 
0.911 0.968 0.960 0.111 0.03 7.353  3.068 0.353  
Lowest 
2008 2009 2005 2010 2012  2011 2010  2005 
0.854 0.912 0.912 -0.029 0.019 2.428  2.483 0.210  
Banking Conventional Banks 
Indicator Efficiency Profitability Stability 
Measure TE PTE SE ROA ROE NIM Z-score Capital 
Mean 0.823 0.881 0.927 0.01 0.07 2.789 2.982 0.140  
Highest 
2005 2012 2005 2006 2005/11 2009 2012 2012  
0.835 0.897 0.936 0.016 0.014 2.888  3.088 0.163  
Lowest 
2009 2009 2006 2009 2012 2011  2008 2008  
0.810 0.868 0.923 0.005 0.013 2.719  2.905 0.127  
Banking Socially Responsible Banks 
Indicator Efficiency Profitability Stability 
Measure TE PTE SE ROA ROE NIM Z-score Capital 
Mean 0.948 0.978 0.966 0.005 0.025 3.484  3.897  0.305 
Highest 
2010 2005 2010 2006 2005  2006 2012  2012 
0.977 0.997 0.989 0.007 0.018 3.764  3.979 0.326  
Lowest 
2009 2009 2006 2008 2012  2012 2006  2005 
0.927 0.956 0.941 0.002 0.01  3.306 3.843 0.282  
Notes: 1. TE: Technical Efficiency, PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency, SE: Scale Efficiency, ROA: 
Return on Assets, ROE: Return on Equity. 
            2. Red highlight: the minimum measures, Green highlight: the maximum measures. 
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Appendix 16: The significant variables that impact efficiency, profitability and stability (UK and MENA for IB and CB, across the world for SRBs) 
Notes: 1. IB: Islamic Banks, CB: Conventional Banks, SRB: Socially Responsible Banks. 
      2. TE: Technical Efficiency, PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency, SE: Scale Efficiency, ROA: Return on Assets, ROE: Return on Equity, NIM: Net Interest Margin, Z: Z-score, Cap: Capital ratio. 
      3. LTA: bank size, EQTA: capital ratio, LOANSTA: loans intensity, LOANSDEPO: credit risk, TAEQ: financial leverage, DEPOSITSTA: deposit ratio, ROA: returns on assets, FATA: 
operating leverage, LAGE: bank age, LOGZ: z-score, FORE: dummies for foreign banks, DOM: domestic banks, GOV: government banks, LGDP: gross domestic production, INFLATION: 
inflation rate, MCAP: market capitalisation to GDP, GFC: Global financial crisis.  
      4. (+): Positive and significant variable, (-): Negative and significant variable, (+/-): Positive (OLS) and negative (significant) variable (FEM), (-/+): Negative (OLS) and positive (FEM). 
      5.       : Islamic banking       : Conventional banking      : Socially responsible banking. 
Significance Efficiency Profitability Stability 
Banking Type IB CB SRB IB CB SRB IB CB SRB 
Indicators TE PTE  SE TE PTE  SE TE PTE  SE ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM Z Cap Z Cap Z Cap 
Bank-specific variables 
LTA + - + + + +    + + + + + -   - +/- - - - - + 
EQTA  -   + - + +  - - + +    - + +  -/+  +  
LOANSTA + +  + + +    -   +  +    +/- + - +  -/+ 
LOANSDEPO        +    - -     +  + + + + +/- 
TAEQ + + + + + + + + +                
DEPOSITSTA          - +  +  -          
ROA +  +  + +             + - + + + - 
FATA   
 
               -  + +   
LAGE -  - - -              + -  -   
LOGZ          + + + + + + +  +  +  +/-  + 
FORE    - -            - -   -  - + 
DOM    - -           - - - + - -  -  
GOV    - -    +       -  - +  -  -  
Macroeconomic variables 
LGDP 
   
+ + + + + + +/- - - - 
 
- - 
 
- - + -/+ + -/+ + 
INFLATION 
   
- - 
 
+ + 
 
- - 
   
- 
    
 -  - 
 
MCAP + + + + + 
 
+ + 
   
- - + - + + + - + + - 
  
GFC 
    
- 
  
- 
      
+ 
    
 - 
   
